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ABSTRACT 
 
 
‘THE AXIS OF RESISTANCE’: THE ROLE OF RELIGION IN IRANIAN 
FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 
EZGİ UZUN 
PhD Dissertation, July 2018 
Dissertation Supervisor: Prof. Meltem Müftüler-Baç 
 
Keywords: Religion and International Relations, Iran’s Foreign Policy, Axis of 
Resistance, Transnational Shia Politics, Ideological Armies 
 
 
 
 
Scholarship on Iran’s foreign policy has been primarily interested in Iran’s nuclear 
program in the recent years. Rouhani Administration’s historic nuclear negotiations with 
the international community have led many to conclude that Iran pursues an increasingly 
moderate and pragmatist foreign policy. However, the nuclear rapprochement happened 
in synchrony with an equally important phenomenon in Iran’s foreign policy – Iran’s 
increased engagement with the Shiites in the Middle East. This study examines the ‘Axis 
of Resistance,’ a dense Iran-led alliance network of state and non-state actors covering a 
wide range of Shia mobilization across the Middle East. Why does Iran pursue a foreign 
policy with distinct religious and ideological contours in the post-2003 Middle East, 
despite the observed pragmatism and rationalism in relations with the West during the 
same period? What role does religion play in Iran’s ‘Axis of Resistance’ policy? This 
study theoretically subscribes to an emerging research program which seeks to merge the 
study of religion into International Relations. The study first examines the role of religion 
in Iran’s foreign policy by historically tracing transnational politically activist Shiism and 
its implications on the Islamic Republic after 1979. The following chapter examines 
Iran’s foreign policy in Middle East after 2003 with a focus on Shia mobilization across 
Iraq and Syria. The last chapter examines the Iranian political elites’ discourses on the 
transformations of the region after 2003. This research is based on multiple qualitative 
methodologies including field research in Iran, elite interviews, process-tracing, and 
discourse analysis. 
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ÖZET 
 
‘DİRENİŞ EKSENİ’: İRAN’IN DIŞ POLİTİKASINDA DİNİN ROLÜ 
 
 
EZGİ UZUN 
Doktora Tezi, Temmuz 2018 
Tez Danışmanı: Prof. Dr. Meltem Müftüler-Baç 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Din ve Uluslararası İlişkiler, İran’ın Dış Politikası, Direniş Ekseni, 
Uluslar Ötesi Şii Siyaset, İdeolojik Ordular 
 
 
 
 
 
Son yıllarda İran’ın dış politikası üzerine yapılan çalışmalar çoğunlukla İran’ın nükleer 
programına odaklanmıştır. Hasan Ruhani hükümetinin uluslararası camia ile vardığı 
tarihi nükleer uzlaşma, İran rejiminin gitgide daha ılımlı ve pragmatist bir dış politikaya 
doğru evrildiği yönünde genel bir kanıya yol açmıştır. Öte yandan, İran’ın nükleer 
müzakereleri, eşit derecede öneme sahip başka bir dış politika olgusuyla eş zamanlı 
olarak gerçekleşmektedir: İran’ın Ortadoğu’daki Şiilerle giderek artan ilişkileri. Bu 
çalışma, Ortadoğu’da geniş bir yelpazede seyreden Şii hareketliliğini kapsayan, İran’ın 
başını çektiği, devlet ile devlet dışı pek çok aktörden oluşan ve ‘Direniş Ekseni’ adı 
verilen yoğun ittifak ağını incelemektedir. İran, aynı dönemde Batı ile ilişkilerinde 
gözlemlenen pragmatizm ve rasyonalizm yönelimine rağmen, neden 2003 sonrası 
dönemde Ortadoğu’da belirgin bir dini ve ideolojik dış politika izlemektedir? Din, İran’ın 
‘Direniş Ekseni’ politikasında nasıl bir rol oynamaktadır? Bu çalışma, din olgusunu 
Uluslararası İlişkiler literatürüne entegre eden ve son dönemde yükselmekte olan bir 
araştırma programına kuramsal katkıda bulunmayı amaçlamıştır. Çalışma ilk olarak ulus 
ötesi Şii siyasi hareketler ile bunun 1979 sonrası İran İslam Cumhuriyeti üzerindeki 
etkilerinin tarihsel bir izlemesini yaparak dinin İran’ın dış politikasındaki rolünü 
incelemektedir. Tezin bir sonraki bölümü Irak ve Suriye’deki Şii hareketlere odaklanarak 
İran’ın 2003 sonrası Ortadoğu politikasını ele almaktadır. Çalışmanın son bölümü ise İran 
siyasi elitlerinin 2003 sonrası dönemde Ortadoğu’daki dönüşümlere ilişkin söylemlerini 
incelemektedir. Bu araştırma, İran’da gerçekleştirilen saha çalışmaları, elitlerle yapılan 
mülakatlar, süreç izleme ve söylem analizi gibi birden fazla ve çeşitli nitel araştırma 
metoduna dayanmaktadır.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
1.1.Introduction 
 
 
 
On the curvy hills of Park Taleghani spanning next to Modarres Expressway of 
Tehran rises the tallest flagpole of Iran. The location of this sign of Persian nationalism 
is not arbitrary. The rising colors of green, red, and white, along with the emblem of 
Islamic Republic at the center are easily discernable from one of the most crowded 
highways and the most frequently visited public places adjacent to it. What is not quite 
discernable from outside though is that the flagpole oversees a large museum complex 
covering an 18-hectare space. Given the copious number of Qajar and Pahlavi palaces, 
historical museums, and art galleries, this museum is neither Tehran’s most famous 
cultural spot nor its most recommended touristic attraction. Nevertheless, the museum is 
undoubtedly one of the most important spots for the curious students of Iranian military 
and security culture, as it presents the most important era of the Islamic Republic: The 
Holy Defense. Officially named ‘The Holy Defense Museum and the Promotion of 
Resistance Culture,’ this museum is an Iranian war museum, established in 2009 and is 
run by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.  
 
The Holy Defense (defa-e moqaddas in Persian) refers to Iran’s 8-year-long war 
with Iraq. What non-Iranian social science scholars call ‘1980-88 Iran-Iraq War,’ this war 
is covered by several terms with religious and revolutionary undertones in the Iranian 
political discourse, with the most frequently used of them being ‘holy defense war,’ 
‘sacred defense’ and ‘imposed war.’ The prolonged war with Iraq maintains a significant 
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place in the psyche of the Islamic Republic. The war came upon the Islamic Republic in 
its early years, when the Islamic state system was most vulnerable due to ongoing political 
struggles inside the regime. Efforts to establish new state institutions matching the 
ideology, functions of the revolutionary Islamic regime, as well as the reconstruction of 
a nearly non-existent army, which was almost dissolved after the Revolution due to its 
ties to the Pahlavi regime, all contributed to the Republic’s vulnerability. On one hand, 
seizing on the revolutionary regime under most unfavorable conditions, the war inflicted 
huge human and material losses on the side of the Islamic Republic for 8 years, gaining 
a place in its history. On the other hand, the war also served to empower the institutional 
and ideological composition of the Islamic regime internally by reiterating its anti-
imperialistic and revolutionary ideology, developing new models of popular mobilization 
at all levels of society, and finally by paving the way for the construction and further 
institutionalization of an ideological, volunteer-based, and popular security actor – the 
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. The 8-year-long defense against Iraq as well as its 
allies is thus a total resistance against the attempts of the opponents to wipe out the new 
revolutionary ideology and system in its infancy. The Holy Defense Museum is thus a 
tribute to those key revolutionaries, veterans, and martyrs who sacrificed themselves for 
the defense of the new Islamic regime and its ideology.     
 
The content of the museum is roughly divided into three main themes: the 
revolution, the war, and martyrdom. Passing through a corridor of real-size 
representations of revolutionary personalities, the visitor enters the first hall of the 
revolution, where a large collection of photos, videos, multimedia, documents, and maps 
are displayed to inform the visitor on the events leading up to the revolution and its 
immediate aftermath. After savoring the large collection of information in the previous 
hall, the visitor walks through a realistic display of war scenes with technologically 
innovative and compelling representations of war-struck cities, classrooms, and factories 
accompanied by a morbid sound of tanks, bullets, and aircrafts in the background. The 
visitor then meets the heroes of the war in the following hall – the Hall of Martyrs. This 
is the tribute hall for war veterans and martyrs, which conveys the story of their sacrifices 
during the war with an artistic display of their life stories, personal belongings, and letters. 
There is a non-random sequence in the arrangement of the whole display and it becomes 
most evident when the Hall of Martyrs end up at ‘the Hall of Ashura,’ a generously 
decorated shrine room hosting a representation of the shrine of the first Shiite martyr of 
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the historic battle of Karbala – the shrine of Imam Hossein. The museum is no longer a 
museum now –  rather being a shrine, the shrine of the Martyr of martyrs, a religious 
narrative captivating the visitor at his very emotions and faith. As such, one cannot  avoid 
hearing the message of the whole display of Ashura proceeding the hall of the martyrs: 
Iranian soldiers’ sacrifice during the 8-year-long war against Saddam regime, as well as 
‘the arrogant, oppressive, imperialistic Western powers’ and their Arab allies is nothing 
more than the continuation of Imam Hossein’s movement against the ‘oppressive’ 
Umayyad regime in the 7th century AD. Sacrifice, martyrdom, and resistance to 
oppressive rulers is the backbone of Shia faith narrative that originated in the Battle of 
Karbala and later fed the ideological and mobilizational components of Shia political 
activism of the 20th century including that of Islamic Republic’s revolutionary cleric – 
Ayatollah Khomeini. The message of martyrdom and sacrifice in the Hall of Ashura re-
connects with the sacrifices of the 20th century political activism at the so-called 
Martyrdom Bridge proceeding it, where the visitor is exposed to the flashing names of 
Holy War martyrs reflected visually on both sides of the bridge.  
 
The visitor expects the museum to conclude with the informative display of the 
ceasefire and the subsequent agreements signed by both countries setting the terms of 
peace. However, the ceasefire with Iraq neither means the end of the holy struggle with 
Iraq, nor is the end of the war a source of pride for Iranians. The real source of pride for 
Iran is their resistance in defending the revolutionary Islamic regime for 8 years, ensuring 
its survival, and subsequently reconstructing the war-torn country despite strict 
isolationism and material hardships it felt after 1979. Therefore, upon reaching the last 
hall of the museum called the Hall of Victory, the visitor encounters a series of large-
framed uncensored photographs showing the hanging of Iraq’s overthrown leader 
Saddam Hossein and his fateful defeat in the hands of his superpower patron after the 
2003 invasion. The memory of war, hardship, sacrifice, endurance and the final victory 
is thus carried over as the official end of the war. Finally, right across the exit of the 
museum, the visitor enters a mosque modelled real-size after the Jame Mosque of 
Khorramshahr, a mosque in the port city of Khorramshahr on the western war front which 
became the hotspot of volunteer mobilization during the war. The mosque becomes the 
symbol of Islamic resistance at this point, where ordinary people mobilized themselves 
in defense of the Islamic Republic within the realities of institutional and military 
shortcomings. The mosque is thus another symbol for the timelessness of the resistance: 
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where there is the mosque, or where there is Islam, there is the resistance. Moreover, the 
mosque is also the symbol of the nation’s victory: where there is the mosque, there is the 
willpower and perseverance for a divinely-ordained, albeit late coming, victory.1 
 
The Holy Defense Museum can be read as a microcosm of the military and 
security culture of the Islamic Republic. The military and security culture whose seeds 
were sown during the 8-year-long war subsequently transcended the war and informed 
the foreign policy calculations and tools of the Islamic Republic in the later decades. The 
war might be over, yet its lessons and experience, the experience of ‘the Islamic 
resistance’ is there. The second half of the museum’s name is quite telling in this respect: 
‘The Promotion of Resistance Culture.’ Surprisingly, very few sources exist on ‘Iranian 
resistance’ for a curious reader outside of Iran and the concept is quite unknown to the 
students of Iranian politics unless they are interested in the security culture of Iran.2 As a 
revolutionary regime with a deep-rooted ideological and intellectual background, the 
Islamic Republic is well-known for its creativity in devising novel political terminology 
that matches to its political ideology. The Islamic Republic’s ideology can be summarized 
as a careful and innovative blend of anti-imperialism, anti-liberal modernism, Third-
Worldism, Shiism, and revolutionary Islamism. ‘Resistance’ has always been a central 
concept to the state ideology and is used by Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei 
predominantly to refer to the resistance against what he calls the ‘arrogant powers,’ i.e. 
the Western imperialism headed by the USA. Accordingly, resistance in its original 
meaning is against the infiltration of the liberal socio-political system, capitalism, 
materialism, and secularism into the Iranian socio-political system through the dynamics 
of globalization, foreign intervention, and expansionist American policies. In this respect, 
the Islamic Revolution is recognized as the first manifestation of ‘resistance’ fought 
against the Shah regime domestically, who presumably gave way to such a political and 
ideological intervention in Iran during his reign.   
 
                                                
1 This narrative is based on the author’s observations during the field trip to Tehran in August 2015. For detailed 
information about Holy Defense Museum, see the official webpage ‘Main Page: Holy Defense Museum,’ Holy 
Defense Museum, accessed May 21, 2017, http://en.iranhdm.ir.  
 
2 See Arshin Adib-Moghaddam, On the Arab Revolts and the Iranian Revolution: Power and Resistance Today 
(London: Bloomsbury, 2013); Eric Mohns and Andre Bank, ‘Syrian Revolt Fallout: End of the Resistance Axis?’ 
Middle East Policy 19, issue 3 (2012): 25-35; Graham E. Fuller, ‘The Hizballah-Iran Connection: Model for Sunni 
Resistance,’ The Washington Quarterly 30, issue 1 (2007): 139-150.     
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In foreign policy as well, the ‘resistance’ is against the penetration of the forces of 
globalism into Iran’s political system, the American presence in the Middle East, and any 
international attempt to challenge the Islamic Republic through a strict policy of political 
isolationism and economic sanctions. The ‘resistance’ is political and economic, and 
above all, military. The Holy Defense War is thus the first manifestation of the Islamic 
Republic’s military resistance to the international community who provided extensive 
military and economic assistance to Iraq during the war and politically and militarily 
isolated Iran by heavy sanctions. Iran learnt to respond to such challenges by ‘popular 
mobilization,’ i.e. by devising its own military mobilization system of volunteer recruits 
who would fight for an all-out defense of the Islamic Republic inside and outside - its 
territorial integrity, anti-imperialistic revolutionary Islamist ideology, and its very 
existence. The institutional extension of the popular mobilization is the Islamic 
Revolutionary Guard Corp (IRGC) and the Basijis, i.e. the volunteer-based youth 
affiliates of the IRGC who are responsible for the defense of the Islamic regime mainly 
at home, but also abroad when needed. ‘Islamic resistance’ as such has a comprehensive 
content, as it is a discourse, a policy behavior, and finally an institution.  
 
The Islamic Republic of Iran has been a topic of scholarly research in Political Science 
and International Relations for two predominant reasons: the Islamic Revolution of 1979 
and its nuclear program. Scholars on Iran have shifted their attention to the latter since 
2002, when two secret nuclear sites were discovered by the international community.3 A 
high number of research has been generated on the causes of Iran’s nuclearization and its 
possible implications on regional and international politics.4 The nuclear stalemate 
between Iran and the international community temporally coincided with three 
                                                
3 See ‘Timeline: Iran Nuclear Crisis: Chronology of Key Events Since 2002,’ BBC, last modified September 24, 
2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4134614.stm.    
4 For a selected list of works on Iran’s nuclear program, see Kenneth Waltz, ‘Why Iran Should Get the Bomb: 
Nuclear Balancing Would Mean Stability,’ Foreign Affairs 91, no. 4 (2012): p. 2-5; Mustafa Kibaroglu, ‘Good for the 
Shah, Banned for the Mullahs: The West and Iran’s Quest for Nuclear Power,’ The Middle East Journal 60, no 2 
(2006): p. 207-232; Mustafa Kibaroğlu, ‘Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions from a Historical Perspective and the Attitude of 
the West,’ Middle East Studies 43, no. 2 (2007): p. 223-245; Etel Solingen, Nuclear Logics: Contrasting Paths in 
East Asia and the Middle East (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2007); Jahangir Amuzegar, ‘Nuclear Iran: 
Perils and Prospects,’ Middle East Policy 8 (Summer 2006): p. 90–112; Anthony H. Cordesman, ‘Iran and the United 
States: The Nuclear Issue,’ Middle East Policy 15 (Spring 2008): p. 19–29; Nihat Ali Özcan and Özgür Özdamar, 
‘Iran’s Nuclear Program and The Future of U.S.-Iranian Relations,’ Middle East Policy 16 (Spring 2009): p. 121–
133; Chris Quillen, ‘Iranian Nuclear Weapons Policy: Past, Present and Future,’ Middle East Review of International 
Affairs 6 (June 2002): p. 17–24; Ray Takeyh, ‘Iran’s Nuclear Calculations,’ World Policy Journal 20 (June 22, 
2003): p. 21-28; Arzu Celalifer Ekinci, İran Nükleer Krizi (Ankara: USAK 2009). 
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presidencies in Iran: Mohammad Khatami’s reformist rule, the hardliners’ rule under 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, and finally the rule of the pragmatist leader Hassan Rouhani. 
The repeated shifts in the nuclear negotiations between confrontation and moderation 
reflected these very leadership dynamics and the general course of Iranian foreign policy 
in each period. In line with this, when this research started in 2014, the Islamic Republic 
appeared to be following a very pragmatist path towards moderation and integration with 
the international community under the pragmatist Hassan Rouhani’s presidency. The 
former nuclear negotiator and pragmatist politician Hassan Rouhani had won a landslide 
victory over his hardliner predecessor Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in the 2013 presidential 
elections and was on the path to a decisive resolution to the nuclear stalemate with the 
international community. Finally, President Rouhani signed the historic JCPOA with the 
P5+1 in 2015,5 helped partially lift the economic sanctions Iran was facing, and seemed 
to open a window of opportunity for Iran’s closer integration with the international 
political and economic system. After Ahmadinejad’s insistency on Iran’s nuclear rights in 
the international arena, the international community interpreted the Iranian move to 
temporarily forsake its nuclear right under Rouhani’s government as a sign of distancing 
away from revolutionary ideals, a gradual regime moderation, and demands for 
integration with the international system. JCPOA and associated expectations for 
moderation in Iran’s internal and external policy remained to be the focus of foreign 
policy analysts and Iran experts in this context.  
 
Nevertheless, what was largely overlooked by the academic community within the 
above-described context, and what policy circles finally became increasingly curious 
about, was the reverse foreign policy strategy Iran was pursuing in the Middle East during 
the same period. An overview of the transformation of region since 2003 is necessary to 
situate the Iranian strategy into a proper analytical context. Without doubt, the 2003 US 
invasion in Iraq was a systemic shock in the region, which precipitated a chain of 
transformations in Iraq with wider implications in the region. The fall of the Baath regime 
in Iraq created a power vacuum both in domestic affairs and regional affairs. The Sunni 
Baathist regime – long-described as the hallmark of Arab nationalism in the region - was 
replaced by electoral politics, which is dominated by a Shia-majority rule. As the 
sectarian demographics in Iraq favored Shiites in electoral politics, the period of electoral 
                                                
5 For Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), see ‘Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action,’ US Department of 
State Website, accessed May 21, 2018, https://www.state.gov/e/eb/tfs/spi/iran/jcpoa/.  
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politics witnessed a revival of the Shia hawzas in Najaf and Karbala, the increased 
relevance of Shia religious actors such as Ayatollah Sistani of Najaf in Iraqi politics, and 
a resurgence of Shia political parties long suppressed by the Baath regime including the 
Islamic Dawa Party and the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI).6 
There was a clear shift of power from the Sunnis to the Shiites under electoral politics 
and this finally resulted in a sectarian conflict in 2006.7 A second systemic shock came 
only 5 years later in 2011, when Tunisians, Egyptians, and Libyans took to the streets 
protesting the authoritarian regimes. The existing governments were overthrown and a 
short moment of democracy swept in Egypt and Tunisia, where Islamic political parties 
came to power.8 On the other hand, Libya fell into a tribal civil war, attracting foreign 
jihadists who wanted to establish an Islamic caliphate in this failed country.9 It was clear 
in 2011 that Islamist political ideology, religious and sectarian identities, and religious 
actors would matter in the political reconfiguration of the Middle East. As a matter of 
fact, the spill-over of the Arab protests in Syria and Yemen manifested themselves as 
wide-range sectarian conflicts.10 The sectarian war was soon transformed into a sectarian 
proxy war that pulled in regional players, possibly out of regional leadership calculations 
but also along sectarian and ideological lines. Finally, a Sunni jihadist group calling 
themselves the Islamic State in Levant (ISIL) captured the city of Mosul  in Iraq in 2014 
and declared a caliphate.11 The rise of ISIL in Iraq was the result of political grievances 
Sunnis felt with the de-Baathification of Iraq, which was then merged with foreign 
jihadist dissents from al-Qaeda and established a transnational Islamic state on Iraq and 
Syria. A sequence of these events in the region since 2003 showed the centrality of 
religious elements, Islamist political ideology, sectarian identities, Islamist and/or Shia 
                                                
6 See Soren Schmidt, ‘Shia-Islamist Political Actors in Iraq: Who are They and What do They Want?’ Danish Institute 
for International Studies Report 3, 2008, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/46712/DIIS-RP_2008-3_web.pdf.   
 
7 James A. Baker III and Lee H. Hamilton, eds., The Iraq Study Group Report: The Way Forward, A New Approach 
(New York: Vintage Books, 2006).   
 
8 On the rise of Islamism in Egypt and Tunisia, see Khalil Al-Anani, ‘Islamist Parties Post-Arab Spring,’ 
Mediterranean Politics 17, issue 3 (2012): p. 466-472.  
 
9 See Zineb Abdessadok, ‘Libya Today: From Arab Spring to Failed State,’ Al-Jazeera, May 30, 2017, 
https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/04/happening-libya-today-170418083223563.html.   
 
10 See ‘Syria’s Civil War Explained from the Beginning,’ Al-Jazeera, April 14, 2018, 
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/05/syria-civil-war-explained-160505084119966.html, and ‘Key Facts about 
the War in Yemen,’ Al-Jazeera, March 26, 2018, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/06/key-facts-war-yemen-
160607112342462.html.   
 
11 ‘The Rise and Fall of ISIL Explained,’ Al-Jazeera, June 20, 2017, 
https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/06/rise-fall-isil-explained-170607085701484.html.   
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political parties, religious political actors, and jihadism as defining the conflicts, power 
games, and the reconstruction efforts defining the Middle East today.       
 
Iran’s foreign policy in the Middle East after 2003 should be evaluated within the 
above-described regional context. The Iranian regime responded to the shifts in reginal 
power balances and domestic political order with quite an assertive foreign policy 
strategy. Reliance on Shia identity was the prime Iranian strategy in Iraq right after the 
invasion. As such, Iran’s initial reaction to the political power shift in Iraq from the Sunnis 
to the Shias was one of intense political support for Shia political parties and building a 
unified Shia block in electoral politics.12 However, the increasing sectarian violence in 
Iraq after the withdrawal of American troops in 2011, the eruption of sectarian war in 
Syria, and the rise of ISIL pushed Iran towards more overt military strategy in the region. 
By 2014, the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Qods Forces – which was originally tasked 
with the export of the revolution during 1980s -  mobilized an extensive network of pro-
Iranian Shia militias in Iraq, sent Iranian Basij volunteers to fight in Syria, cooperated 
with Lebanese Hezbollah in mobilizing a small of number of Shia villages to fight against 
domestic opponents in Syria, and moved its Iraqi proxies to Syria to fight alongside the 
Assad regime.13 Without a doubt, Iran’s Middle East policy relied heavily on the political 
and military mobilization of Shias across the region. This overt military activism required 
justification on the part of the Iranian regime. In this respect, a heavy ideological 
discourse with strong references to the Islamic Revolution and Shia symbolism 
accompanied the Islamic Republic’s strong political and military activism in the region.  
 
A central discourse adopted by the Islamic Republic in referring to its policy in 
the region was ‘resistance’ – a rather familiar concept rooted in the Islamic ideology of 
the Iranian regime, as well as the Holy War. Over the years, the concept has been deeply 
ingrained in the ideology of the Islamic Republic with everyday ramifications. As a matter 
of fact, any visitor of Tehran with a knowledge of the Persian language will quickly 
recognize upon entering any quality bookstore in Tehran that bookstores have separate 
                                                
12 See Michael Eisenstadt, Michael Knights, and Ahmed Ali, ‘Iran’s Influence in Iraq: Countering Tehran’s Whole-of-
Government Approach,’ Washington Institute Policy Focus 111, April 2011, 
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/PolicyFocus111.pdf.   
 
13 Bayram Sinkaya, ‘Arap Baharı Sürecinde İran’ın Suriye Politikası,’ SETA Analiz, no 53, April 2012. 
http://file.setav.org/Files/Pdf/20121121171707_seta-arap_bahari_surecinde_iran’in_suriye_politikasi.pdf.  
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sections on the theme of ‘resistance,’ or ‘mogawamat’ as it is said in Persian. Hundreds 
of books published on Iran’s own experience of ‘Holy Defense’ and ‘popular 
mobilization’ will catch the visitor’s attention immediately. What the visitor will find 
next among the shelves is another hundreds of books written not on Iran, but on the 
Palestinian resistance and Lebanese Hezbollah against Israel though, a topic the Islamic 
Regime is very vocal about.14 A sense of continuity in the Iranian understanding of 
‘resistance’ is visible, where Palestinian and Hezbollahi resistance are recognized as parts 
of the same international movement headed by the Iranian Resistance since the 
Revolution. But the concept of ‘resistance’ has proved to be dynamic rather than static. 
In line with regional changes, the concept has surpassed its original content, now covering 
not only the activities of self-acclaimed resistance groups such as PLO and Lebanese 
Hezbollah, but also the Syrian regime and the pro-Iranian Iraqi Shias in the recent years.  
 
This point is quite visible in the speeches of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah 
Khamenei, but more so in the statements issued by IRGC members. The IRGC 
commanders and Basijis talk about ‘resistance’ not necessarily as an individual policy 
orientation solely attributable to the Islamic Republic, but as an ‘axis’ or as a ‘front’ of 
resistance movements in the Middle East that are traditionally allied with and led by 
Iran.15 The common terms used are ‘Resistance Axis’ or ‘Resistance Front’ – ‘mehvar-e 
moqawamat’ or ‘cephe-ye mogawamat’ in the Persian language. In the current usage, the 
groups in question are predominantly Shia political actors and Shia movements. This axis 
thus includes the Lebanese Hezbollah, the Alawite Assad regime in Syria, the Shia 
political parties and the pro-Iranian Shia militia in Iraq and Yemen in the past couple of 
years. The common denominator binding these groups together is that they are either 
predominantly Shia or share an ideological affinity with Iran. In its traditional usage, the 
opposition of the axis is against the American policies in the Middle East, ‘Zionist’ 
policies of the primary US ally in the region – Israel, and the Arab client regimes in the 
                                                
14 This observation is based on the author’s field trip to Tehran, Iran in July 2016.  
 
15 An example can be found in a news article on Sepah News, where an IRGC commander says ‘The first strategic 
principle of the Islamic system was to support and rely on the resistance axis and to support the oppressed people of 
the world such as in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Palestine, etc., all of whom are examples of this support. The strategy 
of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Syria focuses on the axis of resistance and the preservation of Syria lies in the core 
of the resistance.’ ‘Sardar Hajizadeh Motreh Kard: Pasohe Kubande Sepah Tahdidat Belof Siyasi Nist (General 
Hajizadeh Argued: Sepah’s Harsh Response to Threats is not a Political Bluff),’ Sepah News Website, accessed May 
21, 2017,  
http://www.sepahnews.com/index.php/sepahnews/item/3850-رادﺮﺳ-ﯽﺟﺎﺣ-هداز-حﺮﻄﻣ-دﺮﮐ-ﺦﺳﺎﭘ-هﺪﻨﺑﻮﮐ%E2%80%8C-هﺎﭙﺳ-
ﮫﺑ-تاﺪﯾﺪﮭﺗ-فﻮﻠﺑ-ﯽﺳﺎﯿﺳ-ﺖﺴﯿﻧ.html.  
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Middle East. Except Palestinian resistance groups, all other parties are minority or 
majority Shia groups (or Shia off-shoots) who have not yet attained political power in 
their countries of origin - except for the Assad regime in Syria. Iran’s ‘axis of resistance’ 
policy thus reflects a Shia predominance in the changing regional context where 
sectarianism is on the rise.  
 
Given these developments, Iran’s relations with the Shia government in Iraq, its 
unfailing support for the Assad regime, military ties to Hezbollah, and supportive stance 
towards the minority groups in Yemen have finally raised Iran to newspaper storylines 
and policy analyses for a reason other than the staggering nuclear deal in the last couple 
of years. Religion, sectarian identity, Shiism, and ideology seemed to define the nature 
of Iranian involvement in the region. The first person to address the Shia aspect of this 
policy was the King Abdullah of Jordan, who talked about a Shia political revival in the 
region as early as 2014, in the shape of a ‘Shiite Crescent’ spanning from Lebanon on the 
Northwest of the Middle East to the Shia-dominated Iraqi government and Iran on the 
East and down to Yemen on the southern edge of the Arab peninsula.16 The ‘Shiite 
Crescent’ concept carried an overt religious symbolism for having an element of ‘Shia’ 
in it. The term was adopted for a time by policy analysts and scholarly research was 
generated discussing the existence and/or implications of the Shiite Crescent for the 
politics of the Middle East during the last decade.17 On the other hand, the Iranian regime 
has repeatedly rejected the claims over the existence of a Shiite Crescent, instead saying 
that Iran is supporting both Sunni and Shia resistance movements with ideological 
similarities, the most prominent example being the Palestinian Liberation Organization 
(PLO).  
 
Nevertheless, the Iranian rejection of the term has failed to negate the strong Shia 
component in the Iranian foreign policy since 2003. Religion seemed to be a central 
component of Iran’s foreign policy on the Middle East region. A common sectarian 
                                                
16 See Robin Wright and Peter Baker, ‘Iraq, Jordan See Threat to Election,’ Washington Post, December 8, 2004, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A43980-2004Dec7.html?noredirect=on; and  
Kayhan Barzegar, ‘Iran and the Shiite Crescent: Myths and Realities,’ Brown Journal of World Affairs 15, no 1. 
(Fall/Winter 2008): p. 87-99.  
 
17 For prominent examples, also see Vali Nasr, The Shia Revival: How Conflicts within Islam Will Shape the Future 
(London and New York: W. W. Norton, 2007); Haji-Yousefi, ‘Whose Agenda is Served by the Idea of a Shia 
Crescent?’ Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations 8, no. 1 (2009): p. 114-135; Maximilian Terhalle, 
‘Are the Shia Rising?’ Middle East Policy 14, no. 2 (2007): p. 69-83; and Salloukh, ‘The Arab Uprisings and the 
Geopolitics of the Middle East,’ p. 32-46. 
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identity seemed to characterize the parties of the Iran-led ‘axis of resistance.’ The Iranian 
ideological security forces originally tasked with the ‘export of the revolution’ were the 
primary implementers of this policy on the field. Although Iran was following a rather 
reconciliatory foreign policy on the nuclear issue and a sense of moderation was visible 
with the Western countries, no moderation was in horizon on the Eastern front. When this 
research started in 2014, Iran’s Middle East strategy strongly resembled ‘the export of the 
revolution’ policy of the first revolutionary decade indeed. The Qods Forces’ involvement 
in the field, Iran’s increased political and military involvement with Iraqi Shiites, and the 
heavy ideological and Shia discourses accompanying Iranian involvement all reminded 
Iran’s aspiration to export its revolutionary ideology and system to the Middle East for 
the creation of an overarching Islamic state during the first decade of the revolution. Such 
commonalities between the first decade of the revolution and today raises curiosity over 
the intricacies of Iran’s ‘Axis of Resistance’ policy in the region. An element of continuity 
is visible in Iran’s foreign policy towards the Middle East, informed by revolutionary-
ideological and religious elements, whereas there seems to be more fluctuation in Iran’s 
relations with the West between pragmatist and ideological currents.    
 
 
 
1.2.  Research Question and the Scope of the Thesis 
 
 
 
Against this background, this thesis aims to understand Iran’s ‘Axis of Resistance’ 
policy in the Middle East today. What motivated this research is the observed incongruity 
between Iran’s foreign policy towards the international community, or its Western foreign 
policy, and its policy towards the Middle East, or the Eastern foreign policy. In other 
words, this research is interested in understanding the incongruity between Iran’s 
moderation of relations with the West during the nuclear talks, and the reverse, far-from-
moderate strategy in the Middle East. Given the fact that religious and sectarian identity 
seems to be at the center of Iran’s strategy in the region, this thesis is also motivated to 
understand the role of religion and Shiism in this foreign policy. Both motivations have 
shaped this research around two overarching research questions: 
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Research question I: Why does Iran pursue a foreign policy with distinct religious 
and ideological contours in the post-2003 Middle East, despite the observed 
pragmatism and rationalism in relations with the West during the same period?  
 
Research question II: What role does religion play in Iran’s ‘Axis of Resistance’ 
policy? 
 
 In answering both questions, this research is primarily committed to 
understanding and explaining what the ‘Axis of Resistance’ is. As such, a good part of 
this research is on mapping out the political, institutional, and ideological pillars of ‘the 
Axis of Resistance.’ However, this presents us a highly extensive regional phenomenon 
that covers several political players geographically dispersed across the Middle East, 
including the Lebanese Hezbollah, Assad regime in Syria, pro-Iranian Shias in Iraq, the 
Islamic Republic in Iran, Houthis in Yemen, as well as the Palestinian resistance groups. 
Therefore, the ‘Axis of Resistance’ is a highly complex phenomenon, where all players 
might have their own understanding of and policy for the phenomenon. Given the 
complex nature of this phenomenon, the scope of this research is limited to the Islamic 
Republic’s perspective. It aims to understand the Iranian policy of the ‘Axis of 
Resistance,’ its motivations, institutions, and discursive pillars. As such, this research 
predominantly excludes other parties’ perspectives of the ‘Axis of Resistance’ such as the 
Syrian perspective, Iraqi Shia perspective, and the Hezbollahi perspective. Moreover, this 
research is also limited to understanding the Iranian perspective on a specific geography: 
Iraq and Syria. There are three reasons for this geographical limitation. First, this research 
is interested in the religious and sectarian aspect of this phenomenon, and not very much 
on the traditional anti-Zionist, ideological aspect of the ‘Axis of Resistance’ alliance. 
Therefore, Palestinian Resistance is automatically excluded from the study. Secondly, 
Iraq and Syria have emerged as the two biggest cases reflecting and impacting the grand 
currents of political transformations in the region. The greatest revival in sectarian 
politics, Shia mobilization, and sectarian conflicts have taken place in both countries. 
This makes the study of both cases relevant to understand the religious and sectarian 
element in the ‘Axis of Resistance’ after 2011. And third, while Iran’s foreign policy today 
covers Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and other Gulf countries with notable Shia populations, Iran’s 
foreign policy since 2003 is focused on Iraq and Syria. Both are the two biggest cases 
where Iranian involvement has taken place. As such, both cases provide us more 
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comprehensive data and insights on the dynamics of Iranian engagement in the region. 
For the specified reasons, this research will examine Iran’s ‘Axis of Resistance’ in Iraq 
and Syria.  
  
  Time-wise, this research covers the Iranian foreign policy towards Iraq between 
2003 and 2017 and towards Syria between 2011 and 2017. The starting times refer to the 
events that have precipitated the rapid political changes defining the political context 
today. In this respect, the year 2003 refers to the American invasion of Iraq. On the other 
hand, 2011 has been chosen for multiple reasons, where it refers to the eruption of Arab 
uprisings, the beginning of the sectarian civil war in Syria, and the withdrawal of 
American troops from Iraq. All events were ‘critical junctures’ for Iran determining the 
course of its foreign policy on both countries. One difficulty regarding the study is that 
the ‘axis of resistance’ is very recent phenomenon and still in progress. The regional 
context lies on a shaky ground and thus is extremely susceptible to change via another 
systemic shock. The players, contexts, relationships, and calculations change very 
rapidly. Due to the topicality of the phenomenon at hand and its extreme susceptibility to 
change, this research has been limited to 2017 as the endpoint. This way, the study limited 
the collection of data within these specified time periods and fixed the data’s relevance at 
a certain historical period, which facilitated theoretical analysis. Finally, while the ‘Axis 
of Resistance’ could be examined from a variety of theoretical perspectives, this study is 
confined to understanding the role religion plays in this policy from the Iranian 
perspective. Theoretically, the study of ‘religion’ within International Relations 
scholarship is a very recent phenomenon. An emerging research program committed to 
theoretically integrating ‘religion’ into the existing IR scholarship is in place for a decade. 
This research theoretically subscribes to and aims to contribute to that emerging 
scholarship, which will be discussed in the next section.      
 
 
 
1.3.  Religion and International Politics          
 
 
 
The political science’s interest in the study of religion does not have a prolonged 
history. 1950s and 1960s witnessed a tide of political theorists and comparative politics 
scholars consorting to modernization theory, which presumed a roughly monotonous and 
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progressive transition from the ‘pre-modern’ or ‘traditional’ to the ‘modern’ society. The 
rationalization of social and political institutions, processes, and cultures was not only the 
subject of scholarly research but also an aspiration, an oriented goal, a project by these 
scholars. Secularization in a progressively rationalizing social and political realm became 
an assumption rather than a hypothesis empirically verified and/or falsified by political 
science research.  
 
A wave of socio-political transformations in the following decade brought the 
necessity to re-examine the key hypotheses of secularization theory - the decline in 
religious faith, the functional differentiation of the sacred and the secular, and the 
privatization of religion. World Values Surveys from 1980s onwards showed that faith in 
God has not decreased as hypothesized by secularization theory. The demographics of 
religious faith changed in favor of certain religions over others. A Pew Forum study found 
that given the current rates of birth, migration patterns, and religious switching for each 
religion, Muslims are expected to outnumber Christians after 2070.18 Secondly, the 
functional differentiation of religion and politics has been challenged by the worldwide 
proof otherwise. In 1970s the Middle East and South East Asia witnessed a rise in religio-
political movements, the Islamic Revolution of Iran of 1979 being a symbol of 
inauguration in this respect. The Iranian people, disillusioned by the socio-economic 
problems generated by the Shah’s modernization policies, replaced the Shah regime with 
a Shiite clerical theocracy in 1979. Islamist political movements emerged in Egypt, 
Tunisia, Iraq, and Syria, challenging the authority of secular regimes in these countries. 
In South and South-East Asia, the rising Hindu nationalism instituted its political force 
in India in the form of Hindu nationalist parties in late 1960s, and the separatist Tamil 
movement in Sri Lanka campaigned for a Buddhist homeland. The Americas were not 
exempt from the growing influence of religion in politics either. The Catholic Church in 
Latin America spearheaded the democratization movements in Latin American countries 
against authoritarian rulers in 1970s, and Evangelical Protestantism imposed its influence 
over key public policy discussions in the USA. Such developments prompted many 
scholars to challenge, question, and re-write the contours of modernization and 
secularization theory.  
                                                
18 For extended religious demographics, see Pew Research, ‘The Future of World Religions: Populations Growth 
Projections, 2010-2050,’ Pew Forum, April 2, 2015, http://www.pewforum.org/2015/04/02/religious-projections-
2010-2050/.   
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The field of international relations ignored the role of religion in global politics 
more than any other sub-field of political science, however. IR’s basic ontological 
assumptions about world politics and the dominant methodological and epistemological 
orientation of the field are the primary reasons for this lack of curiosity. Despite several 
differences, realism, liberal IR, and constructivism share one basic ontological 
assumption about world politics: the Westphalian order. All three paradigms converge on 
their acquisition that the world has evolved towards a system of sovereign, territorial, 
autonomous states since the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia.19 The treaty is traditionally 
accepted as the hallmark of modern nation-state system after a period of multiple and 
overlapping sovereignties of kings, popes, princes, and feudal lords in the medieval 
Europe. In the Westphalian global order, autonomous, territorially distinct, and sovereign 
states are primary actors of international politics. The sovereign figure in the modern state 
has the exclusive authority to decide on matters pertaining to his territory. No sovereign 
sitting outside the state borders, feudal lord, king or religious actor, is legitimately 
authorized to intervene in the domestic matters of the modern states. Accordingly, IR has 
evolved as a field investigating the political, military, and economic interaction among 
these autonomous and territorially distinct political units. Rational self-calculation and 
power positions, which are often measured by material capabilities, are assumed to 
determine the nature of international interactions and individual foreign policy decisions 
in this system. Religion in this system is assumed to be restricted to the domestic realm 
only, with no influence on the nature of the system, inter-state interactions or interest 
calculations. Moreover, given the assumption that the state is the primary actor of 
international politics, non-state actors have long been marginalized in IR analyses. This 
often meant that non-state actors with religious and ideological priorities would only have 
marginal impact on the system, on actors’ interactions, and policy calculations. 
 
IR scholarship has been driven out of its comfort zone because of empirical 
developments that marked the increasing relevance of religion in world politics. Religious 
movements that were deemed to be domestic movements are no longer confined to 
national borders. To the contrary, they have increasingly transcended national borders, 
taken shelter in neighboring countries, and spread their missions and visions to other 
                                                
19 Daniel Phillpot, ‘The Religious Roots of Modern International Relations,’ World Politics 52, no. 2 (2000): p. 206-
245; Elizabeth Shakman-Hurd, The Politics of Secularism in International Relations (New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 2007).    
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geographies. Religious movements within nation-states forge alliances with other nation-
states, which provides them funding, military training, and technology for their own 
national foreign policy concerns. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan during the Cold 
War and the mobilization of religio-nationalist Mujahedeen movement against the 
Soviets is a case in point, which benefited from the US assistance during its conflict with 
the Soviet Union. The collapse of the state and the ensuing power struggle among 
factionalized religious groups moved the Islamic fundamentalist and Wahhabi/Salafist 
political movement Taliban as the victor of the post-invasion regime in Afghanistan. 
Taliban’s political influence soon transcended the Afghan national borders though, when 
similar Islamist insurgents thrived in the neighboring Pakistan and Afghanistan finally 
became a safe haven for the international Islamist jihadist network Al-Qaeda. The 
destruction of Twin Towers in 9/11 marked the beginning of a discursive, ideological, 
and political connection between Islam and terrorism in the minds of US foreign policy 
makers. The following decade is a testimony of how the US foreign policy took religious 
actors and religious movements seriously. The USA defined global terrorism as the top 
security threat to the country, headed the global campaign against Islamist jihadist 
terrorism, and assisted fragile and collapsed states in their state-building efforts against 
the rise of Islamist militants on these territories.  
 
The social and political developments in the Middle East since the Arab Spring 
further proved the increasing salience of religion for national and regional 
reconfigurations in the last couple of years. The increasing visibility of Islamist political 
movements such as Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the rise of an Islamist political party 
to power in the post-Ben Ali Tunisia, the eruption of sectarian violence in Syria and Iraq, 
and the settlement of Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) across the Iraqi-Syrian border 
not only aroused curiosity, but also created far more complex socio-political concerns for 
policy makers, international civil society groups, and political scientists. The 
prolongation and regionalization of the Syrian conflict, coupled by the disintegration of 
existing institutions, massive humanitarian crisis, and the ensuing chaos caught the 
international community unprepared. Neither failed and near-failing states of the Middle 
East, nor the militarily and economically more developed international powers seemed to 
possess the capability to solve the security complications posed by these developments 
in the region. The existing assumptions of transnational politics ingrained in the minds of 
policy-makers and policy analysts failed to provide the necessary tool box to understand 
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and explain the increasing salience of religion in global politics and to find solutions for 
the associated socio-political and security complications today. What was necessary was 
the formulation of a new terminology of global politics, new assumptions, and 
postulations to make sense of the transformation of politics across national borders along 
these questions.  
 
Against these developments in world politics, political scientists slowly started to 
take the issue of religion more seriously. The first scholars to incorporate religion into 
their analyses were working within comparative politics rather than IR. They were 
particularly interested in studying alternative political identities such as ethnicity, 
nationality, and religion in the post-Cold War era. In this respect, Huntington’s (1993) 
‘Clash of Civilizations’ thesis undeniably stands as the primary work among the early 
scholarly works on religion and world politics.20 Developing theories on the possible 
evolution of world politics in the post-Cold War era, Fukuyama (1992) was arguing that 
the clash of liberal and communist ideologies between two superpowers was over, leaving 
its way to the victory and dominance of one ideology worldwide.21 In this rather 
optimistic account of post-Cold War global order, democracy, human rights, and liberal 
market economy would be the name of the game, leaving no room for further conflict 
among states. Huntington was challenging this very optimism, arguing instead that 
people’s cultural and religious identities –instead of material gains or power politics- 
would be the main reason for conflict in the post-Cold War period.22 His work received 
volumes of criticism by the academic community on ethical and scientific grounds. 
Ethically, the clash of civilization thesis was assumed to influence G. W. Bush’s policy 
on Afghanistan and the Middle East, thereby becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
Scientifically, Huntington’s conceptualization of ‘civilization’ was highly criticized. The 
concept of ‘civilization’ has many aspects including the geography, religion and culture 
inherent within. However, Huntington used these aspects interchangeably in his analysis, 
thereby confusing the term. He categorized some of the six major world civilizations 
according to their cultural affinities (Eastern civilization), while some others were 
                                                
20 See Samuel P. Huntington, ‘The Clash of Civilizations?’ Foreign Affairs 72, no. 3 (1993): p. 22-49; Samuel P. 
Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations: Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon and Schuster Publishing, 1996).   
 
21 Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992).  
 
22 Huntington, ‘The Clash of Civilizations?’ passim; and Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, passim. 
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categorized along religious lines (Islamic civilization). His problematic identification was 
further aggravated by his monolithic take on civilizations. Huntington did not consider 
religious and cultural nuances within his civilizational units; for example, he did not 
differentiate Sunni Islam from the Shia.  
 
Huntington’s ‘clash of civilizations’ and the criticism therewith affirmed the 
difficulty of studying religion within a social scientific paradigm. Despite such 
contentions, Huntington’s thesis still opened a fertile research ground for more studies on 
religion. Another influential scholar following Huntingtonian lines, albeit in a more 
focused manner, was Juergensmeyer’s (2008) work on religious nationalism.23 
Juergensmeyer’s study sought to explain the root causes of the resurgent religious 
activism in the post-Cold War global social and political order. He argued that most 
conflicts in the post-Cold War period are not between different religious groups, but 
between secular nationalism and religious movements confronting it. Religious activism 
of Indian Sikh movement and the Islamic Revolution in Iran were among the responses 
to the populations’ disenchantment with the modernist, secular nation-states. Religious 
identity rose as an alternative to the nation-state, Juergensmeyer argued, creating intra-
state conflicts and religious revolutions worldwide. Without a doubt, these early works 
were influential contributions as they questioned the modernization thinking24 and 
welcomed religion in social and political science analysis.25  
 
The rising instances of religious violence and religious terrorism in global politics 
extended the scholarly space for the global study of these topics in early 2000s, but still 
from a non-theoretical and non-IR perspective. Juergensmeyer’s (2000) work on religious 
terrorism and violence in five major religious traditions including Islam, Christianity, 
Sikhism, Judaism, and Buddhism sought to explain the root of violent behavior among 
religious groups with reference to cultures of violence.26 Juergensmeyer provided the 
                                                
23 Mark Juergensmeyer, The New Cold War? Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular State (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1993); Mark Juergensmeyer, Global Rebellion: Religious Challenges to the Secular 
State, from Christian Militia to al-Qaeda (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008). 
 
24 Juergensmeyer, The New Cold War?, passim; Jose Casanova, Public Religions in the Modern World (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1994).  
 
25 Peter L. Berger, ed., The Desecularization of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics (Michigan: William 
B. Eerdmans Publishing, 1999); Gilles Kepel, The Revenge of God: The Resurgence of Islam, Christianity, and 
Judaism in the Modern World (University Park: Penn. State Univ. Press, 1994). 
 
26 Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence (Berkeley: University of 
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theological justifications of violence ingrained in these religious cultures in the form of 
symbols. He argued that religious followers with a propensity towards violence see the 
world as a cosmic battle for which they voluntarily become martyrs. The symbols of 
cosmic battle and martyrdom were found to be recurrent in various off-shoots of religious 
terrorism. In a similar vein, Almond and Appleby (2003) studied the rise of 
fundamentalism worldwide, where they refuted the assumed association between Islam 
and fundamentalism by exploring the cases of fundamentalism in monotheistic 
(Christianity, Judaism and Islam) and syncretic (Buddhism, Hinduism) religions.27 The 
bottom-line of their work was that all religions can generate fundamentalist movements 
depending on structural conditions such as economic factors and the conflict between 
secularism and religion in these polities, chance element which is defined as sudden 
political and economic crisis, and the movements’ leaders choices to respond to these 
structural conditions and chance events. Against the increased association of religion with 
fundamentalism, terrorism, and violence in these studies, some scholars took an opposite 
position and focused on the peacebuilding role of religion. In this respect, Haynes (2009) 
examined how some religious personalities and organizations may function as ‘religious 
peacemakers’ promoting peacebuilding, tolerance, and reconciliation in conflict 
situations.28 In a similar vein, Appleby et. al. (2010) studied the interrelation between 
Christian theology, the ethics of peace, reconciliation, and interreligious dialogue against 
their practical applications in diverse national and geographical contexts.29 Finally, 
Seiple, Robert and Hoover (2004) emphasized the potential role of religion in conflict 
resolution and peace-making through ‘faith-based diplomacy’ in a world of armed 
conflicts, military interventions, and religious terrorism.30 
     
Interestingly, the real theoretical engagement of the IR field with religion started 
in the British IR academia, even before religion was acknowledged as a pressing security 
                                                
California Press, 2000). 
 
27 Gabriel Almond and Scott Appleby, Strong Religion: The Rise of Fundamentalisms around the World (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 2003).  
 
28 Jeffrey Haynes, ‘Conflict, Conflict Resolution and Peace-Building: The Role of Religion in Mozambique, Nigeria 
and Cambodia,’ Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 47, issue 1 (2009): p. 52-75.  
 
29 Scott Appleby, Robert Schreiter, and Gerard Powers, Peacebuilding: Catholic Theology, Ethics, and Praxis (Orbis 
Books: 2010).  
  
30 Robert Seiple and Dennis Hover, eds., Religion and Security: The New Nexus in International Relations (New 
York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004).   
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issue in the American IR academia after 9/11. Academic conferences in the British 
academia were organized on a wide range of topics concerning the place of religion in 
world politics, such as the impact of faith on armed conflicts, international political 
theology, and transformation of the international society via religious resurgence, faith 
and reconciliation.31 However, these early scholarly works were more in the form of an 
under-theorized empirical outcry for the neglect of religion in international relations 
theory. This body of research unfailingly embraced a terminology that emphasizes the 
return of religion after a lengthy process of marginalization by the forces of 
modernization and secularization. Petito and Hatzopoulos’ (2003) description of the 
religious phenomenon as a ‘return from the exile’ is a case in point. In their introductory 
chapter, Petito and Hatzopoulos argue that the association of religion with Islamic 
terrorism, the ‘clash of civilizations,’ the repressive authoritarian Islamic regimes, along 
with the rapid rise of religious parties elsewhere have put religion in the spotlight as a 
repressive political mechanism.32 Petito and Hatzopoulos attempt to reverse the 
representation of religion as a repressive political mechanism, arguing that religion is 
actually the ‘victim’ of modernization due to its prolonged ‘Westphalian exile.’33 Still, 
the following chapters of their work are designed as an attempt to open up theoretical 
outlets for understanding ‘the return of religion from exile’ in the areas of religious 
pluralism,34 securitization of religion,35 and the global resurgence of religion.36 
 
Thomas (2005) constitute another such example. Like Petito and Hatzopoulos’ 
‘return from the exile’ discourse, Thomas emphasizes the ‘resurgence’ of religion in 
global politics by arguing that three critical events signaled the return of religion to world 
                                                
31 The most important conference in this respect was ‘Religions and International Relations’ in 1998, jointly organized 
by London School of Economics and Millenium Journal. The presented papers as well as new studies inspired by this 
conference were collected in a special Millenium issue in 2004, titled Religion and International Relations: A Return 
from Exile under the editorship of Fabio Petito and Pavlos Hatzopoulos, who had convened the 1998 LSE Convention.  
 
32 Fabio Petitio and Pavlos Hatzopoulos, Religion in International Relations: the Return from Exile, (NewYork: 
Palgrave, 2003).  
 
33 Ibid., p. 1-2.  
 
34 Scott Thomas, ‘Taking Religious and Cultural Pluralism Seriously,’ in Religion in International Relations, ed. 
Petito and Hatzopoulos, p. 21-53. 
 
35 Carsten Bagge Laustsen et. al., ‘In Defense of Religion,’ Religion in International Relations, ed. Petito and 
Hatzopoulos, p. 147-180. 
 
36 Richard Falk, ‘A Worldwide Religious Resurgence in an Era of Globalization and Apocalyptic Terrorism,’ Religion 
in International Relations, ed. Petito and Hatzopoulos, p. 181-208; and Fred Dallmayr, ‘A Gobal Spiritual 
Resurgence?’ in Religion in International Relations, ed. Petito and Hatzopoulos, p. 209-236.  
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politics: the Iranian Revolution of 1979, the collapse of communism leading to the rise 
of the Polish Church in Poland, and September 11 with the ensuing global war on terror.37 
Similar to Petito and Hatzopoulos, Thomas attempts to open up a theoretical outlet for 
the incorporation of religion into international relations theory at inter-state, intra-state 
and individual levels of analysis. Thomas expands Petito and Hatzopoulos’ ‘Westphalian 
bias’ argument by analyzing the assumptions of positivism, individualism, materialism, 
and implicit secularism in dominant IR paradigms. Thomas’ effort is one of 
deconstructing the existing IR paradigms, their assumptions, and conceptualizations 
given the empirical crisis generated by religion in world politics.  
 
Fitzgerald (2011) convincingly challenged the discourse on religion as returning 
from exile and resurging, and instead argued that a scholar who studies religion and IR 
are wrong in advancing religion as a phenomenon to be re-introduced to world politics.38 
Indeed, religion has never been exiled by modernization and thus has never resurged, as 
the distinction between the religious and the secular has been a social construction and a 
17th century myth.39 Fitzgerald ambitiously problematizes religion, secularity, and 
politics. What is religion? What kinds of spiritual practices are counted as religious faith 
and what is the politics of this categorization? How do we differentiate the religious from 
the secular in social, political, or legal practice? His major contribution to the literature is 
his problematization of politics as a non-/secular enterprise. Fitzgerald argues that politics 
is constructed during modern times as a rational, problem-solving, and secular enterprise 
revolving around the issue of power. His problematization of modern assumptions on and 
conceptualizations of religion, secularism, and politics affirms the existence of a fertile 
research outlet for further examination of religious/secular actors, institutions, and 
practices. 
 
 These studies have gradually culminated into more theoretically informed 
accounts of religion in international relations. Among the first theoretically informed 
theses on religion and international relations is Hurd’s work examining the relationship 
                                                
37 Scott Thomas, The Global Resurgence of Religion and the Transformation of International Relations: the Struggle 
for the Soul of the Twenty-First Century (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004). 
 
38 Timothy Fitzgerald, Religion and Politics in International Relations (New York: Continuum, 2011). 
 
39 Ibid., p. 87.  
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between different types of secularisms and foreign policy. Following the footsteps of 
Fitzgerald, Hurd (2007) argues that the modern secular world has a religious foundation 
already.40 Hurd makes the point that Western notion of secularism has two empirical 
trajectories. The first is laicism, which creates two distinct realms as politics and religion 
and expels religion from the political arena. The second is Judeo-Christian secularism, 
which does not make any attempt to expel religion, but sees it as part of the socio-cultural 
life. States embracing any of these two trajectories tend to exhibit different foreign policy 
behaviors. Hurd shows that American foreign policy towards Iran is not secular, but 
informed by the Judeo-Christian secular tradition. Alternatively, the European Union, 
which embraces the laicist tradition, formulates a foreign policy towards Turkey on the 
basis of its laicist credentials. The research on the types of secularism take on a more 
ambitious and quantitative turn with Jonathan Fox’ A World Survey of Religion and the 
State (2007). Fox attempts to re-conceptualize the relations between religion and 
government across 175 cases by examining multiple indicators such as the presence of an 
official religion, preferential treatment of certain religions, the treatment of religious 
minorities, and the government regulation of the majority religion.41 The result is a 
composite index of ‘government intervention to religion’ (GIR), collected from data on 
countries between 1990 and 2002. Fox finds that multiple types of secularism exist across 
the modern world and he supports his thesis with individual case studies. 
 
Finally, the theoretical acknowledgement of religion within the IR have pushed 
some scholars to theoretically incorporating religion into existing IR paradigms. These 
scholars examined the theoretical space religion holds, or can possibly hold, in realism, 
liberalism and constructivism without degenerating these research programs. One 
prominent attempt is Snyder’s (2011) edited volume on religion and international politics, 
whose main point is that religion can be integrated into dominant IR paradigms without 
violating their core assumptions.42 A striking section in his volume is on structural 
realism, the paradigm seemingly most hostile to religion due to its ontological and 
epistemological basis. On the assumption of anarchy, for example, he argues that while 
anarchy has been the prevailing international condition in all historical epochs, anarchy 
                                                
40 Hurd, The Politics of Secularism in International Relations, passim.  
 
41 Jonathan Fox, A World Survey of Religion and the State (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2007). 
  
42 Jack Snyder, ed., Religion and International Relations Theory (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011).  
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did not always mean the lack of a religious order. Similarly, he incorporates religious 
logic into the realist assumptions of balance of power and interest seeking behavior. From 
a philosophy of social sciences perspective, Snyder shows that religion can be 
incorporated into realism without necessarily degenerating this research program. Barnett 
and Nexon’s (2011) pieces in the same volume expand the discussion by examining 
possibilities constructivist and liberal paradigms can offer for a scientifically informed 
study of religion.43 In a similar vein, Sandal and James (2011) examine realism, 
neorealism, and neoliberalism to show how the religious element is already incorporated 
in these research programs.44 What is remarkable about Sandal and James’ review is that 
rationalist paradigms and their key theories do not inadvertently reject the role of religious 
ideas in world politics. Their compelling accounts of key IR scholars such as Morgenthau, 
Niebuhr, and Nye show that religious ideas may play an instrumentalist and functional 
role in shaping policy decisions by defining rational interests and the interaction context. 
Sandal and Fox’ edited volume integrating religion into international relations paradigms 
is another comprehensive attempt to locate the relevance of religion within each IR 
paradigm along with its theoretical off-shoots.45  
 
This research aims to build on the theoretical arena opened by these scholars 
integrating religion into existing IR paradigms of realism, liberalism, and constructivism. 
The Islamic Revolution of 1979 is one of those events that put religion as the basis of 
Iran’s new government system and brought a systemic shock to the Middle East. The 
revolution had a far-reaching impact on the foreign policy orientation of the Islamic 
Republic. This thesis attempts to examine the role of religion in the Islamic Republic’s 
foreign policy since its foundation and the evolution thereof by situating it into existing 
IR paradigms.  
 
 
                                                
43 Michael Barnett, ‘Another Great Awakening? International Relations Theory and Religion,’ in Religion and 
International Relations Theory, ed. Snyder, p. 91-115; and Daniel H. Nexon, ‘Religion and International Relations: 
No Leap of Faith Required,’ in Religion and International Relations Theory, ed. Snyder, p. 141-168. 
 
44 Nükhet Sandal and Patrick James, ‘Religion and International Relations Theory: Towards a Mutual Understanding,’ 
European Journal of International Relations 17, no. 1 (2011): p. 3-25.  
 
45 Nükhet Sandal and Jonathan Fox, eds., Religion in International Relations Theory: Interactions and Possibilities 
(New York: Routledge, 2013).  
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1.4.  Religion and Iran’s Foreign Policy   
 
 
 
 The Islamic Revolution of 1979 was one of those striking events in the history of 
modernity that reversed the scholars’ understanding of secularism and modernity. The 
Iranians overthrew the Shah regime which was committed to an ambitious program of 
Western modernization and finally replaced it with a Shia theocracy. Twelver Imamite 
Shiism is recognized by the Islamic Republic’s Constitution as state religion and the state 
is ruled by velayet-e faqih, a modern conceptualization of Shia clerical rule introduced by 
Ayatollah Khomeini which means ‘the guardianship of the jurist’ in state affairs. One 
common misunderstanding concerning Iran is the representation of the Islamic 
Revolution as a one-shot event. The Islamic Revolution is frequently seen as a sudden, 
single event that quickly raised the Shia clergy as the ultimate political authority in Iran 
and traditional religious Shia school as the only determinant of the new system. While 
this representation is not hundred percent faulty, it is misleading for many reasons. First, 
the Islamic Republic is not a theocratic system that was established by the Islamic 
Revolution in 1979 for once and for all. Rather, we should see the Iranian Revolution as 
a critical moment that sparked a decades-long Islamic state-building process in Iran after 
1979. The Islamic state building process included the definition of the state ideology, 
what this research will call ‘revolutionary Islamism,’ the identification of the role of the 
Shia clergy in politics, and the creation and consolidation of Islamic state institutions. 
The year 1979 is a midpoint of a Shia political movement that started by Shia clerical 
hawzas, clerical figures, and Shia theologians as far back as the 19th century across the 
Middle East, achieved a successful revolutionary manifestation in Iran, and transformed 
into an Islamic state-building in the decades to come. This is emphasized by the Supreme 
Leader Ayatollah Khamenei;     
 
   ‘The Revolution is a permanent process, not a temporary one so much so 
that we say an incident occurred at such and such a time during which a group 
of people poured to the streets and it lasted 10, 20 days or two or six months 
and it led to the overthrow of the regime. We cannot say that the Revolution 
is this. This is only part of the Revolution. The Revolution is an eternal and 
permanent reality. ‘Revolution’ means a transformation. Deep 
transformations do not occur in the course of six months or one, five years. 
Besides, transformation and big changes do not have an expiration date. They 
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never come to an end. This is what "revolution" means. Revolution is a 
constant process.’46   
 
We should therefore think of the Islamic Republic as a work in progress for many decades, 
both preceding and proceeding the revolutionary moment in 1979. It is not a traditionally 
faith- or doctrine-based Islamic movement but a modern Islamist political movement 
shaped by the given socio-political and historical context preceding and proceeding it, the 
dominant understandings of legitimate political action and/or political movement, 
political ideological currents of the time, and finally the – often selective - interpretation 
of religious doctrines for the specified political action. As such, religion is not purely a 
faith system or faith doctrine in the political composition of the Islamic Republic after 
1979. To the contrary, religion is in a dynamic and cyclical relationship with politics. 
Therefore, the Islamic Republic is not a theocratic system that was established by the 
Islamic Revolution in 1979 for once and for all, but a work in progress for the last forty 
years, constantly rebuilding and reforming itself for optimal functionality as a theocratic 
nation-state that functions in an international political environment that does not 
necessarily favor its survival and longevity.  
 
Against this background, the concept of ‘religion’ needs further clarification when 
used in the political science and international politics field. The concept of ‘religion’ is 
more than a specific faith system and its doctrine manifested by a holy book, written 
codes, narratives, and traditions when used in international politics. That does not mean 
that the doctrine is irrelevant to politics, it does play a role. However, when talking about 
religion and politics, one means the practical implications of religious doctrine on non-
religious spheres of life including the politics, economics and society through human 
interpretation of religious faith and doctrine. The historical, temporal, and spatial 
dimensions within which the religious faith and doctrine influence the ideology, 
institutions, actors, and political interactions matter. Such a conceptualization takes the 
religious faith out from its static nature and gives it increased dynamism. Many scholars 
better use the term ‘public theology’ instead of ‘religion’ to refer to its dynamic interaction 
with political, social, legal and institutional processes. Such conceptualization of religion 
opens up a richer space for us to discuss and understand the various political 
                                                
46 Khamanei, Ali. ‘IGRC Blocks the Enemy’s Infiltration.’ The Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei’s Website, 
published September 16, 2015, http://english.khamenei.ir/news/2155/IRGC-blocks-the-enemy-s-infiltration.  
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manifestations of religion across the globe. For example, when using the term ‘political 
Islam’, one should be aware of the fact that there is no one ‘political Islam’, but ‘political 
Islams.’ The Khomeini’s activist Shiism is one type of political Islam, while the quietist 
Shiism of Najaf is another. Salafism/Wahhabism is a one brand of political Islam shaping 
and shaped by Saudi politics in the Gulf, while the Islamist political parties in Tunisia and 
Turkey are another brand. Even when one looks at the variety of Islamist jihadist groups 
in Syria, Libya, and Iraq, one will see that they all entertain different ideas about the 
proper religio-political order as well as the tools and mechanisms for establishing this 
order. This variety is the result of the variety of interpretations as well as political, social 
and legal necessities informing such interpretations at a specific time and space.   
 
 That being said, the first step of this research is to carefully extricate the ‘religious 
element’ from the religio-political complex called the Islamic Republic. What do we mean 
when we talk about ‘religion’ in the Iranian political system? Is it the faith doctrine? The 
religious and sectarian identity of the Iranian population and the regime? The religious 
ideology? Religious actors? Or religious institutions? Scholarly attention will be given to 
the question of how religious faith manifested itself in the ideological, institutional, and 
political configuration of the nation at a specific time. Answering these questions thus 
requires a deeper understanding the contours of transnational Shia political activism and 
Khomeini’s version of politically activist Shiism, i.e. how long-accumulated socio-
political, ideological, intellectual, and religious inputs formed the basic tenets of the 
activist, revolutionary, Shia ideology of the Islamic Republic, its institutions, actors, and 
power centers. This research is not treating ‘religious’ and ‘political’ as binary opposites, 
as they constantly feed into each other. Rather, it is recognizing the dynamic, cyclical 
relationship between the two and aiming to dissociate the ‘religious element’ therein for 
a better understanding of its meaning and role in Iranian politics.  
  
 The second step in understanding the role of religion is to gauge how religion, 
after shaping the ideological orientation, institutional structure, and domestic power 
centers, manifested in Iran’s foreign policy after 1979. Chapter 3 of this thesis will show 
in detail that religion manifests in Iran’s foreign policy in multiple fronts: religion as 
identity, religion as ideology, religion as a transnational ontology, and religion as an 
institution. Briefly, the transnational Shia networks that developed in the 19th and 20th 
centuries; the Islamist revolutionary ideology as an amalgamation of anti-liberal 
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modernism, anti-imperialism, Shiism, and revolutionary Islamism; the Karbala narratives 
of the Shia faith, martyrdom and sacrifice; and the early experience of the Islamic 
Republic in the Holy Defense War and the export of the revolution have leagued together 
to shape the Islamic Republic’s foreign policy roles, duties, interests, objectives, and 
capabilities. Religion informs Iran’s foreign policy on many fronts. Nevertheless, not all 
dimensions fare equally in Iran’s foreign policy across time, place, and theme. To the 
contrary, certain dimensions may be highlighted more at a specific time over others. This 
research will discuss what determines the predominance of one factor over another in the 
course of Iran’s foreign policy and thus contribute to the scholarship on the role of religion 
in foreign policy making.      
 
The above-mentioned point has been largely ignored in the existing research on 
Iran’s foreign policy. The existing research has rather focused on an observed swing 
between ‘rationality’ and ‘ideology’ in Iran’s foreign policy over the last four decades. 
Tracing this swing, scholars of Iranian foreign policy have traditionally studied the 
foreign policy of Iran by dividing it into several periods: 1) the revolutionary period 
between 1980-1989 which covers the Supreme Leadership of Imam Khomeini, 2) the 
period between 1989-2005 which coincides with conservative-pragmatist Hashami 
Rafsanjani’s presidency and his reformist successor Mohammad Khatami, 3) the period 
between 2005-2013, which is characterized by the presidency of hardliner Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad and finally 4) the period since 2013, when another centrist and pragmatist 
president Hassan Rouhani assumed office. This periodization relied on two problematic 
assumptions. First, such accounts treat the issue of ‘ideology’ and ‘rationality’ as binary 
opposites. The Iranian foreign policy orientation is depicted as if the Islamic Republic is 
walking on a tight rope, one end signifying rationality and the other ideology. Second, 
such accounts lie on the assumption that what determines the Iranian regime’s position 
on this tight line is domestic political factionalism. Should the regime elites observe full 
commitment to the precepts of revolutionary ideology which makes Iran ‘the Islamic 
Republic’ as hardliners propose? Or should they reform the system economically and 
politically by opening the regime up to the system and forging closer and deeper relations 
with the rest of the world as pragmatists suggest?  
 
It would be equally problematic to argue that factionalism does not play role in 
Iran’s foreign policy. To the contrary, factionalism plays a significant role. However, an 
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over-reliance on factionalism in foreign policy research masks a deeper underlying 
structural problem emanating from the very existence of the Islamic Republic. One 
preliminary observation concerning the Islamic Republic is an existential confusion and 
duality in the international arena. As Chapter 3 will discuss in more detail, the Islamic 
Revolution is defined by Iran as a transnational revolution which places self-ascribed 
transnational Islamic roles and duties on the shoulders of the Islamic Republic. The 
revolution is aimed to establish an Islamic Ummah, overthrowing the Westphalian nation-
state system and uniting all Muslims both Sunni and Shia under a single Islamic authority. 
On the other hand, the Islamic Republic continued to function as a modern nation-state, 
sharing the basic national interests of territorial integrity and political survival with any 
other state within the system. Iran’s existential dilemma was very clear: The Islamic 
Republic was a ‘revisionist’ state that followed ‘anti-systemic’ foreign policy ultimately 
aimed to reverse the Westphalian international order, but also needed to conform to the 
rules of interaction of this very system to ensure its own survival. On the one hand, the 
Islamic Republic has allegiance to the very transnational Islamist political movement 
from which it emerged, which defines religio-ideologically defined transnational duties, 
roles, and interests for Iran. On the other hand, the state has to ensure the nation-state’s 
interests, which are predominantly rationally and pragmatically defined. 
 
 One central argument of this thesis is that the Islamic Republic’s above-described 
identity crisis has been the primary determinant of its foreign policy for the last four 
decades. Domestic factionalism should be treated as an extension of this underlying 
structural dilemma. The domestic political elites’ perception of the regional and 
international political context, their preference-ordering and priority-setting concerning 
the Islamic Republic’s roles, duties, interests, and objectives in external relations is 
strongly bound by the existential dilemma of the Islamic Republic. In a similar vein, the 
discussions over ‘ideology’ and ‘rationality’ are an extension of this very dilemma. 
However, a closer observation shows that the direction of shift between ‘ideology’ and 
‘rationality’ is not as much chronologic and periodic as it is circumstantial and thematic. 
While it might be true that the Islamic Republic is walking towards either end of the rope 
during certain periods, most change happens depending on the circumstances and the 
policy theme at hand.  
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Chapter 4 will show that Iran’s foreign policy between 2003 and 2017 is a good 
laboratory to show the above-described point. Upon examining the nuclear diplomacy of 
the pragmatist president Rouhani with the USA and Europe, this seems to be the epitome 
of rationality and pragmatism in Iran’s foreign policy. Signing a deal with the USA, the 
ideology arch-opponent of the Islamic Republic, along with the implications of the deal 
for the future of nuclear technology, economic liberalization and the possible 
transformation of the Iranian society stirred domestic discussions especially within the 
more conservative and hardliner circles. The previous presidents had already positioned 
themselves on the nuclear issue in line with the political faction they are representing. 
However, this very rational policy of nuclear diplomacy coincided with increased Iranian 
engagement with the Iraqi and Syrian regimes. We witnessed more overt military 
presence of IRGC officers in the field supporting the predominantly Shia entities against 
the advance of ISIL and other Sunni extremist groups and the Iranian leadership was 
bolder regarding the Iranian presence in the region. The Middle East policy is there since 
2003 despite the presidential changes across factional politics.   
 
This leaves us with multiple conclusions. First, the influence of factional politics 
depends on the foreign policy issue area. Accordingly, there is a constant inter-factional 
rift and a repeated shift between ‘rationality’ and ‘ideology’ on nuclear diplomacy and 
relations with the West. On the other hand, there seems to be less change and more 
continuity in Iran’s relations with co-sectarian, co-ideological, and co-religious political 
movements. As existing influential scholarship on Iran’s foreign policy predominantly 
examine the very topical nuclear issue, factionalism seems overemphasized as a basic 
determinant of Iran’s foreign policy, and the strong continuity over other foreign policy 
issues is largely overlooked. This thesis aims to examine the elements of ‘continuity’ in 
Iran’s foreign policy with a specific focus on Iran’s Middle East policy between 2003 and 
2017. While Chapter 3 will show the institutionalization of the ‘religious’ element in 
Iran’s foreign policy on multiple facets over decades, Chapter 4 will map out how this 
institutionalization was manifested in the basic foreign policy strategies the Islamic 
Republic adopted after 2003 in the region. Chapter 5 will lay out Iran’s foreign policy 
discourses regarding its Middle East policy after 2003 and shed important insights on the 
complicated relationship between ‘rationality’ and ‘ideology’ in the Islamic Republic’s 
foreign policy. Forty years after the Islamic Revolution, the Islamic Republic can be 
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identified as a consolidated revolutionary regime today. Religion has become an 
institutionalized foreign policy element of this consolidated revolutionary regime.  
 
 
 
1.5.  Methodology and Data 
 
 
 
This study is conducted by the use of multiple qualitative methodologies. Process 
tracing has been predominantly employed to historically trace the evolution of the role of 
religion in Iran’s foreign policy. Collier defines process tracing as ‘an analytical tool for 
drawing descriptive and causal inferences from diagnostic pieces of evidence – often 
understood as part of a temporal sequence of events or phenomena.’47 This research is 
based on a within-case-study that aims to understand the evolution of transnational Shia 
political activism and its implications on the Islamic Republic’s foreign policy after 1979, 
which renders process-tracing a useful method. A thorough description of the 
phenomenon and related concepts is the first step of this research. In this respect, the 
research first makes a thorough description of how the seeds of political Shiism were 
sown in the 12th century and evolved into transnational Shia political activism in the 21st 
century. Second, the varying conceptual reflections of this phenomenon on the Islamic 
Republic’s foreign policy since 1979 are identified. In this respect, a large body of Islamic 
Republic’s peculiar foreign policy concepts such as the ‘holy defense war,’ ‘export of the 
revolution,’ ‘Islamic Awakening,’ and ‘axis of resistance,’ among others, are explained in 
detail. Besides descriptive inference, process-tracing is employed in this research also for 
causal inference, where it is used to test the explanatory power of three competing 
hypotheses in understanding the increased role of religion in Iran’s Middle East policy 
today. 
 
A second qualitative methodology employed for this study is field research 
conducted in the summers of 2015 and 2016 in Tehran, Iran. These field trips included an 
anthropological observation of the Iranian state system and culture, albeit to a modest 
extent, as well as Persian language-training and elite interviews with relevant researchers, 
academics, policy-makers. The field research included repetitive visits to the military 
                                                
47 David Collier, ‘Understanding Process Tracing,’ PS: Political Science and Politics 44, issue 4 (2011): p. 823.  
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museums and the revolutionary, ideological, and religious landmarks of the Islamic 
Republic in Tehran. Moreover, I also made field observations during the ideological and 
religious celebrations of the Islamic Republic including the Holy Defense Week 
celebrations and Shia religious ceremonies. Both experiences provided important insights 
and illuminating information on religion-state and religion-military culture relations. 
These observations provided the necessary background knowledge to better understand 
and analyze the Islamic Republic’s ideology, religion, institutions, and military culture.  
 
Nevertheless, a most significant aim of the both field trips was the elite interviews 
conducted in Iran with a variety of people who are engaged in the foreign policy making 
circles of the Islamic Republic. A good part of the interviewees referred to in this thesis 
include the foreign policy experts of the Center for Strategic Research (CSR), one of the 
two leading foreign policy research institutes in Iran. As a leading foreign policy research 
institute, CSR is affiliated with a state institute, the Expediency Council of the Islamic 
Republic. CSR is headed by Ali Akbar Velayati, who is the chief foreign policy advisor 
of the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei in the National Security Council of Iran. The 
current research endeavors of CSR are to support the policies of the conservative-
pragmatist Hassan Rouhani’s government. Therefore, the interviews conducted with CSR 
researchers predominantly reflect the foreign policy vision of the current government. 
The rest of my interviewees were foreign policy experts, researchers, academics, and 
journalists from Center for Islamic Research, ANA News Agency, Center for Middle East 
Strategic Studies, Shahid Behesti University, Tarbiat Modarres University, and Imam 
Hossein University – the university owned and run by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard 
Corps. I also interviewed several researchers, diplomats, journalists, academics working 
in Turkey, Washington, and Iraq. A total of 22 elite interviews were conducted for this 
research, of which 19 were used in this dissertation. The remaining interviews were not 
used due to a lack of direct relevance to the topic. While a few interviewees have agreed 
for their names to be disclosed throughout the thesis, a majority of my interviewees have 
chosen to remain anonymous. Therefore, instead of using their names, I coded those 
anonymous interviewees with numbers. The field research in Iran and the interviews 
constitute the backbone of this thesis. They not only contributed to my understanding of 
the intellectual and institutional pillars of the Islamic Republic and the Islamic Republic’s 
foreign policy culture, but also provided the data and insights delineating Iran’s policy in 
the Middle East today.  
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Another set of data used for this research concerns armed Shia mobilization in 
Iraq and Syria. By collecting the Shia mobilization data, I aimed to map out the 
characteristics and size of armed Shia mobilization across two countries and to determine 
the extent of Iranian influence over Shiites across the region. One problem I encountered 
during this process is that a considerable amount of data exists on Sunni armed 
mobilization, and more so on Sunni jihadist groups, but less so for Shia armed groups. 
The data is predominantly taken from a limited number of, yet highly detailed and 
ambitious, works and datasets collected by individual area researchers, university 
research centers, and think-tanks. Most data on Shia mobilization used in this research is 
based on ‘Jihad Identifiers Database’ collected and made accessible online by the Jihad 
Intel Group of the Middle East Forum.48 Two other datasets where additional data is taken 
for dataset build-up and double-checking purposes are a Stanford University research 
project called ‘Mapping Militant Organizations’49 and ‘TRAC Dataset’ by Terrorism 
Research and Consortium.50  
 
A new trend in the Western research circles is the appearance of a new body of 
individual researchers who are not necessarily associated with any university research 
center, think-tank or intelligence unit and yet collect a rich set of data by examining the 
social media accounts of religious armed groups.51 Despite the general reliability and 
credibility concerns on this new type of independent social media researchers, they 
provide important details on the Syrian civil war and the fighting groups in their 
publications and blogs. One such prominent researcher whose data has heavily informed 
this research is Phillip Smyth.52 The empirical richness provided by such researchers is a 
great contribution to the study of Shia networks in the Middle East at a time when the 
                                                
48 For detailed information on Jihad Intel Project, see ‘Main Page: Jihad Intel Project,’ Jihad Intel Project, accessed 
June 20, 2017, http://jihadintel.meforum.org/.   
 
49 For detailed information on Mapping Militant Organizations Project, see ‘Main Page: Mapping Militant 
Organizations,’ Stanford University Mapping Militant Organizations, accessed May 3, 2017, 
http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/.   
 
50 For detailed information on and access to TRAC dataset, see ‘Main Page: TRAC, Terrorism Research and 
Consortium,’ TRAC Website, accessed 5 May, 2017, https://www.trackingterrorism.org/.  
 
51 For a discussion on individual social media researchers, see Thanassis Cambanis, ‘The Jihadi Hunters,’ Boston 
Globe, October 2, 2014, https://www.bostonglobe.com/ideas/2014/10/02/the-jihadi-
hunters/tTC2t6UNIyzlioSoGBs5VO/story.html.  
 
52 About the data collected by Smyth, see Phillip Smyth, ‘The Shiite Jihad in Syria,’ Washington Institute, February 
2015, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/the-shiite-jihad-in-syria-and-its-regional-effects.    
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interest in compiling datasets on such groups is still in its infancy. Compiling data from 
such diversified sources, I created a Shia armed mobilization dataset which included Shia 
armed groups that were active sometime between 2003 and 2017 in Iraq and Syria. This 
dataset covers as much information on the characteristics of these groups as possible such 
as their year of origin, countries where they are active, their ideological orientations and 
relationships with other states, entities and institutions including Iran, Hezbollah, and 
Hashd al-Shaabi. One important note about the data on Shia armed groups is that the 
conflicts in Iraq and Syria are rather contemporary phenomena with a history of a decade 
at most. The conflict is an ongoing one, which makes rapid changes possible such as the 
rapid dissolution of existing groups, the formation of new groups, and the rapid formation 
and dissolution of alliances. Therefore, constantly updated data is necessary to map the 
linkages within the Shia armed groups networks.  
 
Finally, one chapter of this thesis is devoted to understanding the featured 
discourses the Iranian political elites have increasingly adopted in addressing the socio-
political developments in the Middle East since 2003. Discourse analysis is employed in 
analyzing this data. The data relies on multiple sources. The first source is the Supreme 
Leader Ayatollah Khamenei’s speeches between 1988-2017. The Supreme Leader’s 
speeches bear significance for mapping the general ideological orientation of the Islamic 
Republic. For one thing, he is the ultimate foreign policy decision-maker of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran, where other foreign policy actors often engage in a tug of war to get his 
backing regarding the adoption of a specific policy. For another, he often acts as the 
ideological trend-setter and observant of the Islamic Republic. As such, Ayatollah 
Khamenei’s speeches provide us with important clues on how the Islamic Republic is 
framing the regional developments as well as the regime’s response to such 
developments. The second source used for discourse analysis is Persian newspapers and 
news websites. The use of newspapers for discourse analysis in social sciences might 
present certain difficulties for the social science researcher. The chief among these 
difficulties lie in the fact that newspapers might act as unofficial information and 
propaganda bureaus of certain political actors. Newspapers are often far from objectivity 
in that case, with a potential to present the researcher with fake news and false data. Such 
problems of reliability and objectivity also hold true for Iranian newspapers. However, 
what makes certain Iranian newspapers and news websites relevant for the purposes of 
this research is that they act as official information channels for certain political actors. 
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This is especially the case with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. The IRGC is a 
security actor that often refrains from transparency and from freely giving out information 
on their activities. The IRGC thus does not have an official website as Ayatollah 
Khamenei does. However, the IRGC consistently distributes information about their 
political views military activities on officially designated media outlets. Therefore, data 
on IRGC’s views and activities in the Middle East has been collected from IRGC-related 
news agencies and websites. The most frequently used news outlets included Mehr News 
Agency and Fars News Agency, two news agencies claimed run by and close to IRGC; 
the Sepah News, referred to as the official news channel of IRGC; as well as the official 
news outlet of Iranian Basij. These news outlets are frequently used to by researchers 
working on IRGC.     
 
 
 
1.6.  The Relevance of the Study 
 
 
 
The relevance of this study is manifold. First, this study thematically focuses on a 
very recent history of the Middle East: the regional transformations between 2003 and 
2011. Given the recentness of the socio-political events marking the transformation of the 
region, there are very few academic studies examining this period. Many of the existing 
works, also cited extensively in this research, are in the form of policy papers and think-
tank reports. While these works make a great contribution on our empirical understanding 
of the regional transformations, they are theoretically under-developed. This study thus 
contributes to the intellectual space opened by such empirical studies by bringing in a 
more comprehensive empirical and theoretical element.  
 
This is especially true for the study of Iran’s foreign policy in the Middle East. As 
discussed above, many of the existing work on Iran’s foreign policy focus on Iran’s 
relations with the West and especially on the nuclear policy in the recent years. IR scholars 
have made great contributions to our understanding of Iran’s nuclear program, the 
contentious relations with the USA, and the evolution of Iran’s Western policy. However, 
the Islamic Republic’s relations with the Middle Eastern states have been largely left 
under-explored. Very few scholars and non-academic researchers have an interest in the 
study of transnational Shia politics, Shia mobilization, and Iran’s relations with the Shia 
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world. Very few academic volumes and even research reports have been generated on 
such topics so far, which makes existing studies extremely valuable. To my knowledge, 
there are no books written on the ‘Axis of Resistance’ in the English and Turkish 
languages either and the theme is largely under-explored. My stay in the USA as a visiting 
research scholar as a part of the dissertation writing process and my personal contacts 
with relevant scholars and policy researchers in New York and Washington DC have also 
shown that very few people are trained on these topics and the scholarly and policy 
interest has been rising only recently. As such, this study is a timely contribution to this 
recently rising research interest on transnational political Shiism and Iran’s relations with 
the Shia world. 
 
A second relevance of the study is that it is primarily based on two field trips to 
Iran. These field trips included an anthropological observation of the Iranian state system 
and culture, albeit to a modest extent, as well as Persian language-training and interviews 
with relevant researchers, academics, policy-makers. The field research as well as Persian 
language training helped me study the topic from an Iranian perspective, differentiate 
some ill-informed and biased accounts of the Islamic Republic found among English-
speaking sources, and finally decrease the thesis’ reliance on indirect and secondary 
analysis. The background of this research is also informed by academic volumes written 
by Iranian scholars in the Persian language. However, not all sources are cited in the thesis 
and they were primarily used to cultivate my approach to and understanding of the issue 
at hand. All in all, on-site observation, interviews conducted with Iranian policy elites and 
experts, and reliance on Persian sources are the methodological strengths of this research.   
 
Finally, this research contributes to the scholarly debates on the increasing 
relevance of religion in world politics today. The study traces the evolution of the role of 
religion in Iran’s foreign policy from the revolutionary period to 2017. By doing so, this 
research aimed to surpass the rationality and ideology dichotomy and to examine the more 
inter-dependent and intricate relationship between the two in the Iranian case.  
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1.7. Thesis Outline 
 
 
 
After outlining the aim, the theoretical background, the methodology, and the 
importance of the study in the introductory chapter, this thesis will be divided into five 
more chapters. The second chapter surveys the existing literature on religion and 
international relations. The observed global phenomena leading up to the emergence of 
the research program called religion and international relations and a detailed literature 
review of this scholarship is outlined in this chapter. This chapter makes a lengthy 
discussion on the prospects of integrating religion into three IR paradigms, i.e. realism, 
liberalism, and constructivism/post-structuralism. The three hypotheses, each 
corresponding to how existing IR paradigms would answer the research questions, are 
presented at the end of this chapter.   
 
The third chapter is a historical chapter that process-traces the role of religion in 
Iran’s foreign policy from the revolutionary period onwards. This chapter first discusses 
the historical institutionalization of Shia clerics, learning hawzas, transnational Shia 
politics across the Middle East up to 1979, and the Islamic Revolution of 1979. This part 
is necessary to understand how the 1979 Islamic Revolution was the culmination of an 
ongoing transnational Shia political activism in the Middle East. The last part of this 
chapter discusses the evolution of the ideology and institutions of the Islamic Republic 
with two foreign policy phenomena in its early years – ‘the Holy Defense War’ and ‘the 
export of the revolution’ policy. A comprehensive historical background to the ideological 
development of Shia political activism in Iran as well as the development of the Islamic 
Revolutionary Guard Corps and Basij as the institutional extension of these developments 
is expected to prepare the analysis of current trends in Iranian foreign policy in the coming 
chapters. It should be noted that this historical chapter is a sketch of main historical 
developments that contributed to the evolution of Iran’s foreign policy. The historical 
details provided in this chapter are less than complete and the list of the historical events 
is not exhaustive.  
 
The fourth chapter examines Shia revival since 2003 in the Middle East. This 
chapter focuses on the Iranian strategy for the developments in Iraq and Syria and on 
Iranian links to emerging Shia networks in these countries. The first sections of this 
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chapter lay out the Iranian understanding of and strategy on the recent transformations in 
the Middle East by a reliance on my interviews. This discussion is also supplemented by 
a historical overview of Iran’s relations with Iraq and Syria since 2003 and 2011 
respectively. The following sections map out Shia mobilization across Iraq and Syria and 
the Iranian influence over this mobilization process by the use of Shia mobilization 
dataset. These sections are followed by an examination of a new security structure in both 
countries called ‘popular mobilization forces’ or ‘national defense units.’ The final part 
of this chapter discusses the implications of the Iranian strategy on Shia revival for the 
military transformation of the Middle East, the transnational ideological and institutional 
socialization, and for the future of political and military order in the Middle East.           
 
The fifth chapter is devoted to an analysis of Iranian foreign policy discourses on 
the transformations of the Middle East since 2003. A survey of the discourses by 
Ayatollah Khamenei, IRGC commanders, as well as other foreign policy elites 
responding to regional transformations since 2003 are reduced to five core concepts: the 
Islamic Awakening, the resistance (axis), popular mobilization, takfiri terrorism, and 
finally the defense of the sacred shrines. The content, referents, and the historical 
evolution of these concepts are examined with examples taken from relevant sources. 
This chapter serves to understand the discursive patterns the Islamic Republic follows in 
disclosing its views on regional developments, devising its current mode of foreign 
policy, and finally in promoting this policy to both domestic and foreign audience. This 
chapter thus lays out how the Islamic Republic chooses to frame its activities and 
strategies in Iraq and Syria extensively.  
 
Finally, the concluding chapter sums up the key propositions of this study with a 
comparison of the ‘export of the revolution’ and ‘axis of resistance’ policies. This 
comparison not only tests the hypotheses proposed in the second chapter, but also traces 
the evolution of the role of religion in Iran’s foreign policy. This is followed by an 
acknowledgement of the limitations of this study and propositions for further research.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND RELIGION 
 
 
 
 
2.1.  Introduction 
 
 
 
A survey of existing International Relations scholarship shows that the field of 
international relations has ignored the role of religion in global politics more than any 
other sub-field of political science discipline. As a matter of fact, religion traditionally 
stands uneasily with the existing international relations paradigms due to 1) IR’s basic 
ontological assumptions about world politics, and 2) the dominant methodological and 
epistemological orientation of the field. This section will discuss the ontological, 
epistemological, and methodological foundation of the IR field that has theoretically 
complicated the integration of religion into IR frameworks. 
 
Despite several differences, realism, liberal IR, and constructivism share one basic 
ontological assumption about world politics: the Westphalian order. All three paradigms 
converge on their acquisition that the world has evolved towards a system of sovereign, 
territorial, autonomous states since the Treaty of Westphalia of 1648.53 The treaty is 
traditionally accepted as the hallmark of the modern state system after a period of multiple 
and overlapping sovereignties of kings, popes, princes, and feudal lords in the medieval 
Europe. In the Westphalian global order, autonomous, territorially distinct, and sovereign 
states are the primary actors of the international system. The sovereign figure in the 
modern state has the exclusive authority to decide on matters pertaining to their territory. 
                                                
53 See Daniel Philpott, ‘The Religious Roots of Modern International Relations,’ World Politics 52, issue 2 (2000): p. 
206-245; Hurd, The Politics of Secularism in International Relations, passim.  
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No sovereign sitting outside the state borders, feudal lord, king or religious actor is 
legitimately authorized to intervene in the domestic matters of the modern states as well 
as their interaction. Accordingly, IR has evolved as a field investigating the political, 
military, and economic interaction among these autonomous and territorially distinct 
political units, oftentimes excluding non-state actors. Religion was restricted to the 
domestic realm only, materialism and rationalism defining the nature of international 
interactions in its stead. Another consequence was that the sub-field of political science 
studying politics outside of the national borders was named “inter-national relations’, 
with “nations’ standing at the center of the phrase. 
 
The realist paradigm with its classical and structural off-shoots accentuated the 
'national' part of the Westphalian thinking more than any other paradigm. Borrowing from 
the philosophical traditions of Thucydides and Hobbes, the realist paradigm assumes that 
autonomous states operate in an anarchical international system with no central authority 
to govern inter-governmental relations.54 The anarchical international system drives states 
towards self-help measures such as bandwagoning and balancing. The decision about 
which self-help measure to adopt is a matter of rational calculation in the Machiavellian 
sense. States bandwagon with or balance others out of interest maximization, security 
providence or power maximization. Norms, ideas and identities do not play any role in 
states’ foreign policy decisions. Moreover, the realist paradigm characteristically defies 
the linkage between the domestic and the international except its neo-classical off-shoot, 
which assumes that states do not act as unified actors and their domestic characteristics 
matter in foreign policy making.55 The Westphalian thinking is also evident in the strict 
realist distinction between the domestic and the international. After Treaty of Westphalia 
(1648) and Treaty of Augsburg (1555) restricted the political implications of religious 
                                                
54 See Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 
1948); Stephen M. Walt, Origins of Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987); Kenneth Waltz, Man, the State 
and War: A Theoretical Analysis (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959); Kenneth Waltz, ‘The Stability of 
Bipolar World,’ Daedalus 93, no. 3 (1964): p. 881-909; Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading: 
Addison-Wesley Publishing, 1979); Charles L. Glaser, ‘Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help,’ 
International Security 19, no. 3 (1994-95): p. 50-90; Robert Jervis, ‘Realism in the Study of World Politics,’ 
International Organization 52, no. 4 (1998): p. 971-991; John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics 
(New York: WWW & Norton Company, 2001).  
 
55 See Fareed Zakaria, From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America’s World Role (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University, 1998); Gideon Rose, ‘Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,’ World Politics 51, 
issue 1 (1998): p. 144-172; Thomas Christensen, Useful Adversaries:Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and 
Sino-American Conflict, 1947-1958 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 1998); Randall L. Schweller, Deadly 
Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler’s Strategy of World Conquest (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998).  
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affairs to domestic government of each territorial unit with the principle of cuius regio, 
eius religio, the relations among these territorial units were assumed to be freed from the 
influence of religious ideas, norms, and identities. The relations among these territorial 
units were reduced to non-normative, non-ideational, materialistic and/or rational 
interest-based policy choices. Consequently, the international system was assumed to be 
a secular one, without religious ideas, identities, or norms playing any part in its 
formation. One challenge for the realist research paradigm in the post-Cold War period 
has been the rise in religious and ethno-religious conflicts. Due to its secular and 
materialistic ontology, the realist paradigm has unwittingly ignored religious and 
sectarian conflicts in the Middle East and Southeast Asia though.  
 
The liberal international relations scholarship has arguably challenged the 
Westphalian assumptions of domestic-international divide and the primacy of states as 
the actors of international system central to the realist thinking. Some liberal scholars 
stressed the relevance of non-state actors and international regimes,56 some others studied 
the linkage between the domestic and international,57 and yet others argued that regime 
and political leadership types determine the likelihood, magnitude, and severity of 
conflicts.58 These scholars’ challenge to the Westphalian principles was only limited to a 
few research topics though. Liberal IR scholars studied why international regimes were 
formed in certain issue areas but not in others; how multiple actors such as interest groups, 
political parties and political leaders with their multiple interests influence foreign policy 
outcomes; and why democracies rarely fight with one another.  In the meanwhile, a wider 
                                                
56 See Robert O. Keohane, After HegemonyCooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University, 1984); Stephen D. Krasner, ‘Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as 
Intervening Variables,’ International Organization 36, issue 2 (1982): p. 185-205; Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty: 
Organized Hypocricy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 1999); Ernst B. Haas, ‘On Systems and International 
Regimes,’ World Politics 27, issue 2 (1975): p. 147-174; Ernst B.Haas, ‘Why Collaborate? Issue-Linkage and 
International Regimes,’ World Politics 32, issue 3 (1980): p. 357-405.  
 
57 See Robert D. Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,’ International 
Organization 42, issue 3 (1988): p. 427-460; James D. Fearon, ‘Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of 
International Disputes,’ American Political Science Review 88, issue 3 (1994): p. 577-592; Graham Allison and Philip 
Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: Longman, 2nd edition, 1999).  
 
58 See John R. Oneal and Bruce Russett, ‘The Kantian Peace: The Pacific Benefits of Democracy, Interdependence, 
and International Organizations, 1885–1992,’ World Politics 52, issue 1 (1999): p. 1-37; William Dixon, ‘Democracy 
and the Peaceful Settlement of International Conflict,’ American Political Science Review 88, issue 1 (1994): p. 14-
32; Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Randolph M. Siverson, ‘War and the Survival of Political Leaders: A Comparative 
Study of Regime Types and Political Accountability,’ American Political Science Review 89, issue 4 (1995): p. 841-
855; Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, et. al., ‘Political Institutions, Policy Choice and the Survival of Leaders,’ British 
Journal of Political Science 32, issue 4 (2002): p. 559-590; Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, et. al., ‘Testing Novel 
Implications from the Selectorate Theory of War,’ World Politics 56, issue 3 (2004): p. 363-388.  
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range of domestic political dynamics such as the circularity of state-society relations, the 
differential impact of political ideologies, the distribution of power among political actors 
went largely unnoticed in the research of liberal scholars. A similar neglect is also 
observable in the study of religion. Like realism, the liberal paradigm assumed that the 
sovereign, territorial, autonomous states are secular when it comes to their relations with 
one another. Religious identity is assumed to have national rather than international 
implications, creating a supposedly secular international system. Therefore, the study of 
states with religious constitutions such as Saudi Arabia and Iran, religious political actors 
such as the Pope, religious non-state actors and movements such as Evangelicals and the 
Organization of Islamic Conference were left untouched by the liberal paradigm. Another 
possible research outlet for liberal scholars could be mapping out different church-state 
relations configurations across countries and how they would impact foreign policy 
decisions. However, the secular ontology of the liberal paradigm left such topics 
unexplored, restricting them to the domain of comparative politics.  
  
In contrast to realism and liberalism, the constructivist paradigm appeared to stand 
as a promising research paradigm to integrate religion into international politics. 
Constructivism’s emphasis on ideas, identities, and norms renders this paradigm a 
potential outlet for research on religious identities. However, the early constructivist work 
suffered from the same shortcoming as its realist and liberal counterparts did: the assumed 
secularism of the international system. When Wendt argued that international system is a 
social construction, his primary emphasis was on the constructed and ever-constructing 
nature of anarchy.59 He deconstructed the principles of sovereignty, self-help, rationality, 
and power politics inherent in the realist logic, implying that international change is 
possible if political actors and political scientists deconstruct their understanding of the 
international system. Another group of scholars problematize the international norms, 
their creation, dispersion, and influence the domestic politics of individual states.60 From 
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this research tradition flew a large collection of work on human rights norms, 
environmentalism, gender and conflict among others. Yet another group studies the 
emergence of a global civil society as distinct from a domestic civil society.61 While these 
areas pose a fertile ground for the inauguration of a constructivist research tradition 
integrating religion, the assumption of the secular international system and the restriction 
of religious identities to national borders thwarted such studies.   
 
The dominant epistemological and methodological contour of the IR field is 
another reason for the neglect of religion in the IR discipline. Epistemological discussions 
have traditionally had far-reaching impact on the evolution and growth of the IR 
discipline. As a matter of fact, two out of the three grand debates in the IR discipline are 
epistemological and methodological. One of these is the second debate, which reflects 
the behavioral revolution of 1960s in sociology and psychology and put empiricism at the 
heart of social science analysis. This debate questioned the validity of traditional 
interpretism and philosophical accounts that classical realists extensively relied upon for 
explaining conflict behavior. In its stead, the new generation IR scholars emphasized the 
use of empirical methods on the premises of verification, falsification and measurement 
across many cases. The collection of large conflict datasets such as the Correlates of War 
project marked the hallmark of this empiricist trend. With the second debate, IR has 
evolved towards a scientific enterprise, where empiricism, verification and falsification 
became the dominant norm for a scientific IR scholarship.  
 
The third debate further expanded the epistemological and methodological 
evolution of the IR discipline, which started with the second debate. During 1980s-1990s 
an epistemological debate between positivist and post-positivist IR scholarship 
dominated the field.62 Positivist scholarship is rooted in the assumption of an objective 
social reality and it aims to replicate the natural science methodologies to examine that 
reality. This scholarship is ontologically rationalist, meaning that there are observable 
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rational regularities in the social order and these regularities can be revealed by scientific 
methods. Positivism is characterized by a total refutation of metaphysics and of the study 
of non-observables. Accordingly, positivists are methodologically empiricists, with a 
strong emphasis on observation, techniques of verification and falsification, and on 
measurement. However, contrary to the deterministic nature of natural sciences, social 
science positivists are probabilistic. Acknowledging the complexity of the social reality, 
positivists aim to uncover general patterns of international behavior and law-like 
regularities rather than general laws. Methodologically, the empiricism of IR is often 
equated with quantitative techniques such as survey methods and statistics. However, the 
importation of agent-based modeling from microeconomics rendered game theory and 
rational choice popular in IR scholarship in recent years. Positivist scholarship is often 
defined as a problem-solving enterprise due to its strong emphasis on explaining the 
causes of international phenomena. Accordingly, positivist scholars seek to explain ‘why’ 
a certain phenomenon happens rather ‘what’ happens or ‘how’ it happens. Positivist IR 
scholarship has studied a wide range of observable international phenomena including 
material capabilities, conflict and cooperation patterns, and the establishment of 
international regimes, among others. Balance of power, theories of international 
cooperation and democratic peace are among noteworthy theoretical contributions of 
positivists to the IR field.  
  
The post-positivist scholarship departs from positivist scholarship with its 
assumption of a value-laden social order. The reality is not exempt from the agents’ 
perception and interpretation of it. Accordingly, the social reality is under a constant 
process of construction, re-construction and de-construction, which makes an objective 
and infallible scientific examination of international phenomena difficult to conduct. 
Therefore, seemingly scientific inquiry into international phenomena is theory-laden and 
subjective. The theory-ladenness of social reality foregrounds the post-positivists’ 
emphasis on the study of non-observables. The post-positivist IR scholars seek to uncover 
the patterns of construction, re-construction, and de-construction by examining the 
observable implications of non-observables. Their focus, therefore, is diverted towards 
the questions of “how’ and “what’, ignored by positivist scholars. The post-positivist 
focus on “how’ and “what’ questions traditionally foregrounds the “interpretive’ nature 
of this research program. Post-positivists counter this labeling though, arguing that the 
distinction between interpreting and explanation is not clear-cut and “what’ and “how’ 
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questions often serve as a first step for explaining “why’ an international phenomenon 
occurs. Methodologically, post-positivist scholarship is often criticized for lacking a 
rigorous set of scientific methods. However, the linguistic turn in IR, which brought 
language and the linguistic creation of norms and ethics to the center of post-positivist IR 
scholarship, made discourse analysis a widely-used method of investigation. Post-
positivist IR has contributed to IR scholarship with the study of international norms and 
ethics, Marxism, feminism, environmentalism, critical security studies, among others. 
However, most of this research is criticized by positivist scholars for comprising a less 
than rigorous, systematic and scientific research paradigm.  
 
The study of religion in IR scholarship falls at the center of this epistemological 
and methodological debate between positivists and post-positivists. The dominance of 
positivism in the American IR made religion a not-so-tenable topic to be studied for a 
number of reasons. First, the concept of religion is hard to define. The existing rationalist 
scholarship takes the conceptualization of religion for granted, narrowing it down to its 
19th century modernist understanding as belonging to the realm of ‘the sacred’ and as a 
binary to the realm of ‘the earthly’ and ‘the secular’ as put forward first by Weber and 
Durkheim.63 Such conceptualization pushed religion out of the study of politics, which is 
deemed to be an earthly and secular enterprise in modern times. Secondly, such a narrow 
conceptualization of religion creates operationalization and measurement problems for 
the predominantly positivist IR field. As religion assumingly belongs to the ‘sacred’ 
realm, it is deemed to be an ‘unobservable’ phenomenon by positivist scholars. The 
unobservable nature of religion pushed its study out of ontologically rationalist research 
traditions including realism and liberal IR. Methodologically, the measurement of this 
seemingly unobservable phenomenon stood uneasily with the dominance of large-N 
quantitative scholarship in IR.  
 
In a Smithian sense, the orientation of American international relations field 
towards an ontologically rationalist, epistemologically positivist, and methodologically 
quantitative social science discipline is the main reason for IR’s neglect of religion in 
world politics.64 A survey of realist, liberal, and constructivist scholarship shows that IR 
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discipline remained silent before the heightened relevance of religion in world politics. 
The study of religion was deemed to challenge the basic assumptions, premises and 
methodological orientation of these research programs and lead to scientific degeneration. 
Therefore, early studies on religion and world politics were theoretically hesitant, often 
in the form of under-theorized descriptive accounts mapping the resurgence of religion in 
global politics. Nevertheless, the very challenges religion posed to the basic ontological 
and epistemological orientation of IR opened a crack in the scholarship, where a fertile 
theoretical research ground flourished. A number of researchers made an attempt to 
problematize the concept of religion, while some others brought scholarly attention to 
how religion challenges the assumptions of the Westphalian order, including sovereignty, 
territoriality, and rationality. Ironically, the incorporation of religion to IR scholarship, 
which was feared to degenerate IR paradigms, soon proved to be a fertile research arena 
and enriched the IR field theoretically.     
 
 
 
2.2.  Religion and Realism  
 
 
 
Realism is often depicted as a paradigm supposedly most hostile to the study of 
religion in the IR discipline. While this line of thinking is justifiable to a certain extent, it 
mirrors a paradigmatic prejudice as well. Realism is occasionally treated as a monolithic 
paradigm, built on an already fixed and undisputed body of core assumptions and 
premises. The truth is that realism is a not a monolithic paradigm and its core assumptions 
have been the central point of debate by scholars both within and outside of the realist 
paradigm. Accordingly, a thorough examination of different realist off-shoots is needed 
for an understanding of their take on religion in world politics. This thesis concentrates 
on classical realism, structural realism, and neo-classical realism for the purposes of this 
examination.  
 
Classical realism is based on four main assumptions about international 
interaction: 1) nation-states are the primary actors of world politics, 2) states are unitary 
actors, meaning the state speaks with one voice when it comes to foreign policy decisions, 
3) the international system is one of anarchy, where there is no legitimate central 
authority, 4) states’ ultimate objective in this anarchic international system is to achieve 
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power and/or security, 5) therefore, they engage in a rational cost-benefit analysis in 
foreign policy decision-making processes. These five basic assumptions are not refuted 
by structural realists, although they are not shared by their neo-classical counterpart. What 
differentiates classical realists from structural realists however is the level of analysis. In 
Waltzian terms, classical realism is a ‘first image’ theory, which presumes that individuals 
are the main cause of international conflict.65 The causes of wars are rooted in the nature 
of statesmen and foreign policy decision-makers, or more deeply, in the human nature 
itself.66 Waltzian first image is consistent with Morgenthau’s account of classical realism. 
Morgenthau sees human nature as the root cause of all foreign policy decisions and 
conflict.67 He argues that anarchy creates a constant fear of indeterminacy and insecurity 
for its constituencies. In a Hobbesian sense, the ultimate aim of individuals in anarchy is 
security and survival. Individuals’ fear of insecurity and instinct for survival is 
compensated by their lust for power. The end result is their constant engagement in self-
interested behavior to achieve power.  
 
 Morgenthau’s emphasis on ‘human nature’ as the root cause of war indicates that 
immaterial factors act as a background condition or as an independent variable shaping 
state behavior in classical realism.68 The ‘first image’ factor that shapes foreign policy in 
Morgenthau’s classical realism is the psychology, characteristics, and perceptions of 
individual statesmen. Individuals’ psychology, weak dispositions, and prejudices can lead 
to miscalculated and unsound foreign policy decisions including conflict. Morgenthau’s 
‘first image’ theory indicates that classical realism is not theoretically prejudiced against 
immaterial factors that can play a role in the making of foreign policy. To the contrary, 
the individual-level analysis opens a space for the integration of culture, identity and 
religion into classical realism. The religious identity of key foreign policy-makers can 
lead to the formulation of a cooperation scheme among states and/or non-state actors 
sharing a religious identity. For example, the religious revolutionary ideology of 
Ayatollah Khomeini might be the primary reason for Iran’s support to Shiite Hezbollah 
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in Lebanon. Similarly, religious identity of statesmen and foreign policy makers may also 
shape their perceptions of threat and security, when a confronting state is of a different 
religious identity. The Sunni-Shiite distinction between Saudi Arabian and Iranian 
leadership is often attributed as a factor driving their foreign policy behavior towards each 
other.        
 
Reinhold Niebuhr’s Moral Man and Immoral Society (1932) illustrates a more 
direct discussion on the relationship between religious ethics and politics. As a Christian 
theologian, Niebuhr questions to what extent Christian religion and faith can help build a 
just and perfectly functioning society. His most basic contribution is his argument that 
faith might improve individual lives, while individual morality disappears when it is 
collectivized at the level of large groups and nations.69 First, he argues that Christian 
religion creates a sense of fallible and imperfect human being, who is afflicted with the 
original sin as opposed to an almighty and infallible God. The idea of fallible, guilty, 
powerless human being might lead people to assume that they do not have the capacity 
to find solutions to political and social problems.70 The religious idealists and 
sentimentalists fall into a sense of ‘defeatism,’ where they believe all the injustice, 
inequality, slavery, and wars are a part of God’s ‘natural law’ on earth for the sinful men.71 
Therefore, the religious idealists do not make any attempts to improve society. Secondly, 
while human egotism might be overcome with the Christian ideals of love and 
compassion, groups lack the capacity to transcend self-interests and observe sympathy 
for outsiders. This un-transcended egotism will manifest itself as inter-group conflict. 
Therefore, Niebuhr sees society as in a state of constant clash and conflict in a Hobbesian 
sense. Social/political groups with strength and numerical majority subsume others that 
lie on the lower levels of socio-political hierarchy. The only way to govern the relations 
between groups is politics and coercion, and not religious ethics. Both Morgenthau and 
Niebuhr implicitly share the conclusion that religion should not be integrated into 
political decision-making processes. In Morgenthau’s analysis, religion can be seen as a 
factor fueling statesmen’s prejudices against states with a different religious affiliation, 
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which may lead to miscalculated foreign policy decisions. In a similar vein, Niebuhr 
adopts the Augustinian metaphor of ‘city of God’ versus ‘city of man,’ where the latter is 
and should be governed by the politics of coercion. In that sense, Niebuhr is a realist and 
defies the role of religion as a problem-solving agent in world politics.  
 
The assumption of ‘rationality’ in classical realism also deserves a thorough 
analysis. The lust for power is a constant and interests are a function of power in 
Morgenthau’s theory. However, the question of ‘interests’ in classical realism stands 
among the most debated and misconceived issues in the IR literature. Morgenthau’s 
discussion of ethics in international politics can possibly better illuminate the issue of 
interests in realism. Morgenthau’s conception of ethics is informed by Machiavelli’s 
‘political’ ethics as opposed to ‘private’ ethics.72 The political ethics in a Machiavellian 
sense is the ethics of responsibility. The ruler should pursue interests that are compatible 
with the ultimate security of his constituency. Any means to this end is justified, be it 
peace or war. Machiavellian private ethics, on the other hand, is Christian morality, where 
Christian ideals of peace, love and compassion are employed for the purposes of a healthy 
government of societies and policies. Machiavelli argues that a good ruler does not and 
should not pursue his private Christian ideals, but ‘political ethics’ to secure the ultimate 
interests of his people. Morgenthau borrows Machiavellian ‘political ethics’ and ‘ethics 
of responsibility’ in his discussion of Realpolitik in international relations. In an 
anarchical international system where the states’ ultimate interest is survival and security, 
statesmen should pursue certain hard power objectives. In other words, the ‘rationality of 
interests’ is traditionally associated with some easily measurable, ‘materialized’ 
objectives in the broader rationalist IR scholarship. As a result, the attainment of military 
capabilities and hard power stand at the core of classical realism. Classical realists even 
left out economic objectives from power equation, seeing it as an issue of ‘lower politics.’   
     
What is left out in the broader rationalist paradigm is that rational interests can be 
achieved through the employment of immaterial means/objectives. If religious identity 
might serve to achieve a foreign policy objective, the statesman can choose to build his 
policy on religious and ideological affinity with other states. Iran’s political and military 
support for the Shiite government in Syria and Hezbollah in Lebanon might be seen as 
                                                
72 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, passim.  
 49	
	
rational decision to bolster Iran’s power position and to balance the heavily Sunni-
dominated states in the region. Religion along this line of thought is ‘a functional tool’ to 
achieve security and power. The ‘substantive’ core of religion, i.e. its doctrine, does not 
play any role in its adoption as a functional tool. Rather, it is the common ‘religious 
identity’ that counts as a tool for rational cost-benefit analysis. In other words, religion 
can be incorporated into classical realism as a functional tool, shaping statesmen’s cost-
benefit calculations in the process of foreign policy making. The incorporation of religion 
into classical realism as a functional tool does not challenge the rationality assumption, 
hence not leading to paradigm degeneration. The functionality of religion in conflict 
settings is also embraced by Fox in his discussion of ethno-religious conflicts.73 He argues 
that there are three paths religion might have an impact on foreign policy making 
processes. First, religious orientation of policy-makers can determine the types of policies 
in a conflict situation. Secondly, religion might give legitimacy for support or opposition 
to the government. And thirdly, it can transform local issues to international issues.74 Of 
these, Fox seems to give more weight to legitimacy as the primary function of religion in 
driving the course of ethno-religious conflicts, which is akin to the instrumentalist logic 
of classical realism.  
 
While classical realism is open to incorporate religion, structural realism has less 
of a theoretical space to do so.  Structural realism is based on three basic assumptions 
about world politics: 1) international system as anarchy, 2) states as rational unitary 
actors, 3) power maximization and/or security as the ultimate goal. In an anarchic 
international system, states resort to self-help measures to ensure their survival. Structural 
realists tend to associate self-help with conflictual behavior and competition. There is a 
general pessimism about the prospects for cooperation in structural realism due to the 
problem of relative gains and the possibility of cheating. Correspondingly, states 
constantly vie for military advantages and aver from reducing their military capabilities. 
The central point of distinction between classical realism and structural realism is the 
level of analysis though, rather than the possibility for conflict and cooperation. In 
Waltzian terms, structural realism is a ‘third image’ theory, which presumes that the 
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attributes of the international structure are the main cause of international conflict.75 The 
causes of wars are not rooted in ‘human nature’ and the individual characteristics, 
psychology, and perceptions of statesmen, but in the anarchic international structure.76 
Structural theories share the assumption that the sum is more than its parts. Comparably, 
structural realism argues that the international structure is more than the agents 
comprising it. The relative distribution of power within the system determines the 
statesmen’s policy decisions.  
 
Structuralist scholars have employed various indicators to measure balance of 
power within the system. Some scholars focused on the number of great powers within 
the system, or system polarity.77 Waltz argued that bipolar systems, where there are great 
powers with relatively equal capabilities in the system, are easy to manage conflicts and 
agreements.78 Bipolar systems are more stable and predictable. As one state increases its 
capabilities, the other will respond the same way. Adventurism by the client states is 
mitigated by two great powers who behave as system managers. On the other hand, in 
systems where there are three or more great powers, dangers are diffused, responsibilities 
are unclear, and definitions of vital interests are easily obscured. While sharing Waltzian 
line of thought, Mearsheimer categorizes multipolar systems as balanced and unbalanced 
multipolarities depending on the existence of a potential hegemon.79 He further elaborates 
that a potential hegemon generates spirals of fear within the system, aggravating military 
build-up and making the system unstable. Some scholars also examined the influence of 
system polarity on war duration, frequency, severity, and magnitude. Hopf argues that 
bipolar systems are less severe, less frequent, and less violent compared to multipolar 
systems.80 Some other scholars shifted the focus from system polarization to power 
concentration, i.e. capabilities and size of states, within the system. Siverson and Sullivain 
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found that diffuse and even distribution of capabilities is linked to higher occurrence of 
war.81 Mansfield found that there is an inverted U-shaped relationship between 
concentration of power and war.82 Middle-level concentration is more linked to war. 
Finally, Glaser argued that the balance between offensive and defensive capabilities will 
determine the likelihood of conflict or cooperation as a self-help measure in the anarchic 
international system.83  
 
Whether it is system polarization or power concentration, structural realism offers 
a rather mechanical understanding of foreign policy making. Statesmen do not seem to 
have many policy options, because the structure is rigid and individual statesmen do not 
have much control on the structure. Rather, it is the international system that works as a 
constraint on the statesmen’s policy decisions. Moreover, the defining element of the 
international system is power in a material sense, which is measured by military 
capabilities. Accordingly, structural realists do not talk about any non-material aspect of 
the international system, such as ideas and identities, which makes the incorporation of 
religion into structural realism difficult. However, Sandal and James list a few studies 
exemplifying some points of intersection between structural realism and religion.84 They 
refer to Posen’s work (1993) on ethnic conflict, in which they argue that the collapse of 
the multi-ethnic states leads to a domestic anarchy comparable to international anarchy.85 
Ethnic communities’ behavior in a domestic anarchy is also comparable to what states do 
internationally, such as balancing and employing self-help measures for survival. Posen, 
in other words, is using the neorealist terminology including balance of power and 
security dilemma to analyze ethnic conflicts, which might inspire work on religious 
conflicts as well.86 Another scholarship Sandal and James refer to is Walt’s (1987) 
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‘balance of threat’ theory.87 According to Walt, not only states’ power positions, but also 
their perception of other states’ intentions shapes their international behavior. They either 
balance or bandwagon states that are not only powerful, but also those they perceive to 
be threatening. Religion can easily be incorporated into this scholarship as a factor 
shaping threat perceptions. One can hypothesize that religious differences may function 
as a source of threat for states, which may determine their foreign policy behavior. While 
these examples may inspire research to incorporate religion into structural realism, this 
research paradigm makes less room for religion due to its level of analysis. Religion can 
be incorporated into this paradigm if the concept and the nature of ‘international structure’ 
are opened to discussion. However, the concept is taken for granted in structural realism 
and the studies deconstructing the concept are already within the constructivist paradigm. 
Therefore, studies analyzing the religious underpinnings of the international system 
would be expected from the constructivist paradigm.  
 
Structural realism has been largely criticized for the disconnection between the 
international structure and individual foreign policies of states.88 As discussed above, 
structural realism is a mechanical theory of inter-state behavior. Theoretically, the 
characteristics of the system are the independent variable, automatically determining the 
likelihood for war or peace. What is lost in this cause-effect relationship is how system 
polarization or the concentration of capabilities within the system is translated into 
specific foreign policy decisions. As a result, several scholars calling themselves 
neoclassical realists brought the state back into the analysis. Neoclassical realism is 
commonly designated as a ‘second image’ theory of realism, where states’ characteristics 
act as an independent variable in the analysis. For example, replacing the balance of 
power with ‘balance of interests,’ Schweller argues that interests precede power and 
power is determined upon preferences.89 His interest-based explanation is further 
elaborated by his categorization of states according to their preferences and intentions 
such as jackals, wolves, lions, and lambs. The individual state behavior is determined by 
these state categorizations. Jackals and wolves pursue a revisionist foreign policy, where 
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they attempt to re-shape the system in accordance with their individual preferences. 
Lambs and lions are, on the other hand, status-quo states, which benefit from the current 
functioning of the system. In a similar vein, Van Evera brings perceptions and 
misperceptions by statesmen of interaction with other states as a factor shaping foreign 
policy.90 War is more likely when there is a perception of diplomatic threatening, 
hostility, windows of vulnerability, or the belief that conquest is easy.  
 
Neoclassical realism as a second-image theory might open a fertile research outlet 
for religion. One possibility would be examining the conflict behavior of individual states 
or dyads with varying religion-state relations. Fox’ work on the configurations of religion 
and state can be informing in this respect.91 Fox attempts to re-conceptualize the relations 
between religion and government across 175 cases by examining multiple indicators such 
as the presence of an official religion, preferential treatment of certain religions, the 
treatment of religious minorities, and the government regulation of the majority religion. 
The result is a composite index of ‘government intervention to religion’ (GIR), collected 
from data on countries between 1990 and 2002.92 Fox finds that multiple types of 
secularism exist across the modern world and he supports his thesis with individual case 
studies. Fox’ dataset can be used to examine whether a specific type of GIR is more highly 
correlated with conflict behavior than others. Fox does not apply GIR to the study of 
conflict patterns within realism, although he produced an influential body of scholarship 
on religious conflicts within the liberalist paradigm.  
 
Independent from its level of analysis, the realist paradigm is ontologically 
rationalist and epistemologically positivist. To reveal the rational law-like regularities 
among phenomena, realist scholars have largely turned to empiricist epistemologies with 
large-N quantitative methodologies. In the recent years, scholars working on religion 
within the rationalist and positivist paradigms including realists have collected large 
datasets to gauge the relationship between religious identity and conflict patterns. Maoz 
and Henderson introduce the World Religion Data under the Correlates of War Project, 
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which classifies religions and religion families and provides information about the 
number of followers for each classification.93 Maoz and Henderson also reveal 
descriptive statistics on religious similarity, conflict and alliance patterns. They find that 
religiously similar dyads have a higher probability of forming alliances when compared 
to dyads with dissimilar religions.94 In a similar vein, religiously similar states are more 
likely than religiously dissimilar ones in committing to their alliances.95 A surprising note 
though is that the probability of conflict between religiously similar dyads is not very 
different than religiously dissimilar dyads.96  
 
Some major large-N studies examining the relationship between religion and 
conflict were produced within the realist paradigm on a variety of themes. Fox (2005, 
2007) and Fox and Sandler (2004) tries to test Huntington’s ‘clash of civilization’ theory 
across his religion and conflict dataset, and finds that wars are not driven by civilizational 
differences as Huntington claims but by religious differences.97 If it were driven by 
civilizational differences, we would see a heightened amount of conflict among states, 
but a majority of the conflicts are in the post-Cold War period. Finding a religious pattern 
in the nature of conflicts, Fox also studies whether some religions are more conflict-prone 
than others.98 The increasing number of conflicts in the MENA region as well as the rise 
of Islamic fundamentalism has created an image of Islam being more conflict-prone than 
other religions. Fox refutes this image to a certain extent with his findings are Christians 
are more involved in conflicts, while Muslims enter more intra-religious conflicts 
compared to their proportion size.99 The domestic and intra-state nature of conflicts 
worldwide has moved the scholars of religious conflict towards the study of ethnic 
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conflicts and hence the liberalist paradigm. Fox et. al. examined the states’ behavior of 
intervention into ethnic conflicts elsewhere and finds that Islamic states are more likely 
to intervene into other states where religious minorities are at risk.100 Similarly, Toft 
analyzes the relationship between religion and civil wars. She finds that 30 % of civil 
wars between 1940 and 2000 are rooted in religion and religious civil wars are more 
violent and prolonged than non-religious ones.101 Toft argues that the type of the religious 
belief matters, as most religious civil wars happened in the Islamic societies. The 
quantitative analysis of religion found its place also Toft, Philpott, and Shah’s study on 
diverse empirical themes of the 21st century including inter-religious and intra-religious 
civil wars and mediation by religious actors.102   
 
While revealing correlations and patterns between religion and other phenomena, 
the large-N quantitative analysis of religion, the realist scholarship of religion and conflict 
does not necessarily explain what role religion plays in these conflicts. Notwithstanding 
the rationalist ontology of the realist scholarship seems to bode well with the 
instrumentalist accounts of religion, where religion is used as a tool for justifying other 
non-religious, often political, economic, and military concerns. According to the realist 
logic, a state can instrumentalize its religious affiliation with minorities in another state 
to justify its military and political intervention there. In a similar vein, a state may refer 
to religious doctrinal reasons for arming religious non-state actors with similar religious 
affiliation. The substantive core of religion, including the religious belief, doctrine and 
law, does not become the primary reason for religious foreign policy. However, how 
religion influences world politics is a matter of discussion even for some rationalist 
scholars. Fox and Sandler argue that religion can influence foreign policy in several 
ways.103 First, religion can act as an identity, but Fox and Sandler argue that the 
scholarship subscribing to religion as a source of identity argument is not clear on how 
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that identity influences policies specifically.104 In other words, what makes religion 
different from an ethnic and national identity is not clearly defined by this scholarship. 
Some scholars focus on religion’s potential to provide a secure identity to the 
individual,105 some others highlight religion’s influence on justifying certain ethnic and 
national ambitions,106 yet others emphasize religious identities per se for the rise of 
religious fervor as in the case of religious terrorism.107 Secondly, religion as a belief and 
faith system and the level of religiosity can motivate followers for a religious foreign 
policy.108 Thirdly, religious doctrines and theology can motivate policy-makers to adopt 
them for justifying specific policies.109 The differentiation between influence of religious 
belief and of doctrines is that most religions contain multiple and often contradictory 
doctrines among which policy-makers choose the most relevant ones in justifying their 
specific actions. As such, while religious the substantive core of religion drives the 
foreign policy, the specifically chosen doctrines among many others become a tool for 
justifying non-religions policy concerns.110 Religious institutions are another source of 
influence, where they can either help mass mobilization or act as an authority.111 The final 
influence of religion, which Fox and Sandler highlight the most among all, is its 
legitimization capacity.112 Religion can be instrumentalized by policy-makers to justify 
any kind of policy. Religion as a justification tool seems to be embraced as an assumption, 
rather than as a hypothesis to be tested across empirical data, within the rationalist 
scholarship due to the ontological premises of this paradigm. Most of the large-N 
quantitative realist scholarships listed above do not seek to test hypotheses about the 
different functions of religion in foreign policy making though. Upcoming research on 
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religion within the realist paradigm should go beyond merely tracing correlations between 
religious affiliation and conflict behavior and examine the functions of religion in policy-
making processes. 
 
Besides realism’s shortcoming for explaining why and/or under what conditions 
religion becomes a tool, its basic assumptions can also be questioned with an attempt to 
open a theoretical space for the study of religion within this paradigm. Rationality 
assumption deserves an in-depth discussion for being the most uncompromising 
assumption towards religion. Rationality is one of the most misunderstood concepts in 
social analyses. Within rational-choice scholarship, which has informed most scholarship 
within realism and liberalism, rationality means that actors have fixed set of preferences, 
and they act strategically and instrumentally to maximize the chances of attaining their 
preferences. The relationships among actors is a strategic game, which is informed by the 
context within which they are acting, other actors’ preferences and preference ordering, 
and their level of information thereupon. Rational choice theory does not dwell on the 
content of the preferences though; the nature and the characteristics of the preferences are 
left untouched. Rationality in this sense is a decision-making methodology only, cost-
benefit calculus being the core of this methodology. However, realism has tended to attach 
a specific content to rationality informed upon its specific ontology while adopting 
rational-choice theory. Accordingly, realist scholarship has often equated rationality with 
political, economic, and military benefits. The realist scholarship ignored the possibility 
that the milieu of strategic interaction could be influenced by ideas, perceptions and 
identities of the specific actors involved in the game. In a similar vein, the preferences 
can also be influenced by the ideas, perceptions, and identities of the actors. If rationality 
is a decision-making methodology rather than a content, then the classical and neo-
classical variants of realism can study how religious ideas and identities can influence the 
interaction-setting, preference orderings, and their behavioral outcomes.  
 
Another concept to be analyzed in relation to religion is the very concept of 
‘power.’ Power in the realist thinking is predominantly associated with material 
capabilities. The size of a state’s military capabilities can determine a state’s power 
position in the international system, the distribution of power, and alliance patterns 
according to the classical realist and neorealist logic. Ideas and ideologies are often left 
out of the calculations of ‘power’ though. If ideas, beliefs, ideologies are found to be 
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relevant for state behavior, their influence is deemed to be ‘soft’ at best and is often 
covered by Nye’s concept of ‘soft power.’ Realists might tend to see religion as a soft 
power in international politics; however, the rising relevance of religion in the 
international scene in the last couple of decades shows that the power of religion is more 
than ‘soft.’ The political transformations sweeping the world for the last forty years are 
political revolutions with religious contours or religious civil wars, which is far from 
being ‘soft.’ To the contrary, religion might act as a ‘hard power’ in a number of ways. 
First, the influence a state derives from ideas, beliefs, norms, and ideologies can outweigh 
its power derived from military capabilities. For example, a state might exert more 
influence over another state by supporting co-religionists than by threatening through 
missile capabilities. Secondly, the power of ideas can be translated into military power as 
well. The religious beliefs and narratives about ‘the right socio-political order’ can help 
mobilize populations for the purposes of establishing that order. Religion is translated 
into ‘hard power’ when this mobilization has a military nature. The rise of religious armed 
groups is a case in point here, where either the threats to a specific religious identity 
become a motivation for armed mobilization, or the motivation to establish ‘a right order’ 
as specified by a faith tradition may be the driving factor for the establishment of powerful 
ideological armies. Thirdly, sharing a common religion may be a motivating factor for 
forging alliances. Alliances with co-religionist states and non-state actors can augment a 
state’s power in international politics. In short, despite the non-accommodative attitude 
of realism towards religion, the integration of this concept into the study of various IR 
assumptions and concepts such as power, rationality, and alliances can open up a fertile 
research area studying the recent developments in international politics.    
 
 
 
2.3.  Religion and Liberalist Paradigm 
 
 
 
The liberalist international relations paradigm is often depicted as the continuation 
of idealism/utopianism. Like idealism, liberalism is more optimistic about world politics 
compared to realism. It holds that world politics is not exclusively about conflict and 
security and that peace is achievable. The relations among states are not only about the 
attainment of military prowess, but economics also play a major role in shaping inter-
state interactions. States need both military capabilities and economic development to 
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ensure their survival. The destructive capacity of war often poses a threat to economic 
development. Therefore, the cost of war might be more than its benefits under certain 
circumstances, making it a not-so-feasible self-help tool to employ. Moreover, states are 
more interdependent than ever in an economically interconnected and highly globalized 
world. Therefore, a conflict in one part of the world also has the potential to disrupt the 
processes of economic development and security in other regions. What follows is that 
cooperation is not impossible and there is ample room for inter-state cooperation within 
the system.  
 
Like realism, liberalism also sees states as primary actors of international politics. 
However, following idealism’s emphasis on the League of Nations, liberalism also gives 
considerable attention to non-state actors. Inter-governmental organizations, international 
non-governmental organizations, multinational corporations, individuals, political elites, 
domestic political parties, etc. are extensively studied with respect to their role in conflict 
and cooperation by liberalist scholars. Despite such distinguishing characteristics, it is 
difficult to talk about a homogenous list of liberalist assumptions and propositions 
though. Liberalism is perhaps the most eclectic IR paradigm embodying diverse 
assumptions, propositions, and topics of study. Liberalist paradigm has generated a very 
diverse area of research including theories of international cooperation, institutionalism, 
globalization, transnationalism, integration, process-based decision-making, democratic 
peace, and complex interdependence among others. Two liberalist theories worth 
mentioning with respect to religion are neoliberal institutionalism and foreign policy 
decision-making models. 
 
Neoliberal institutionalism is a structural and strategic theory of international 
cooperation. Like structural realism, neoliberal institutionalism is also a third image 
theory. It shares structural realism’s assumption that international system is anarchic and 
the anarchic international system shapes individual states’ behavior. Oye observes that 
cooperation among states in such a system is more prevalent than conflict and explains 
how cooperation is possible and can be made possible in an anarchic system.113 He argues 
that international interaction is not a one-shot game but an iterated one. There is an 
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expectation for future interaction, i.e. ‘the shadow of future,’ which increases the chances 
for present cooperation. He extensively employs a game-theoretical language to detail 
how the cost-benefit calculation determines the moves in this strategic interaction. Like 
structural realism, neoliberal institutionalism is also a rational theory of international 
interaction. Keohane argues that it is not norms, ideas, or identities that drive states 
towards cooperation.114 Rather, cooperation should be understood as an extension of 
individual self-interest calculation. In a liberal contractarian sense, inter-state contracts 
are possible when the benefits of cooperation surpass its costs. This is also where the role 
of international institutions enters in calculation. While states are still the primary actors 
of international interaction, international institutions increase the chances of cooperation 
by shaping the cost-benefit analysis. Grieco argues that institutions reduce verification 
costs, create iterativeness, and make the punishment of cheaters in the international 
system.115 In other words, regimes make it more rational to cooperate by lowering the 
likelihood of being double-crossed. International regimes do not substitute for 
reciprocity; but they reinforce and institutionalize it.  
 
At first sight, the neoliberal institutionalist logic seems to make little room for the 
incorporation of religion into this research program. Liberal contractarian logic seems to 
overwhelm the program’s approach towards institutions. International cooperation and 
regime formation are seen from the lens of rational self-interest, constant game, and 
bargaining. Like structural realism, interests are assumed to be material, either in a 
military or economic sense. Therefore, religious norms and identities could not find a 
theoretical space in the writings of neoliberal institutionalist scholars. Nevertheless, some 
scholars have emphasized that norms and perceptions can change the contextual logic of 
interaction. Axelrod and Keohane’s study reconciling structuralist accounts of 
cooperation with a contextual understanding is informing in this respect.116 They argue 
that factors such as the number of players within the system, the pay-off structure, and 
the shadow of the future shape the structure in which cooperation will occur. However, 
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the possibility of cooperation between two states within this structure is further impacted 
by the context of norms and perceptions of institutions. In a similar vein, Axelrod 
incorporates cognitive processes into his later research on why some institutions decay, 
while others flourish.117 He argues that the psychological factor of ‘boldness’ is the key 
factor for defection, while ‘vengeance’ is the key for punishing those defectors. There is 
an inverse relationship between vengeance and boldness, as when vengeance rises, 
boldness drops. However, vengeance comes with the cost of enforcement. When 
enforcement cost is high, vengeance drops and boldness increases, leading to norm decay. 
Axelrod and Keohane’s contributions to neoliberal institutionalist logic with the inclusion 
of norms, perceptions, and cognitive processes can open up a space for the study of 
religion within this research program. For example, institutionalist scholars can study the 
role of transnational religious actors such as The Catholic Church or The Organization of 
Islamic Conference (OIC) in shaping conflict and cooperation likelihood. A research on 
how OIC can shape the cost-benefit calculation of its members in their interaction with 
one another through shared Islamic identity can be a contribution to the literature.  
 
Some neoliberal concepts can directly relate to the study of religion. One such 
concept is Nye’s ‘soft power,’ by which he means influencing the preferences of others 
by the use of non-material means.118 A state’s soft power can rest on three sources: 
culture, political legitimacy, and moral authority.119 A state can use these sources to 
achieve the foreign policy objectives it aims to achieve. The concept of soft power is not 
limited to states though, and it can theoretically be generalized to the study of non-state 
actors. For example, transnational religious actors such as The Catholic Church, the 
Organization of Islamic Conference, and terrorist networks such as Al-Qaeda and ISIL 
can be analyzed with respect to their legitimacy, authority and influence on states and 
other non-state actors. Recently several domestic Islamist groups in different Middle 
Eastern states have paid allegiance to ISIL, which can be analyzed with the concept of 
soft power within the neorealist logic. Haynes’ work on transnational religious actors and 
soft power is an important contribution to the study of religion within neoliberal paradigm 
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in this context.120 Haynes examines several transnational religious actors including 
American Evangelical Protestants, Roman Catholics, the Organization of the Islamic 
Conference, Sunni fundamentalist groups such as al-Qaeda and Lashkar-e-Taiba, and 
transnational Shia networks such as Hezbollah with respect to their role in international 
politics. Haynes concludes that these actors attempt to use their religious identity and 
ideology to achieve their political ends. Their employment of religious soft power has a 
transformative effect on the international order.  
 
While neoliberalism can make room for the study of religion as discussed above, 
its emphasis on the structure and rationality assumptions restricts the range of this 
research. Like structural realism, neoliberal institutionalism sees the international 
structure as one of anarchy. The structure is operationalized on material terms, i.e. the 
distribution of military and economic power. Ideational factors such as religion have no 
role in the ordering of this structure. This partly follows from an assumption shared by 
structuralist IR theories that international and domestic realms are separate from one 
another and religion belongs to the domestic realm in the modern understanding of the 
international system. However; another brand of liberalism transcends this assumption of 
domestic-international separation and focuses on the linkage between these two realms 
instead. Referred to as linkage politics, this brand of liberalism examines how domestic 
characteristics of states and the order of the international system often interacts with one 
another to shape foreign policy processes.  
 
Putnam’s ‘logic of two-level games’ is the highlight of this scholarship, where he 
assumes that states are not unitary actors and decision-makers are constrained by both 
domestic and international pressures simultaneously.121 Foreign policy decisions on 
waging wars, forming of alliances, and signing of treaties is the result of a bargaining 
process both at the international and domestic level. Putnam demonstrates that the chief 
negotiators are engaged in a two-level game. In Level 1, bargaining takes place among 
chief negotiators at the international level. In Level 2, the discussions take place within 
each constituency whether the agreement should be ratified and if it is to be ratified under 
what terms. Putnam contends that any agreement at Level 1 should fall inside Level 2 
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win-sets of each of the parties to the bargaining process. The size of the win-sets in each 
party to the accord matters. The larger the win-set, the better the chances are for reaching 
an agreement since a smaller win-set may cause what Putnam calls as involuntary 
defection, i.e. chief negotiators’ inability to deliver a bargain due to difficulties at the 
second level. The larger the win-set of one party relative to the other, the higher the 
chances are to be pushed around by other Level 1 negotiators. Moreover, a smaller win-
set relative to your opponents can be a relative advantage. This last point implies that 
democratic governments have an upper hand in international negotiations, as the 
multiplicity of domestic actors in democratic polities constrains the chief negotiator, who 
in turn can use these constraints to further push for his position at the international level.  
 
Allison’s bureaucratic politics model is another landmark theory of second-image 
liberalism, which he employs in analyzing the Cuban missile crisis. According to Allison 
‘each national government is a complex arena for intra-national games,’ where ‘the 
decision maker of national policy is not one calculating individual but rather a 
conglomerate of large organizations and political actors.’122 It is the ongoing bargains, 
tugs-of-war and struggles amongst formal actors that ultimately affect a state’s foreign 
policy. Allison argues that ‘most of the players participate in foreign policy decision 
making via their roles’ and positions in the government.123 The particular positions define 
the players’ preferences, interests, capabilities and responsibilities. Therefore, it becomes 
natural for actors to bring the perspectives and interests of their own organization or 
position.124 There are three analytically distinguishable factors that shape a player’s 
perceptions, preferences and standpoints. First, actors have parochial priorities which 
make them sensitive to their organization’s interests and orientation.125 Second, personal 
and domestic interests play an important role in making decisions on foreign policy 
issues.126 Third, stakes are shaped by each player’s understanding of what the national or 
organizational interest might be. The domestic-level interest formation and conflicts of 
interests generate foreign policy outcomes.  
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The logic of two-level games and the bureaucratic politics tradition as examples 
of second-image liberalism might seem to generate a more fertile research outlet for the 
study of religion compared to neoliberal institutionalism. However, the inherent 
secularism of the liberalist paradigm manifests itself also in its second-image brand. 
Second-image liberalism is theoretically rooted in one track theory of modernization, 
which assumes that the rationalized bureaucratized state, capitalist market, liberal 
economy will be accompanied by secularization. Adopting the Western model of 
modernization, liberalism sets itself apart from the intricacies of multiple modernities. 
Nevertheless, a few scholars of religion and IR have produced influential work within 
this domain. In his study of under what conditions domestic religious actors resort to 
democratic means or violence, Philpott argues that the type of secularism, i.e. the 
institutional arrangement of church-state relations is a determining factor.127 He 
categorizes church-state relations as ‘high-differentiated’ versus ‘low-integrationalist’ in 
degree, and as ‘consensual’ and ‘conflictual’ in kind. Accordingly, in high-differentiated 
societies there can be high levels of violence if the relationship between the church and 
the state is conflictual such as in Communist Poland and Kemalist Turkey. However, if 
the relationship between the two is consensual, the likelihood of resorting to democratic 
methods increases as in the USA. In the same scholarship, Philpott also introduces the 
concept of ‘political theology,’ which he defines as ‘a set of ideas that a religious authority 
holds about legitimate political authority.’128 Political theology approach asks such 
questions as who possess the political authority in a polity, what are the obligations of the 
state in advancing justice and promoting religious faith, and what religious believers 
should do for the state.129 Philpott’s political theology approach is a rather actor-based 
theory and it seeks to understand how the ideas of religious and non-religious actors about 
the church-state relationships might influence policy making processes. There are 
multiple ways how political theologies might come into existence. An actor with a 
specific political theology such as Islamic Sharia, might change the institutional 
arrangement of church-state relations after coming to power. Alternatively, a religious 
group might develop their political theology after achieving political and institutional 
power. Political theologies might also be rooted in centuries old ideational and political 
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processes. In either case, religious ideas and institutions are in constant interaction, 
shaping the policy outcomes. Philpott’s political theology approach can be employed in 
examining states and/or sub-state religious actors’ patterns of alliance formation with 
religious fundamentalist groups elsewhere. Why do some states sponsor ISIL and the 
fundamentalist opposition groups in Syria while others do not? Similarly, political 
theology approach can also help liberalist IR scholars tract the changes in states’ general 
foreign policy orientations after religious political parties assume power. 
  
Another line of research connecting second-image liberalism with the study of 
religion is the study of foreign policy making processes. Warner and Walker develop an 
ambitious foreign policy model depicting the role of religion in foreign policy making. 
Warner and Walker treat religion not as an individual factor, but rather as a 
‘framework.’130 This framework consists of six conceptual boxes borrowing from 
liberalism, realism, constructivism, and institutionalist theory: geopolitical position 
(power); domestic culture or heritage (ideas and culture); public opinion, interest groups 
and parties (interests); and organizations and state structures (institutions). Geopolitical 
position might either influence institutions and interests, indirectly shaping foreign policy 
decisions, or directly determine foreign policy decisions. Ideas and culture has a similar 
weight on interests and institutions. However, the causal arrow runs both ways, as the 
institutional setting and public opinion can also shape religious ideas, which might in turn 
be translated into foreign policy decisions. Warner and Walker argue that the causal 
arrows transmit information ‘about the appropriate actions to take based on religious 
beliefs about human nature, society, and the world.’131 In other words, the transmitted 
information about religion provides guidance for political ethics in that context.132 
Foreign policy decision-makers take this piece of information and metamorphose it into 
actual foreign policy decisions. In the rest of the study, Warner and Walker use this 
framework to theoretically integrate religious foreign policy decisions into realist, 
liberalist and constructivist paradigms.    
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 Although not theoretically well-informed, Helfont takes an implicitly liberalist 
approach in analyzing Saddam Hussein’s instrumentalizaton of Sunni Islam in foreign 
policy making.133 He argues that despite his secular orientations at the domestic political 
level, Saddam Hussein pursued religious diplomacy for the purposes of national security 
and regime security during Iran-Iraq War. To attract other Sunni Middle Eastern states’ 
support against sanctions imposed on Iraq during the war, Saddam established favorable 
relations with the Muslim Brotherhood of Syria, Egypt, and Jordan. Due to lack of 
diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia, Saddam engaged in religious diplomacy with 
Saudi clerics and religious communities.    
 
 Another fertile area of research to integrate religion into the liberal research 
paradigm is new wars scholarship. While scholarly analyses of conflict behavior indicate 
a decline in the prevalence of inter-state wars, intra-state wars have increased. The main 
reason for the increase in this new type of wars is state failure and/or the breakdown of 
political/public authority. What differentiates the nature of intra-state wars from inter-
state ones is the number and the type of actors involved. While states are the main actors 
of inter-state wars, a wide range of actors including non-state actors, warlords, and 
terrorist groups perpetuate and/or prolong the war. Newman argues that such a variety of 
actors create multiple motives for the emergence of these conflicts such as political 
economy, identities, political ideologies, and religion.134 These actors often act with the 
motivation of prolonging the war, rather than finishing it, because they benefit 
tremendously from new war economies such as the economies of plunder, illegal 
economies and black market. Goldewijk merges the new war scholarship with religion on 
the basis of human security.135 A majority of new wars are identity-based wars such as 
ethnic and religious conflicts. The ethnic and/or religious nature of these conflicts 
aggravates their human security aspect. Deliberate targeting of civilians, forced human 
displacement, and civilian victimization such as rape and ethnic cleansing pose serious 
threats to human security due to their religious identification.  
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 The branch of liberalism that transcends the assumption of domestic-international 
divide is a promising paradigm for a theoretically informed study of religion in 
international relations. While the liberalist paradigm has long evaded the study of religion 
due to its secularist bias, the very integration of religion into liberalism with the study of 
religious identities, religious conflicts, and religious actors can greatly enrich this 
paradigm.  
 
 
 
2.4.  Religion and Constructivism/Post-Structuralism  
 
 
 
Contrary to its realist and liberalist counterparts, constructivism might be 
acclaimed as a more accessible theoretical environment for the study of religion due to 
its reception of norms, ideas, identities, and culture in international politics. While this 
might hold true to a certain extent, the earliest constructivist writings also share a basic 
bias that the whole international relations scholarship is based on: the secular Westphalian 
bias. This bias is visible even in the most central brand of constructivism, the Wendtian 
constructivism, which problematizes the givenness of anarchy, rational interests and 
power politics of the Westphalian system.136 In his discussion on the constructed nature 
of anarchy, Wendt criticizes the realist paradigm for treating the anarchic international 
system as given and the identities and interests of agents as exogenous. Wendt claims 
instead that the international system cannot be thought as separate from the agents 
comprising it. While the nature of the system constrains the behavior of states and foreign 
policy decision makers as the agents of interaction, the agents perpetuate the system by 
constantly observing the international rules of the game. 
  
Wendtian understanding of the basic assumptions of international politics is not 
very different from that of rationalist paradigms. Wendt acknowledges the basic tenets of 
Westphalian system 1) that autonomous, sovereign, and equal nation-states are the primary 
constituents of the international system; 2) that states interact with one another in an 
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anarchic system where there is not central authority regulating that interaction; 3) which 
makes balance of power, self-help, rationality the rules of the game. Wendt diverges from 
the rationalistic theories with his dynamic understanding of the international system though. 
While Westphalian nation-states, anarchy, self-help, and rationality constitute the 
underlying features of world politics, it is only historically so. What keeps this ontology 
intact is not the material configuration of the system, but the ideas and perceptions 
regarding the functioning of the system. The agents’ ideas, beliefs, and attitude towards the 
system perpetuate its continuity. Other constructivist scholars elaborate on how exactly 
these ideas can shape the international system and the nature of interaction therein. 
Kratochwil argues that rules, norms, and ideas are constitutive of the game setting.137 
Norms and rules determine several components of international interaction including who 
the actors are, what rules those actors are obligated to follow for certain political ends, and 
what strategies they should devise. Accordingly, norms and identities can shape the inter-
subjective meanings of rationality, interests and preferences. Norms and identities also 
shape inter-subjective understandings of international structure, which does not exist a 
priori. Kratochwill contends that political action is a rule-governed activity and as the rules 
change, so do the actors, structure, and strategies.138  
 
 Despite its strong emphasis on the constitutive role of rules, ideas, and identities, 
the classical constructivist scholarship has not studied the role of religion in international 
politics. In analyzing different types of international anarchy, Wendt fails to problematize 
religion either. Wendt categorizes three types of international anarchy: Hobbesian culture 
of conflict, Lockean culture of self-interest, and Kantian culture of mutual non-
violence.139 These three different understandings of international anarchy have found 
their place in realism, neoliberalism, and democratic peace scholarships respectively. 
However, all three types are deeply ingrained in the idea of secularism, which does not 
make any room for the constitutive role of religion. The most important step to 
problematize the constitutive role of religion on international relations is taken by 
Philpott, who argues that modern international relations is not secular as the modernist 
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paradigm assumes and its current configuration is rooted in the Protestant Reformation.140 
The Protestant Reformation and the ensuing religious wars in Europe created a new 
political system which is sovereign and autonomous over territorial units with fixed 
boundaries. This new political system, i.e. the nation-states, became the primary agent of 
the current international system. Philpott argues that if it were not for the Treaty of 
Westphalia in the aftermath of the European religious wars, the ‘shifts in economic and 
organizational structures, in trade, class, societal coalitions, wealth, technology, military 
might, the institutions of domestic coercion, and the international balance of power’ 
leading to the current state system would not be possible.141 The nation-state system 
gradually dictated the current patterns of law, conflict, peace, and commerce in 
international politics.142 The assumed secularism of international politics is also attributed 
to the Westphalian Treaty, which ruled that the religious identity and law will be 
accredited by the sovereign over a specific territorial unit, thereby restricting the 
relevance and influence of religion to the domestic realm only. The sharp separation of 
domestic and international realms in the dominant international relations theories is the 
reason for IR’s lack of interest in religion.  
 
One theoretically informed constructivist thesis built on Philpott’s thesis and 
worth mentioning is Hurd’s work on the politics of secularism in international relations.143 
After convincingly arguing that the modern secular world has a religious foundation 
already, she problematizes the singularity of secular trajectories. Accordingly, Hurd 
makes the point that Western notion of secularism has two empirical variants. The first is 
laicism, which creates two distinct realms as politics and religion and expels religion from 
the political arena. The second is Judeo-Christian secularism, which does not make any 
attempt to expel religion, but sees it as part of the socio-cultural life. States embracing 
any of these two trajectories tend to exhibit different foreign policy behaviors. Hurd 
shows that American foreign policy towards Iran is not secular, but informed by the 
Judeo-Christian secular tradition. Alternatively, the European Union, which embraces the 
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laicist tradition, formulates a foreign policy towards Turkey on the basis of its laicist 
credentials. 
 
More recent scholarship in the constructivist paradigm brings a more critical 
perspective to the study of religion in international politics by problematizing the concept 
of “religion’ itself. As Fitzgerald argued elsewhere, the concept of religion is a 
construction of liberal modernity and its liberal-modern definition as the binary opposite 
of what is profane or what falls outside of the secular domain is not applicable to all 
societies and cultures.144 Accordingly, several IR scholars have turned their attention to 
conceptual developments in other disciplines such as theology, philosophy and sociology. 
Sandal introduces the concept of “public theologies’ for a replacement of “religion’ in the 
study of international politics.145 Public theology refers to the practical implications of 
religious doctrine on non-religious spheres of life including the politics, economics and 
society through human interpretation of religious faith and doctrine.146 Contrary to the 
presumably static nature of religious doctrines, the concept of public theology is more 
dynamic. Public theology embraces the historical, temporal and spatial circumstances in 
which religious faith and doctrine might manifest itself in institutional, political, social, 
and economic processes.147 Sandal attributes this dynamism to agents’ perception of 
religious doctrine, which might change across time and issue areas.148 In the sphere of 
politics, a specific public theology might be produced and institutionalized by the 
religious authority, informed to the public and political authority, and influence politics 
including conflict, protest, and governmental processes.149 
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Sandal adopts the concept of public theology in another work where she examines 
the role of religious actors in conflict transformation in North Ireland and South Africa.150 
Her second contribution to the constructivist scholarship on religion is her adoption of 
Haas’ ‘epistemic communities’ in analyzing the role of religious actors.151 An epistemic 
community in political science is a network of professionals who has a knowledge and 
expertise and share a set of normative beliefs on political processes. In more concrete 
terms, technocrats, bureaucrats, and diplomats are traditionally seen as a part of the 
epistemic community. Policy-relevant knowledge producers such as academics and 
policy researchers also form an epistemic community. Sandal argues that the body of 
people comprising the epistemic community indicates the conceptual bias for the modern 
understanding of knowledge as rational and scientific.152 Religious actors, theologians, 
institutions, and authorities with religious knowledge and expertise can also comprise an 
epistemic community though. Sandal argues that exegesis –the critical interpretation of 
religious texts- and hermeneutics – the constitutions of guidelines for interpretation- that 
is acquired during religious training is what makes faith leaders recognized experts on 
different issue areas.153 Faith leaders as epistemic communities might adopt different 
public theologies depending on the time and issue area. Sandal shows that both South 
African and Irish faith leaders have transformed their exclusive public theologies on the 
South African apartheid regime and the Irish religious conflict to an inclusive one, thereby 
contributing to the resolution of respective conflicts.   
 
Constructivist scholarship has brought further theoretical innovation to IR, one of 
which is Lynch’s neo-Weberian approach to religion in international politics.154 Lynch 
finds that most of the scholarship on religion leaves religious ethics and doctrines out of 
scholarly analysis due to the essentialist, dogmatic, and stationary understanding of 
religion. However, she argues, religious doctrines and ethics are not stationary and they 
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are prone to change in line with the context they become relevant in and the actors’ 
interpretations of them. According to this logic, religious doctrines and ethics do not act 
as they appear in religious texts and sources. Rather, religious doctrines should be taken 
as ethical constructs by actors who attach specific functions and meanings to them in line 
with their socio-political contexts. Lynch’s approach to religion is an important 
contribution to our understanding of religion in one crucial way. Lynch does not treat 
religion as a static entity but as a process which is also shaped by religious actors and the 
socio-political circumstances in which it appears. This approach makes religion not only 
an independent variable but a dependent variable in scholarly analysis. Lynch’s neo-
Weberian approach is also a viable tool to understand why certain religious doctrines 
become more politicized than others, or why a specific religious doctrine becomes 
politicized under a specific context while not in others.        
            
Despite its secular Westphalian bias, constructivism has generated a theoretically 
rich and innovative body of literature in the study of literature. An equally innovative 
literature on religion and international politics is generated within the post-structuralist 
IR scholarship. Two theoretical contributions to the study of religion are the Copenhagen 
school of security studies and international political theology. Both contributions share 
post-structuralism’s ‘linguistic turn,’ where the linguistic act becomes practical act. 
Copenhagen school of critical security studies has opened a successful path for the 
integration of religion into security studies. Laustsen and Weaver’s work on the 
securitization of religious objects is one of the landmark studies in this scholarship.155 A 
sub-element of the Copenhagen school, securitization theory studies ‘how security issues 
are produced by actors who pose something (a referent object) as existentially threatened 
and therefore claim a right to use extraordinary measure to defend it.’156 This theory posits 
that a referent object is assigned such an importance and urgency above other political 
objects and issues that extraordinary measures are required to protect it and/or to ensure 
its survival.157 Relevant political actors securitize an object or an issue for a political 
purpose and in line with the audience who can either accept or reject its securitization. 
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Therefore, securitization theory holds that security is not objective, but inter-subjective, 
defined by what is securitized, by whom, and how.158 Securitization scholars emphasize 
speech-act as a central element of the securitization process, whereby an object or issue 
is securitized simply by labeling it as a security issue. If a political actor propagates a 
specific ethnic identity to be under threat, that ethnic identity becomes a security issue 
and any measures to protect it becomes legitimate.159 Laustsen and Weaver argue against 
the mainstream association of religion with an identity or community though. Religion 
has rather a substantive core differentiating it from ethnic communities and identities such 
as being Kurd or Armenian. Taking religion as a sui generis category with a substantive 
core, they define it as ‘true faith, our possibility to worship the right gods the right way 
and—in some religions—thereby have a chance of salvation.’160 Laustsen and Weaver 
employ the securitization framework in examining what referent objects are 
metamorphosed into religious security issues. They find that agents often securitize 
religious places, taking them as sacred referent objects. In conflict settings, religious 
places of worship, churches, tombs, and shrines are made an issue of protection and 
intervention by political actors with attempt to benefit politically or militarily.   
 
Sheikh contributes to the ongoing securitization debates by deconstructing the 
concept of religion.161 She employs Ninian Smart’s seven-part scheme for the study of 
religion, which differentiates between the emotional, legal, doctrinal, material, 
institutional, practical/ritual, and narrative/ritual aspect of the concept.162 She questions 
what aspect of religion gets referred to by religious actors aiming to defend religion. 
Building on Smart, Sheikh re-conceptualizes religion as a composite concept which can 
be analyzed as a type of culture, identity, rationality, power, doctrine, interpretative 
community, etc. depending on the research question.163 Sheikh’s reconceptualization of 
religion as a composite concept can help IR scholars and policy makers to analyze what 
                                                
158 Ibid.  
 
159 Ibid.  
 
160 Ibid., p. 709. 
 
161 Mona Kanwal Sheikh, ‘The Religious Challenge to Securitization Theory,’ Millenium: Journal of International 
Studies 43, no. 1 (2014): p. 252-272.  
 
162 Ibid., p. 260.  
 
163 Ibid., p. 263.  
 
 74	
	
transnational or domestic religious groups seek to defend when securitizing religion. 
Fundamentalist religious groups and their actions are often interpreted with respect to the 
religious doctrine they are subscribing to. However, securitization research can help 
identify whether it is a religious community, identity, or doctrine that is being securitized 
and extraordinarily defended. 
 
Despite her scholarly subscription to securitization theory, Sheikh also criticizes 
securitization theory for its neglect of taking religion qua religion.164 While most of the 
scholarly work in religion and IR emphasize the constructed nature of religious-secular 
divide including securitization theory, they still treat religion as another type of ideology, 
identity, or instrument. Religion loses its very core in such studies, being often treated as 
an instrument for a higher and serious aim. The instrumentalist logic, which is implicit in 
securitization theory also, takes religious doctrine only as an instrument for achieving 
certain political, economic aims, thereby dissociating religion from its own essence, 
relevance and meaning. The reverse position is the essentialist position though, which 
delinks religion from the behavior of its followers and the socio-political and the 
institutional context. Sheikh implicitly proposes that the scholars studying religion should 
not fall into these two polar positions. They should rather find the middle ground between 
the deterministic, doctrinal aspects of religion per se and its possible instrumental 
relevance for other spheres.  
 
Building on her religion quo religion discussion, Sheikh proposes three possible 
paths to incorporate religion into IR studies in another work. She argues that subscribing 
to religion quo religion approach necessitates leaving the instrumentalist or essentialist 
accounts of religion aside and identifying the substantial dimensions of religion at the 
first place. Accordingly, she proposes three substantial dimensions of religion: religion as 
a belief community, religion as power, and religion as speech act. Scholars who identify 
religion as a belief community can examine how the constructions of religious identities 
or the interpretations of religious doctrines can shape political actors’ decisions.165 The 
identification of religion as a power emphasizes religion being a distinct form of 
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rationality and authority which can ‘shape interests, political action, and identities.’166 
Accordingly, religion as a power might appear ‘as a competitive provide or order, justice, 
security and legitimate violence vis-à-vis the state.’167 Religious as a speech act is what 
securitization scholars subscribe to. Speech act theory takes speaking as doing and 
examines what the referent objects of religious security are. Sheikh argues that the 
referent object of religious security is not identity or community, but the true faith.168    
 
Not all studies within post-structural IR scholarship subscribe to securitization 
theory. Another scholarship employing speech act theory without necessarily restricting 
its focus to securitization is Kubalkova’s international political theology.169 Kubalkova 
takes a non-positivist approach to the study of religion, questioning the existing secular 
ontology and positivist epistemologies of mainstream IR and constructivist scholarship. 
She defines her approach to the study of religion as one of rule-based constructivism a la 
Onuf, i.e. how rules influence the non-linguistic aspects of human existence. Kubalkova 
argues that religion is an assertive rule in Onuf’s terms, which have been dismissed as 
‘non-modern, primitive and irrational’ in social science scholarship.170 These rules are 
articulated by religious communities and religious actors generally in informal networks 
and give them a special status and prestige.  Assertive rules require not an active but a 
passive acceptance of information as education does. Given the prestige the religious 
actors embody, religious rules as a type of assertive rules inform the followers what they 
don’t know and ought to know. As such religion as a set of assertive rules direct the 
process of reasoning. The reasoning driven by emotions and passions can be more 
powerful that rational calculations at times. The politicization of religion happens when 
religion as a set of assertive rules meet with other types of rules such as commissive and 
directive rules, which embody wealth and power. At this point, one should study how 
religion as an assertive rule might define the structure and the agency, the conditions for 
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rational choice, the constitution of resources, institutions and social relations.171 
Kubalkova argues religion as a set of assertive rules can become an international force, 
even a hegemonic force, as such.   
 
Both constructivism and post-structuralism have generated a rich body of research 
integrating religion into these paradigms. One crucial contribution to the study of religion 
and international politics is the problematization of the concept of religion. Scholars 
either employ alternative terminologies such as public theology and international political 
theology, or they deconstruct the concept of religion to study its multiple aspects. This 
was part of an attempt by constructivist and post-structural scholars to recognize and the 
substantive core of religion and to examine religion quo religion, as different from and/or 
transcending ideologies, identities, or mobilization tools. The mainstream IR scholarship 
with its realist and liberalist off-shoots, on the other hand, has refused to treat religion 
quo religion, but they defined it as another ideology or identity aiming to serve certain 
political, military or economic aims. The increasing volume of scholarship on religion 
within both paradigms reflected the recognition of the rising relevance of religion in 
world politics, though a slow and reluctant one, even to the point of challenging their own 
ontological and epistemological premises. However; their refusal to examine the 
substance of religion, and depicting as merely another type of identity, ideology, or 
mobilization tool stood in the way to do what rationalist, positivist, and problem-solving 
paradigms claim to do the best: to explain why. Why did religion revive at the first place? 
Why did religion but not any other non-religious political ideology or ethnic identity 
become so central to the international political movements today? Why do people tend to 
mobilize around religious movements rather than movements with non-religious 
ideologies such as communism? What is distinctive about religion that makes it so 
successful in shaping politics and conflicts today? By taking religion quo religion, 
constructivist and post-structuralist paradigms make an attempt to understand the concept 
and defining elements of this concept first. The deconstruction and the examination of 
this multifaceted and multilayered phenomenon not only opens up a fertile research 
ground for constructivist and post-structuralist scholarship on religion, but also for 
scholarship with an instrumentalist view on religion. Rationalist and positivist scholarship 
can study what aspect of religion gets instrumentalized in political and military decision-
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making mechanisms. Similarly, rationalist and positivist scholars can examine the 
rationality behind religious movements and behavior. Theoretically informed studies on 
religious rationality can not only enrich these paradigms theoretically, but also help them 
explain religious-related phenomena, to reveal cause and effect mechanisms behind such 
phenomena, to ask why, without degenerating their core scientific assumptions and 
premises. While constructivist and post-structuralists scholarly concern for the 
substantive core of religion opens a room for theoretical innovation, what is missing as 
yet is their application to empirical cases. Studies employing religion as a composite 
concept or adopting international political theology in its stead are low in number. 
Scholarship merging these theories with the empirics will pave the way for further 
innovative research in the study of religion and world politics.    
 
 
 
2.5.  Hypotheses 
 
 
 
To relate the aforementioned-discussion on how different IR paradigms might 
answer the research questions posed for the purposes of this study, we can propose three 
basic hypotheses each corresponding to one IR paradigm.  
 
Hypothesis I:  Iran is caught up in a regional power game since 2003, where the 
regime instrumentalizes religion to become the regional leader. 
 
Hypothesis 1 is a realist one, as it focuses on the functional use of religion as a foreign 
policy tool. A realist hypothesis presumes that states might use religion as a cover for 
high-politics objectives. In that sense, realism sees religion relevant to international 
politics only to the extent that it serves the state’s military, economic, political interests. 
While religion seems to be the most distant paradigm towards the study of religion, the 
functional use of religion can be incorporated into the assumptions about interaction 
context/setting as well as rationality, interests, and foreign policy objectives. According 
to this hypothesis, states can extend military and economic support to religious groups in 
a civil conflict within a rival state, if the prolongation of the conflict will diminish the 
power of that rival state. Alternatively, states can extend military and economic support 
to a regime with the same religious identity to secure their alliance with that state and 
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their own standing. What is crucial is also to identify why policy makers might choose 
religion as a functional tool, i.e. what functionality religion does play. How does religion 
as an identity, doctrine, or institution contribute to religion becoming a ‘power’ on its 
own? Or how does religion as a ‘power’ can in turn influence the interaction-setting, 
preference orderings, and behavioral outcomes? If states are increasingly employing 
religion or sectarian identity as part of their geopolitical calculations, we need to further 
identify what aspects and functions of religion can serve states’ geopolitical interests.  
 
Hypothesis II: Iran’s religious foreign policy in the Middle East reflects the 
ongoing factional balances tipping towards regime hardliners in domestic politics.  
 
Given the emphasis on sub-national actors, the third hypothesis theoretically adheres to 
the liberal paradigm. The testing of the hypothesis first necessitates the identification of 
any foreign policy change that is accompanied by a leadership change. A powerful 
presumption about Iranian foreign policy is that the regime’s foreign policy swings 
between ideology and pragmatism in line with the power balances in domestic factional 
politics. Accordingly, when reformist and/or conservative pragmatist factions achieve 
political leadership, the foreign policy tips towards pragmatism. However, when regime 
hardliners achieve political power, Iran pursues a rather ideological foreign policy. Iran’s 
religious ideology and identity since 1979 has driven the regime towards an ideological 
foreign policy in various decades and under various leaderships in its contact with the 
West. The question is whether this swing towards a religious foreign policy is defined by 
factional swings across all foreign policy themes? This study focuses on this question in 
testing Hypothesis II. 
 
Hypothesis III: Iran’s Islamist revolutionary ideology leads to an ideological and 
religious policy in the Middle East. 
 
The second hypothesis is a constructivist hypothesis. This hypothesis rests on the 
presumption that states have identities and ideational factors plays a role in shaping 
foreign policy behavior. The religious and sectarian identity can assign certain 
transnational roles, duties, and even ideologically defined interests to a state. If a religious 
or sectarian community in another state is facing an actual or perceived threat by another 
religious or sectarian group, the co-religionist or co-sectarian state can extend military 
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and political support to that community out of a self-ascribed moral duty to do so. In a 
similar vein, a state might have a grand vision and objective of establishing a religio-
political community. Any military, political, and economic support to co-religionist 
and/or co-sectarians extended by this state can reflect this ideological foreign policy 
objective. Iran’s foreign policy during the revolutionary period can be defined as a good 
example of ideological foreign policy, characterized by ideologically and Islamically 
defined roles, duties, and transnational objectives. The question is whether religious 
ideological played a role in steering Iran’s foreign policy in the post-revolutionary period 
as well. Does the revolutionary period have an ideological and religious legacy over 
following periods? In what ways does religious identity and ideology exhibit continuities 
in the realm of foreign policy? Is there an observed change in its role over time and in 
what ways? The coming chapters will focus on these questions in testing the relevance of 
Hypothesis III.  
 
As discussed in Chapter 1, this study will treat the concept of ‘religion’ as a ‘public 
theology.’ The reason for this choice is that religion in the sense of a public theology 
refers to the practical implications of religious doctrine on non-religious spheres of life 
including the politics, economics and society through human interpretation of religious 
faith and doctrine. This dissociates the concept of religion from its static nature and 
embraces the historical, temporal and spatial circumstances in which religious faith and 
doctrine might manifest itself in various aspects of foreign policy. In line with this, this 
study treats ‘religion’ as a multi-faceted concept, i.e. religion as an identity, ideology, 
mobilization capability, legitimization tool, institution, among others. While testing the 
above-given hypotheses, this study will also examine various facets and roles of religion 
in Iran’s foreign policy.   
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2.6.  Conclusion 
 
 
 
This chapter has laid the basic theoretical background of this study. Accordingly, 
this study follows the footsteps of an emerging scholarship that integrates the study of 
religion into IR. This chapter first discussed how religion has been ignored by IR field 
due to the ontological, methodological, and epistemological bias of the field. This 
discussion was followed by a classification of existing scholarship into three dominant 
IR paradigms and suggestions on how to further study religion within each paradigm. 
Three hypotheses have been proposed to examine the increased relevance and role of 
religion in Iran’s Middle East policy after 2003. The following section will discuss the 
role of religion in Iran after the Islamic Revolution of 1979 and how it impacted the 
revolutionary period’s foreign policy.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
IRAN’S FOREIGN POLICY AND RELIGION 
 
 
 
 
3.1.  Introduction 
 
 
 
Iran is a interesting case for an analysis of the role of religion in foreign policy 
making. The Islamic Republic is run by a theocratic regime since the Islamic Revolution 
of 1979. Twelver Imamate Shiism is recognized by the Islamic Republic’s Constitution 
as the state religion and the state is ruled by velayet-e faqih, a modern conceptualization 
of Shia clerical rule introduced by Ayatollah Khomeini which presumes ‘the guardianship 
of the jurist’ over state affairs.172 This new theocratic regime aroused curiosity among 
academics and policy-makers alike regarding the new mechanics and orientation of 
Iranian foreign policy. The immediate implications of the 1979 Revolution was that it 
introduced a new state ideology, which can be summarized as a careful and innovative 
blend of anti-imperialism, anti-liberal and Islamic modernism, and revolutionary 
Islamism. The Shia identity and Shia clerical institutions fed into the religious elements 
within the state ideology. Coupled with revolutionary motives, the Shia and Islamic 
elements provided a road map for the new regime’s behavior on the transnational front 
during the early years of the revolution. The Islamic Republic assumed ideologically 
defined transnational duties in international politics that further determined its 
transnational interests and objectives. On the other hand, the Islamic Republic continued 
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to exist within the secularly defined Westphalian order which required the interests of the 
nation-state to be the central driver of foreign policy behavior.  
Pursuing transnational Islamist goals as a nation-state functioning within the 
Westphalian system created dualities for the foreign policy behavior of the Islamic 
Republic. The identity and ideology-infused transnational roles and interests of the 
Islamic Republic posed dilemmas for the rationally-defined nation-state interests, thereby 
creating a constant debate around ideology vs. rationality/pragmatism in Iran’s foreign 
policy since 1979. In this respect, analysts on Iranian foreign policy have predominantly 
dealt with Iran’s foreign policy behavior as a constant swing between ideology and 
pragmatism since the 1979 Islamic Revolution.173 Such analysts treated the Iranian 
foreign policy as being shaped by incumbent Iranian leaders’ positions on the ideology 
and rationality axis and compartmentalized foreign policy across four periods: 1) the 
revolutionary period between 1980-1989 which covers the period of leadership under 
Imam Khomeini, 2) the period between 1989-2005 which coincides with conservative 
pragmatist Hashami Rafsanjani’s presidency and his successor reformist Mohammad 
Khatami, 3) the period between 2005-2013, which is characterized by the presidency of 
hardliner Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and the increased role of Islamic Revolutionary Guard 
Corps in politics, and finally 4) the period since 2013, when another centrist and 
pragmatist president Hassan Rouhani assumed office.  
 
The inherent assumption in this periodization is that the Islamic Republic pursued 
an ideological foreign policy until the death of Imam Khomeini in 1989. Iran’s foreign 
policy discourse during this period heavily relied on Imam Khomeini’s understanding of 
the international political system and the revolutionary Iran’s role within this system. One 
foreign policy priority was given to the defense of the new revolutionary regime against 
external ‘aggressors,’ which were extensively defined by the revolutionary regime to 
include both Saddam Hossein and his regional and international collaborators committed 
to toppling down the regime. The revolutionary regime, which put emancipation and 
independence as key themes of its revolutionary process, acclaimed itself as a ‘model’ to 
inspire others for similar revolutionary movements; and hence ‘the export of the 
revolution’ or of revolutionary ideology was adopted as another foreign policy priority. 
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Facing the grave consequences of the prolonged war with Iraq and the perceived 
disappointment with the export of the revolution policy, the revolutionary regime’s 
transnational aspirations slowly dimmed. Iran’s careful calibration of reconstruction 
needs and economic interests in the post-1989 period was interpreted by others as a turn 
to pragmatism and rationalism in foreign policy. The fact that president Rafsanjani put 
foreign policy priorities on the economic reconstruction of the country and his successor 
Khatami attempted for the political integration of the Islamic Republic into the existing 
international community as a modern, pluralist Islamic regime in ‘peaceful 
coexistence’174 with other states seemed to strengthen the proposition that Iran was 
choosing pragmatism and rationality over ideology.175 On the other hand, president 
Ahmadinejad seemed to steer Iran’s foreign policy back to ideology after 2003, where his 
foreign policy discourse revolved around the issue of ‘justice’176 in the international 
system, which was manifested extensively in his non-reconciliatory attitude towards the 
West on the issue of nuclear politics.177 When president Rouhani’s emphasized economic 
development, sought end the international isolation of Iran, and started rapprochement 
with the West on the nuclear issue after 2013 which culminated in the historic nuclear 
deal in 2015, this was acclaimed as the hallmark of pragmatism in Iran’s foreign policy.178   
 
Such periodization has analytical merits, as it neatly maps out Iran’s foreign policy 
behavior and facilitates its study. The periodization inherently reflects the factionalization 
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of Iran politics in the post-1989 era, and each faction’s understanding of how to solve the 
revolutionary regime’s existential dilemmas following the moderation of early 
revolutionary fervor.179 Nevertheless, such periodization misses the intricacies of a highly 
complex political system marked by dualities. For one, this periodization assumes that 
ideology and pragmatism stand as two opposite poles. Such reasoning leaves out the fact 
that the Islamic Republic is a revolutionary regime and the revolutionary ideology is the 
raison d’etre of the Islamic Republic. The ideology can directly act as a framework for 
the revolutionary regime, determining its roles and duties in the international arena, 
decision-making processes, foreign policy institutions, interests, capabilities, and even 
security culture. Any foreign policy decision dedicated to the defense or expansion of the 
ideology can be very rational, where rationality and ideology distinction becomes 
obsolete.  
 
For another, such reasoning dismisses the manifested dynamism of the Islamic 
Republic over time, where the regime has constantly transformed itself in line with 
internal and external realities. One mistake in the study of the Islamic Republic would be 
to treat the Islamic Republic as a theocratic system that was established with the Islamic 
Revolution in 1979 for once and for all. Rather, the Islamic Republic is a work in progress 
for the last forty years. In this respect, the Islamic Republic started out as an infant 
revolutionary Islamic regime, with no role model or precursor to emulate in terms of 
ideology, institutions, and survival strategies in an international system which does not 
favor the longevity of such a revisionist and anti-systemic regime. Creativity was 
necessary to define and re-define its own terms of existence ideologically, institutionally, 
and strategically. Finding a common ground between a revolutionary Islamist ideology 
committed to revising the international system and its need for survival as a territorial 
nation-state functioning in this very system was a necessity. Reaching a consensus 
between the ideological duties and interests on the one hand, and the more territorially 
defined security-related and economic interests was another. On top of that should be 
added the clashing internal forces since the revolution, where the secular and the 
religious, the state and communal elements of the regime enter an internal tug of war over 
their interpretations of the system, interests, and their imagination of a proper 
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revolutionary regime. In this respect, Mishal and Goldberg describe the praxis of policy 
making in Iran is as a ‘friction’ due to the diverse ‘interpretation’ of issues, values, and 
interests at the state and communal, religious and secular, national and international 
levels.180 Any policy should thus be treated as a middle-ground outcome of constant 
interpretative ‘debate’ of internal and external circumstances within the regime.181 The 
question of ideology and rationality is a ‘debate’ or ‘friction’ as well, where ideology and 
rationality amalgamate with one another at different levels and under different conditions, 
thereby shaping the foreign policy context, interests, foreign policy objectives and 
preferences. The Islamic Republic’s foreign policy is thus more complex than the 
ideology and rationality duality would permit. 
 
Finally, this periodization is delineated predominantly over an examination of 
Iran’s relations with the West. Upon examining the history of domestic factionalism, one 
realizes that domestic factions exhibited great divergence over the themes of Iran’s 
economic integration into the global system and diplomatic relations over the nuclear 
program. On the other hand, factions remained relatively consensual on regional issues 
and relations with the Muslim world. Iranian consistency in supporting the Lebanese 
Hezbollah and the Palestinian movement is the paragon of this consistency. Rationality-
ideology dichotomy may serve as a useful analytical category in examining Iran’s 
relations with the West, but it may fail to address the relative consistency in the Middle 
East policy.  
 
One central argument of this thesis is that the issue of religion in Iran’s foreign 
policy transcends the ideology-rationality dichotomy, while simultaneously reflecting the 
‘debate’ and ‘friction’ inherent in Iranian policy making. Given the Shia identity and 
revolutionary Islamist ideology of the regime, one can consider religion originally as an 
identity and ideology shaping various components of Iran’s foreign policy including its 
transnational roles, duties, interests, objectives, capabilities. Religion has constituted the 
ideological infrastructure of the revolutionary regime and has been ingrained into the 
institutions of the regime since the revolution. Therefore, we can argue that religion has 
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been a consistent element of Iran’s foreign policy. Nevertheless, this does not mean that 
religion has impacted each aspect of foreign policy in the same way and played the same 
role across all periods. More than frequently, external and internal circumstances explain 
what aspect of the religious ideological discourse is highlighted for the purposes of a 
specific policy. In a similar vein, these circumstances determine whether religion is 
employed for achieving the state’s transnational ideological objectives, for regional 
power maximization, or for regime survival. We should thus keep in mind the ideological 
and infrastructural consistency of religion and/or of revolutionary Islamist ideology in the 
Iranian case and move our focus to the internal shifts in the duties, interests, and 
objectives associated with this religion. In other words, we should focus on the ‘friction’ 
and ‘debate’ associated with the religious ideology of Islamic Republic in the realm of 
foreign policy.   
    
 This chapter is thus devoted to understanding the role of religion as an element 
influencing various components of Iran’s foreign policy since the Islamic Revolution of 
1979. The first section of this chapter is devoted to understanding the role of religion in 
the pre-revolutionary period. Therefore, the first section makes a lengthy discussion of 
the institutions of the Shia faith, the emergence of Shia hawzas, and the 
transnationalization of Shia political activism in the Middle East before 1979. The 
following sections discuss the socio-political circumstances and the ideological 
underpinnings of the Islamic Revolution of 1979. Against this historical background, the 
last sections examine the early experiences of the Islamic Republic in external relations, 
where ‘the Holy Defense War’ with Iraq and ‘the export of the revolution’ will be our 
focus. The chapter will finally conclude with an analytical discussion on the how religion 
shaped the transnational roles, duties, interests, objectives, and even capabilities of the 
Islamic Revolution during the first decade of the revolution, with ramifications over 
following decades.  
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3.2.  Transnational Shia Political Activism in the Middle East 
 
 
 
The discussions about an emerging Shia political activism in the Middle East and 
that of ‘Shiite Crescent’ started in 2003, when the fall of the Saddam regime as the 
epitome of Arab nationalism in the Middle East gave way to the empowerment of Shia 
political parties in Iraq.182 While 2003 was a crucial turning point for religious politics in 
the Middle East, we should not overlook the underlying socio-political or religio-political 
structures that pushed up to the surface when right conditions arose. When we look past 
2003, and 1979, we observe the historical formation of a self-standing Shia clerical 
networks with significant political, economic, and theological independence across the 
Middle East. Independent poles of Shia clerical centers coexisting under multiple national 
settings emerged. These clerical centers were horizontally aligned with one another and 
formed transnational religious networks across the Middle East. An exploration of these 
historical structures and processes will show that the Islamic Revolution in Iran and the 
emerging Shia revival in the Middle East is a consequence of the long-accumulated 
religio-ideological currents, institutions, and networks in the region. The 
institutionalization of the Shia ulama and Shia learning hawzas are the first step of this 
process. 
 
 
3.2.1. The Usuli School and the Institutionalization of Shia Religious Authority  
 
The schism between the Sunni and Shiites is one of disagreement over legitimate 
religious and political leadership of the Islamic Ummah following the death of the 
Prophet. The Shia form of Islam emerged subsequent to the appropriation of religio-
political institution of caliphate by the Umayyad Dynasty and the suppression of the 
prophet’s remaining family in the Battle of Karbala in the 7th century whom the Shias see 
as the natural heir to the caliphate. The Shias saw family line and heritage as the source 
of legitimate authority and leadership.  The Shia tradition then created the institution of 
the Imamate under the authority of the Sixth Imam Jafar al-Sadeq.183 Arjomand defines 
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the doctrine of the Imamate as ‘divinely inspired leadership,’ where the Imams, each of 
whom would be a descendant of the prophet’s family, would get their authority from 
divine inspiration and ilm, the knowledge.184 The Imams were tasked with leading the life 
in the Islamic community, i.e. the Islamic Ummah, in line with Qur’anic precepts and 
Islamic traditions in the post-four caliphate period. Religious leadership during this 
period would differ from the four-caliphate period, as Islam had transcended its confined 
borders at the lower ends of the Arabian Peninsula and spread to upwards to Syria, Iraq, 
and Iran, which generated the need to adapt the Islamic thought and socio-political system 
on these new geographies. The Imams were thus the descendants of the prophets, tasked 
with studying and interpreting the Qur’anic precepts and Islamic traditions according to 
the needs of the socio-political structures existing on the new geographies and generating 
legal systems to lead the everyday life and politics of the Islamic Ummah. In that sense, 
the Shia Imams were the chief religio-legal and political authorities governing the Ummah 
in the absence of the prophet. The family heritage and Islamic knowledge was one 
element that defined the institution of the Imamate, while charismatic leadership was 
another. In this respect, Dabashi argues that the institution of the Imamate was the 
perpetuation of ‘charismatic’ leadership that began with the Prophet Mohammad and 
continued with the institution of the caliphate, the martyred Imam Ali and his 
descendants.185 This charisma manifested in the institution of the Imamate through the 
concept of ‘infallibility,’ where the Imams were deemed to be ‘infallible’ sources of 
emulation in their legal judgement, action, and the leadership of the Islamic community 
in all aspects of life.186 The office of the Imamate in the Shia tradition was maintained 
until the end of the disappearance, the Gaybet, of the 12th Imam during a political conflict 
in the 9th century.  
 
 The gaybet of the 12th Imam precipitated the formation and gradual 
institutionalization of the Shia ulama for the coming centuries. Following the gaybet of 
the 12th Imam, the absence of a religious authority to interpret the Qur’anic precepts and 
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Islamic tradition gradually created the body of Islamic scholars, the ulama, who would 
interpret and execute the Islamic law. A single authority to interpret and execute Islamic 
law in the body of the Imam was decentralized and delegated to multiple, though no more 
infallible, religious authorities due to the theological vacuum that emerged following the 
disappearance of the last Imam. This soon generated theological discussions over the 
interpretation and execution of religious law. Two main legal schools of thought emerged 
in this respect: The Akhbari and Usuli schools. From a theological and legal perspective, 
the Akhbari school places the Quran and Hadith as the only sources of Islamic law, where 
no jurist or human authority could generate Islamic law.187 On the other hand, the Usuli 
school added the element of individual reasoning of the ulama, the Islamic jurist, as an 
additional source of Islamic jurisprudence to Quran and Hadith.188 The emergence of 
rationalist Shiite jurists and theologians such as al-Sharif al-Murtada and his student al-
Shayk al-Tusi in the 11th century, who emphasized the rational thinking and reasoning by 
the learned jurist as an additional component of the sacred law and thus increased the 
substantive content of the sacred law by accepting individual traditions contributed to the 
formation of the Usuli school.189 By early 14th century, the principle of ijtihad, which 
highlighted ‘the competence of the jurist to derive legal norms from the sources of the 
Sacred Law’ and finding reason-based solutions to worldly problems in addition to Quran 
and Hadith was already established.190 The rise of the Usuli school over traditionalist 
Akhbaris and the adoption of the practice of ijtihad had revolutionary consequences for 
the further institutionalization of the Shia ulama. In the absence of the prophet and the 
Imams, mujtahids, i.e. the independent scholars interpreting the Islamic law through 
ijtihad, achieved legal authority and independence. No unity in the interpretation of 
religious law was sought and each mujtahid was independent in his interpretation and 
legal formulation. The Usuli school gradually assured the independence of mujtahids as 
a religio-legal authority and lead to the establishment of an autonomous Shiite 
hierocracy.191  
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The institutionalization of Shia hierocracy gained a strong impetus, when Twelver 
Imamate Shiism became the state religion under Safavid rule in 1501. Sunni Sufism was 
the dominant form of Islamic faith among the Iranian populations in the 16th century. And 
the Safavid dynasty was also created by a Sufi order with a militaristic and millenarian 
outlook.192 Nevertheless, the Safavids embraced Twelver Imamate Shiism as state 
religion and they did so for two reasons. First, their millenarian outlook matched with the 
Shia belief of the return of Imam Mahdi from the gaybet and rule over the world. The 
Safavids embraced the millenarian attributes of Twelver Shiism such as the expected 
return of the Twelfth Imam in gaybet and the return of the Imam Mahdi for territorial 
expansion over Sunni-dominated territories.193 Secondly, the institutionalized structure of 
the Shia ulama would constitute the bureaucrats, officers, and legal professionals for the 
Safavid state-building. Therefore, the Safavid rulers imported Shia jurists and theologians 
from the Arab lands.194 The Safavids generated a body of clerical state professionals such 
sayyeds, who were local administrators in the Safavid lands, and shayk al-Islam, the chief 
religious authorities.195 The Mujtahids became the recognized authorities in taxation and 
non-religious law during the centralized Safavid rule, thereby acquiring authority also in 
non-religious law besides religious law. The establishment of a professional clergy during 
the Safavid rule as well as the intellectual revolution of the Usuli school and ijtimah in 
Shia jurisprudence marked the gradual emergence of a Shia hierocracy. The relations 
between the Shia ulama and the rulers during the Safavid rule was one of accommodation. 
The Safavid rule relied on the institutional structure and ideological underpinnings of 
Twelver Imamate Shiism for political reasons. Although the Safavid dynasty collapsed in 
the 18th century, the legacy of the state-clergy relationship established at that time would 
be rediscovered with Khomeini’s moment in the 20th century. Nasr defines this as the 
‘Safavid contract,’ where the Shia never trusted that the Safavid rule is the legitimate 
Islamic rule but an optimal one where they could propagate for the Shia faith and create 
the Shia law until the return of the Imam Mahdi.196 The Shia ulama’s support for the rulers 
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of the state in exchange for the safe domain for the propagation of Shiism provided by 
the state itself was carried as a new state tradition over centuries.197   
 
Nevertheless, the fall of the Safavids and the dissolution of the central authority 
brought a new developmental path for the Shia clerical class. In the absence of a powerful 
central authority precipitated, the Shia clerical class became more decentralized and more 
independent in ensuring its own existence. The Shia clergy became more concentrated in 
certain geographical areas, developed their clerical learning centers, and drew clerical 
students across the Middle East. They were financially dependent on the taxation and 
voluntary contributions from the lay Shia populations to run themselves, which 
necessitated the spread of Shiism to wider populations by their own efforts.198 In this 
respect, the migration of Shia ulama out of Iran following the fall of the centralized 
Safavid state and the weakened Ottoman authority in Iraq led to the rise of the shrine 
cities of Najaf and Karbala as prominent Shiite hawzas, i.e. clerical learning centers, in 
the 19th century.199 Najaf and Karbala hawzas became influential ideological power 
centers and exerted influence on the Shiite populations in Iraq thanks to the institutional 
autonomy and strength of Shia mujtahids. Both cities became prestigious learning centers 
and attracted prospective students of theology from across the Middle East. The coming 
centuries would witness the increased relevance of Najaf and Karbala as influential 
centers of Shia politics. 
 
Amid this process of clerical decentralization, two theological developments 
contributed to further independence and authority of the Shia ulama in the 19th century: 
1) the idea of velayet, the guardianship of the jurist over the Islamic community in the 
absence of the prophet and Imam; 2) taqlid, or mujtahids becoming a religious example 
to followed in a wide range of religious and non-religious issues for the observers of the 
faith. Both the institution of velayet and taqlid indicated the emergence of a hierarchy 
among a plethora of independent mujtahids. Each equipped with differential levels of a 
knowledge of Islamic jurisprudence and piety, come mujtahids came to be acknowledged 
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as the highest authority and a source of ‘emulation for all Shias in matters of religious 
law’ and for the right path.’200 The mujtahids of Najaf started to announce themselves as 
marja-e taqlid, i.e. the source of emulation and a religious reference to be followed by 
Shiite communities who needed the guidance of a high jurist to lead their lives according 
to true Islamic faith in the absence of the Imam and the prophet.201 The followers of Shia 
faith could choose their marja and there was room for the co-existence of multiple marja-
e taqlids. But both velayet and taqlid signaled the further concentration of clerical power 
centers in Najaf and the increased power and influence for the Shia ulama in the society.   
 
The Shia clergy in the Najaf and Karbala hawzas gradually grew towards 
economic and political independence, forged alliance with local economic actors and 
relied on local gangs for security. The gradual institutionalization of the Shia ulama as 
religious and non-religious legal professionals, as state officials during the Safavid rule, 
and finally as decentralized educational, ideological, and social power centers in the form 
of hawzas over centuries can be said to establish them as a social class. Given the growing 
presence of Shia ulama as a resourceful social class in the Middle East, it should not be 
surprising to see their mobilizational capacity for political ends at the beginning of the 
20th century. Two events exemplify the growing mobilizational capacity of the Shia ulama 
and religious power centers in the early years of 1900s. First, when the British mandate 
was imposed on Iraq following the collapse of the Ottoman state in the early, Shia clerical 
centers were the ones who got mobilized against the British mandate on Iraq. The Najafi 
clerics mobilized their tribal armies and started a nationalist revolt against the British, 
which is inscribed on Iraqi history as the ‘Revolution of the 1920s.’202 A similar historical 
trajectory was observed in Iran during the first constitutional process of 1906. 
Accordingly, the Shia ulama in Iran would be recognized as one of the seven social 
classes making up the consultative body, 20 % of the majlis would be of the ulama, the 
proposed Suplementary Fundamental Laws would recognize Twelver Imamate Shiism as 
state religion, and the majlis would be called ‘the Sacred National Consultative Body.’203  
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In short, the gradual institutionalization of the Shia ulama in the embodiment of 
the Imam, the intellectual revolution of the Usuli school and of ijtihad, and the emergence 
of an independent marja explains the institutional empowerment of the Shia clergy as a 
social class and a critical power center in the Middle East. As such, the influence of 
religion on politics should first be sought in the institutionalization and mobilization 
capacity of the religious class. This very capacity has brought the Shia ulama as a central 
political stakeholder against the systemic transformations that hit the Middle East by 
World War I and the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in the 20th century.  
 
 
3.2.2. The Iraqi Hawzas 
 
The 20th century brought two systemic shocks challenging the power and the 
authority of the Shiite clerical centers in the Middle East: 1) the collapse of the Ottoman 
Empire, and 2) the abolition of the Caliphate. The collapse of the Ottoman Empire was 
followed by the establishment of modern, centralized nation-states under the mandate of 
Western powers across the Middle East except for Turkey. The new nation-state system 
challenged the ideological, economic, and political independence of the hawzas by 
concentrating these powers in state institutions through centralization and 
bureaucratization. A gradual process of centralization, rationalization of state and 
jurisdiction, the establishment of standing armies, secularization, and nationalization 
casted a serious blow to the existing legal, economic, ideological and political authority 
of the Shiite clerics. As discussed above, the hawzas power predominantly comes from 
their predominance over the education system. The secularization and the modernization 
of the education in Iraq gradually deprived the hawzas of their monopoly over 
education.204 The secularization and rationalization of the jurisdiction also adversely 
affected the legal areas traditionally owned by the Shia clergy including criminal, family, 
and commercial law, thereby dealing a major blow to the legal and economic authority of 
the Shia clerics.205  
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The abolition of the Caliphate by the new nation-state system in Turkey was the 
second shock to the status of religion within the Middle Eastern socio-political system. 
In a sense, this event caused a shock wave across the Muslim world, as the modern nation-
state system and westernizing political reforms brought by it carried the implications of 
Western individualism and liberalism as a counter-force to the symbols of Islamic values 
within society. Crooke argues that individualism as associated with Western 
modernization and the communitarianism of the Islamic society clashed with the 
modernization policies, secularization, and the abolition of the Caliphate in early 20th 
century Middle East.206 The Islamic thought was based on a collective social system, 
which implies ‘a just, equitable, and compassionate society’ – an Ummah – where religion 
is experienced not only on the individual level, but also governs the day-to-day affairs of 
the individuals at the collective level for the ‘collective welfare’ of the Ummah.207 
According to Crooke, the Caliphate was the institutional guardian and embodiment of 
this Islamist collectivist world view as opposed to the rising Western individualism and 
its embodiment as the secular nation-state system. Therefore, the abolition of the 
Caliphate created an organizational vacuum for the survival of this worldview in the 
Middle East and for the quest for alternative reflections in Islamic thought and 
organization. This was a time for innovation in Islamic thought and organization and the 
emergence of multiple and decentralized movements of Islamic theology and philosophy 
in a geographically dispersed fashion both in the Sunni and Shia world.208 ‘Horizontal 
networking of the Islamic Ummah’ had replaced the vertical and hierarchical system of 
the Caliphate.209  
 
The nation-state building process not only casted a blow to Shia clerical authority, 
but also influenced the status of Shia populations within these new political systems in 
an adverse manner. The nation-state building and modernization had a chain of influences 
over Shia populations in the Middle East. First, the modernization process loosened the 
strong relations within confessions, where the traditional social links between the Shia 
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clergy and the Shia religious authority were adversely impacted.210 In Iraq, the 
modernization and rationalization of the system gradually changed the nature of 
traditional tribal social relationships. It is true that tribal and religious leaders’ influence 
over their followers were gradually diminished, but the community-relations were 
thoroughly dissipated but rather changed its form. In this respect, the nation-state building 
across the Middle East predominantly favored the Sunnis in many countries, where 
governmental and bureaucratic posts and economic benefits were distributed according 
to community- and sectarian affiliations. The nation-state building process in the early 
20th century created today’s sectarianism across the Middle East, which can be defined as 
the accumulation of socio-economic and political grievances by a social class demarcated 
by religious-sectarian affiliation.211 As Majidyar argues in an interview with the author, 
‘the marginalization and discrimination of the Shiite communities within the Arab world,’ 
where ‘the Shiites are treated as second class citizens, denied their rights,’ marks sectarian 
politics in the Middle East today.212 The political problems and conflicts between 
religious sects today should thus be understood as an extension of the failed nation-state 
building processes in the Middle East for decades. 
 
In Iraq too, the state-building process and the ensuing bureaucratization favored 
the Sunnis in the country both during the monarchical rule and the Baath regime. The 
well-educated Shias in the urban centers were disappointed by the lack of access to 
bureaucratic positions and underrepresentation in the new state, which lead to an 
accumulation of grievances.213 Western political ideologies and thoughts seemed like a 
possible solution to the perceived injustices and inequalities experienced by the Shia 
populations, where especially Marxism and communism addressed that need. Those well-
educated, urban Shias of Iraq were particularly drawn to the communist movement in 
Iraq.214 When Abd-al Karim Qasem achieved power in Iraq via a military coup in Iraq in 
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1958 and later allied with the communist block to ensure his rule, the Shia ulama started 
to associate Marxism with the existing regime.215 Moreover, the Shia clergy was disturbed 
by the potential influence of communism in further undermining their already shaken 
authority over the Shia population. Both communist movement and the Shia ulama 
overlapped as sources of patronage for the disadvantaged Shia in the society. As a result, 
the Shia clerics in Najaf proposed Islamism an alternative solution addressing the 
grievances of the Shias.216 Marxist ideology and Islamism encountered as rivals 
addressing the same social base. However, this encounter would have a tremendous 
impact on the mobilizational and ideological evolution of Islamism in Iran before 1979.  
 
Although Islamism as a political ideology was born in Najaf hawza, it is rather 
surprising that politically active Shiism was developed as an innovative political brand 
by the Najafi scholars. The Najaf hawza has always been the most recognized and 
prestigious Shiite religious center since the 19th century, with its clerical education 
centers, schools, large numbers of students coming to the hawza ranging from Pakistan 
to Lebanon, and the amount and the quality of theological works they generated in the 
Islamic thought and philosophy. The prestigious position of Najaf as a strong center for 
Islamic law, theology and philosophy confused the theologians at the senior positions on 
the hawza’s emerging political activism.  Some clerics were ‘politically quietist,’ where 
they propagated for clerical non-interference in political affairs. The reason is that they 
thought political interference would diminish the theological quality of the Islamic 
scholarship they are renowned for. According to this quietist school, Najaf should remain 
as an elite Shia learning center, as any interference with politics can contaminate its 
quality and the prestige of Shia scholarship. A prominent marja representing the quietist 
position was Muhsin al-Hakim, who was recognized as the sole marja between 1955 and 
1970 only in Iraq, but also for all Shia communities across the Middle East. His rise as 
the sole marja coincided with the rise of communist movements in Iraq and the later rise 
of pan-Arabist Baath Party. During this time, al-Hakim shunned politics to a greater 
degree, restricted other clerics and Shia communities’ participation in the communist 
movement and the party with an attempt to limit the influence of Marxist-communist 
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thought on the Shiite communities.217 Al-Hakim was also seeking to protect the hawza’s 
relative independence and immunity from the central state during this period. Al-Hakim’s 
traditional quietist position was later adopted by marja Qasim al-Khoei between 1970 
and 1992 to a certain extent and by Ali al-Sistani from 1992 onwards until he assumed a 
more political position with the Iraqi political developments in 2009. 
 
An alternative position to the ‘quietist school’ was taken up by the prominent 
clerical Sadr family in 1950s. A Najafi Shia scholar himself, Baqir al-Sadr led the 
‘politically activist’ current originated in the Najaf hawza and he became the key name 
for the intellectual discussion and institutionalization of political Shiism in Iraq. Baqir al-
Sadr was a leading cleric of the time and he contributed to political Shiism through his 
governmental and economic theses. His Our Philosophy is noteworthy in this respect, 
where he criticized the dominant ideological currents of the West, i.e. Marxism and 
capitalism, and proposed an alternative system of government based on Islamic 
philosophy and institutions.218 Baqir al-Sadr’s proposed political system was one where 
the Islamic ummah was governed by Islamic law in a democratic way.219 He argued that 
the khilafat, i.e. the caliphate, meant the government of the people during the time of the 
prophet. The Imams took up the duty of governing the Ummah after the period of four 
caliphate period. However, the 12th Imam disappeared and left room for the government 
of the Islamic community by an alternative political structure. This political structure, 
Baqir al-Sadr argued, would be based on the regular election of representatives from the 
community. In other words, the right and responsibility to rule was transferred to the 
Ummah with the disappearance of the last Imam according to Baqir al-Sadr.220 The role 
of the marjaiyya within this system would be one of final supervision over the executive 
and legislative bodies elected by the Ummah.221 Baqir al-Sadr’s thesis on the rule of the 
Ummah in a democratic way was a great novelty in the political philosophy of the time 
and a significant contribution over the political philosophy of Shia governmentality. Sadr 
                                                
217 Ibid., p. 135-136.  
 
218 Crook, Resistance: The Essence of Islamic Revolution, p. 88.  
 
219 Ibid., p. 90-91. 
 
220 Ibid.  
 
221 Louer, Transnational Shia Politics, p. 86. 
 
 98	
	
was therefore inscribed into Shia intellectual history both as a political philosopher and 
an influential Shia cleric.  
 
Baqir al-Sadr’s contribution to Shia politics was not only limited to writing 
philosophical treatises, but he also mobilized one of the first modern examples of Shia 
political activism in Iraq. Baqir al-Sadr, along with al-Hakim’s son, founded the famous 
Islamic Dawa Party of Iraq in 1958.222 The Dawa Party can be defined as the first modern 
resistance movement in the form of a Shia political party in modern Iraqi history. Baqir 
al-Sadr merged what he observed about the mobilizational and organizational 
components of modern political movement with his Islamist vision. The Dawa Party was 
a Shia clerical political party committed to establishing a democratically-ruled Islamic 
Ummah. The party published booklets on Islam’s position on workers’ rights and 
overcoming wealth inequality, trained activists through party work, established religious 
schools and charity organizations.223 Baqir al-Sadr’s political treatise and Islamic Dawa 
Party are crucial first steps towards the mobilization of political Shiism.224 Theoretically, 
Baqir al-Sadr had put forward a Shia theory of political government in Our Philosophy. 
Practically, he had gone against the traditional quietist position of the Najafi Shia marja 
and formed a Shia political party. As such, we can argue that the seeds of a Shia-led 
Islamic state were sown in Iraq and an Islamic State would perhaps be expected to 
materialize in Iraq. However, the Shia political revival faced a brutal suppression in Iraq 
when the Baath regime came to power by a coup in 1968 and Baqir al-Sadr was executed 
by Saddam’s regime in 1980. The Dawa movement was originally a local one, in the sense 
that the movement aimed to challenge the central government in Baghdad and the Najafi 
political activism retained its local/national contours until 1980s. Despite his inherently 
local vision, Baqir al-Sadr inspired similar movements elsewhere, and this time, with 
international repercussions. 
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3.2.3. The ‘Karbala Paradigm’ and the Transnationalization of Shia Hawza 
Activities 
 
The Shia political activism that was initiated by Najafi clerics in Iraq soon evolved 
as a decentralized and horizontal network-type Islamic movement across the Middle East. 
New clerical centers with political credentials emerged across the Middle East. One such 
clerical center was based in the Iraqi city of Karbala. Karbala had a great religious 
symbolism for the Shias world. The historic battle between Imam Hossein and the 
Umayyad ruler that defined the great schism in the world of Islam took place in Karbala. 
The death of Imam Hossein and his followers in this desert town with a definitive crack-
down by the Umayyad is inscribed in the narrative history of Shiism as an instance of 
oppression and injustice inflicted upon the rightful Prophet’s family by the illegitimate, 
unjust ruler. On the other hand, Imam Hossein’s encounter with and suffering in the hands 
of the Umayyad ruler’s forces is received as a virtue of sacrificing the self for the greater 
good of the Islamic community. The Karbala narrative is thus a founding myth for the 
Shias, marked by a great suffering inflicted on their rightful leader, self-sacrifice, and by 
martyrdom.225 The elements of oppression, self-sacrifice, and martyrdom in this narrative 
shaped the self-identification of the Shias as an oppressed and marginalized faith 
community. This is also reflected on their political positioning against central authority. 
Nasr argues that the martyrdom of the Imam deepened the Shias’ rejection of and 
resistance to Sunni authority as well as of worldly domination and power as a 
manifestation of this belief.226 The emotional elements, the passion of self-sacrifice, and 
the drama of oppression have been kept alive to this day by Shia religious rituals.227 The 
Ashura ceremony is a hallmark ritual in this respect. The Ashura ritual is a mourning and 
commemoration ceremony, where Imam Hossein and his family’s suffering and self-
sacrifice is animated with symbolic self-tormenting and self-sacrificing rituals by 
ordinary Shias.228  
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In modern times, the narrative, ritualistic, and emotional underpinnings of Karbala 
have surpassed its original reference to a 7th century battle to refer to a resistance 
movement, revolutionary moment, and social uprising.229 The narrative of Karbala Battle, 
the socio-political experience of Shias throughout history, the accompanying narratives 
of suffering, oppression, and martyrdom, as well as the drama and emotions attached to 
this historical experience are invoked by the Shias for political mobilization. Fisher calls 
this ‘Karbala Paradigm,’ i.e. ‘the Shi’ite paradigm of struggle for social justice, against 
the government.’230 In other words, the Shia narratives of Karbala have constituted the 
Shia political culture of resistance against injustice, oppression, and discrimination 
inflicted by the central authority. We should also put the ‘Karbala Paradigm’ in its proper 
context when evaluating the perceived Shia marginalization and disempowerment within 
Sunni-ruled countries in the region, as referred to by Majidyar in his interview.231 The 
Karbala narrative is the emotional and ritualistic component of the Shia faith. Besides the 
institutional components of the Shia faith, this ritualistic component, also serve 
mobilizational purposes for Shia political activism in the following centuries.   
 
The city of Karbala in Iraq hosts the shrine of Imam Hossein and has thrived on 
the symbolism of martyrdom and community rituals in the Shia world as a city of shrines 
and pilgrimage. This has also differentiated the Karbala ulama from their Najafi 
counterparts. The Karbala ulama did not grow as much on the quality of Islamic theology 
and philosophy they have produced as they did on the promotion of the emotional and 
ritualistic collective consciousness created by the Karbala.232 If Najaf hawza became 
renowned for its theological elitism, Karbala’s popularity was folk-based, emotional, and 
ritualistic. Therefore, the Najaf hawza enjoyed a theological strength over Karbala hawza 
in the 20th century. Louer argues that a religious leadership crisis between Najafi and 
Karbala hawza further shaped the nature of the distinction between the two. Accordingly, 
Najafi scholars did not endorse the theological credentials and religious leadership of the 
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Karbala cleric Mohammad al-Shirazi. In return, al-Shirazi strengthened his position as 
the leader of Karbala by tapping into his ‘social capital’ in the city, i.e. by establishing 
close personal connections and alliances to other clerical families, merchants, and 
Iranians.233 Al-Shirazi also tapped into the historical importance of Karbala and the very 
resistance narratives in establishing Karbala as a reputed rival hawza to Najaf. In short, 
Karbala hawza rose with the Karbala clerics’ social capital and the emotional, ritualistic 
power of the shrine city of Karbala, rather than the hawza’s theological and scholarly 
outputs.234 
    
Politically, al-Dawa Party and the Najafi clerics were dominating the local Iraqi 
politics. Therefore, al-Shiraziyyin family of Karbala engaged in political mobilization in 
a distinct form. Their formation resembled al-Dawa in the sense that they put Islamism at 
the center of their political discourse and they employed violent action against the central 
authority in Iraq.235 But the Karbala-led political organization diverged from al-Dawa by 
giving primacy to the Shia clerical supervision on politics, where Louer defines the 
formation as ‘a secret revolutionary avant-garde’ rather than a mass political party.236 
When the Shia political activism was harshly suppressed by the Baath regime, the Karbala 
hawza moved its activities across the border, to Iran and the Gulf countries with sizable 
Shia minorities. Important clerical families of Karbala including al-Shirazi, al-Qazwini, 
and al-Modarrasi already had strong personal and family ties with Iran and Qom hawza.237 
Many of their members moved to Qom, were exposed to theological training, and 
widened their personal ties there. Al-Shirazi family formed strong hawza ties to Shia 
populations in the Gulf, such as in Kuwait and Bahrain. The nature of these activities 
remained as horizontal cross-clerical networks and the activities aimed at reviving 
cultural and religious ties among the Shias living under varied nation-states. To this end, 
they established Shia learning centers, empowered the Shia ulama in these countries and 
supported Shia community networks.238  
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Another importance of Karbala hawza was that the clerical families were close 
allies of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini of Iran well before the Iranian Revolution of 1979. 
Khomeini is known to spend time in Najaf hawza during his exile to Iraq in 1964, a period 
which coincides with Baqir al-Sadr’s political activism in Iraq. Khomeini was presumably 
influenced by Baqir al-Sadr’s philosophy of Islamic governance based on popular 
representation, upon which he would form the basis of his own theory of Islamic 
government – velayet-e faqih.239 While Baqir al-Sadr did not live long to materialize the 
Islamic State along the idea of popular representation, Khomeini was preaching about his 
theory of velayet-e faqih, i.e. the guardianship or government by the jurist, when he was 
still in Iraq. Despite Baqir al-Sadr’s political engagement, the marja Al-Hakim 
predominantly remained as a politically quietist scholar. When the Islamic Revolution 
happened in Iran, Al-Hakim’s successor Qasem al-Khoei maintained his predecessor’s 
tradition of political quietism and abstained from endorsing the Islamic Revolution in 
Iran.240 While the Najafi marja remained quiet on the revolution in Iran, the Karbala 
hawza became the main supporter of Khomeini both before and after the Islamic 
Revolution.  
 
The most prominent cleric of Karbala supporting the Iranian Revolution was 
Mohammed al-Shirazi. Al-Shirazi entertained the idea of a transnational Islamic 
revolution and the establishment of a clerical government. Along with his supporters 
called ‘the Shiraziyyin,’ Al-Shirazi saw the Islamic Revolution in Iran as the first step 
towards an ‘Islamic world revolution’ and as compatible with his transnational ideals.241 
Therefore, he sheltered Khomeini right before the revolution in Iran and continued to be 
the chief transnational clerical ally of the revolutionary regime after 1979. When Baqir 
al-Sadr was executed by the Baath regime, the Karbala hawza attained a critical 
opportunity to press the Karbala influence in Iraq, which they thought would be achieved 
via their transnational networks. After the revolution, Khomeini invited Al-Shirazi to 
Qom to run his own seminaries and let al-Shiraziyyin open a political office in Tehran to 
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control and coordinate their transnational activities.242 The revolutionary regime 
concurrently adopted the policy of regime exportation in 1981 by opening the ‘Office of 
the Liberation Movements’ and assigning Mohammad Montazeri, the son of one of the 
greatest clerical figures of the revolution Grand Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri, to lead 
the office.243 The transnational ideals of the Shiraziyyin and the Office of the Liberation 
Movements overlapped for a period of time and the Iranian regime provided material 
support to Shiraziyyin’s office in Tehran, from where the revolutionary influence was 
expected to spread across the Middle East by Shiraziyyin’s transnational activities.  
 
Nevertheless, Iranian alignment with the Shiraziyyin got severed due to the 
emerging theological differences regarding the nature of the Islamic regime in Iran. At its 
essence, Khomeini’s understanding of the velayet-e faqih was based on the rule by a 
single marja and he was that single marja. Al-Shirazi, on the other hand, was propagating 
for leadership by a collective marja.244 This was both a leadership struggle over a 
prospective ‘Islamic Ummah’ and a theoretical disagreement over Shia governmentality. 
Al-Shirazi had brought his own entourage of fellow clerics and students to Qom hawza 
and was seeking to establish a plurality of marjaiyya in Qom. For Khomeini and his 
cadres, Al-Shirazi’s efforts in Qom not only meant a direct challenge to Khomeini’s 
authority in Qom hawza and hence was a source of power struggle between the two, but 
Al-Shirazi’s understanding of collective leadership of the marja also risked the very 
Islamic state building process in Iran.245 Therefore, the Shiraziyyin influence was tamed 
by the revolutionary regime in Iran in the following years, as was the case with other 
dissident clerical voices in Qom after the revolution, and while Al-Shirazi stayed in Qom 
until his death in 2001, he had already become marginalized from 1982 onwards.246  
 
The historical evolution of Shia political movements shows that there was already 
a Shia political revival in the Middle East well before the Iranian Revolution in 1979. The 
political movement was spearheaded by the Shia ulama and Shia hawzas in Iraq. Their 
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evolution as independent institutionalized legal and ideological authorities and their 
mobilization capabilities have raised the Shia ulama as central political stakeholders. The 
institutional independence of the Shia ulama comes from their theological and 
jurisdictional subscription to the Usuli School, which gives senior clerics the authority to 
interpret, formulate, and execute the Islamic jurisprudence. The Shia clergy thrived as 
legal experts, jurists, and bureaucrats of the Safavid rule and their ideological, 
educational, and legal influence was maintained after the fall of the Safavids. The advent 
of nation-state system in the Middle East, modernization, secularization, and 
Westernization came as a systemic shock to the Shia hawzas. However, the Shia clerical 
centers had already developed the institutional and mobilizational capacity to act as an 
organized political and ideological resistance force against these structural shocks. In this 
respect, some clerics from Najaf and the Karbala hawza steered the course of Shia 
political mobilization in Iraq. The foundation of an Islamic government was perhaps 
expected to materialize in Iraq, but the repressive mechanisms of the Baath regime 
hindered such a formation. In the end, the Islamic Revolution materialized in Iran in 1979.  
 
The Iranian Revolution of 1979 not only provided inspiration for similar 
movements, but also the organized institutional mechanism to materialize similar 
objectives. The transnational Shia movement would continue in the form of horizontal 
networks of dispersed and variegated Shia actors across the Middle East. It should be 
noted that the Shia actors who participate in this network exhibit significant theological 
differences and pay allegiance to different branches of Shiism such as Alawi Shiism, 
Twelver Imamate Shiism, or Ismailism. However, what binds them is their idea of a socio-
political ‘resistance’ against the structural shocks of the 20th century and a willingness to 
respond to them via collective endeavor. What sets them apart along the path is the 
emerging differences of opinion over the political ideas and mechanisms to achieve this 
ideal. The intra-Shia relations are hence woven with constant forging and breaking of 
alliances and as much political rivalries as cooperation and alignments. The Islamic 
Revolution in Iran unleashed such a complex network of relationships among the Shia 
centers and figures, ranging from Iran to Iraq and Lebanon, which will be discussed in 
the coming sections.  
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3.3.  The First Modern Shia State of the Middle East: The Islamic Republic of Iran      
 
 
 
A crucial step in understanding the role of religion in Iran was understanding the 
rise of transnational Shia revival, both in its clerical and political forms by the 20th century 
in the Middle East. A second crucial step is to situate the Islamic Revolution of 1979 
within this transnational Shia movement and evaluating the revolution as the culmination 
of this movement into a revolutionary Shia theocracy in Iran. This makes an analysis of 
the nature of the revolutionary Islamist regime in Iran with a specific emphasis on the 
socio-political context and the intellectual background of the revolution necessary. The 
Islamic Revolution of Iran should be evaluated as a step towards an Islamic state-building 
process in Iran and this process rests on three pillars: 1) The revolution was a reaction 
against the adverse implications of Westernization, modernization, and foreign 
intervention in Iran, which got aggravated by the Shah regime’s social engineering 
policies and the authoritarianism accompanying it. 2) The revolutionary regime has 
institutionalized a peculiar Islamist political ideology and political system. 3) Not only 
the revolutionary character of the movement and the dominant political ideology, but also 
the early experiences of the revolutionary regime informed the institutional build-up and 
evolution of the system. The next two sections will discuss the first two pillars of this 
process.  
 
 
3.3.1. The Socio-Political Basis of the Islamic Revolution 
 
The development of the revolutionary ideology in the pre- and early revolutionary 
period has a prolonged history. The whole process can be traced back to the politics of 
modernization during the Qajar dynasty. Influenced by the Ottoman reforms at the end of 
the 19th century, the Qajar rule undertook several attempts at Westernization and 
modernization which included modernizing the army, industrializing the economy, giving 
trade concessions to Western countries, bureaucratizing the state, and modernizing the 
education system.247 However, the modernization attempts, the increased British and 
Russian intervention, and the subsequent transformation of the socio-economic structure 
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had disruptive effects for the Iranian society in the long run.248 The modernization of the 
Iranian state which was aborted during the Qajari rule by the revolts of traditional 
aristocracy and Shia ulama was taken up first by Reza Khan and then by his son Reza 
Shah starting from 1930s. Institutional changes which included a new civil code and 
secular education system were introduced in a top-to-down fashion. In addition to that, 
the rise of capitalistic system and the generation of a western-style bourgeoisie in a 
society largely based on agricultural economy is also invoked as a precipitator of 
disruptive changes in the pre-revolutionary Iranian society.249 In the rural areas, the 
landlords became more powerful vis a vis tenants and peasants in this system, who lost 
their lands and remained at a disadvantaged position economically, thereby creating grave 
land-related problems.250 In the urban setting a new bourgeoisie was created which was 
composed of bureaucrats, army officers, merchants, and foreign investors as well as a 
working class who remained economically and socially disadvantaged vis a vis the 
changes.    
 
By 1960, rapid capitalization had brought severe economic problems and high 
levels of inflation, % 60 of the urban population were living on the slums, and the 
discrepancy between classes was widened.251 Landlords and the urban bourgeoisie were 
better-off vis a vis land tenants, peasants, and urban working class people. Reza Shah 
sought to address these problems through two means: First, he introduced a reform 
package, the so-called ‘White Revolution’ of 1962, which included a historical land 
reform stipulating the distribution of land to landless tenants and peasants.252 Secondly, 
he opened the country to increased foreign influence in several sectors. While the first 
strategy created additional economic discussions and contributed to the reform weariness 
of the public, the second one increased foreign-dependency. The Iranian natural resources 
and oil stood at the center of the discussions concerning foreign influence on the country. 
The large oil reserves proved to be both a doom and an asset for the Iranian state for the 
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solution of economic and political problems experienced by the Iranians. The British had 
already gained concessions over Iranian oil sector since Nasr-al Din Shah of Qajar for 
searching oil and mining.253 The British influence over the Iranian oil increased gradually 
from World War I onwards, when the British established the Anglo-Persian Oil Company 
(APOC) with an attempt to secure oil flows to the Royal Navy.254 This was followed by 
increased concessions to the British over oil search in Northern provinces of Iran, oil 
operations, and employment at APOC.255 Amid economic problems experienced by 
Shah’s economic modernization policies, the oil sector soon became critical, steering the 
course of politics in Iran. As result, internal political discussions concerning the foreign 
influence over Iran’s national resources culminated in a short nationalist revival in early 
1950s, when Mohammad Mosaddeq of the National Front came to power as the prime 
minister of Iran.256 Once he came to power, Mosaddeq established the National Iranian 
Oil Company (NIOC) and nationalized the Iranian oil.257 The nationalization of the 
Iranian oil was a shock to the British. Along with the USA, whose oil interests were also 
indirectly threatened by the nationalization of oil in Iran, the UK staged a coup against 
Mosaddeq.258 The coup would be inscribed in the Iranian psyche as the hallmark of 
foreign intervention in Iranian politics and inflame the Iranian sentiments against Western 
colonialism and imperialism. 
 
By 1979, Iran was suffering the disruptive effects of the complicated and 
problematic process of modernization in all spheres. Greater inequality between landlords 
and peasants, between the urban and the rural, and among the urban centers across the 
country had led to the accumulation of public grievances. The economic reforms and land 
reforms introduced by Shah Reza Pahlavi were far from improving the situation of the 
disadvantaged segments of society. Following the coup against Mosaddeq, the US 
achieved increasing influence over the military and politics of the Iranian state. The US 
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had monopoly over arms and military technology sales to Iran and had an increased 
influence over the government by providing advice on financial matters.259 The existing 
public funds were spent on arms and technology purchase from the USA as a part of 
Shah’s military modernization. The US control over governmental planning through 
political counselling meant a direct encroachment by foreigners of Iran’s domestic policy 
processes. By 1979, the problem in Iran was the accumulation of grievances especially at 
the lower segments of society who were left disadvantaged by the modernization of the 
Iranian state at large and hence were chanting for equality, justice, and independence from 
foreign influence.   
 
The Iranian society whose disadvantaged segments are adversely effected by a 
rapid and mishandled process of modernization coupled with capitalism and foreign 
interference did create two ideological backlashes: Marxism and political Islam. Like the 
case of Iraq, it is not surprising to encounter the simultaneous emergence of both 
ideologies. First, both ideologies appealed to the disadvantaged segments of the society, 
i.e. the working class of the urban setting as well as the peasants and tenants of the rural 
areas. Both ideologies, therefore, sought to address the socio-economic complications 
created by industrialization and rapid urbanization. Second, both ideologies intersect at 
their anti-colonialism which formed the basis of all political and governmental 
discussions in Iran due to the increasing British and American influence in the country. 
Both Marxism and Islamism exhibited rivalry over the intended population base, as both 
addressed the common socio-economic and political problems experienced by the lower 
and disadvantaged segments of the society. It is therefore not surprising to see the 
intellectual environment of the pre-revolutionary period to be marked by Marxists as well 
as the theological and philosophical writings by Shia clerics and lay Shia scholars. A 
manifestation of the Marxist vitality at the intellectual level was the Marxist political 
parties, where the historic Tudeh Party is the most significant example of this intellectual 
trend.260 The fate of the Marxist political parties was one of harsh suppression by the 
Shah’s regime, which only pushed these groups either towards dissolution or its reverse, 
armed guerilla tactics.261 The Marxists were thus hindered by the Shah regime in their 
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attempts to reach wider masses. Nevertheless, Marxists made a significant contribution 
to the Iranian revolutionary spirit, albeit in a manner unforeseen: The Islamists were 
gradually drawn into Marxist ideology and subsequently imported Marxist elements into 
their Islamists political agenda. The popular Mujahedeen-e Khalq is the outcome of such 
an ideological amalgamation - Islamist-leftism, where the sons of the ulama and the 
bazaaris increasingly adopted a Marxist vocabulary and sought to fit the ‘revolution’ 
discourse into Shiism. They merged the Karbala narratives with the Marxist concepts of 
revolution, class, and justice. They rephrased Imam Hossein’s resistance against 
Umayyad Dynasty in Karbala as a class-based revolt against landlords.262 The 
Mujahedeen’s ideological development went synchronically with Ali Shariati’s lectures 
that merged Shiism with the revolutionary elements in Marxism and both put Shiism as a 
mobilizational element for a successful revolution against the Shah regime. In short, by 
the time the revolution came, the socio-political context in Iran had generated a variety 
of intellectual currents all of which would feed into the ideology of the revolutionary 
regime, which is the topic of the next section.  
 
 
3.3.2. The Intellectual and Ideological Basis of the Revolutionary Regime      
 
As previously discussed, an ideological current emphasizing the active role and 
responsibility of the clergy to philosophically devise and practically execute a political 
movement to address the socio-economic ills created by modern nation-state building and 
colonial intervention was underway in the Middle East as far back as the beginning of the 
20th century. The Constitutional Revolution in Iran and the failed 1920 Revolution in Iraq 
are the first instances of clerical mobilization in this respect. Later in 1950s, Baqir al-Sadr 
both generated a theory of Shia governmentality and stood out with his political 
engagement in the Dawa Party in contrast to the traditionally quietist approach of Najaf 
hawza. Baqir al-Sadr’s empowerment as a Shia political resistance force against the 
central Iraqi state also inspired Karbala hawza, where their activities reached Gulf 
countries and Al-Shiraziyyin family became a significant ally to Iran during the 
revolution. Therefore, while the Iranian society was giving birth to a resistance movement 
against Westernization, modernization, and colonialism, a transnational circulation of 
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intellectual ideas was already underway. Political Shiism had emerged as an intellectual 
current, a political solution, and as a transnational force. Finally, this current found a voice 
in Iran through the works of Iranian Shia clerics and lay scholars and an intellectual 
environment emerged, where several clerical figures and Shia thinkers exchanged views 
on the prospects of Shia faith for generating political solutions to the socio-political 
problems at hand. As such, we should interpret the revolutionary moment in Iran as well 
as the revolutionary regime as a reflection of the theological-philosophical vitality 
sweeping Iran and the region well before the revolution. While there are numerous 
clerical figures and lay Shia thinkers who influenced the pre-revolutionary intellectual 
environment in Iran such as Shariatmadari, Taleqani, and Bazargan among others, the 
personalities whose intellectual legacy is traceable in the institutions and ideology of 
Iran’s foreign policy will be covered within the scope of this study. Three figures worth-
mentioning within this context are Jalal al-Ahmad, Ali Shariati, and Ayatollah Ruhollah 
Khomeini.       
   
A prolific writer, philosopher, and intellectual of his time, Jalal al-Ahmad’s 
contribution to the intellectual discussions surrounding the Iranian society is his coinage 
Gharbzadegi, i.e. ‘Westoxication.’263 Jalal al-Ahmad was the son a Shia cleric in Qom, 
who had lost his position due to Shah’s anti-clerical policies.264 During 1960s, Al-Ahmad 
took an anti-Shah position and first got affiliated with the communist Tudeh Party. 
However, he gradually shifted away from Western ideologies to Islamism, in an 
intellectual environment which increasingly associated Westernization in Iran’s cultural 
arena with Western domination in economics and politics.265 Al-Ahmad’s famous coinage 
Gharbzadegi addressed to this Western domination and referred to the adverse 
implications of Western lifestyle, habits, and culture on the social and economic structures 
of the Eastern nations.266 According to Al-Ahmad, the importation of Western liberal 
values, capitalism, consumerism, and Shah’s pro-American policies constitute the 
‘Westoxication’ of the socio-economic system in Iran.267 The concept of ‘Westoxication’ 
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reflected the growing anti-Americanism in Iran during 1960s, especially after the coup 
against Mosaddeq government. However, its relevance went beyond decades and was 
adopted by Ayatollah Khomeini in designing the indigenous cultural, economic, and 
public policies of the revolutionary regime. In the post-revolutionary Iran, 
‘Westoxication’ implied a strict anti-Western and anti-American cultural policy. In the 
foreign policy as well, the term can be associated with the heavy anti-Americanism of 
Iran’s foreign policy discourse, where the USA is designated as the chief enemy - ‘the 
Great Satan’268 - and American hegemony as ‘global arrogance.’ As coming sections will 
discuss in more detail, the self-portrayal of the Islamic Republic as a force resisting the 
American-dominated international system and the American policies in the region is 
rooted in the rising anti-Americanism and discourses like Gharbzadegi in the pre-
revolutionary period.  
 
Greatly influenced by Jalal al-Ahmad’s ‘Westoxication,’ but becoming more 
popular than any other scholar in the pre-revolutionary period is not a cleric, but a 
sociologist of religion – the famous Ali Shariati. A sociologist educated in France during 
1960s and interested in the Algerian Liberation Movement of the time, Shariati was 
heavily influenced by Marxism as well as third-worldism.269 As a Marxist, he was 
interested in the Marxist logic of the emancipation of the peoples by revolution. However, 
Shariati was questioning the mechanics of social mobilization for a successful 
revolutionary action, and more specifically, how an emancipatory revolution would be 
achieved in a non-European setting. Shariati’s contention was that the Marxist ideas of 
class struggle, justice, and revolution were meaningful and valuable for an emancipatory 
political movement, yet insufficient as discourses, terminologies, imageries after which 
Iranian masses would get mobilized. Shariati was thus seriously questioning how a 
Marxist movement could mobilize the Iranian peasants living in the rural parts of Iran 
against the Shah regime. He had a belief in the power of religion in mobilizing the masses, 
but he was particularly disillusioned with Shia clerics. Shariati saw Shia clerics primarily 
as an institutionalized body legal scholars with a ‘clerical monopoly’ over the 
interpretation of Islam, distant from the real needs and problems of ordinary people, 
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funded by and serving the interests of the propertied classes and bazaris in Iran.270 What 
he was reacting against was the institutionalized, legalized, hierarchical ‘Safavid Shiism,’ 
and in response, he was proposing ‘Alid Shiism.’271 Shariati’s conceptualization of ‘Alid 
Shiism’ rested on folk Shia imageries of Karbala, Shia heroes of Ali and Hossein, as well 
as on martyrdom.272 He rephrased Imam Hussein’s struggle with the Umayyad Dynasty 
in Karbala as a struggle between an oppressor ruler and a resistant religious leader.273 
Shariati hailed Imam Hossein’s martyrdom as an example and inspiration for the Shias to 
take the necessary social action for achieving equality and justice in the 20th century 
Iranian setting.274 His solution for igniting the revolutionary fervor among the masses and 
drawing them to the Iranian streets was to borrow from folk Shiism. Shariati’s lectures, 
writings, and tapes became very popular in Iran before the revolution, but he passed away 
without seeing the revolutionary moment in Iran. Nevertheless, there is no contention in 
that his ideas inspired a wide range of intellectual currents, activists, and thinkers in pre-
revolutionary Iran ranging from Mujahedeen-e Khalq to Ayatollah Khomeini. His thought 
impacted not only the revolutionary moment, but the revolutionary state-building in Iran 
as well. Although he did not participate in the revolutionary action, his theoretical merger 
of revolutionism with Shia imageries earnt Ali Shariati the title of ‘the ideologue of the 
Islamic Revolution.’275  
 
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini is the Shia theologian who acted on the 
revolutionary moment in Iran. As a Shia theologian, he contributed to the pre-
revolutionary intellectual environment with his unique theory of Islamic government, 
velayet-e faqih. However, as discussed elsewhere, his political thinking was influenced 
by the non-quietist, non-traditional, and fundamentalist theological-intellectual 
movements of the time in Iraq. Khomeini is known to be in contact with Baqir al-Sadr of 
Najaf in the 60s and 70s, when the latter’s theory of representative government in Our 
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Philosophy generated political discussions in the hawza over Shia clerical rule.276 
Contrary to the political quietism of the Shia clerics of Qom in Iran and following the line 
of political activism opened by Baqir al-Sadr and Dawa Party in Iraq, Khomeini 
advocated clerical intervention into politics. According to Khomeini, while the society 
was undergoing great social and economic difficulties under the rule by an 
unaccomplished monarchy, the world should not wait for the coming of the vanished 
Imam to bring justice and salvation. The Shia clerics should rather actively seek solutions 
to the daily problems experienced by the nations of the whole world. Accordingly, his 
theory of velayet-e faqih, refers to the guardianship of the jurist and the government of 
the society by a marja in accordance with the precepts of the Islamic faith in the absence 
of the vanished 12th Imam.277 Khomeini’s velayet-e faqih is inspired by Plato’s 
‘philosopher king,’ where he sees the educated ulama as the legitimate class to guide and 
take care of the spiritual and national interests of the nation.278 In Khomeini’s 
understanding, the Islamic faith was not only to be believed, but to be acted and 
proactively implemented by the Shia clergy. Besides political activism of the Shia clergy, 
Khomeini also borrowed from Baqir al-Sadr’s popular elections, as he was aware that 
popular participation was necessary for the total transformation of the old system. The 
idea of ‘the guardianship of the jurist’ based on popular representation formed the basis 
of the key Islamic governmental bodies in revolutionary Iran such as the popularly elected 
‘assembly of experts’ and ‘the supreme leader’ elected by the former.   
 
Another source of inspiration for Khomeini was Shariati’s Marxist reading of Shia 
theology. Khomeini heavily borrowed from Shariati’s revolutionary mode which he saw 
as necessary to move towards the revolutionary moment. Like Shariati, he imported the 
idea of class struggle from the Marxist ideology which he embellished with an Islamic 
terminology. For Khomeini, the root cause of all conflicts in the world as a conflict 
between the ‘oppressors’ and the ‘oppressed.’279 Khomeini adopted a global vision in 
defining the content of both terms, where he more than frequently defined ‘oppressors’ 
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as the capitalist, imperialist Western countries as well as their monarchical allies in the 
Middle East, and ‘oppressed’ as the deprived Muslim populations of the Middle East.280 
Seeing the quietist ulama in these countries as indirectly contributing to this oppression, 
Khomeini propagated for a proactive religious leadership to liberate the peoples living 
under these regimes. He actively promoted the discourses of justice, right, and equality 
in framing the call for proactive intervention. In an ideologically divided world where 
American capitalism and Soviet communism stood against one another, Khomeini 
proposed Islamism as a third way for liberation and emancipation. He saw the Islamic 
awakening inaugurated in Iran with 1979 Revolution as the first step of a world-wide 
movement, where all the oppressed peoples would mobilize against the oppressors by 
emulating the Iranian example.  
 
 
Figure 1. From Ijtihad to the Islamic Revolution of 1979 
 
 
 
The 1979 revolution in Iran has a large socio-political and vibrant intellectual 
background, of which only a sketch has been provided within the scope of this study. It 
should be noted that the critical junctures and intellectual movements discussed above 
are selected to prepare the historical background for the evolution of the revolutionary 
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regime’s foreign policy and the list of the intellectual and political currents provided here 
is not exhaustive. Several conclusions can be derived from this discussion. First, the Shia 
ulama has played a central role in the Islamic Revolution. Over centuries, the Shia ulama 
has developed an institutional capacity to act as an independent political force by the 19th 
century through the development of ijtihad and Usuli school. The penetration of the 
nation-state system after World War I in the Middle East; the fall of the Caliphate; and 
the ambitious and top-down programs of nation-state building and modernization 
administered by Middle Eastern rulers have disturbed the interests of the ulama under the 
nation-state. However, the social and intellectual capital of the Shia ulama also featured 
them as modern political stakeholders and earnt them a mobilization capacity over the 
masses who were adversely affected by the nation-state building processes. While some 
ulama chose to maintain their traditional political quietism in Najaf, some others actively 
engaged in Islamist political party formation and revolutionary action. As such, an 
emerging Islamist political activism and religious intellectual environment characterized 
the Middle East region well before 1979. Second, the socio-political context and the 
intellectual movements in Iran culminating in the revolution were a part of this broader 
context in the Middle East. Ayatollah Khomeini was inspired by the politically activist 
Shia ulama and the Islamist political movements in Iraq during his exile. As such, the 
Shia faith gradually emerged as an indigenous, nationalist resistance force against the 
Shah regime. Third, the Shia theological-intellectual movement was not independent 
from the inspiration of modern ideologies and secular intellectual thoughts either. 
Marxism, anti-imperialism, third-worldism and anti-Western modernism were the 
featured ideological and intellectual currents in this respect. Leading ulama and lay Shia 
thinkers of the time merged these multiple religious and secular ideologies more than 
frequently in an untraditional and original way. Fourth, the Karbala narrative of the Shia 
faith was used as the central mobilizational component for a successful revolution. The 
scholars reframed the Karbala Battle as a class struggle, or the first instance of a centuries-
old global struggle between the ‘oppressor’ and the ‘oppressed,’ and hailed Imam 
Hossein’s martyrdom as a human virtue necessary for revolutionary action. Finally, the 
revolution of 1979 established a Shia theocracy based on Ayatollah Khomeini’s velayet-
e faqih. The new regime’s ideology can be defined as ‘revolutionary Islamism.’ 
Nevertheless, ‘revolutionary Islamism’ is not merely based on Shiism and Islamism; 
rather, it is a careful and neat amalgamation of both Islamist and secular intellectual 
elements that fed into the revolutionary moment in Iran. Accordingly, revolutionary 
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Islamism is an amalgamation of politically activist Shiism, third-worldism, Marxism, 
revolutionism, anti-Americanism, anti-imperialism, and anti-Western/Islamist 
modernism. Both Shia theocracy and revolutionary Islamism would have far-reaching 
impact on the Islamic Republic’s mode of existence as a revolutionary and anti-systemic 
state in the international system and thus shape its course of foreign policy.  
 
 
 
3.4.  The Foreign Policy of the Islamic Republic During the First Decade 
 
 
 
The historical and intellectual background leaves us with several cues on the 
course of Iran’s foreign policy after 1979. First, Iran’s foreign policy after 1979 should 
be treated as the foreign policy of a revolutionary regime. Second, the Islamic 
revolutionary movement in Iran is not separate from the greater Shia revival 
masterminded by influential Shia clerics and lay intellectuals in the 20th century across 
the region. Third, the revolutionary regime in Iran is based on a peculiar theocratic 
regime, which is inscribed into the Article 57 of the Islamic Republic’s Constitution as 
velayet-e faqih, which presumes ‘the supervision of the absolute authority of the 
command (velayat-e amr) and religious leadership (imamate) of the community of 
believers.’281 Fourth, the ideology of the revolutionary regime can be defined as 
‘revolutionary Islamism,’ which is a careful and innovative blend of political Islam, 
revolutionism, Twelver Imamate Shiism, Persian nationalism, anti-liberal modernism, 
and anti-imperialism. Altogether, religion is featured as a central element of the 
revolutionary regime. Religion defined the regional interaction context within which the 
revolutionary regime maneuvered, the identity of the regime, and the ideology regime. 
The question at this point is to what extent religion has been featured in Iran’s foreign 
policy as well. 
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Figure 2. The ideology of the Islamic Republic of Iran 
 
 
 
 
Foreign policy experts who have been interviewed during the field research have 
repeatedly emphasized the role of identity and ideology in Iran’s foreign policy. 
According to Interviewee 8, ‘Identity is very crucial in Iran’s foreign policy,’ as it defines 
the content of national interests, upon which relevant tools and strategies are 
determined.282 What could confuse the analyst is the complicated nature of the Islamic 
Republic’s identity and its implications on foreign policy. This is pointed out by some 
interviewees. Saghafi-Amari defines the Iranian identity as ‘composed of three themes: 
the Islamic thought, the Shia identity, and Iranian culture.’283 In a similar vein, 
interviewee 8’s account points out to Islam and Shiism on the one hand, and Iranian 
nationalism and civilization on the other, as simultaneously constituting the Islamic 
Republic’s state identity. The coexistence of ‘Islamism’ and ‘Iranian nationalism’ in Iran’s 
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revolutionary ideology creates ontological complications and foreign policy confusions 
for the Islamic Republic. As discussed before, the Islamic Republic is a Westphalian type 
of nation-state, where the national security priority lies in the survival of this territorial 
unit. On the other hand, revolutionary Islamism and Shiism shifts the analytical focus 
from the Iranian state to the greater Islamic community, the Ummah. The ontological 
duality of the regime reflects Iran’s decades-old foreign policy dilemma: Will the Islamic 
Republic continue to exist as a Westphalian nation-state that conforms to the norms, rules, 
and principles of the existing international system with a priority of ensuring its survival 
within this system? Or will it be a revisionist state committed to the priorities of the 
transnational Islamist movement it came from and to the transformation of the existing 
system?  
 
 
 
Figure 3. Between Nation State’s Interests and Transnational Interests 
 
 
 
 
These questions have intrigued foreign policy analysts on Iran, where most 
analysts evaluated the Iranian foreign policy as fluctuating between realism/pragmatism 
and ideology, between the self-ascribed roles and circumstantial realities, and between 
the nation-state interests and the Ummah’s interests. Most analysts agree on the 
proposition that the Islamic Republic’s early foreign policy is ideologically-driven, where 
the revolutionary Islamist identity and ideology plays a central role.284 On the other hand, 
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these and other analysts also argue that the ideological aspirations of the revolutionary 
regime is curbed by pragmatist necessities and the primacy of nation-state’s interests in 
the post-1989 period, where they defined Iran’s foreign policy moving away from 
ideology to greater realism and pragmatism.285 One central argument of this thesis is that 
the Islamism has been carried over decades in Iran’s foreign policy. Before expanding 
this argument in the following chapters, we need to examine Iran’s ideological foreign 
policy under the revolutionary period and two grand themes associated with this period: 
The Holy Defense War and the export of the revolution.  
 
 
3.4.1. Iran-Iraq War of 1980-88: The Holy Defense War   
 
On 22 April 1980, the Saddam regime in Iraq initiated a sudden military attack 
against Iran, which led to an eight-year-long war between two countries. Analysts initially 
invoked territorial reasons to understand the outbreak of the war, as Iran-Iraq relations 
had been ridden by territorial disputes and double sovereignty claims well before the 
revolution.286 One of the disputed territories was Shatt al-Arab, a waterway of 130 miles 
in total, the last 55 miles of which constitute the Iraq-Iran border.287 Both states have 
strategic and economic calculations regarding the region, as Iraq has a port with an 
opening to the Gulf and there are large oil reserves in the region.288 Due to its strategic 
importance, the area was a matter of dispute between the Ottomans and Persians as early 
as the 1820s, which led to several border treaties between the Ottomans and Persians, and 
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then the subsequent regimes of Iraq and Iran.289 However, the treaties were repeatedly 
un-made and re-made, leaving the issue at a stalemate for the coming periods. Another 
disputed area was the Iranian Khuzestan province, which is heavily populated by ethnic 
Arabic tribes. The Arab fabric of the community strengthened the Arab-nationalist 
Saddam regime’s claim that Khuzestan was a part of Iraq, while Iran saw the region as its 
natural component.290 A third territorial dispute was over three small islands close to the 
Strait of Hormuz, Abu Musa, Greater Tunb and Lesser Tunb.291 While two of these islands 
belonged to United Arab Emirates, the Iranian Shah laid claim over them in 1970s, which 
further drew Iraq to the game of sovereignty claims on the islands due to their strategic 
importance.  
 
Nevertheless, the territorial disputes and double sovereignty claims had already 
been partially settled by the sign of Algiers Agreement between two countries in 1975.292 
Therefore, analysts sought Saddam’s decision to declare war against Iran in the 
geopolitical and domestic circumstances generated by the Islamic Revolution in 1979. As 
a matter of fact, the territorial disputes had already reflected decades-long geopolitical 
rivalry between the pan-Arabist Iraq and Persian Iran, and the Sunnis and the Shiites.293 
The Islamic revolution and the ensuing regime change created a moment of vulnerability 
for Iran in this geopolitical power game. The leaders of the new regime were investing 
the country’s resources for the formation and institutionalization of the new regime. The 
Iranian army, the Artesh, was partly disbanded by the new regime due to their supposed 
allegiance to the ancien regime.294 The war thus caught Iran militarily unprepared and 
unwilling to engage in any external conflict during the early revolutionary period. Under 
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these adverse circumstances on the part of Iran, a window of opportunity was clearly 
opened for Iraq to claim regional leadership and the conditions seemed extremely ripe.  
 
Enjoying its advantageous position at the beginning of the war, the Baathist 
regime expected to win a definitive victory in a couple of months.295 Saddam’s forces 
captured the largest Iranian port of Khorramshahr on the West and surrounded the city of 
Abadan, the largest cities with oil refineries in 1980.296 Both Ayatollah Khomeini and 
Bani Sadr government were suspicious about the Artesh, as the leadership in early 1980 
was still more concerned about any anti-revolutionary element inside the country than 
any external threat.297 But once the war erupted, the Iranian regime had to deploy the 
Artesh. Nevertheless, the Artesh was joined by a parallel military institution in the fight 
against Iraq, the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). The IRGC was a religious-
revolutionary institution, whose original task was ‘to protect and preserve the Islamic 
Revolution and its gains.’298 There was a division of labor between the two sets of armies: 
whereas the Artesh was responsible to protect the Iranian state and its borders against 
external threats, the IRGC was originally tasked with protecting the revolutionary Islamic 
regime against externally and internally defined counter-revolutionary threats. The 
Iranian regime framed Saddam’s invasion as an aggression and threat against the Islamic 
revolutionary regime and its achievements, which created the ground for the IRGC to 
push for their relevance over the war. The IRGC and Artesh were further assisted by an 
ideological militia formation called the Basij, who were the volunteering youth militia 
trained for fighting by the IRGC.299 The military offspring of the revolution and war, both 
the IRGC and the Basij’s war approach reflected an element of revolutionary fervor, 
which was embellished with Shia narratives of self-sacrifice and martyrdom, and fought 
against Saddam’s forces with human wave tactics.300  
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Once they successfully took Khorramshahr back from Saddam’s forces in 1982, 
the Iranian regime saw the utility of the revolutionary army and militia in compensating 
for their weakness in conventional capabilities. Saddam had miscalculated the duration 
of war and was now thinking of withdrawing from the war due to the Israeli invasion of 
Lebanon in 1982. On the other hand, their achievements in Khorramshahr encouraged the 
IRGC to continue with the war. Between 1982 and 1984, the Iranian regime’s military 
position changed from defense to offense. During this period, Iran moved the war across 
the Iraqi border to incorporate the heavily Shia-dominated constituencies. The initial 
expectation was that the common Shia identity would encourage the Iraqi Shias to unite 
with the Iranian regime against the Saddam regime. Overall, Iraqi nationalism 
outbalanced Shia identity and not all Iraqi Shiites revolted against the Saddam regime 
despite their complicated relationship. Nevertheless, the Iranian involvement with the 
Shias earnt Iran one of its most profitable allies not only for the period of the war, but 
also for the post-Saddam period: The Supreme Council of Islamic Revolution in Iraq, 
a.k.a SCIRI.      
 
As discussed before, a Shia political revival was underway in Iraq as early as 
1950s. Mohammad Baqir al-Sadr had formed Islamic Dawa party in Iraq in the 1950s.301 
The Dawa Party emerged as a Shia political party that aimed to gradually proselytize the 
society, seize political power and establish an Islamic theocracy in Iraq.302 The party 
continued to function as an anti-Baathist political force in the next decades, despite the 
political suppression it faced under the Baathist regime. The Islamic Revolution of 1979 
was a critical moment for the Baath regime though, where the Shia activists felt 
encouraged by the success of the revolution in their neighbor and toned up their anti-
Baathist rhetoric.303 This was followed by an extensive anti-Shia repression across Iraq, 
which lead to the execution of Mohammad Baqir al-Sadr. Faced with the extent of state 
repression against Shia political activism mounting, many Shia political activists took 
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shelter on the side of the border on the early days of the war, including Mohammad Baqir 
al-Hakim, who was a son of the famous clerical al-Hakim family.304  
 
The movement of Shia clerics and political activists from Iraq created a significant 
opportunity for the Iran, where the Iranian regime organized various Iraqi Shia elements 
into an umbrella organization called the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in 
Iraq.305 Defining itself as ‘a government in exile,’ the SCIRI had important Shia clerical 
and political figures among its cadres including Mohammad Baqr al-Hakim, who 
represented the Iraqi marjaiyya, the Dawa Party member Kathem al-Haeri, and 
independent Shia clerics and political activists such as Ayatollah Mahmoud al-Hashimi 
Shahroudi, Ali al-Haeri, and Mohammad Taqi al-Modarrasi.306 SCIRI soon adopted 
Khomeini’s velayet-e faqih and the objective to establish an Iranian-style Islamic 
theocracy in Iraq.307 The IRGC also trained another force that acted both as an 
intelligence-gathering unit and military operations wing to SCIRI called the Badr 
Brigades.308 With their ideological embrace of velayet-e faqih and military activities 
against the Arab-nationalist Saddam regime, SCIRI became a powerful ally and Badr an 
efficient proxy to Iran during the war. SCIRI thus replaced Dawa Party as a central 
resistance force against the Iraqi regime.  
 
The war was extended from the Iran-Iraq border away to the Persian Gulf in 1983, 
when Saddam’s forces attacked Iran’s offshore oil facilities and caused an oil spill-over 
that impacted the Gulf countries.309 In 1984, Iraq went as far as blocking the Karg Island, 
one of the most important oil facilities of Iran, and targeting foreign oil tankers.310 The 
extension of the war into the Gulf was a direct threat to the global economy, where the 
prolongation of the war was only contributing to the potential economic risks for the 
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international community. As a result, France, the USA, and the Gulf countries found 
themselves involved as sides to the conflicting parties. This phase of the war is important 
in shaping the war alliances for both parties, which would also inform Iran’s core allies 
for the coming decades. France was one of the main supporters of Iraq during the war and 
delivered military equipment and missiles to Iraq.311 The Carter Administration in the 
USA had seemingly announced neutrality, which was in fact a policy of dual containment 
against Iraq and Iran.312 On the one hand, the US-Iran relations were already tense since 
the Islamic Revolution, particularly due to the Hostage Crisis of 1979, and any reversal 
of the Islamic Revolution by a successful Iraqi operation would thus be a welcome 
outcome for the USA. The US administration was negotiating with the Iranian regime to 
release the hostages in exchange for providing military equipment and lifting the freeze 
on Iranian assets.313 On the other hand, once the Iranian forces outmaneuvered the Iraqi 
forces in 1982, the US Secretary of State George Schultz adopted the policy of containing 
the Iranian threat against the Gulf by supporting the Saddam regime.314 Accordingly, The 
USA provided technological aid, military equipment, satellite intelligence, and chemical 
war technology to Iraq.315 The USA also influenced the UN Security Council decisions 
regarding Iraq’s use of chemical weapons against Iran, where the international 
community either took a mild tone or remained silent on Iraq’s war crime.316  
 
The Soviet and Chinese stance on the war was no different, where both countries 
benefited from the war economy and sold military technology to Iraq.317 Nevertheless, a 
definitive let-down for Iran was caused by the extensive regional support for Iraq, where 
the Gulf countries emerged as main beneficiaries even before the extension of the war to 
the Persian Gulf. Saudi Arabia, whose relations with revolutionary Iran was rigged due 
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to the latter’s denunciation of the Saudi regime as an ‘un-Islamic’ institution ruled by 
‘corrupt men’ that used oil revenues for American demands in the region, sided with 
Saddam and provided 10 Billion Dollar loans.318 Kuwait had already disclosed its support 
for Iraq by providing logistical support and a total of 6 billion Dollars by 1981 – in the 
early times of the war.319 Qatar and the United Arab Emirates maintained a general policy 
of neutrality due to internal differences of opinion regarding the war. However, the pro-
Iraqi Emirates and Qatar also provided financial aid to Iraq with a value of 1-3 billion 
Dollars and 1 billion Dollar respectively by 1981.320 Amid increasing international and 
regional support to Iraq in financial, diplomatic, and military terms, Iran felt heavily 
isolated and marginalized in the region. The only regional player supporting Iran was the 
Syrian regime. Strategic considerations brought Iran and Syria together in early 1980s, 
where the political isolation of Syria on the Palestine-Israeli conflict following the Camp 
David Accords, the congruence of Syrian and Iranian interest in Lebanon regarding the 
political empowerment of Lebanese Shias, and Syria’s rivalry with another Baathist 
regime in Iraq brought both countries closer.321 The Assad regime provided intelligence 
support to Iran, secretly transferred Soviet-made weapons, concluded an arms deal, 
signed trade agreements, and closed the Iraqi pipelines crossing the Syrian lands upon an 
oil deal with Iran in 1982.322 The Syrian-Iranian alliance that was formed during the Iran-
Iraq War proved to be extremely robust over the years and dictated the course of the 
Syrian conflict after 2011. Therefore, the Syrian-Iranian alliance of 1980s is of immense 
importance and has far reaching implications for the post-2011 regional balances.     
 
The war inscribed ineffaceable marks in the political consciousness of the 
revolutionary regime in Iran. The ‘war of the cities,’ where each party targeted major 
urban centers, inflicted great destruction on Iranian cities, civilian populations, industrial 
centers, and oil installations.323 Economic devastation was immense due to a drop in oil 
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prices, the rising inflation, and chronic unemployment.324 Iranian economic infrastructure 
and civilian populations were thus greatly harmed due to the war, where the human cost 
reportedly reached 300 thousand Iranians.325 Western and Arab support to Iraq only 
aggravated the devastation and the hardships on the part of the revolutionary regime. It 
could be argued that the 1980-88 war made the Islamic Republic a la Tilly, as it irrefutably 
shaped the ideological consolidation of and the institutional structure of the Islamic 
Republic.326 Ideologically, the war fostered the anti-imperialist, religious identity of the 
Islamic Republic. The Western and Arab support of Iraq at the expense of Iranian 
populations and cities perpetuated the revolutionary regime’s lack of trust to the ‘unjust’ 
international system. Feeling extremely isolated both at the regional and international 
level, Khomeini re-invoked the theme of the revolutionary discourse of ‘independence’ 
and ‘self-reliance’ and extended his ‘neither East, nor West’ philosophy to foreign policy 
realm.327 Moreover, the war also perpetuated Khomeini’s central discourse regarding the 
international system, i.e. the ‘oppressors’ nations vs. the ‘oppressed.’ The war was 
discursively framed in Iran as the ‘oppression’ of the Islamic Republic by the modern, 
capitalized, Western powers which, in the Iranian discourse, extended cutting-edge 
military technology to Iraq at the expense of the immense cost on Iran. The war was a 
‘defensive jihad’ in the Iranian political discourse, as it was fought not only against the 
Iraqi regime but against a broad international community that allegedly aimed to reverse 
the revolutionary achievements.328 The war was fought against Western powers, Western 
imperialism and capitalism, and their Arab allies in the region. The ideological references 
earnt the war a sense of sacredness and the Iranian regime officially referred the war ‘holy 
defense war,’ ‘sacred war,’ and ‘imposed war.’ 
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Like the revolutionary moment of 1979, the Islamic and Shia faith elements 
played a crucial role in mobilizing the Iranian human resource for the war as well. The 
holiness and sacredness of the war also came from the fact that ‘the holy defense’ 
discourse relied extensively on the employment of Qur’anic concepts, Shia narratives, 
and Shia symbolism. When Iraq executed the first military attack on Iran, Ayatollah 
Khomeini’s response was to invoke the Islamic concept of jihad, i.e. a war which would 
be fought with the participation of everyone within the society for the collective defense 
of the Islamic revolution, it ideology, institutions, and values.329 Jihad implied a collective 
mobilization of the country’s overall resources for the defense of the Islamic regime and 
revolutionary ideology. A defensive jihad as such was not limited to the battlefield, but it 
was to be embraced as a moral duty by all individuals of the Islamic regime in the 
workplaces, universities, and market places and implied the total mobilization of the 
Iranian society for the defense of the revolutionary values.330 The anti-imperialist 
discourse was also framed in Islamic concepts. The Western powers’ interference with 
the war was framed as fitna, caused by their colonialist temptations and ‘arrogance.’331 
The war itself was another link in the chain of the battle between haqq and batil 
throughout history and a test, i.e. imtihan, and ‘experiment’ on the capacity of the Islamic 
regime to choose haqq or ‘truth’ and on their endurance to defend the Islamic ideals.332  
 
One challenge concerning the war for Iran was how to legitimize the fight against 
fellow Muslims in Iraq. In this respect, the Iranian regime categorized Saddam and the 
Baath regime as bughat, i.e. as dissenter of the faith.333 The Iranian leadership and 
influential clerics of the time defined the Baath regime as a dissenter, as according to this 
discourse, they acted contrary to the Muslim interests, deceived the populations, and 
committed themselves to the overthrow of an Islamic system in Iran.334 Imam Khomeini 
invoked Shia imageries in legitimizing the war against another Muslim country in this 
respect, where he equated the Iranian struggle against Baathist regime to that of Imam Ali 
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against Muslim rulers of the time, saying Imam Ali did not fight against Muslims but 
against those Muslims who did not choose haqq and remain true to the Islamic faith.335 A 
related Shia concept was kufr, which theologically meant recognizing the God, but not 
acknowledging his order with words and action, thereby neglecting the faith and the 
ummah.336 In the Iranian usage kufr referred to the ‘enemies’ of the Islamic Republic.337 
In the war discourse, kufr had two connotations. The notion first referred to any state that 
saw the Islamic Republic and its Islamic ideology as a threat and opposed to Iran. The 
Iranian leadership used the notion to refer to US imperialism and ‘global arrogance,’ i.e. 
estekbar, the Soviet Union, and any of their allies.338 Secondly, kufr could also be Muslim 
enemies, as in the case of takfir, which referred to Wahhabi movements that declared 
others as dissenters and legitimized war against them.339 The Iranian leadership used kufr 
as any state or ideology that did not conform to the values, principles, and revolutionary 
ideology of the Islamic Republic during the war. ‘The holy war’ was thus framed as a 
sacred struggle to defend the fledgling Islamist regime and its ideology.  It was a jihad 
against kufr, all international forces and their regional allies, that aimed to reverse the 
achievements of the Islamic Revolution in the Iranian war discourse.   
 
Perhaps the most widely used concept during the war was shahada, which referred 
to the act of ‘self-sacrifice’ and ‘martyrdom’ during the jihad. While notions of fitna, kufr, 
jihad, bughat, and takfir legitimized the war by framing it as a moral duty against the 
opponents of the Islamic order, the notion of shahada implied the mobilizational strategy 
of the Iranian regime. Shahada was closely linked to the mobilization of Iranian men and 
youth for the ideological security organizations of the Islamic Republic, i.e. the IRGC 
and Basij forces.  While martyrdom and self-sacrifice are central tenets of Islamic jihad 
in general, the notion of shahada has a peculiarly profound place in Shia faith due to its 
centrality to Karbala. As discussed above, the Shias have traditionally treated Imam 
Hossein’s self-sacrifice and martyrdom against the Umayyad Dynasty at the battle of 
Karbala in the 7th century AD as a resistance. The Karbala event was inscribed in the Shia 
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narratives and symbolism as a moment of resistance and Imam Hossein’s struggle and 
perseverance as self-sacrifice for the greater good of the Islamic community.340 Imam 
Jafar al-Sadiq’s ‘Every day is Ashura; every land is Karbala!’ was a frequently used 
slogan during the Iranian revolution.341 The ‘culture of Ashura’ had thus already attained 
a central place in the Shia collective psyche motivating collective action over centuries 
and the Iranian leadership invoked emotional attachment to Karbala by extolling 
martyrdom first during the revolution and later for the war. The primary objective was to 
find recruits for the IRGC and volunteer fighters for the Basij. A secondary objective was 
to encourage the population’s resistance against all infrastructural, economic, military 
implications of the war. Therefore, a large propaganda sector promoting the notion of 
shahada developed in Iran. The mullahs, clerics, and political leaders preached on the 
virtue of martyrdom, perseverance, and ‘selfless struggle.’342 The Iranian cinema industry 
shot hundreds of movies narrating the stories of war martyrs.343 Tehran’s streets were 
named after the martyrs of the war and were decorated with wall paintings depicting 
them.344 In short, shahada, Karbala paradigm, and Ashura culture were consistently 
invoked to ensure collective mobilization during the Holy Defense.  
 
The ‘holy defense war’ has an immense role in defining Iran’s early experience 
with the external world as a revolutionary regime. The Iranian regime defined who is an 
ally and who is enemy for the first time during this war. The war proved the 
marginalization of Iran as an anti-Americanist, anti-systemic, revolutionary Islamist 
regime with the region, where most of the Middle Eastern states allied with Iraq. The 
extreme cost of the war on Iran and the international and regional marginalization of Iran 
constituted the strategic loneliness and isolation of Iran in the coming decades. However, 
a more critical impact of the war on the Islamic Republic is the further institutionalization 
                                                
340 See the section on Karbala Paradigm in Gieling, Religion and War in Revolutionay Iran, p. 113-126.  
 
341 See Stephen Poulson, Social Movements in the Twentieth Century Iran: Culture, Ideology, and Mobilizing 
Frameworks (Plymouth: Lexington Books, 2006), p. 44-47.  
 
342 See Ayatollah Khamenei, ‘Leader’s Speech in Meeting with the Members of the Assembly of Experts,’ The 
Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei Website, September 23, 2010, http://english.khamenei.ir/news/2054/Leader-s-
Speech-in-Meeting-with-Members-of-Assembly-of-Experts.   
 
343 The Cinema Museum of Iran has a large collection of Iranian war movies intended for praising Iran’s war martyrs. 
See ‘Main Page: The Cinema Museum of Iran,’ The Cinema Museum of Iran Website, accessed June 3, 2018, 
http://cinemamuseum.ir/?p=MainPage.  
 
344 This information is based on the author’s personal observations during field trips to Tehran in summer 2015 and 
2016.  
 
 130	
	
and empowerment of the Islamist military and security forces within the new regime. The 
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Basij are a case in point. As discussed, the IRGC 
is the outcome of adverse security circumstances that surrounded the nascent Islamic 
regime in its early years. While Iran’s standing army Artesh was partially disbanded 
because of their allegiance to the Shah regime and hence the possibility of a coup d’état 
against the revolutionary regime, the internal and external circumstances necessitated an 
alternative military solution. The threats to the regime included the armed guerilla forces 
of two leftist groups Mujahidin-e Khalq and the Fedaiyan-e Khalq, the uprisings by 
Kurdish and Azari communities across the country, and the war with Iraq.345 Externally, 
the Iran-Iraq War necessitated the mobilization of Iranian volunteers to fight alongside 
the weakened Artesh. The IRGC was created by the war conditions as a peculiar 
ideological army and has further gained power in non-military sectors of the Iranian 
regime following the war. 
 
Ostovar defines IRGC as ‘a multifaceted organization with reach into many 
different areas’ as ‘it is a security service, an intelligence organization, a social and 
cultural force, and a complex industrial and economic conglomerate.’346 The IRGC was 
first mobilized during the war by the participation of untrained, unexperienced volunteers 
who ‘learned to fight on the job.’347 While the Artesh acted as the conventional military 
forces of the Islamic Republic during the war, the IRGC volunteers attacked the Iraqi 
forces by unconventional strategies such as guerilla warfare and human wave tactics.348 
Their unconventional tactics earnt them a fame during the war when they could repel 
Saddam’s forces, which led to an elevated sense of success on the part of the IRGC, 
changed the Iranian position from one of defense to offense, and eventually led to the 
prolongation of the war. A clear division of labor between Artesh and IRGC is visible 
during its early formation. Accordingly, Artesh was the regular military of the Islamic 
Republic, responsible for the territorial defense of the country. On the other hand, the 
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IRGC was both responsible for the defense of territorial borders and the Islamic regime. 
The latter defined the nature of the IRGC as an ‘ideological army’ which is committed to 
protecting the revolutionary ideology, the revolutionary regime, and the achievements of 
the revolution. As such, the IRGC was tasked with fighting against counter-revolutionary 
forces both at home and abroad.349 This task is safeguarded by Article 150 of the Islamic 
Republic’s Constitution.350 The IRGC is directly responsible to vali-e faqih - the Supreme 
Leader – and takes orders from him. Their direct affiliation with the Leader and ‘devotion 
to the leader’ have earnt them increasing power within the system.351 
 
The forces have an ideological mission and that mission is defined by Islam and 
Shiism. Karbala narratives of martyrdom and sacrifice formed the backbone of their 
mobilization during the Holy Defense War, where the imagery of the Imam Hossein, his 
selfless struggle, and self-sacrifice were portrayed as the guiding virtues of the Guards 
during the war.352 The IRGC has perpetuated their image as an ideological army devoted 
to the protection of velayet-e faqih and revolutionary Islamism through social and cultural 
promotional activities. Some of the most influential news agencies in Iran are run by 
IRGC such as Fars News Agency and Tasnim News. They also regularly publish on their 
political views and activities on Payam-e Enghelab on their primary news outlet, Sepah 
News. ‘Resistance’ is a central discursive element of the IRGC since the war. Ostovar 
defines the element of ‘resistance’ as IRGC’s ‘perpetual state of being,’ because these 
pro-regime forces are not opposing to another system, but are opposing to any opposition 
to the existing system.353 Accordingly, the IRGC is in a perpetual state of resistance ‘to 
actual, perceived, and existential threats to the Islamic Republic and its revolutionary 
system.’354 The resistance was defined as military and political resistance to the 
international system, which did not want to allow the Islamic Republic’s survival as well 
as to any internal opposition to the regime and vali-e faqih at home. As Chapter 5 will 
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discuss in more detail, the nature of the friends, enemies, risks, and threats changed, the 
connotations and content of ‘resistance’ in the Islamic Republic’s discourse have equally 
undergone modifications over time. However, the IRGC’s emphasis on ‘resistance,’ its 
Islamic content and Shia form has remained unchanged. 
The end of the Holy War gradually transformed the IRGC from a mere ideological 
army to an economic actor in the post-1989 era. President Rafsanjani first sealed the status 
of IRCG as a formal military force of the country, and then tasked the IRCG with the 
reconstruction of the war-torn country at all levels. When Rafsanjani initiated the 
privatization of the Iranian economy in 1990s, IRCG was given lucrative state contracts, 
and established the ‘headquarters of self-sufficiency’ and ‘headquarters of 
reconstruction.’355 The IRCG established several companies in industrial, agricultural, 
transportation, mining, construction, import and export sectors, all of which were later 
unified under a colossal industrial complex called Khatam-ol-Anbiya, which literally 
means ‘the Seal of Prophets.’356 Khatam-ol-Anbiya gradually extended its sectoral base, 
where it increased its activities in Iran’s oil sector, became the only contractor in the gas 
sector, and expanded its activities to the telecommunications sector.357 Besides, the IRGC 
has military-industrial complexes and is extremely active in Iran’s banking and financial 
sector. The IRCG is also affiliated with bonyads, the Iranian foundations, such as 
Foundation for the Oppressed, Martyrs Foundation, and Foundation for Mutual 
Assistance, all of which further perpetuated the IRGC’s social and economic influence 
within the regime.358 The military and economic power of the IRGC was supplemented 
by an increasing political power at home as well. This first manifested during Khatami’s 
reform movement, where the IRGC took a strict position as the defender of the Islamic 
regime against the reformers liberalizing policies in 1997. The political influence of the 
IRGC got further accentuated during Ahmadinejad’s presidency, where he appointed 
IRGC staff into key governmental and bureaucratic position.  
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The Basij forces are the second important ideological forces of the Islamic 
Republic. They were initially formed as paramilitary forces of young Iranian volunteers 
who supported the IRGC during the war with ‘human wave tactics.’ In the Persian 
language, Basij means ‘popular mobilization’ for the defense of the Islamic Regime and 
its achievements. Ayatollah Khomeini’s original thinking of the Basij was ‘an army of 20 
million Iranians,’ who would be mentally, physically, and spiritually ready all the time for 
the defense of the revolution and its values.359 After the war, the Basij predominantly 
remained as an internal morality force that oversaw the implementation of Islamist 
revolutionary values in the social and cultural realm. Their offices at the mosques, schools 
and universities facilitate their penetration into the society and perform this duty. Like the 
IRGC, the Basiji played a critical role in suppressing the reformist movement in 2009 as 
the guards of the revolution. Nevertheless, the main importance of the Basij for the 
purposes of this thesis is that they are model of ‘popular mobilization,’ this mobilizational 
capacity is accompanied by their allegiance to revolutionary Islamism and Shiism. Both 
the IRGC and the Basij are the institutional outcomes of the Holy Defense War. Both have 
become more institutionalized and empowered over time as ideological security forces of 
the Islamic Republic. Both have institutionalized an Iranian security culture that features 
‘popular mobilization,’ defensive jihad, martyrdom, sacrifice, and the discourse of 
‘resistance.’ This model of security culture would become central to the Islamic 
Republic’s foreign policy discourse over time, specifically after 2003.   
 
 
3.4.2. The Export of the Revolution 
 
While the ‘holy defense war’ was the first external experience of the Islamic 
Republic, its ‘export of the revolution’ policy was the second. The ‘export of the 
revolution’ concept is not easy to define and the policy generated internal discussions 
regarding the content, extent, and the objectives of the policy. Before defining the policy, 
one should describe the context within which the policy came into formation. As 
discussed in previous sections, the Iranian revolution is a multifaceted revolution. It was 
a response to the domestic socio-political grievances generated by the modernization, 
nation-state system, and the Western intervention into the Middle East under the mandate 
                                                
359 Ali Alfoneh, ‘The Basij Resistance Force,’ Iran Primer, accessed May 18, 2018, 
http://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/basij-resistance-force.   
 134	
	
system after World War I. The increasing dependence of Middle Eastern rulers on foreign 
powers for the reconstruction of the military and economic system, the foreign control 
over the region’s natural resources such as oil, and the repercussions of modernization on 
the social structure and cultural policies had created sufficient ground for the rise of anti-
imperialist and anti-Westernist sentiments among the Middle Eastern populations. The 
empirical implications of this region-wide restlessness in Iran were Shah’s modernization 
policies, the increasing British control over Iranian oil, and the foreign designed coup 
against Mosaddeq. Therefore, the revolution was an anti-imperialistic and anti-American 
revolution. Given the fact that such problems were shared by most third-world countries, 
the revolutionary cadres had a systemic approach to these problems. As such, the 
revolutionary regime was anti-systemic and it aimed to refuse conformism to the existing 
international order with its new mode of existence and ideology. 
 
Secondly, amid a plethora of ideological and intellectual currents, the 
revolutionary regime had generated an amalgamation all with a dominance of one as a 
solution to anti-imperialism: revolutionary Islamism. It was neither Marxism nor 
liberalism, but Islamism, proposed as a third way to cope with the problems experienced 
by the Middle Eastern nations. According to Interviewee 1, who is an Iranian researcher 
on Islamism, the clerical logic was that the USA is going to remove all alternative 
civilizations with an attempt to prevent any alternative views challenging the existing 
international order.360 He argues that this proved to be the case in the post-Cold War 
period, where Russia and China had already accepted the American-led international 
order after the fall of the Soviet Union.361 The Interviewee 1 emphasized the Iranian 
position that the Islamic Republic emerged as one opponent to the American-led 
international order in a philosophical, cultural and ideological sense.362 Imam Khomeini’s 
Islamism was an ideology of resistance to the existing international order and he had a 
universalistic understanding of it. Influenced by the Marxist idea of a ‘universal 
revolution,’ he thought that the Iranian Revolution would be the first step towards a 
worldwide Islamic Revolution. He had a grand vision of a new moral transnational 
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political order that would tear down territorial borders and unite the Islamic Ummah. It 
would be materialized by mobilizing the mustazafun, i.e. the ‘oppressed’ peoples of the 
Muslim community who are artificially separated into nation-states, against the rule by 
mostakberoun, i.e. the ‘oppressors’ and corrupt regimes.363  
 
Despite the existence of similar Islamist movements elsewhere, the Islamic 
Revolution was different from other movements in one sense: While the Islamic and Shia 
revivalist movements across the region were movements only, the Islamic Republic was 
an Islamic state building project. With the revolution, the Islamist revolutionary 
movement had acquired a great institutional and mobilizational capacity. Iran was now 
an Islamic government, which would render it institutionally more powerful than any 
other Islamist movement in the region. This governmental character quickly pushed Iran 
to adopt a somewhat grandiose attitude concerning the leadership of the transnational 
Shia movements. As the next section will discuss in more detail, Iran’s renewed self-
positioning after the Islamic Revolution was one of ‘leadership’ of the Islamic Ummah. 
As a successful revolutionary movement which culminated into an Islamic government, 
the Islamic Republic saw the necessary experience, capacity, and power to be an 
inspirational model and leader to all similar independence movements. The Islamic state-
building process, especially in the security sector with the formation of an ideological 
army like IRGC, also perpetuated this self-identification. 
 
Against this background, how can we define the ‘export of the revolution’ policy? 
According to Sinkaya, the ‘export of the revolution’ is associated with the radical 
revolutionaries’ rejection of the existing international system and Iran’s self-promotion 
as ‘a model to be imitated by the oppressed part of the world, especially by other Islamic 
countries.’364 However, if model-setting is one, provision of necessary support to 
liberation movements is another aspect of the export of revolution.365 Moreover, he argues 
that there is a ‘messianic’ feel to the export of the revolution as well, where the 
revolutionaries engage in ‘a quest for just world order and in an Islamic universalism that 
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seeks to revive the Ummah’ until the return of Imam Mahdi from gayb.366 In a similar 
vein, Ostovar defines the export of the revolution as a policy of radical internationalism, 
which includes ‘taking the revolution’s politics and ideological values to other oppressed 
polities—especially in the developing world—and helping like-minded liberation and 
Islamic movements’ for contributing to their self-determination projects.367 The policy is 
a self-assigned duty of the Islamic Republic and is also inscribed in the Article 154 of 
Islamic Republic’s Constitution, which explicitly states the Iranian support for the 
‘oppressed’ peoples against the ‘oppressors’ in other parts of the world is a duty.368  
 
How was the policy of the ‘export of the revolution’ administered? The Islamic 
Republic’s export of the revolution policy rested on establishing sub-state level relations, 
instead of state-level relations. The revolutionary regime addressed relevant domestic 
factions, movements, and groups in other countries for revolutionary mobilization against 
their respective regimes. While the regime placed no emphasis on the Sunni-Shia divide 
in export of the revolution on the discursive level and indeed adopted a universalistic 
approach aimed at uniting the Islamic Ummah at large, the policy concentrated 
predominantly on Shia populations in practice. Pragmatism might have played a role in 
overreliance on Shias for a number of reasons. First, common Shia identity and Shia 
narratives might facilitate an Islamist Shia mobilization among the Shias. Second, as 
discussed in previous sections and emphasized by one of the interviewees, Shias are the 
socio-politically marginalized stakeholders of the nation-state building processes in the 
Middle East region. Their access to governmental and bureaucratic positions and thus 
economic resources has been a source of contention in Iraq, Lebanon, and the Gulf. The 
marginalization of the Shias, from a pragmatist stance, might have created the background 
to step in and support the political empowerment of fellow Shias. It should also be 
emphasized that some of the countries with sizeable Shia populations are internally 
conflict-torn countries such as Lebanon, which facilitates intervention by foreign actors. 
Finally, the clerical regime in Iran already had pre-existing clerical ties to their Shia 
counterparts in other countries before the revolution. The transnational Shia clerical and 
political networks facilitated Iranian access to their sub-state clients.  
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The export of the revolution was administered by the collective effort of a variety 
of actors inside and outside of Iran including clerical and revolutionary personalities and 
individuals, the IRGC and their affiliated unit Qods Forces and the Office of the 
Liberation Movements, as well as the clerical networks. The export of the revolution 
should thus be understood as a network activity of key clerical and military individuals, 
already existing Shia political nodes across the region, and of unconventional security 
forces. Two significant personalities who contributed to the revolutionary foreign policy 
were Mostafa Chamran and Mohammad Montazeri. Mostafa Chamran’s transnational 
activism dates to late 1970s, where he became interested in Islamist and revolutionary 
movements in the Middle East and actively engaged in the training of guerilla forces in 
Algeria, Egypt, and Lebanon.369 He simultaneously initiated the Iran Freedom Movement 
abroad, which aimed to depose the Shah through armed struggle.370 A training base was 
formed in Egypt, where Iranian youth were recruited by the work of Ayatollah Mahmoud 
Taleqani and Mahdi Bazargan in Iran and sent to Egypt to be trained on irregular warfare 
tactics, explosives, and weapons as well exemplary revolutionary wars of Cuba, Vietnam, 
Algeria.371 This training base was later moved to Lebanon due to the Arab-nationalist 
political environment in Egypt. He contributed to the mobilization of Lebanese Shias by 
Musa al-Sadr, a clerical figure of Iranian origin and cousin of Baqir al-Sadr in Iraq, which 
would culminate in the AMAL movement in Lebanon.372 Nevertheless, he was called 
back by Bani Sadr after the revolution and appointed as the defense minister of the Islamic 
Republic.373 For a short period of time, he coordinated with Musa al-Sadr for the AMAL 
movement from Iran. However, his second duty started with the war with Iraq, where 
Chamran mobilized his own small number of paramilitary fighters, which would later 
form the IRGC, and was killed during the war.  
 
Gradually, the IRGC became the primary contractor of the export of the revolution 
policy. Individuals with strong internationalist revolutionary tendencies have had an 
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impact on the institutionalization of this policy. One such key personality was 
Mohammad Montazeri, the son of the Grand Ayatollah Montazeri, who pressed his 
influence in the IRGC by using his clerical position and opened a separate institutional 
body for the export of the revolution. This new institution was called the Office of the 
Liberation Movements and it was established to support the Iranian activities of 
supporting Islamist liberation movements in the Middle East.374 Montazeri was an ardent 
supporter of the transnationalization of the revolutionary movement. Ahmad Khomeini’s 
accounts cited by Alfoneh indicate that Montazeri saw transnationalization as a way to 
ensure Iran’s complete self-reliance against Western domination and he even suggested 
Khomeini and his son to go to other countries for supporting the revolutionary movements 
there.375 A special unit was formed under IRGC tasked with carrying out the military 
activities of exporting the revolution, the IRGC - Qods Force units. The Qods Force was 
originally planned to be the army of the Islamic countries and their combatants for 
emancipating the oppressed peoples of the Muslim Ummah from the reign of oppressor 
regimes. A bank account was also opened at Bank Melli to collect funding for the 
operation of the Office and the Qods Force.376 In short, key personalities who were 
already active members of Islamist movements elsewhere in the Middle East and their 
pre-existing networks-type relationships culminated in the institutionalization of this 
effort under Qods Forces. After the revolution, the key Iranian figures of transnational 
Shia networks attained key positions within the regime, i.e. Ayatollah Khomeini 
becoming the Supreme Leader, Chamran defense minister, and Montazeri as one of the 
founding fathers of the IRGC and Qods Forces along with Chamran. The Office of the 
Liberation Movement’s early activities focused on Lebanon, Syria, Gulf countries, and to 
a small extent Afghanistan.   
 
Between 1980 and 1988, we see the intensification of the Office and Qods Force 
activities along two main lines: 1) The existing network ties to Lebanon created a strategic 
reason to mobilize the revolutionary movement in Lebanon, 2) The war with Iraq created 
another strategic environment for the concentration of their activities in Iraq. Lebanon is 
a key zone in the Middle East for the mobilization of a Shia revival. Lebanon was a 
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country that fell into political struggle along religious and sectarian lines. The Shia 
politicization there was a response to unequal political representation and economic 
inequalities. As a matter of fact, a famous member of the clerical Sadr family in Iraq and 
a well-known cleric who was first raised in Qom and then joined Najaf hawza - Baqir al-
Sadr’s cousin Musa al-Sadr - had already flown to Lebanon in late 1950s. He contributed 
to the establishment of The Movement of the Deprived, the armed wing of which is 
known as the AMAL movement in 1974, and he became one of the most charismatic 
clerical figures across the Middle East. 377 Musa al-Sadr’s focus was on the disadvantaged 
living conditions of the Shias, despite their sizeable population in Lebanon. He adopted 
the terminology of ‘deprivation’ and ‘disinheritance’ against Marxian ‘class conflict’ in 
his campaign and tapped into Shia identity to revive a sectarian consciousness among the 
Lebanese Shias.378 Mostafa Chamran joined Musa al-Sadr’s efforts in mobilizing the 
Lebanese Shias in 1970s. He transformed the Jabal al-Amel Technical School in South 
Lebanon into a recruitment as well as an ideological and military training center for the 
Shia, and established The Movement of the Deprived along with Musa al-Sadr as well as 
the Supreme Shia Islamic Council of Lebanon, which aimed at uniting the Shia 
factions.379  
 
The Shia revival that flourished in Lebanon under Musa al-Sadr and Chamran 
cooperation was later joined by another Islamist revolutionary discourse within the 
context of Arab-Israeli conflict – anti-Zionism. Israel constitutes an important theme in 
Iran’s foreign policy discourse for a number of reasons. First, as the primary American 
ally in the region, Iran sees Israel as the regional extension of American intervention in 
the region and this perpetuates the former’s anti-imperialistic attitude. Second, as Iranian 
journalist Mostafa Dehghan emphasized in an interview with the author, the revolutionary 
regime saw an opportunity in taking a definitive stance on the prolonged Arab-Israeli 
conflict in the region. Dehghan defines the Arab-Israeli conflict as a ‘common issue’ for 
the whole region, to which many other regional issues are tied.380 At a time when Egypt 
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was gradually shifting away from the anti-Israeli camp in the Middle East towards the 
pro-Western camp with Camp David Accords and when other regional players were 
exhibiting an ambivalent position on the issue at best, the Islamic Republic took a solid 
anti-Israeli position and pressed its force as well as legitimacy in the region.381 The 
Islamic Republic’s anti-Zionist tone earnt the regime a great opportunity to intensify its 
support to Lebanese Shias when Israel invaded South Lebanon in 1982 due to PLO 
activities in Lebanon.   
 
Musa al-Sadr had vanished during his trip to Libya and the secular AMAL 
movement was fighting against Palestinian groups in South Lebanon for afflicting 
damage to Shia populations.382 Nevertheless, there was a group of AMAL fighters who 
were influenced by the Iranian Revolution, drifted away from AMAL, and engaged in a 
military resistance movement against Israeli forces in Lebanon.383 Iran started providing 
arms, military and ideological training to these resistant Shiites in Lebanon by sending 
1500 IRGC officials to Bekaa Valley.384 This group trained and funded by Iran came to 
be known as the famous Shiite militia, and later political party, Hezbollah – The Party of 
God. By 1985, Hezbollah had repulsed Israel from the Lebanese territory by using IRGC-
trained tactics on the field such as guerilla warfare. Hezbollah’s victory against Israel 
earnt the group domestic fame. But in contrast to AMAL, Hezbollah had an openly 
Islamist revolutionary vision greatly influenced by Ayatollah Khomeini’s thoughts. 
Hezbollah disclosed the group’s political vision and ideological contours in what came to 
be known as ‘1985 Manifesto.’ In the Manifesto, Hezbollah paid allegiance to the Islamic 
Republic and Ayatollah Khomeini by saying ‘We obey the orders of one leader, wise and 
just, that of our tutor and faqih (jurist) who fulfills all the necessary conditions: Ruhollah 
Khomeini.’385 They adopted Khomeini’s ‘oppressor’ and ‘oppressed’ language in 
defining the political and military program of the militia formation.386 Accordingly, 
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carrying out an anti-imperialist policy against the ‘colonialist’ American and French 
influence over Lebanon; destroying the ‘Zionist regime’ in Israel; and establishing an 
Islamic government in Lebanon were the three policy objectives of Hezbollah in 1985.387 
It was apparent that from the very beginning, Hezbollah was a resistance movement 
against imperialism, Western influence, and Zionism in Lebanon and in the broader 
region, which put an Khomeini style Islamic government at the center of its struggle.  
 
Hezbollah strengthened its social fame in Lebanon after the war with Israel was 
over, where, very much like IRGC after the Holy War, engaged in social welfare activities. 
In this respect, a Hezbollahi charity network called ‘assistance council of the Imam 
Khomeini’ was organized and run by the spiritual leader of the party, Ayatollah Fadlallah 
for the provision of economic and social assistance to Hezbollah martyrs’ families.388 The 
institution’s activities were designed to increase Iranian-Hezbollahi transnational 
cooperation in the social field.389 In a similar vein, the Iranian-Hezbollahi cooperation 
also included the opening of hospitals and medical centers in Beqaa and Beirut with 
privileged treatment services to the Shias.390 Other activities included opening Islamic 
seminaries, particularly aimed to provide Islamic and ideological training to Shia 
populations for increasing the organization’s recruitment among Shias.391 The Iranian-
Hezbollahi cooperation continued and their ties even flourished under such military and 
social activities during 1990s and 2000s. Even though Hezbollah gradually dropped its 
anti-systemic stance domestically with 2009 Manifesto and became a legitimate political 
party engaged in Lebanese electoral politics, ties to the Islamic Republic never vanished. 
As a matter of fact, despite Hezbollah’s move away from establishing an Islamist 
government in Lebanon, the Iranian regime always saw Hezbollah as a successful case of 
Iran’s export of the revolutionary ideology – of its anti-imperialism, anti-Zionism, and 
Islamism.   
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Besides Lebanon, Iranian efforts at exporting the revolution also focused on Iraq 
during the war. Former Dawa Party cadres and the Shiraziyyin network gained the Iranian 
support against the Saddam regime during this period. As discussed in the previous 
section, when the Dawa Party was almost dissolved by Saddam’s regime, another Shia 
Islamist political party emerged under the name Supreme Council for the Islamic 
Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI). SCIRI was formed by the ex-Dawa members and Islamic 
Action Organization in 1982, part of whom were in exile in Tehran due to the war with 
Iraq. The Iranian regime provided significant support to SCIRI as a bulwark against the 
Saddam regime. SCIRI and its clerical leader Baqir al-Hakim adopted Khomeini’s 
understanding of velayet-e faqih and sought to establish an Islamic theocracy in Iraq. 
Their support by Iran and embrace of an Iranian style theocracy against the Arab-
nationalist Baath regime in Iraq provided Iran with an ally in Iraq. SCIRI posed as a 
resistance and protest force against the Iraqi regime in lieu of Dawa Party during the war. 
Another potential area for Iran’s export of the revolution was the Gulf countries with 
significant Shia populations in Kuwait, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen. While a 
majority of these Shia groups in the Gulf countries were of Sevener Shiism, another sect 
of Shia which bears theological differences to Twelver Shiism, Iran could influence the 
Shiites there mostly thanks to the works of al-Shiraziyyin family in these countries. In 
this respect, the Shiraziyyin family adopted an anti-Bahraini and anti-Saudi program 
carried out from Iran with an attempt to politically empower the Shias in these 
countries.392 The Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain was such a Shiraziyyin-
supported movement with IRGC providing the necessary military, technical assistance.393 
Iranian and al-Shiraziyyin activities provoked Shiite revolts against the Sunni-dominated 
central authority, which embittered Iran’s relations with Gulf regimes.  
 
 The Iranian attempts to export the revolution during the 1980-88 period brought 
along material, political, and military costs with it. One adverse consequence was the 
prolongation of Iran-Iraq War, which is attributed to the ideological fervor of IRGC in 
continuing with the conflict. Secondly, the IRGC and Qods Forces activities, along with 
the eight year-long war, generated great economic distress for the regime. Finally, the 
policy of exporting the revolution was simply unsuccessful in materializing Khomeini-
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style Islamist governments across the Middle East. The Shia sectarian identity and the 
Shia networks that Iranian clerics were a part of even before the revolution gave Iran a 
leverage to export the revolutionary ideology and strategy to different Shia political 
groups. However, serious theological and political differences among these Shia actors 
emerging in multiple national settings hindered the export of the revolution itself. As 
discussed previously, Ayatollah Khomeini, the Dawa Party and al-Shiraziyyin family of 
Karbala displayed significant theological differences on a Khomeini-style government 
based on velayet-e faqih. While they politically and ideologically shared the notion of 
politically activist Shiism and Shia revival, they could not agree on the type of the 
political system to be deployed in their national settings. The Iranian regime thus lost 
hope of exporting the revolution by the end of 1988 and gradually dropped the export of 
the revolution policy starting from 1990s. The accrued costs shifted the Islamic 
Republic’s attention especially in the aftermath of the Holy War towards reconstructing 
the country and solving its economic and political problems.  
 
Although the Iranian attempts to export the revolution did not materialize in 
revolutionary moments across the Middle East, the policy proved to have significant long-
term implications for Iran’s foreign policy in the Middle East. Accordingly, the export of 
the revolution earnt Iran powerful non-state allies in the region. The Islamic Republic’s 
alliances with various Shia and Islamist groups made occasional come-backs during 
1990s and 2000s. In this respect, what started as a policy of exporting the revolution in 
Lebanon gradually evolved into what they called an alliance of ‘resistance.’ The 1990s 
and early 2000s witnessed the strengthening of a ‘resistance block’ against Israel and the 
American policies in the Middle East and this block the Lebanese Hezbollah, Syria, 
Hamas, and Iran. During 1990s, Iran provided significant support to Hamas, which 
included an alleged $30 million funding annually, training of Hamas cadres at IRGC 
camps in Iran and Lebanon, and opening of a Hamas Office in Tehran.394 Hamas thus 
became a significant non-Shia ally to Iran. Iran continued with its strong ties to Hezbollah 
also. When Hezbollah entered war with Israel in 2006, Iran cooperated with Syria in 
transporting sophisticated weaponry and support to Hezbollah. Finally, the relevance of 
Iranian ties to the Shias established with the export of the revolution policy was resurfaced 
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after the fall of the Saddam regime in Iraq in 2003. From 2004 onwards, Iran started 
establishing closer relations with the Shia political parties and groups such as al-Dawa 
and SCIRI, which were suppressed by the Baath regime in previous decades. By 2010, a 
strong alliance under the leadership of Iran was visible between Lebanese Hezbollah, 
Syria, Iraqi Shia groups, and Iran. This alliance was an emerging ‘Shiite Crescent’ for 
some, as it finally denoted an ever-rising Shia empowerment across the region. On the 
other hand, the IRGC preferred to supplement the anti-imperialist and anti-Zionist content 
of their ‘resistance front’ discourse with growing sectarianism in the region after 2011 
and merged ‘the resistance front’ and ‘Shia empowerment’ under ‘axis of resistance.’  
 
 
3.4.3. ‘Islamism’ in Iran’s Foreign Policy  
 
The Islamic Republic’s foreign policy during the revolutionary period is an 
ideological foreign policy. The identity, ideology, and the grand vision of the early Islamic 
Republic led to an Islamist foreign policy during the first decade. As such, Iran’s foreign 
policy during the first decade neatly confirms the Hypothesis III of this study, which 
stated that Iran’s Islamist revolutionary ideology leads to an ideological and religious 
policy in the Middle East. To expand the explanatory power of Hypothesis III, this section 
will continue with Dehghani-Firouzabadi’s discussion on ‘Islamism’ as the overarching 
foreign policy discourse of the Islamic Republic since 1981.395  
 
 In relation to the role of religion in Iran’s foreign policy, Dehghani-Firouzabadi 
argues that ‘Islamism’ has been Iran’s dominant foreign policy discourse since the end of 
Abolhasan Bani Sadr’s government in 1981. The first two-years of the revolution and the 
subsequent 8 years of the first decade reflect the tensions between the nationalist and 
revolutionary Islamist aspects of Iran’s identity. Despite Ayatollah Khomeini’s leadership 
of the revolution and election as vali-e faqih of the Islamic Republic, the regime was still 
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struggling with internal opposition from the secularists and Marxists. During this internal 
struggle, Abolhasan Bani Sadr became the first president of the Islamic Republic. During 
his two-year-long presidency, his foreign policy vision reflected what Dehghani-
Firouzabadi defined as a ‘liberal-nationalist’ foreign policy. During the first two years of 
the revolution, Bani Sadr government reasoned that the Islamic Revolution should be 
received as a national revolution and not as a transnational revolution committed to 
spreading the revolutionary Islamism spirit transnationally.396  
 
The Islamic Republic was identified as a traditional nation-state operating in 
conformity to the existing Westphalian order externally and entertaining ‘religious-
nationalism’ internally.397 Iran was a self-standing, autonomous, territorial nation-state 
abiding by Westphalian norms, institutions, principles, and power balances intrinsic to 
this system.398 The new revolutionary regime did not entertain the idea of revising and/or 
reversing the existing international system, as the foreign policy priorities lied in the 
protection of nation-state’s interests.399 The regime’s foreign policy understanding was 
quite secular and the export of the revolutionary ideology was not a foreign policy 
objective. Islam’s role was limited to Iran’s territorial borders.400 In that respect, Persian 
nationalism was predominant over revolutionary Islamism as a state ideology. As the 
nation-state’s interests have a priority over the Ummah’s interests, the foreign policy 
objectives do not include the support for revolutionary Islamist movements within the 
Islamic Ummah.401 As such, Dehghani-Firouzabadi defines Iran’s ‘liberal nationalist’ 
foreign policy discourse during Bani-Sadr government as ‘realist,’ with revolutionary 
idealism being restricted to domestic affairs and not dominating the foreign policy 
reasoning of the time.402 Securing the Iranian nation-state was a priority over representing 
the interests of the Islamic political movement from which it emerged.  
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With the termination of Bani-Sadr’s government by clerical power nodes in 1981 
and the real consolidation of power by the Islamists within the regime, ‘Islamism’ 
replaced ‘liberal-nationalism’ as the dominant foreign policy discourse for the decades to 
come. This also meant the unseating of a ‘realist’ and secularist foreign policy by an 
ideological one. The Islamist revolutionary identity of the new regime took precedence 
over Persian nationalism. Revolutionary Islamism was taken out of its domestic sphere, 
gradually determining the Islamic Republic’s self-identified roles, duties, interests, and 
objectives in external affairs. The Islamic Ummah’s interests earnt as much relevance and 
priority as the nation-state’s interests and religious political ideology became the central 
determinant of Islamic Republic’s foreign policy.  
 
State Identity. According to the arch-discourse of ‘Islamism’ in Iran’s foreign 
policy culture, the nature, functions, and identity of the Islamic Republic are defined as 
Islamic.403 The Islamic Revolution of 1979 and Shia Islam are the two main components 
of state identity.404 Islamism posits that the Islamic Revolution is not only a national 
revolution but also a transnational revolution.405 The existing international system, along 
with its structure, power relations, and institutions are neither religious nor Islamic, and 
is unjust and discriminative according to this discourse.406 The Islamic Republic 
originally saw its revolution as the first instance of resistance and revolt against this 
‘unjust’ and ‘discriminative’ system, which was expected to be a source of inspiration for 
other nations and to be followed by similar revolutions elsewhere. Being the first instance 
of an Islamist movement that culminated into a revolutionary regime with an Islamist 
identity has delineated certain foreign policy principles and assigned ‘transnational roles’ 
for the new regime.407  
Principles. The general principles of the Islamic Republic lie in the original 
premise that the revolution is not a national but a transnational one. Accordingly, the 
protection of the mostezefan, i.e. the ‘oppressed’ peoples of the world in Khomeini’s 
terminology and support for independence movements are constitutionally defined as two 
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principles of the Islamic Republic.408 The Article 152 of the Islamic Republic’s 
constitution points out to the principles of fight against the international system of 
‘domination,’  and support for all Muslims, which states ‘The foreign policy of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran is based on the rejection of any kind of domination, both its exercise and 
submission to it; the preservation of the all-inclusive independence of the country and its 
territorial integrity; the defense of the rights of all Muslims; non-alignment in relation to 
the domineering powers.’409 Article 154 of the Constitution lays out the Islamic 
Republic’s policy of the support for the independence movements, where it says ‘While 
[the Islamic Republic] completely abstains from any kind of intervention in the internal 
affairs of other nations, it supports the struggles of the oppressed for their rights against 
the oppressors anywhere in the world.’410  
 
Transnational roles. In line with its revolutionary Islamist identity and principles, 
the state’s self-assigned transnational roles include protecting Islam, the Islamic 
community, and the Shias; fighting against imperialism and estekbar, i.e. ‘the global 
arrogance,’ which refers to the US ‘imperialism’ and ‘hegemony’ in Khomeini’s 
terminology; fighting against ‘Zionism;’ protecting the Islamic Revolution, its political 
system, and political ideals; supporting ‘emancipation’ and independence movements; 
protecting the mostezefan; being an ‘exemplary state’ and a ‘model’ inspiring other in the 
Islamic world; being the leader and the center of the Islamic world, as well as a 
‘revisionist’ state.411  
 
Transnational interests. According to Dehghani-Firouzabadi, the above-defined 
‘transnational roles’ determines ‘transnational interests’ in foreign policy, which he treats 
as one of the pillars that comprises the national interest. The concept of ‘transnational 
interests’ is a novelty in this respect and reflects the very dual nature of the Islamic 
Republic as a traditional Westphalian nation-state with self-assigned trans-national and 
anti-systemic aspirations. In parallel to our classical understanding of national interests 
in IR theory, the physical survival of the state, including the survival of the nation-state, 
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national unity, and the territorial borders greatly matter for the Islamic Republic and is 
one pillar of its national interests.412 In addition to that, the Islamic Republic has 
‘transnational interests,’ which are Islamically and ideologically-defined. The 
transnational interests reflect the anti-systemic and revisionist tendencies of the Islamic 
Republic as a revolutionary state. The ideals of ‘emancipation’ and ‘independence’ are 
two main themes accompanying transnational interests in this respect. The transnational 
interests include the survival of the Islamic revolution at home, ‘the export of the 
revolution’ abroad, establishing an international Islamic society, ensuring the unity of the 
Islamic Ummah, revising or changing the existing international and regional system, i.e. 
‘the hegemonic American order’ at the international level and the ‘Israeli-based’ order at 
the regional level.413  
 
Objectives. Finally, the duality of the national interests are further reflected on the 
nature of foreign policy objectives. Dehghani-Firouzabadi’s description of national 
security objectives are parallel to our classical understanding and includes territorial 
integrity, national sovereignty, the survival of the Islamic Republic’s order, the protection 
of the Iranian nation, and economic development.414 On the other hand, transnational 
objectives are again Islamically and ideologically defined, where protection of Islam at 
home and abroad, the export of the revolution, and the unity of the Islamic Ummah 
emerge as three pillars of the Islamic Republic’s transnational foreign policy objectives. 
The Islamic Republic is committed to the protection and survival of the revolutionary 
political order inside the Islamic Republic. The Article 150 of the Islamic Republic’s 
Constitution assigns the duty of protecting the revolution to the Islamic Revolutionary 
Guard Corps, which says ‘The Islamic Revolutionary Corps, established in the early days 
of the victory of the Revolution, will remain in effect in order to continue in its role of 
protecting the Revolution and its achievements.’415 At the regional and international level, 
Iran self-assigned the objective of protecting and supporting Muslim communities, where 
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the Lebanese and Iraqi Shiites, and Bosnian Muslims are the concrete policy outcomes 
thereof.416 
 
The Islamic Republic’s transnational foreign policy objective of ‘exporting the 
revolution’ is related to the original revolutionary ideological premise that the Islamic 
Revolution is a transnational revolution and the Islamic Republic’s revolutionary ideals 
should be spread elsewhere.417 As the only successful case of Islamic revolutionary 
movement, Iran sees itself as the center of the world of Islam and self-assigns the role of 
spreading these revolutionary ideals.418 Three strategies are adopted in accomplishing this 
foreign policy objective. First, Iran aims to extend political and spiritual support to 
independence movements via international organizations and diplomatic channels.419 
Second, the Islamic Republic is portrayed as a ‘model’ of Islamic modernity, where the 
themes of Islam, democracy, and development, which are traditionally deemed 
incompatible according to Western modernist accounts, are embodied in the Islamic 
Republic.420 By borrowing from several pre-revolutionary intellectual currents, the 
Islamic Republic’s early cadres aimed to reverse this traditional understanding, to portray 
the Islamic Revolution in Iran as a model of Islamic modernity in the region, and inspire 
the Muslim world. Finally, Iran resorts to ‘propaganda’ to achieve its transnational 
objectives by spreading the revolutionary ideology via information channels and 
media.421 This way, the Islamic Republic aims to generate new intellectual currents that 
would inspire similar political movements elsewhere in the region.422       
 
While Dehghani-Firouzabadi argues that Islamism has been the dominant foreign 
policy discourse since 1981, he recognizes the fact that the historical and socio-political 
circumstances created ‘intra-discursive shifts,’ if not an ‘inter-discursive’ one between 
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realism and idealism - or between liberal-nationalism and Islamism.423 Accordingly, 
while the Islamic Republic maintained the discursive core of Islamism over decades, the 
level of urgency and priority associated with the self-assigned transnational duties, 
interests, objectives as well as the nature of pursued strategies and tools changed in line 
with historical circumstances. This means that Islamism has not gone without confusions, 
dilemmas, and divergences of opinion over various aspects of foreign policy as the 
external and internal circumstances demanded. These confusions rested on a number of 
questions including how to let Persian nationalist and Islamist identities co-exist, how to 
accommodate Islamic interests with nation-state’s interests, what tools and strategies to 
be used for achieving transnational ideals and objectives, and how to establish a global 
Islamic order within an international system that rested on nation-states.424  
 
During the attempt to accommodate these paradoxes, certain transnational roles 
are highlighted and others are muted, certain interests took precedence over others, and 
certain objectives are highlighted while others are transformed in line with political 
circumstances with no dismissal of the revolutionary Islamist ideology and Shia identity. 
To the contrary, the ideology and identity of the regime always remained at the center, 
whereas the consolidation of the Islamic regime, the gradual institutionalization of 
foreign policy, and the permissiveness of internal and external circumstances dictated for 
Iran to what extent to bring ideology forward in foreign policy. Dehghani-Firouzabadi’s 
point is shared by foreign policy experts and academics interviewed during the field 
research. Interviewees particularly stress the ideological continuation in Iran’s foreign 
policy in this respect, where discourses change only as particular reading of the same 
ideology. Discussing the pragmatism of Rafsanjani period foreign policy, Abbas Khalaji 
referred to his policy as ‘also religious,’ reflecting the contours of ‘political Islam,’ and 
‘a particular reading of political Islam’ under post-war circumstances.425 In a similar vein, 
Interviewee 7 argues that there is an element of ‘continuation in Iran’s foreign policy, 
because of the Supreme Leader,’ who forces the system to continue from government to 
government.’426 He exemplifies Iran’s continual support to the Muslim world and the 
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Palestinian issue as well as its persistent ‘fight with the Great Satan and Israel’ in this 
respect.427 Responding to the periods of rapprochement with and revulsions from 
aforementioned players, he argues that the ideology is the continual element in foreign 
policy, where implementation, i.e. ‘how to combat with the USA and the international 
community’ changes from cabinet to cabinet.428 Responding to what determines the extent 
of Iranian emphasis on ideology in practice, he answers by exemplifying the Iranian 
stance to the nuclear issue;  
 
   ‘The nuclear deal is the last resort to solve the nuclear issue. It we are strong, 
we defy. Iran is in a very difficult economic situation. We are searching for 
our ideal conjecture between security and ideology. When we are weak, we 
are trying to solve our problems. When we have more power, we go back to 
ideology. It is always like a pendulum.’429     
 
The first decade of the Islamic Revolution can be defined as the hallmark of ‘Islamism’ 
in Iran’s foreign policy. Therefore, this period can be treated as a benchmark to understand 
the shifting influence of ideology and religion in Iran’s foreign policy. Nevertheless, 
Dehghani-Firouzabadi does not treat the revolutionary period’s Islamism as monolithic 
either. Rather, he defines the period between 1981-85 as ‘Ideational Pan-Islamism’ and 
the period between 1985-89 as ‘Centralist Expediency.’ Such a discursive differentiation 
rests on the fact that the external security conditions necessitated a change in foreign 
policy priorities and objectives for the Islamic Republic.  
 
One could define the ‘Ideational Pan-Islamism’ of 1981-85 as a pure ideological 
Islamist foreign policy, reflecting the Islamist revolutionary fervor and ambitions of a 
fledgling Islamic Republic. The nature of the Iranian state was defined as Islamic during 
this period, where the legitimacy of the state relied on religion and Islam.430 Even though 
the vali-e faqih assumed the leadership in Iran, he is not only the vali-e faqih of Iranians 
but of all Muslims.431 The state identity is both Islamic and revolutionary. The 
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revolutionary Islamist ideology and principles steer the state to a ‘role-oriented’ foreign 
policy, where logic of appropriateness trumps the logic of rational interests.432  The 
transnational aspect of the revolutionary ideology render the Islamic Republic different 
from other states, where the former has ‘commitments’ above that of a territorial nation-
state.433 
 
 In ‘Ideational Pan-Islamism,’ the Islamic Revolution is defined as a transnational 
revolution and the Iranian Revolution is first pillar of this transnational movement. 
Therefore, there is a heavy emphasis on Iran’s self-assigned roles of being ‘a 
revolutionary and revisionist state,’ fighting against imperialism, estekbar, and Zionism, 
protecting and supporting the ‘oppressed,’ being the leader of the world of Islam, and 
being the ‘patron’ of similar Islamist independence movements elsewhere.434 In line with 
these self-assigned roles, the Islamic interests such as the protection of, support for, and 
the empowerment of the Muslims have a priority over the nation-state’s interests.435 The 
foreign policy objectives are quite revisionist and revolutionary. The spread of the Islamic 
values and revolutionary ideals to the third world and establishing a single Islamic 
Ummah constitutes the first pillar of foreign policy.436 This is accompanied by a total 
dismissal of the existing international system as unjust and dysfunctional. The ultimate 
objective is thus to change the existing international system, for which revolutionary 
strategy is deemed necessary.437 In short, the Islamic Republic’s foreign policy objective 
during 1981 and 1985 can be defined as uniting the Muslims by the spread of Islamist 
revolutionary values, ideas, and norms elsewhere. The unification of the Islamic Ummah 
has priority over securing the nation-state interests of the new Republic. This 
revolutionary and revisionist outlook was embodied in the export of the revolution policy 
of the Islamic Republic during this period. 
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 Nevertheless, the prolonged war with Iraq and the ensuing security threats to the 
new regime would shortly curb the new regime’s strong transnationalist logic with a 
survival logic. In this respect, the Islamic Republic’s foreign policy elites gradually 
shifted their priority away from the unification of the Islamic Ummah to protecting the 
Iranian nation-state. The foreign policy priority lied in the protection of Iran’s territorial 
unity against all costs during the Holy War.438 This did not mean that Islamic Republic 
move away from its self-assigned transnational duty and foreign policy objective of 
unifying the Ummah via revolution. To the contrary, the Islamic Republic’s discourse 
between 1985-89 put the Islamic Republic at the ‘center’ of the world of Islam as the only 
revolutionary Islamist state on earth.439 According to the discourse of ‘Centralist 
Expediency,’ the Islamic Republic was chosen to ‘lead’ the Ummah and serve the greater 
Ummah’s interests.440 As the ‘center’ and ‘leader’ of the Islamic world, Iran’s security and 
survival should be given priority.441 It should be noted that the transnational duties and 
objectives of the Islamic Republic are maintained under the ‘centralist’ discourse. What 
changed is the foreign policy ‘priority’ under war circumstances. The foreign policy elites 
of the time agreed on the proposition that the Islamic state should be fully established and 
stabilized first in Iran as the ‘center’ and ‘leader’ of the Islamic Ummah and then in the 
rest of the world.442  
  
 Contrary to other scholars’ description of Iranian ideationalism as fading under 
Rafsanjani and Khatami’s presidencies, Dehghani-Firouzabadi identifies the foreign 
policy under Rafsanjani’s presidency as renewed forms of Islamisms under both 
presidencies. Accordingly, he calls Iran’s foreign policy discourses under Rafsanjani as 
‘realist Islamism’ and that of Khatami as a policy of ‘peaceful coexistence.’ Under ‘realist 
Islamism,’ the Islamic Republic’s priorities shifted towards the economic reconstruction 
of the country in the post-Holy War period.443 The regime did not abandon Islamism 
during this period, but shifted its priorities to become an example of economically 
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developed Islamic state in the region.444 Militarism was gradually dropped during this 
period, but this did not mean a total refusal of the Islamic Republic’s self-ascribed roles 
as the protector of the mostezefan. The regime promised to protect of the mostezefan 
diplomatically by supporting them in international organizations and the Iranian regime 
chose to combat with the ‘global arrogance’ again diplomatically by challenging the anti-
Iranian policies of the imperialist powers.445 The export of the revolution was also ripped 
of its military connotations and it was reduced to mean to be an example of economically 
developed Islamic state for other nations. Under Khatami’s rule, there is another shift in 
the foreign policy priorities of the Islamic Republic. Khatami’s priority was securing the 
international political legitimacy of the Islamic Republic.446 His foreign policy objectives 
included increasing the legitimacy of Iran’s Islamist political ideology, consolidating 
Iran’s international reputation, and building trust with the rest of the world.447 As such, 
he redefined the identity of the Islamic Republic as a ‘religious democracy’ and the export 
of the revolution during this period meant promoting the Islamic Republic as ‘a model of 
religious democracy’ in the region.448 It should be noted that both Rafsanjani and 
Khatami’s periods are labelled as ‘pragmatist’ and ‘rational’ by scholars. While this is 
correct, as Dehghani-Firouzabadi shows, this shift towards pragmatism and rationality 
never meant a total break-away from Islamism. Rather, both presidents reworked and 
adapted basic precepts of Islamism according to the time, context, necessities, and 
priorities. Religion remained as a constant in foreign policy, but its different roles and 
aspects changed.  
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3.5.  Conclusion 
 
 
 
This chapter leaves us with several conclusions on the role of religion in Iran’s 
foreign policy. First, this chapter showed that the Islamic Revolution should be evaluated 
as part of a greater transnational Shia revival preceding the revolution in 1979. The 
institutionalization of Shia ulama, the Shia hawzas and the Shia theological-political 
currents shaped the ulama’s position as an important power center in the Middle East, and 
the fledgling Islamic Republic’s identity and ideology. Against this background, we can 
argue that, excluding Bani-Sadr government, Iran’s foreign policy until 1989 was an 
ideological foreign policy. The policy heavily bears the imprint of transnational Shia 
political activism and the intellectual environment of the pre-revolutionary period. The 
role of religion during that period was threefold: 1) Shia identity characterized the 
interaction context within which the Islamic Republic operated. Transnational Shia 
networks constituted a good part of this interaction context. 2) Religion served as the 
identity and ideology of the new regime. 3) Religious identity and ideology shaped the 
self-ascribed roles, duties, transnational interests and objectives of the Islamic Republic. 
The foreign policy objective included the establishment of an Islamic Ummah against 
Western imperialism in the region. All in all, religion is features as an identity and 
ideology during the first decade. As such, this neatly fits the constructivist Hypothesis III 
of this thesis. The Iran-Iraq War of 1980-88 and the export of the revolution are the two 
dominant themes defining this period, where the latter can be said to be the hallmark of 
Iran’s religious-ideological foreign policy.   
 
 Nevertheless, a more significant role of religion in Iran’s foreign policy lies in the 
experience of the Islamic Republic during the first decade and the ramifications of this 
experience for the decades to come. It would not be an exaggeration to suggest that both 
the Holy Defense War and ‘the export of the revolution’ policy made the Islamic Republic 
a la Charles Tilly. For one thing, the war consolidated the Islamic Republic’s religious 
ideology. The war shaped the foreign policy terminology of the Islamic Republic, i.e. the 
terminology of how the early revolutionary regime understood ‘the international system,’ 
how it defined ‘the enemy,’ how it defined ‘roles’ within the system. The Islamic Republic 
learnt how to frame external conflicts in a revolutionary Islamist terminology. The war 
mobilized the Iranians around Islamist, anti-imperialist, Shia themes and the heavy 
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reliance on Karbala narratives for mobilization was one outcome of this process. For 
another, the Holy War experience shaped the nature of the Islamic Republic’s security 
system and perpetuated its further institutionalization. In this respect, the 
institutionalization and the further consolidation of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps 
and the Basijis, both of which promoted the idea of a security culture based on an Islamist, 
ideological, volunteer-based, popular mobilization force dominated the organizational 
model of Iran’s security institutions. The IRGC and Basiji organizational model came to 
be portrayed as an Iranian military and security brand by such entities. This organizational 
model became very powerful within the regime over time. In short, the Holy War made 
the Islamic Republic.  
 
Concerning ‘the export of the revolution,’ although the policy failed to manifest 
Islamic revolutions elsewhere, it left Iran with significant experience on interacting with 
the Shiites across the region. Contrary to other Shia movements in the region, the Islamic 
Revolution turned the Shia political movement into ‘a governmental form’ in Iran, 
thereby assigning ‘a state capacity’ to the movement. The export of the revolution policy 
highlighted this state capacity Iran enjoys and featured the Islamic Republic as the only 
state patron of Shia political movements elsewhere in the region. This does not suggest 
that the Islamic Republic is endorsed by all Shia communities and Shia movements in the 
region. As discussed before, not all clerical centers share the Iranian-style Shia political 
activism and maintain their quietist positions. Moreover, those who share Iranian political 
activism might not always share velayet-e faqih as a proper form of Shia governmentality. 
However, as the coming chapters will discuss in detail, some foreign policy analysts 
interviewed for this study emphasize the Islamic Republic being the only Shia patron with 
extensive state capacity to help the marginalized Shias of the region despite all odds. The 
export of the revolution policy has made powerful non-state allies to Iran such as the 
Lebanese Hezbollah. The IRGC-Qods Forces activities in the region provided the Islamic 
Republic with experience in interacting with the Shias elsewhere and mobilizing them for 
political ends.  
 
The keyword is experience. The Islamic Republic has forty years of experience in 
Islamic state building, Holy War, and the export of the revolution. When asked about 
Iranian strength over the mobilization of Shias after 2003 compared to other regional 
powers, one former Iranian diplomat interviewed for this study emphasized the fact that 
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‘Iran has a forty year of experience in such mobilizational activities’449 The question for 
the next chapter is what is the legacy of this historical process on Iran’s axis of resistance 
policy in the region today. Does Iran pursue an Islamist foreign policy objective and aim 
to export velayet-e faqih to other Shia movements in the region? Or does religion play a 
different role under the more consolidated revolutionary regime? The next chapter will 
be the first step to explore these questions.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 
IRAN’S FOREIGN POLICY IN IRAQ AND SYRIA 
 
 
 
 
4.1.  Introduction 
 
 
 
 As discussed in the previous chapter, Iran’s foreign policy during the first decade 
of the revolution is of immense importance in understanding the role of religion in 
revolutionary Iran. ‘The Holy Defense War’ and the ‘export of the revolution’ policies 
reflected the central tenets of Iran’s Islamic revolutionary ideology, where the defense of 
the fledgling Islamic regime and the establishment of an Islamic Ummah under the 
leadership of the Islamic Republic were the central foreign policy objectives. Iran’s 
foreign policy during the first decade was thus an ideological foreign policy. However, 
post-war reconstruction needs, the grave experience of international isolation, and 
economic necessities pushed Iran’s foreign policy towards relatively more pragmatist 
positions during the pragmatist leadership of Rafsanjani and Khatami. The shift towards 
realist and pragmatist considerations did not in any way lead to a total break-away from 
the ideological core of the Islamic Republic. The shifts were rather felt by the issue area 
and the geographical sphere of foreign action and Iran’s foreign policy on the Middle East 
after 2003 would be a one example of this. 
 
 The period between 2003 and 2017 reflects multiple foreign policy tendencies in 
Iran both in terms of policy behavior and discourse. This multiplicity goes hand in hand 
with the changes in the Iranian leadership. The reformist president Khatami was still in 
office until 2005, which was then taken over by the hardliner populist leader Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad until 2013, when he was replaced by another centrist-pragmatist president 
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Hassan Rouhani. The most remarkable issue that brought Iran face to face with the USA 
and European Union was the disclosure of Iran’s secret nuclear activities in 2003 and the 
ensuing international crisis concerning the Nuclear Non-Proliferation regime. Iran’s 
cycles of engagement and disengagement with the international community on the 
resolution of the nuclear issue were in line with respective leadership changes, which 
implicated the centrality of multiple domestic political factions and factional tendencies 
in Iran’s foreign policy. Accordingly, the reformist Khatami administration, which was 
intent on maintaining favorable relations with the West, suspended its nuclear program 
upon an agreement signed with the EU, which was only nullified a few days after the 
hardliner president Ahmadinejad came to power. On the other hand, the period between 
2013 and 2017 was the pinnacle of reconciliation with the West, as Rouhani, the chief 
nuclear negotiator of the Khatami administration, came to office as the president of the 
Islamic Republic and signed the historic nuclear deal with the P5+1.  
 
Iran’s ‘Western’ foreign policy exhibited perpetual shifts between the regime’s 
ideological core and pragmatism. This ‘Western’ foreign policy revolved predominantly 
around the nuclear issue. While the nuclear issue was not the only foreign policy issue 
area for Iran, it was by far the most popular one. In 2003, the US invasion of Iraq 
foreshadowed profound, successive transformations in the Middle East region for the 
decades to come. The Islamic Republic was quick to immerse itself in observing the new 
regional realities and calculating its place within this new context. Both foreign policy 
scholars and foreign policy makers alike failed to pay the same level of attention to Iran’s 
Middle East policy as they did to the nuclear issue. Compared to the relations with the 
West, the Middle Eastern policy of Iran was rather monotonous, consistent and 
determined. The policy had rather strong religious and ideological overtones, where 
alliances with the Shia communities stood out. In this respect, the Middle East policy 
resembled Iran’s first decade policy of ‘export of the revolution.’ Moreover, the 
ideological and religious-looking foreign policy on the Middle East co-existed and was 
co-practiced with the overly more pragmatist nuclear policy.   
 
This chapter is designed to discuss Iran’s foreign policy on the Middle East region 
after 2003 with an emphasis on the role of religion in foreign policy-making. The chapter 
first discusses the cascade of transformations in the region since 2003 as well as the risks 
and the opportunities the regional changes brought for the Islamic Republic. The chapter 
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will continue with a discussion of Iranian foreign policy strategy in the region. The cases 
of Iraq and Syria are singled out as the two most striking cases where Iranian foreign 
policy resembled ‘the export of the revolution’ policy due to the strong presence of 
religious, identity-related, and ideological elements. This chapter shows that the Islamic 
Republic has brought its institutionalized experience from the revolutionary decade in 
addressing the changes in the region. Three separate but inter-linked foreign policy 
behaviors of the Islamic Republic in Iraq and Syria will justify this point: 1) the 
involvement of Iran’s unconventional forces spearheaded by the IRGC as the central 
foreign policy ‘actor’ in these territories, 2) the extensive Iranian support for the Shia 
political and armed mobilization;  3) the Iran-led state-building efforts in the security 
sector, where the IRGC enjoys extensive influence over the creation and reconfiguration 
of paramilitary institutions such as Hashd al-Shaabi in Iraq and Jaysh al-Shaabi/National 
Defense Units in Syria.  
 
 
 
4.2. The Transformation of the Middle East Since 2003 
 
 
 
The first step to understand the Iranian policy on the region is to understand the 
interaction context within which the state operates. The Middle East region has been 
undergoing both internally and externally defined systemic transformations since the last 
decade. One can list three critical junctures in the recent history of the region, each of 
which added another layer of shocks on top of each other: 1) the US invasion of Iraq in 
2003; 2) the tumultuous year of 2011, which involved the eruption of the Arab Spring, 
the civil conflict in Syria, and the withdrawal of American troops from Iraq; and finally, 
3) the rise of the Islamic State (ISIL) in 2014. Each of these events were transformative 
for the region with strong implications on the existing power relations, the established 
political order, and the types of perceived threats. 
 
 The US invasion of Iraq in 2003. The US invasion in 2003 had several 
implications for the region. First, the American arrival in the Iraqi territories perpetuated 
the penetrated image of the region by an international superpower. The invasion came 
right after the strong US discourse of the ‘axis of evil’ and necessity of ‘regime change’ 
in respective countries. Iraq was apparently the first destination for a regime change, 
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creating uneasiness on the part of both Iran and Syria as two referents of ‘the axis of evil’ 
discourse. Second, the fall of the Saddam regime and the destruction of the Iraqi army 
created a power vacuum in the region. The power balances in the region started to change 
slowly, foreshadowing an emerging competition among Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and 
Israel all vying for regional leadership.450 Third, the fall of the Baath regime in Iraq, the 
epitome of Arab nationalism in the northern axis, signaled an emergent change of the 
political order inside this regime. The newly introduced electoral politics in Iraq required 
a sociopolitical reshuffling inside Iraq, where ethnic, religious and sectarian identities 
came to the fore. As a matter of fact, sectarian tensions between the Sunni and the Shia 
surfaced as early as 2006 as a reflection of the shifts in socioeconomic and political power 
between two groups.451 This meant that the existing political order in Iraq, the balance of 
power among ethno-religious groups, and Arab nationalism as a unifying political 
ideology was already disturbed well before 2011. 
 
 The Arab Spring of 2011. The year 2011 was critical in deepening the changes that 
already started in 2003 in Iraq. First, the political upheavals that swept Egyptian and 
Tunisian streets were an outcry against the deep-seated authoritarianism in the region. 
Economic inequalities, poor governance under authoritarian systems, and political 
suppression led people to the streets for democratization and political reform. The Arab 
Spring was thus a confrontation between the authoritarian incumbent regimes and the 
chants for democracy in the North African countries.452 The sociological structure of the 
polities determined who would be the parties to this political confrontation. In the 
Egyptian cases, this was manifested between secularism and political Islam. However, 
when the uprisings reached countries like Syria, Yemen, and Bahrain, where the 
socioeconomic and political system is drawn along sectarian lines, the democratic 
confrontation took sectarian overtones. Abdo distinguishes two definitions of 
sectarianism in the Middle East in this respect. In its traditional form, sectarianism meant 
‘a set of institutional arrangements determining familial, local, regional, and even broader 
                                                
450 For an analysis of how international and regional players received the Iraqi invasion, see Rick Fawn and Raymond 
Hinnebush, eds., The Iraq War: Causes and Consequences (Lynne Rienner Press, 2006).  
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452 See Mark Lynch, The New Arab Wars, Uprisings, and Anarch in the Middle East (New York: Public Affairs 
Books, 2016); John Davis, The Arab Spring and Arab Thaw: Unfinished Revolutions and the Quest for Democracy 
(London and New York: Taylor and Francis, 2013); Mark L. Haas and David Lesch, eds., The Arab Spring: Change 
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kinds of loyalty and affiliation’ as manifested in the Iraqi and Syrian Baath regimes.453 In 
its traditional form in Iraq and Syria, sectarianism determined the allocation of economic 
and political resources among different segments of the society of the basis of patrimonial 
linkages defined by sectarian identities. The sectarian civil wars that erupted in Iraq in 
2006 and in the aftermath of the Arab Spring in other countries, on the other hand, were 
‘primarily the result of the collapse of the authoritarian rule and a struggle for political 
and economic power, and over which interpretation of Islam will influence societies and 
new leaderships’454 The (near) collapse of the authoritarian rule and the demands for 
democratization meant a shift of the existing economic and political power from one 
sectarian group to the other, as a result of which uprisings turned into sectarian conflicts 
in these territories.  
 
 The proxy war in Syria in 2011. The civil war did not remain limited to a 
confrontation between two sectarian groups within the Syrian borders and quickly turned 
into a proxy war, pulling regional powers and international powers as stakeholders into 
the conflict. The Syrian conflict thus soon turned into the central arena of a regional power 
game among Iran, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia.455 However, the game was not only played 
on hard power capabilities, but also on soft power, where the type of the new political 
ideology to replace the old became a matter of contention. In this respect, the Syrian war 
became an arena where all prospective regional powers sought to spread their respective 
political ideologies. Each regional player supported armed groups and militias that 
propagated for their respective political ideologies, which would help expand their sphere 
of political influence in the region. The regional state powers were soon joined by global 
jihadist networks and their local branches. In the end, the decay of the existing Arab 
authoritarian regimes was followed by this ideological proxy war created what Haas 
termed as an ‘ideological multi-polarity’ in the region.456 According to Lerman, four fault 
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lines characterized the ideological map of the Middle East between 2011 and 2016: 1) 
electoral Islamism along the Muslim Brotherhood, Turkey, and Qatar axis, 2) the Salafi 
jihadist ideology exemplified by a divided jihadist network of Al-Qaeda, al-Nusra, and 
later ISIL, 3) the predominantly Shiite axis of Iran, Syria, Iraq, and Lebanese Hezbollah, 
and finally 4) the so-called ‘forces of stability’ which encompassed Saudi Arabia, Egypt, 
Israel, and other Gulf countries – so-called by Lerman due to their unchanging alliance 
with the USA.457 What is remarkable in this ideological mapping is the factionalization 
of Sunni political ideologies, while the Shia political ideology, spearheaded by the Islamic 
Republic, seemed to be more unified. Gause believed that this ‘ideological polarity’ a la 
Haas within the Sunni camp is the reason for the absence of a stable sectarian alignment 
between Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt, Jordan, and the Gulf against the emerging Shia 
alignment led by Iran.458 Despite the absence of a unified sectarian block along Sunni 
lines, sectarianism still made itself felt region-wide as the power game for regional 
leadership especially between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Sectarianism thus became the new 
name for geopolitics in the region, where the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran 
played out for support for Sunni and Shia factions in Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen and 
Bahrain.459 In short, the Arab Spring provided the background for the emergence of new 
political ideologies in the region, which was deepened with the Syrian civil war after 
2011. Ideological multi-polarity characterized the region, with religious and sectarian 
overtones, which impacted the course of geopolitical rivalries in the region. 
 
 Withdrawal of American Troops in 2011 and the rise of ISIL in 2014. The 
American withdrawal from the Iraqi territories was the third critical moment in 2011 for 
regional balances.460 The withdrawal of the superpowers meant a bigger room for regional 
powers to step a decisive manner. The security situation deteriorated in Iraq following the 
withdrawal, leading to a more severe round of sectarian conflict. Both Iraq and Syria 
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simultaneously experienced what can be called as state failure amidst increasing religious 
and sectarian conflicts. It is therefore no coincidence that a global jihadist fall-out from 
Al-Qaeda called ISIL chose Iraqi and Syrian territories as its base of operation in 2014.461 
The capture of Mosul by ISIL in 2014 and its subsequent expansion on the Syrian 
territories created grave human costs. The rise of ISIL redefined the types of threats in 
the region. ISIL’s aggression was against the Shias, other non-Sunni populations, and 
non-jihadist Sunnis, which especially alarmed the Islamic Republic of Iran on the double 
grounds of its national security and that of the fellow Shia populations in the region. The 
state failure on Iraqi and Syrian territories would legitimize regional powers’ intervention 
in these territories in an extended level, in the name of fighting against jihadism, 
extremism, and radicalism.  
 
 In conclusion, by 2014, the Middle East region had turned into a place where the 
regional power balances were disturbed, the existing political order was challenged by 
the emergence of multiple political ideologies, non-state actors and militias had emerged 
as new actors of regional politics, and threat perceptions had changed. Such extensive 
transformations would create both opportunities and risks for all the players involved, 
including Iran.  
 
 
4.2.1. The Iranian Response I: Risks  
 
What impacts did regional transformations have on Iran? Interviews with several 
Iranian experts on foreign policy by the author show the strategic outlook of the Iranian 
experts on the issue. A majority of the interviewees adopted a language that reflected the 
Iranian risks, opportunities, and perceived threats – all neatly fitting a rationalist foreign 
policy logic. Nevertheless, as will be shown below, interviewees also did not refrain to 
use the Islamic Republic’s Islamist discourses. Most interviewees agree on the 
proposition that the Iranian response to transformations in the region were reactive in 
nature. The transnational change shaped the course of Iran’s foreign policy strategy. Iran 
was quick to recognize the opportunities and risks associated with the new reality of the 
region. Each threat that posed a risk for the Islamic Republic also carried opportunities. 
                                                
461 ‘The Rise and Fall of ISIL Explained,’ Al-Jazeera, June 20, 2017, 
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The capability to transform the risks into opportunities would determine the level of 
success Iran would enjoy in the region after 2003. The regional transformations created 
several risks for Iran. According to the interviews, as the crisis throughout the region was 
first and foremost a security-based crisis, the associated risks for Iran were security-
related. 
 
The American Invasion. The American invasion on its western borders was 
deemed as a threat to both the national security and the regime security of Iran. According 
to Interviewee 4, an Iranian foreign policy expert, the security-related priority for Iran in 
the last decade is ‘the survival of the political system,’ which was already endorsed by 
Khomeini’s famous saying following the cease-fire with Iraq in 1988 ‘The survival of the 
systems precedes the Islamic law.’462 In this respect, ‘political stability,’ which is critical 
for the continuation of the state, and ‘territorial integrity’ are the other components of 
Iran’s priorities in the security sector. In the Islamic Republic’s discourse, ‘the main threat 
after the revolution is the USA, because it is a great threat to the system.’463 The 
emergence of the USA on the western border, which is ingrained in the revolutionary 
Iran’s state discourse as ‘the Great Satan,’ the main perpetuator of estekbar, i.e. the global 
arrogance, and imperialism, was alarming for the regime. This was further coupled by 
Bush’s ‘axis of evil’ and ‘regime change’ rhetoric, which would mean that Iran might be 
on the list for invasion and directly threaten Iran’s regime security. According to the 
interviewee, the American presence in the region would also perpetuate the risks 
associated with Iran’s other rivals. In this respect, the USA had supported the Sunni 
oppositionists to the regime, Saudis, Israel, and Mujahedeen-e Khalq.464 In the Iranian 
discourse, these threats are concerned with the USA, which makes the USA ‘the Great 
Satan’ for Iran’s policy elites.465 
 
 Sunni Jihadist Terrorism. Sunni jihadist terrorism spearheaded by ISIL created a 
new threat to Iran’s security. In this respect, interviewee Nasser Saghafi-Ameri, a former 
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Iranian senior diplomat argues that terrorism was one of the main reasons why Iran 
engaged in Iraq and Syria at the first place.466 According to Saghafi-Ameri, 
 
   ‘The neighborhood is dangerous […] and the terrorist activities everywhere 
make it very difficult for any country to manage their security issues. These 
security concerns lead Iran to take a step towards Iraq and Syria. The priority 
for Iran today is to get rid of ISIL and liberating the areas under their control. 
ISIL, terrorism, and regional instability are the most important security 
concerns for Iran today.’467    
       
Interviewees have varying opinions about the roots of Iranian concern with 
terrorism and ISIL in the Middle East. Interviewee 3, a senior Iranian international 
relations expert, views the ISIL threat and terrorism in Syria more from a realist lens than 
ideological. He argues that Syria is an issue of regional rivalry among Iran, Saudi Arabia 
and Turkey.468 He reiterates the ‘geopolitical rivalry’ dimension in the issue of jihadist 
terrorism by saying that ‘ISIL will be a geopolitical rivalry among countries. The ISIL 
policy is a part of that geopolitical rivalry. There is a more realistic approach behind 
identity.’469 On the other hand, Saghafi-Ameri’s speech discloses the Iranian concerns 
over ISIL threat to be rooted in the Shia identity, ideology and Islam as well. For one, 
‘Shiism is the real reason,’ where the anti-Shia rhetoric of ISIL makes Iran an automatic 
target. Accordingly, ‘Iran is at the forefront of fighting against ISIL, [as there are] attempts 
to penetrate the Iranian territory. Iran created a security zone for 40 km that Iran will not 
allow to be passed.’470 For another, the ISIL threat is ‘not only about border security, but 
also about Islam and ideology.’471 According to him, ‘Islam is being seen in Europe and 
the whole world very negatively. [As a state having] a Muslim identity, Iran is trying to 
protect its own Islamic ideology. Ideology and identity becomes an issue, [as] the reaction 
to Islam is very negative.’472 To conclude, Iran’s Shia identity and its Islamist political 
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ideology factor in its calculation of ISIL and jihadist terrorism both as a national security 
and regime security threat.  
 
 Security of the Shia communities. The discussion over Iranian concerns about the 
threats to its national security and regime security would be incomplete without taking 
into consideration the broader community threats directed against the Shias of the region. 
Interviewee 5, an Iranian foreign policy expert specialized on Iran-Iraq relations, 
emphasizes ‘the strategic loneliness’ felt by the Islamic Republic due to its ‘historical, 
geographical, and religious characteristics.’473 This strategic loneliness led Iran to define 
its security ‘beyond [its] borders,’ meaning in Lebanon, Iraq, and Syria, against ISIL.474 
Accordingly, he states that the Shias ‘must have a united stance against external threats’ 
of Wahhabism and ISIL.475 He adds that ‘There is a competition between the 
Salafists/Wahhabis and Shias all around the world. Because the latter are minority, they 
need to be a united front. DAESH is a community threat to the Shias.’476 Accordingly, 
Interviewee 5 emphasizes the ‘human security and community security’ of the Shias, 
where Iranians should defend the Shia populations as well as ‘the holy places.’477 
Interviewee 5’s account shows that due to the Iran’s beyond-borders understanding of 
security, the security of the all Shias of the region is very important. Securing its borders 
against ISIL is therefore not sufficient for Iran, as ‘they are spreading’ throughout the 
region and that risks ‘the security of the partners’ like ‘Syria and Iraq.’478 In other words, 
the security of Iran is also tied to ‘the security of the Shias’ as well as ‘the security of the 
partners’ in the region.479  
 
 The interviews with Iranian experts show that the nature of the crisis in the Middle 
East, characterized by a super-power penetration, proxy war, and jihadist militia 
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proliferation determined the Iranian perception of the associated risks. This security-
based crisis created security-related risks for Iran. The immediate American presence on 
the border threatened the national and regime security of Iran according to the Iranian 
policy elites. Likewise, the rise of the Wahhabi threat and ISIL created risks associated 
with Iranian regime’s security and the community/human security of the Shias. It should 
be noted that Iran’s understanding of beyond-border security interlinks all concerns about 
national, regime, and community-related security, thereby creating a broader lens for 
Iranian policy elites in viewing the regional risks after 2003.     
 
 
4.2.2. The Iranian Response II: Opportunities  
 
Despite the emergence of new risks for Iran after 2003 in the region, the regional 
transformations also brought significant opportunities for Iran. Some developments in the 
region directly presented themselves as opportunities for Iran, while for others, Iran made 
deliberate and concerted efforts to turn them into opportunities.  
 
 Fall of the Baathist Saddam regime in Iraq. According to Interviewee 3, ‘history 
shaped the elites’ understanding of foreign policy’ in Iran and the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-
88 was the moment of history with a decades-long legacy to come.480 As discussed 
extensively in the previous chapter, the war is ingrained as ‘the imposed war’ in the 
Iranian foreign policy discourse, in the sense that the war was ‘imposed’ not only by Iraq, 
but by ‘everyone in the world,’ where ‘great powers encouraged Saddam to attack Iran 
and transferred weapons to Saddam’s regime.’481 According to Interviewee 3, ‘Iran 
battled for its revolution’ in the war, meaning that Iran was battling to protect the young 
regime.482 In this respect, he adds that Iran’s ‘war memory is the context,’ shaping the 
Iran’s perception of the fall of the Saddam regime in 2003.483 The fall of the Baathist 
government meant the disappearance of a decades-long rival on the western frontier, who 
had inflicted grave economic, human, and military cost on the new Islamic Republic. 
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However, the memory would also draw the specific course of action for Iran to prevent a 
repetition of such history. According to Interviewee 3’s account, ‘Iran cannot let anti-
Iranian sentiments come to the scene again,’ meaning that Iran would make any effort to 
not ‘let the Baathist government back again.’484 This point is reiterated by Interviewee 4 
as well. Given the fact that ‘Iraq was the most important threat to Iran in the decades 
before, […] the type of the regime in Iraq is important for Iran.’485 He argues that, in the 
post-2003 period, Iran ‘does not want a Saddam-like government, but [rather] a friendly 
state in Iraq.’486   
 
 Rise as a regional power. The changes in the regional power balances following 
the 2003 invasion created leadership opportunities for Iran. The fall of Iraq created a 
power vacuum in the region to be filled by another regional power, where Iran emerged 
as a potential rising power in the northern axis. Iranian foreign policy experts identify the 
regional players’ behavior in the political and military arena as a balance of power game. 
Given its potential to become a regional power, the Islamic Republic has adopted a policy 
of balancing against other regional and international players. Interviewee 4 argues that 
the USA gradually created a bilateral system in the Middle East after World War II, which 
led to an alliance among the USA, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf.487 Since the 
revolution, Iran has been balancing against this alliance by systematically building a new 
alliance system in the region.488 In this game of balance, Iran is the core, whereas Syria 
and Lebanese Hezbollah are Iran’s main allies against the US-led camp.489 The Iran-led 
alliance in the region, which incorporated the Hamas and the Palestinian resistance on top 
of the Lebanese Hezbollah and Syria is called ‘the Axis of Resistance’ in the Iranian 
foreign policy discourse. The fall of Baathist Iraq in favor of the Shias inside the country 
and the political conflict of the Houthis in Yemen signaled two new potential allies for 
the Iran-led alliance network. This would mean the expansion of the Iran-led alliance, a 
greater and closer coordination among the allies, and an augmented role for Iran as the 
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patron of all included. Interviewee 2, an Iranian foreign policy researcher specialized on 
Iran’s relations regional actors in the Middle East, reiterates this point, where he argues 
that ‘The Iranian regime’s logic in focusing on Syria and Iraq is balance of power against 
Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and the West. Iran is expecting to be a super power in the region 
with the lifting of sanctions. Once the 150 billion dollar-worth sanctions are lifted, Iran 
will be hard to balance in the region.’490  
 
Political Shiism as a Political Ideology. One note of caution on the potential of 
regional players to become a regional power is that this potential does not only depend 
on hard power capabilities. As discussed in the previous sections, the challenges posed to 
the existing political order within MENA states by the Arab Spring, the (near-) state 
failure in Syria and Iraq, and civil conflicts opened the ground for the rise of new political 
ideologies. Each regional player that ended up in the game not only relied on its hard 
power capabilities, but also on its domestic political ideology for greater influence in the 
region. This created an ‘ideological multi-polarity’ in the region, which predominantly 
incorporated different versions of political Islam as propagated by a regional player. In 
this respect, Interviewee 2 defines three versions of political Islam in the region: 1) An 
authoritarian type of political Islam practiced in Saudi Arabia and some Gulf countries, 
2) Electoral type of political Islam identified with the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt, and 
AKP rule in Turkey, and 3) Shia political Islam, ideologically spearheaded by Iran.491 
According to Interviewee 2, the Islamic Republic’s ‘Shia Islam wants to introduce and 
establish itself as a type of political Islam in the region. It exists as a model in the 
region.’492 This links back to the transnational revolutionary Islamist vision of the 
revolutionary regime, where the Islamic Republic has always promoted itself as a model 
of Islamic ideology and regime since the revolution. Hossein Malaek, a former 
ambassador of the Islamic Republic to China and a senior international relations expert, 
argued that the revolution was heavily ideologically-oriented, aimed for establishing an 
Islamic society, promoting Islamic ideology as a source of prosperity for other Islamic 
countries, supporting their emancipation from foreign influence, and solving the 
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Palestinian issue.493 That was the objective of the Islamic Republic during the first decade 
of the revolution, which came to a halt in the second decade despite its materialization by 
the Lebanese Hezbollah. According to Malaek; 
 
   ‘The year 2011 was the climax of such a dream. Islamic nations were 
revolting against their government in favor of the Islamic ideology. The 
Iranian leadership called this ‘the Islamic revival.’ But many intellectuals 
believe that this is Arab revival, and not the Islamic revival. The Turkish 
government was instrumentalized by the USA to facilitate the Arab processes 
in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya. Iranians helped the movement in Libya, they 
were in favor of the processes. This was no benefit-driven attitude, no rational 
attitude, this was [rather] an Islamic vision to help the movements and the 
demonstrations. At the beginning, demonstrations and movements were 
peaceful. Iranians used all the leverage to put these fragile societies into an 
organized movement.’494  
 
In other words, despite their references to rationalist concepts such as balance of 
power and regional leadership, both Interviewee 2 and Malaek were pointing out to the 
fact that the Islamic Republic had not totally renounced the transnational revolutionary 
logic. Rather, their assessments of regional realities, risks, and opportunities reflected the 
Islamic Republic’s changing attitude and vision as an increasingly consolidated 
revolutionary regime, which carefully calculates the contextual circumstances before 
adopting an ideological foreign policy. The Islamic Republic was carefully calibrating the 
context, and the Middle Eastern context after 2003 looked like a window of opportunity 
for Iran to press for a more assertive presence in the region. The Iranian model, with forty 
years of experience in Islamic state building would be another model to be emulated by 
the region which was looking for an alternative political order.  
 
 The Shia Revival. In 2004, King Abdullah of Jordan warned regional leaders 
against the formation of a Shia-dominated alliance network in the Middle East and the 
growing Iranian influence in the region. He called this Iran-led Shia-dominated network 
‘the Shiite Crescent.’ He was saying that Iran was trying to influence Iraqi elections by 
investing heavily in creating a pro-Iranian public opinion by salary payments and welfare 
provisions to the Iraqi Shiites.495 The Iranian involvement in Iraqi politics would lead to 
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the creation of a ‘crescent’ made up of Shiite movements and governments stretching 
from Lebanon on the West, to Syria, Iraq, and Iran on the East, which could change the 
balance of power between the Sunnis and the Shiites in the region and generate problems 
for the USA and its Gulf allies.496 The term ‘Shiite Crescent’ soon entered the political 
and academic discussions, where several works were published discussing the existence 
and/or implications of the Shiite Crescent for the politics of the Middle East.497 The 
Islamic Republic rejected the term for its overt sectarian connotations, claiming that Iran 
was supporting both Sunni and Shia resistance movements with ideological similarities, 
the most prominent example being the PLO. Despite the Iranian rejection of a ‘Shiite 
Crescent,’ the post-2003 period witnessed a gradual and undeniable level of Shia 
empowerment across the region. What started in Iraq as the political mobilization of 
Shiite populations for electoral politics spread to Gulf countries with sizeable Shiite 
populations when the demands for democratic inclusion were raised following the Arab 
Spring. The Shia revival would create strong opportunities for Iran in becoming the patron 
of these Shia populations demanding a greater say in their home countries. The emerging 
patron-client relationship between Iran, as the only modern Shia state with remarkable 
state capacity to support these movements, would soon threaten the internal balance and 
political power in Sunni dominated territories. As a result, as Saghafi-Ameri argued, soon 
‘The Shiite Crescent reflected geopolitical struggle between the Arabs and Iran, [where] 
King Abdollah of Jordan coined the term to bring together the Sunni countries against 
Iran to check Iranian power in the region.’498 The Saudi Arabia – Iran rivalry took a rapid 
turn inside the politically and structurally weak Middle Eastern states where both Sunni 
and Shiite populations co-existed. Both regional players extended political and financial 
assistance to their fellow sectarian and/or ideological factions across the region: in 
Palestine (Hamas vs. Fatah), Lebanon (Hezbollah vs. March 14 block), Syria (Assad vs. 
the Islamists), and in Iraq (Sunnis vs. Shiites).499 In short, as interviewee Abbas Khalaji, 
                                                
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A43980-2004Dec7.html?noredirect=on  
 
496 Ibid.  
 
497 See Barzegar, ‘Iran and the Shiite Crescent: Myths and Realities,’ passim; Nasr, The Shia Revival, passim; Amir 
M. Haji-Yousefi, ‘Whose Agenda is Served by the Idea of a Shia Crescent?’ Alternatives: Turkish Journal of 
International Relations 8, no. 1 (2009): p. 114-135; Maximilian Terhalle, ‘Are the Shia Rising?’ Middle East Policy 
14, no. 2 (2007): p. 69-83; and Salloukh, ‘The Arab Uprisings and the Geopolitics of the Middle East,’ passim. 
 
498 Interview with Saghafi-Ameri.  
 
499 See Gause, ‘Beyond Sectarianism,’ https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/English-PDF-1.pdf.   
  
 173	
	
a former professor of Iranian foreign policy, states, ‘The Shia revival is the natural product 
of the regional context after 2003. After the 2003 invasion and their subsequent pull-back, 
a power vacuum emerged, which Iran filled in the Shiite-populated regions,’500 with 
extensive ramifications across the region in the years to come.   
 
 
4.2.3. The Iranian Response III: Strategy 
 
What dominant strategy has Iran adopted against the regional developments after 
2003? The revolutionary period’s legacy over Iran’s Middle East policy after 2003 has 
pressed its force more on the type of the strategy Iran adopted. Accordingly, the Iranian 
regime repeated its basic strategies during ‘the export of the revolution.’ As the coming 
sections will discuss in more detail, the Iranian regime chose to establish sub-state level 
relationships with the Shias in the region, sent out IRGC as the primary contractor of the 
Middle East policy in the field, and relied extensively on its peculiar security culture 
marked by unconventional capabilities and sectarian identity as a mobilizational force. 
The interviews have thus shown that the Iranian experience of the export of the 
revolution, the ideological security-system building, and the ensuing development of 
Iran’s peculiar security culture have all been institutionalized over decades and 
constituted Iran’s capabilities and strategies after 2003 in the region.     
 
 Establishing Sub-State Level Relations. The most outstanding Iranian foreign 
policy strategy in the Middle East is establishing relations not as much at the state-level 
relations as sub-state level. The Middle East is a region marked by weak and/or 
incomplete state-building processes. As discussed above, the ethnic, religious, and 
sectarian factionalization within the weak states facilitate cross-border alignment with 
state patrons. In the case of Shia revival, Interviewee 2 argues that Iran sees this issue 
‘not as a state-level, but as a group and organization-level issue’501 Iran is the first 
standing example or a modern Shia state in the region, whereas the rest of the Shias are 
either minorities in their home countries or face discrimination under the rule of non-Shia 
factions. While Iran could ‘not engage in strategic relations with the Sunnis at the state-
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level,’ it has turned towards group-level and organizational-level relations with the Shias 
in these countries.502 In Interviewee 2’s words, ‘Iran does not invest in states, it invests in 
organizations. Wherever there are ideological Shia groups, Iran is there.’503 When we 
look at Iran’s relations with the region since the revolution, we observe that this has 
always been the basic Iranian strategy. Iran established close relations ideologically-
affiliated Shias of Lebanon, the Shias in Iraq, the Palestinian resistance and Hamas, and 
Houthis in Yemen. The experience of the revolutionary period should again be reiterated 
here. Interviewee 8 emphasizes the centrality of Iranian experience in this respect, where 
he says ‘Iran has had much chance and experience in how to make groups and militia like 
Hezbollah, Hamas, active Shia groups in Iraq and Afghanistan. It knows how to get 
involved in the crisis and how to get out of that.’504 
 
 IRGC as the Primary Foreign Policy Actor in the Region. Given the fact that the 
nature of the conflicts in the region are security-based conflicts and the basic Iranian 
strategy is establishing sub-state relations with domestic groups sharing an identity or 
ideology-based affinity with Iran, the IRGC, and not the traditional Foreign Ministry, 
became the contractor of Iran’s Middle East policy today. The centrality of the IRGC in 
Iran’s Middle East policy has been emphasized by several interviewees several times 
during the field research. Interviewee 2 argued that ‘The Foreign Ministry of Iran does 
not much influence on the matters pertaining to Syria, Iraq, and Yemen and the decision-
making power in these countries is 70 % in the hands of Qods Force.’505 However, 
Interviewee 10, a Turkish expert on Iran’s security establishment, emphasizes the 
limitations on the decision-making power of the IRGC in the region, instead stating that 
the IRGC is responsible to the Supreme Leader, who is the ultimate decision-maker in 
Iran’s foreign policy.506 He differentiates between decision-making power and policy 
implementation in this respect. Accordingly, the IRGC is one of the decision-makers in 
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the National Security Council, the Supreme Leader is the ultimate decision-maker, but in 
terms of action and policy implementation, the IRGC is the biggest actor in the field.507  
 
 The question at this point is why the IRGC and not the Foreign Ministry is the 
dominant actor in the Middle East. As discussed before and highlighted by Interviewee 
5, Iran’s beyond-border security understanding is one reason for the centrality of IRGC 
in this policy. As Interviewee 10 explains, the Iranian regime treats the security risks in 
the region as ‘an issue of regime security’ and thus directly refers the Middle East file to 
the IRGC, who is responsible for the external and internal security of the Islamic Republic 
according to the Islamic Republic’s Constitution.508 However, Abbas Khalaji’s interview 
shows that the IRGC also has its own ideological and domestic political reasons to invest 
in the regional policy. Ideologically speaking, Khalaji says that IRGC and other 
conservative institutions are responsible to export the revolution and ‘the mentality of 
regime exportation is still there among these groups and this is a very important 
objective.’509 ‘The Middle East is the destination for the export of the revolution,’510  he 
adds, which suggests that the domestic developments in the Arab countries and the Shia 
revival after 2003 is evaluated as another opportunity to manifest this ideological 
objective. Besides the revolutionary ideology, Khalaji also argues that ‘All revolutionary 
institutions and organizations like IRGC, Imam Khomeini Relief Committee, the 
Foundation of the Oppressed, and the Basij Forces see that their power will increase by 
exporting the Shiite Revolution.’511 External power will help the revolutionary 
institutions increase their leverage in domestic politics and balance the reformists 
internally.512 In other words, external power in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen means greater 
domestic power inside Iran. It should be concluded that, irrespective of the IRGC motives 
in the region, IRGC is the most influential actor in Iran’s foreign policy and any analysis 
on the matter should focus on their activities in the region. It should also be emphasized 
that their role in the Middle East policy is independent of any presidential change and 
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factional power shifts within the regime, which gives the Iranian foreign policy strategy 
in the Middle East a more monotonous, consistent, and institutionalized outlook.     
 
     Unconventional Capabilities. As discussed in the previous chapter, Iranian 
security culture relies more on unconventional capabilities than conventional ones. The 
centrality of IRGC and its affiliated institutions in the security sector - as ideological 
security institutions with a hybrid organizational structure of an army and internal security 
force simultaneously - and the IRGC-Qods Force’s experience in mobilizing domestic 
groups in other countries overlap with the above-discussed items of Iranian strategies in 
the Middle East today. It should therefore be noted that Iran continues to rely on its 
unconventional capabilities in the Middle East region. It should be emphasized that 
religious identity and ideology acts as a crucial mobilizational element in this respect. It 
will be discussed in the coming sections that a common Shia identity, popular 
mobilization, and ideology and/or identity-based security institutions will be the basic 
tenets of Iran’s use of unconventional capability in Iraq and Syria. 
 
 The regional transformations and the Iranian interviewees evaluation of them 
provide several hints about the role of religion in Iran’s Middle East policy after 2003. 
First, the transnational context is characterized by more religious elements than any other 
previous period. The rise of various Islamist political ideologies as possible alternatives 
for a new political order in the region, the complicated nature of democratization in Iraq 
and Syria as tied to sectarian politics, and the rising sectarian conflicts in the region 
provided a favorable regional context for the Islamic Republic. Nevertheless, as the 
interviewees showed, the Islamic Republic has been more concerned with the rational 
calculation of the risks and opportunities this favorable environment raises for Iran. The 
interviews suggest that Iran’s grand visions of being the patron and a political model for 
the rising Shia movements is still alive. However, unlike the revolutionary period, the 
regional realities determine the extent of the Iranian ambition to go after this vision and 
the content of the associated policies. On the other hand, the revolutionary period’s legacy 
over Iran’s Middle East policy after 2003 has pressed its force more on the type of the 
strategy Iran adopted. In this respect, the IRGC – Qods Forces and the Iranian model of 
security organizations became the central components of Iranian strategy in Iraq and 
Syria. Moreover, the pre-existing Shia networks the Iranian regime invested in during the 
export of the revolution policy, most notably in Iraq proved to be an asset for the Iranian 
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regime after 2003. A similar trend is observable with Lebanese Hezbollah as well, who 
became the central stakeholder ensuring Iranian interests in Syria after 2011. The 
following sections will discuss Iran’s relations with Iraq and Syria with a specific focus 
on this aforementioned-point.  
 
 
 
4.3.  Iran’s Relations with Iraq in the post-2003 Period 
 
 
 
The immediate impact of the US intervention in Iraq on Iran was the creation of 
several political and economic opportunities. A non-Arab, Shia, and Islamic revolutionary 
state with a history of resisting the established regional order and attempts to export its 
political system to available countries in the region, the Islamic Republic was usually 
seen as a threat by regional players including Saddam’s Iraq. This contributed to the 
Islamic Republic’s perception of isolationism in the region, which Interviewee 5 calls ‘the 
strategic loneliness’ of Iran in the Middle East.513 As discussed above, the Iranian 
response to this perceived strategic loneliness was forging sub-state level alliances with 
social movements sharing ideological, identity-based, and political affinities with Iran. 
This strategy required a deeper penetration into the domestic politics and societies of the 
respective states. The weakening of the state apparatus and the shifts of domestic power 
balances in favor of the Shiites in Iraq facilitated the execution of this very strategy for 
the Islamic Republic.  
 
 The fact that the 60 – 65 % of the Iraqi population are of Shia identity was an 
important opportunity on the co-sectarian Iran.514 The federalization of the Iraqi political 
system and the introduction of electoral politics lead to political mobilization on ethnic 
and sectarian lines. The fall of the Baath regime thus meant a rapid process of political 
empowerment on the part of the Iraqi Shias who were politically marginalized before, but 
constituted the electoral majority now. As Abbas Khalaji emphasizes in his interview, the 
Shia revival in Iraq ‘was rooted in the political system of Iraq,’ where they ‘had to 
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empower themselves’ following the end of the Baath regime.515 The political 
marginalization of the Iraqi Shias during Saddam’s rule was already shared by all the 
fragmented communities of Shias across the region except for Iran, which had 
institutionalized the Shia political power in the form of a modern nation-state. The Islamic 
Republic, thus emerged as the main supporter of these fragmented communities ranging 
from Lebanon to Bahrain and Saudi Arabia.516 Regarding the Iranian patronage for the 
Shias, Malaek states that ‘The Shia communities know that there is a center for moral and 
material support and Iran served this purpose for a long time. This is a fact.’517 Malaek’s 
point is supported by a public opinion survey conducted among the Iraqis in 2012, where 
the Iraqi Shiites see Iran a model for themselves, showing that sectarian and religious 
commonalities play a role in determining the people’s perceptions about an external 
model.518 In Mostafa Dehghan’s terms, ‘Most of the Iraqi Shiites see Iran as a big brother,’ 
thereby facilitating closer relations between the Iraqi Shias and Iran after 2003. 
 
 The immediate positive impact of the post-2003 period on bilateral relations can 
be analyzed at cultural and political levels. Culturally, sectarian affiliation posed the 
greatest opportunities for close connections. This was mostly realized about the Shia 
hawzas of Najaf and Karbala. Trans-national clerical relations gained momentum 
between Qom, Najaf, and Karbala, where Shia clerics paid bilateral sabbatical visits to 
respective hawzas.519 Religious tourism between the Holy Shrine cities of Najaf, Karbala, 
and Mashad in Iran became popularized.520 As a part of the religious tourism, the Arbaeen 
pilgrimage gained a center stage.521 Two million Iranians go to Karbala for Arbaeen 
ceremonies annually, while many Iraqis come to Mashad to visit Imam Reza’s shrine.522 
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The Iranian regime has invested in the technical and infrastructural components of the 
Arbaeen tourism. In 2014, the Qods Force commander Qasem Soleimani is reported to 
order the construction of a road to another shrine city of Samarra.523 For the 2017 
ceremonies, Iranians opened two medical clinics to the service of the pilgrims who walk 
several days on foot from their home cities to Karbala.524 Iran also cooperated with the 
Iraqi state on the security of the pilgrims during the Arbaeen, where Iran’s air defense 
forces provided air security to the pilgrims.525 In short, early cultural relations 
concentrated on Shia commonalities, pilgrimage visits, and ceremonies.  
 
Politically, the fact that religious demographics is in favor of Shia Arabs signified 
the accumulation of political power in the hands of Shia political actors in electoral 
politics with ramifications over the political reconfiguration of the post-Saddam Iraqi 
state in favor of the Shia political actors. As Interviewee 5 emphasizes, forging 
connections to Iraqi Shia political parties was the primary foreign policy strategy Iran 
employed for greater political influence over this country.526 Iranian links to Shia political 
groups in Iraq have attracted attention during the last decade, but the bilateral links date 
back to the Holy Defense War in 1980s. During this time, several Shia groups with armed 
wings in Iraq allied with Iran against the Saddam regime both at the ideological and 
military levels. Relations with the Shia communities in Iraq was established mostly 
through the IRGC- Qods Force’s efforts in Iraq. As the Qods Force was a military entity 
originally tasked with spreading the Islamic Republic’s ideology to neighboring Muslim 
lands during the 1970s, establishing deep network-style relationships with Shia entities 
was necessary to achieve mobilizational capacity among Iraqi Shias. The Qods Force’s 
ambition to mobilize the Shias for an Islamic revolution against the Saddam regime was 
materialized by ‘the Islamic Resistance’ movement in Iraq during the 1980s, although the 
armed movement did not achieve to topple down the Saddam regime and establish an 
Islamic regime.527 The Islamic Resistance discourse was hence active during the 1980s 
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in Iraq and it was a strong mobilizational discourse among the pro-Iranian Iraqi Shias 
during the Holy Defense War. The Qods Force’s network style armed mobilization model 
during the 1980s would provide the necessary infrastructure for Iranian engagement in 
the post-Saddam period.  
 
When the Holy War was over, the cadres of these Shia opposition groups sought 
refuge in Iran and maintained their network links, institutional structures, and 
mobilizational capabilities thanks to Iranian support. After the outbreak of 2003 Iraq War, 
these groups went back to their homelands and they attained a central place in Iraqi 
electoral politics due to their entrenched networks and mobilizational structures in post-
Baath Iraqi political system in 2003. The Iranian investment in the mobilization of Shia 
communities in Iraq started to pay off during the post-Saddam period. In this respect, the 
Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) and its military wing called the 
Badr Brigades became the most powerful allies of Iran in the Iraqi politics. SCIRI was 
established in the 1980s during the Iran-Iraq War as an opposition force to the Saddam 
regime.528 Iran had the closest ties to SCIRI and Badr during this time, as the Islamic 
Republic supported this group as a proxy along with the Lebanese Hezbollah, both of 
which were Iran’s ‘export of the revolution’ projects.  
 
Like the Lebanese Hezbollah, SCIRI adopted Iran’s velayet-e faqih as its political 
ideology. SCIRI rebranded itself in Iraq’s new political environment in 2007 though, 
where the group dropped ‘Islamic Revolution’ from its banner and changed its name to 
Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI).529 The Badr Brigades were largely transformed 
into a reconstruction and development organization through social work back in 2003.530 
A good number of Badr members were also incorporated into the Iraqi police, army, and 
security forces after the invasion.531 The party’s transformation reflected the group’s new 
political position in the post-invasion electoral processes in a demographically Shia-
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dominated Iraq: SCIRI had decided to be integrated into the Iraqi state as a national 
political force by distancing itself ideologically from Iran. SCIRI wanted to keep their 
Islamist tendencies in a nationalist way, where entrenched ties to Iran and subscription to 
its transnationalist ideology was an obstacle.532 On the other hand, the armed Badr 
Organization distanced itself from ISCI, retained its pro-Iran stance, and became the most 
powerful pro-Iranian armed Shia organization within Iraq.533  
 
The ideological and political transformation of Iran’s then most trusted Shia ally 
was telling about the reality and the future of Shia revival in the region: The so-called 
Shia revival was not an ideologically and politically monotonous phenomenon. To the 
contrary, the Shia revival was a rather diversified project, with highly diversified opinions 
on critical issues including the role of the Shia marjaiyya in Iraqi politics, the confusion 
over allegiance to Iraqi nationalism and sectarian identity, and the type of the political 
future the Shias were envisioning. The political and ideological diversity of the Iraqi Shias 
created important challenges for Iran at two levels: 1) at the level of Shia marjaiyya, 
where multiple marjaiyya positions came face to face politically and theologically, 2) at 
the level of Shia political parties, where multiple political parties with different political 
ideologies and visions dominated Shia politics in Iraq.      
 
Iraq has an exceptional position in terms of Shia religious politics. Except for the 
Islamic Republic, countries with sizeable Shia populations such as Afghanistan, Lebanon, 
United Arab Emirates, and Pakistan do not have learning hawzas and marjaiyya, but Iraq 
has Najaf and Karbala religious hawzas and a powerful Shia marjaiyya.534 The Najaf 
hawza and the Shia marja was exposed to strict state pressure under the Baathist 
regime.535 During this time, the Qom hawza of Iran emerged as the center of Islamic 
Revolution and continued to be a well-known religious learning center internationally. In 
                                                
532 Joseph Felter and Brian Fishman, ‘Iranian Strategy in Iraq: Politics and ‘Other Means,’ Combating Terrorism 
Center at West Point, Occasional Paper Series, October 13, 2008, p. 27, 
https://ctc.usma.edu/app/uploads/2010/06/Iranian-Strategy-in-Iraq.pdf.   
 
533 ‘Badr Organization of Reconstruction and Development,’ http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-
bin/groups/view/435.   
 
 
534 Interview with Majidyar. 
 
535 Mahdi Khalaji, ‘The Last Marja: Sistani and the End of Religious Authority in Shiism,’ The Washington Institute 
for Near East Policy, Policy Focus 59, September 2006, p. 3, 
https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/PolicyFocus59final.pdf.    
 
 182	
	
the Islamic Republic’s political tradition, both reformist and conservative circles come 
from the city of Qom.536 The city of Qom is a multinational and international city 
attracting learning Muslims from all around the world such as Bangladesh, Afghanistan, 
Iraq, Turkey, China, Saudi Arabia convene for religious education.537 The Shia revival 
after 2003 re-shifted the clerical balances to the advantage of the Iraqi marjaiyya. Grand 
Ayatollah Ali Sistani of Najaf, the successor of the famous Iraqi Shia marja Abu al-Qasim 
al-Khoei, emerged as the most powerful marja not only of Iraq, but also of the greater 
Shia world. In post-Saddam Iraq, he acted as the representative of the Iraqi Shia 
communities, he propagated for electoral politics in Iraq, and became a diplomatic 
reference point both for the USA and Iran. According to Mahdi Khalaji Ayatollah Sistani’s 
international popularity comes first from his predecessor and mentor Al-Khoei’s religious 
networks, which he could use as a ‘symbolic capital,’ source of ‘prestige,’ and ‘social 
influence.’538 Secondly, his popularity as an esteemed source of emulation gained him 
economic power. As Khalaji emphasizes, Ayatollah Sistani is the richest marja across the 
Shia, he uses the hawza’s revenues and religious taxes to fund seminary students and 
clerics with higher salaries than any other marja, and thus increases his religious network, 
social influence and prestige as a marja among the Shias, and his number of followers.539  
 
During the field research to Tehran, several interviewees emphasized the fact that 
Sistani’s rise as a powerful marja across the Shia world besides the Qom hawza generated 
multiple rival marja positions in the Shia world. For one thing, Ayatollah Sistani is 
theologically most respected and the most followed Shia marja. As Majidyar states, in 
countries such as ‘UAE, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, which has sizable Shias populations of 3 
million people, you see that most of them have their marjaiyya in Iraq. They follow 
Sistani, not Ayatollah Khamenei.’540 Even in Iran, in his interview, Malaek emphasized 
that ‘The Shia marjaiyya in Iraq is more popular than the marjaiyya in Iran. Iranians who 
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follow Sistani are 60 % more’ than the Iraqis who follow the marjaiyya in Qom.541 For 
another, Interviewee 4 argues that the marjas in Najaf and Qom differed extensively in 
terms of the role of Shia clerics in politics.542 The difference is manifested in the 
distinction between the Najafi tradition of ‘quietism’ in political affairs and the Qomi 
tradition of political ‘activism,’ or clerical involvement in politics.543 Imam Khomeini’s 
velayet-e faqih stands at the center of this distinction. The Iranian clerical rule since 1979 
is based on velayet-e faqih, which has institutionalized the clerical role in politics and the 
legitimacy of their political activism. Velayet-e faqih is thus the Iranian brand of Shia 
political activism and a governmental model of revolutionary political Islam to be 
exported to Shia popular movements across the region. The Iranian regime could export 
velayet-e faqih as a political ideology to the Lebanese Hezbollah, however it failed to be 
materialized as an Islamic governmental model in the multi-religious Lebanese socio-
political scene. A similar situation is observable in the multi-ethnic, multi-religious, and 
multi-sectarian Iraqi politics, which complicates the adoption of velayet-e faqih. This 
handicap is recognized by the Iranian experts interviewed on Shia political activism. In 
this context, Majidyar argues, ‘[There are] different religious definition of what the Shiite 
leaders’ role in politics is. That is very different in Najaf. […] this velayet-e faqih is just 
a new concept and velayet-e faqih has had very limited followers, limited acceptance 
inside of Iraq, especially in the religious cities like Karbala and Najaf. So, there is always 
a tension.’544  
 
Ayatollah Sistani of Najaf subscribes to the traditional quietist school of Najaf. As 
Interviewee 6, an Iranian professor of international relations, pointed out, he preferred the 
political isolation of the Najafi marja.545 However, the weakness of the Iraqi state in the 
post-Saddam period increased the political influence of Ayatollah Sistani as well as that 
of the Najafi hawza. According to Interviewee 4, the weakness of the Iraqi state has 
determined the course of hawza-state relations in Iraq, where ‘In Iraq there is no modern 
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concept of a state entity that has the legitimate use of force. This type of state does not 
exist in Iraq. For that reason, the hawza in Iraq is very different from Qom. There is no 
conflict between the Qom hawza and the Islamic regime in Iran. But in Iraq, the state is 
very weak, the hawza is powerful.’546 Under such circumstances, Ayatollah Sistani’s 
political salience can be summarized as his capacity to unite the Iraqi Shias for political 
power. According to Interviewee 9, a Turkish diplomat in Erbil, ‘[The Iraqi] marja 
provides the unity to Shias that the Sunnis do not enjoy in Iraq.’547 One priority for 
Ayatollah Sistani in Iraqi politics is the political unity of the Shias and the continuation 
of the Shia state in Iraq.548 This point is shared by Interviewee 7, a professor of 
international relations, who states that amid the political multivocality of the Iraqi Shias 
in electoral politics, ‘Ayatollah Sistani wants to be a peaceful balancer in Iraq, not a base 
for political action.’549 A second priority for Ayatollah Sistani, which indeed pushed him 
to greater political engagement, was the security of the Shia populations and the Shia 
hawzas against the emerging ISIL threat. As will be discussed in the coming sections in 
detail, Ayatollah Sistani issued a fatwa for the mobilization of all Iraqis for the defense of 
the Shias and the Shia holy sites, which lead to the establishment of an umbrella 
organization encompassing various Shia militias under the Hashd al-Shaabi, the Iraqi 
Popular Mobilization Forces. In short, the Shia revival in Iraq generated two marjaiyya 
in Iraq and Iran, which rivalled to each other in terms of theological influence and 
diverged from one another on the clerical engagement in politics. As such, the Shia revival 
in the Iraqi hawzas would not necessarily mean adopting the Iranian Shia political model 
for Iraq on the part of the Iraqi marja. This also would not mean greater political influence 
by the Islamic Republic on Najafi hawza. Malaek reiterated this point;  
 
   ‘The Iranian politics, security, religious leadership will not do anything in 
Iraq, if Sistani is against that. This is the case in Lebanon too, Iran will not do 
anything in Lebanon, if Hezbollah’s Fadlallah does not want anything. So, 
Iran is the puppet of Sistani and Fadlallah in certain issues, for example 
demonstrations. […] So, Iran and Iraq cannot look at Sistani as a political 
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instrument. He is independent of the government. Clergies with less influence 
can be used, but Iran cannot use grand ayatollahs.’550  
 
The multivocality of Shia politics was proved at the level of Shia political parties 
as well. As early as 2005, Iraq had two more Shia political parties in addition to SCIRI 
and Badr: the Islamic Dawa Party known for Nouri al-Maliki who served as the prime 
minister of Iraq, and the Iraqi nationalist block led by Moqtada al-Sadr of the famous 
clerical Sadr family. The Islamic Dawa Party was established as far back as 1957 by two 
established Iraqi Shia clerics - Mohammad Baqir al-Sadr and Mahdi al-Hakim.551 The 
party was thus rooted in the Shia ulama, where al-Hakim and al-Sadr represent the 
political and economic grievances of the Shia ulama and community in Iraq. In the later 
decades, the Dawa Party faced a severe crackdown by the Baath regime, and as a result, 
some of its members moved to Damascus to open up Dawa offices in Damascus and some 
others went to Lebanon and joined the AMAL movement.552 Despite Mohammad Baqir 
al-Sadr’s original vision of activist Islamist politics which called for an Islamist rule by a 
community of Shia clerics, the party did not subscribe to Islamic Republic’s velayet-e 
faqih and today can best be described as a Shia political party functioning in a multi-
ethnic and multi-religious Iraq. A last major Shia political force is the Sadrist movement, 
led by Muqtada al-Sadr, the son of the revered Shia cleric Ayatollah Mohammad Sadiq 
al-Sadr. Moqtada al-Sadr adopted an ultra-nationalist and populist political position 
appealing to the Shiite urban poor in Iraq.553 His popularity grew also when he adopted a 
strong anti-American rhetoric and targeted the presence of Coalition Forces through its 
strong and violent militia - the Mahdi Army.554 Moqtada al-Sadr’s relations with Iran has 
been especially problematic since 2007 for several reasons. The Mahdi Army’s 
involvement in violent sectarian clashes against the Sunnis and against the Coalition 
Forces stood at odds with the Iranian ambition to ensure the presence of a peaceful 
electoral environment where Shia populations could achieve political relevancy via 
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elections. The ultra-nationalistic tendencies of Muqtada al-Sadr would bar Iran’s 
influence over Iraq in the post-Saddam period. Finally, the Iranian support for other Shia 
factions in Iraq including the Dawa Party meant the empowerment of Muqtada al-Sadr’s 
political rivals at home.    
    
Apparently, the Iraqi Shias were not a unified block sharing a unified ideological 
and political position regarding the post-Saddam Iraq. To the contrary, the Iraqi Shiites 
were rather diversified in terms of their social classes, geographic distribution within Iraq, 
ethnic origins, and finally political and ideological orientations. Some of them entertained 
the idea of a Shia Islamic state in Iraq and looked to the Islamic Republic as a possible 
source of emulation. Some others were Iraqi Arab nationalists and seemed to be relatively 
more distanced to transnational political and ideological influences like Iran. For Iran, the 
plurivocality of Iraqi Shia political factions was a threat against the formation of a unified 
Shia electoral block against Sunnis in Iraq and hence the Iranian aspiration to have a 
friendly Shia state as a neighbor. Therefore, the Islamic Republic’s priority in the early 
years of the post-Saddam Iraqi state was to act as a power-broker among all Iraqi Shia 
factions and maintain a unified electoral block, which was deemed necessary to establish 
a friendly Shiite-dominated government in a demographically Shiite-dominated Iraq.555 
This strategy succeeded in the 2005 elections, where three major Shia political groups 
came together under the United Iraqi Alliance (UIA), won the majority of the seats in the 
interim parliament, and exerted considerable influence over the new constitution making 
process.556  
 
However, the Iranian role as a power-broker soon proved to have limits. The UIA 
coalition formed under Iranian mediation gradually loosened in the following electoral 
seasons, new Shia political factions emerged, and rival Shia electoral lists were formed 
as political alternatives for Shia electorates. Despite such complications reflected on 
electoral politics, Iran maintained its influence over the Iraqi state. Qasem Soleimani, the 
IRGC-Qods Force commander better known for his military engagement in Iraq and 
Syria, was also a major political actor, influenced the appointment of pro-Iranian figures 
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from the Shia political parties and groups close to Iran to key governmental and 
bureaucratic positions.557 In a similar vein, the Iranian regime also helped promote the 
chances of specific Shia coalitions in the elections through the provision of political 
consultants and broadcasting equipment.558 One final note about these actors is that all of 
them are coopted by the Iraqi state in one way or another. Some of them such as Dawa 
and Sadrists run as major political parties with immense popular support, some others 
such as ISCI have their key figures appointed to key bureaucratic positions, yet others 
such as the Badr run welfare institutions. The Iranian links to these actors to varying 
extents, albeit in a complicated manner, show the extensive network-type relationships 
Iran enjoys within the Iraqi state. 
 
Given the diversified nature of the Shia revival in Iraq both at the level of marjas 
and Shia political parties, the Iranian regime looked cautious about the type of the 
political system to be established in Iraq. The socio-religious and socio-political diversity 
of the Iraqi society would not easily allow a velayet-e faqih type of clerical rule in Iraq. 
Arab nationalism among the Iraqis was another factor to act as an obstacle before the 
Iranian influence.559 Therefore, the Iranian discourse on the type of political system in 
Iraq was not the export of the revolution or velayet-e faqih, but ‘a friendly regime’, that 
would be ‘ideologically close to’ and in a good cooperative relationship with Iran.560 Iran 
kept its connection to the Shia political parties, focused on keeping the integrity and union 
of the Shias in electoral politics despite their differences, decreased tensions among them 
where necessary, and provided political advice and technical support.561 Despite 
ideological and political disagreements with, Iran continued to be seen as the most 
important ally by Shia political parties in Iraq. As Interviewee 5 states, ‘The Shia political 
parties believe that they cannot find a country to lean on. Iran is the only real supporter 
of the Shia in Iraq. Saudi Arabia is the real oppositionist for the Shia, and the USA cannot 
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guarantee the power of the Shias in Iraq. They feel it necessary to have better relations 
with the Iranian regime, as Iran supports them without any condition.’562 
 
The year 2011 was an important turning point for Iran both in Iraq and in the 
region. The withdrawal of US troops from Iraq and the growing political tensions between 
the Sunnis and the Shias once again ignited the sectarian violence. That same year, the 
Syrian regime, Iran’s only ally in the region, was challenged by popular uprisings and 
gradually fell into a regional proxy war. The Syrian regime, along with the Lebanese 
Hezbollah, was the center of an anti-US and anti-Israeli alliance called the ‘Axis of 
Resistance’ for Iran. The Islamic Republic was reluctant to lose its only state ally and the 
center of its regional alliance to the opposition forces inside Syria and the IRGC-Qods 
Forces had already stepped onto the Syrian territories to keep the Syrian regime intact. 
The rise of ISIL threat in 2014 across the Iraqi-Syrian territories was a golden opportunity 
for Iran to press its military presence in the region. The security threat inflicted by ISIL 
had united the Iranian regime, the Iraqi Shias, Assad, and Lebanese Hezbollah together. 
The Iranian regime’s focus thus shifted from the political sector more to the security 
sector and engaged in a rapid militia mobilization and security sector institutionalization 
campaign in both countries. The next section will detail the Iranian – Syrian alliance in 
this respect.   
 
 
 
4.4.  Iran’s relations with Syria in the post-2011 Period 
 
 
 
In early 1980s, the geopolitical situation in the Middle East brought two seemingly 
incompatible states together under an alliance network that endured to this day. Syria 
under Assad regime and Iran under the revolutionary Islamic Republic proved to be one 
of the most enduring allies in the region. As a matter of fact, both were socio-politically 
and ideologically very different from one other. The Syrian regime was ruled by the 
Alawite minority regime represented by the Hafez Assad’s family - an identity whose 
legitimacy was an issue of contention both for the Shias and the Sunnis. Iran, on the other 
hand, had emerged as the first modern Shia state in the region with 1979 Revolution. 
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Ideologically, the Syrian regime was Baathist, socialist, and Arab nationalist, while the 
new Iranian regime was revolutionary and pan-Islamist.563 Despite such differences, both 
states worked in close cooperation with one another on regional and domestic issues at a 
broader level, which has culminated in the Syrian civil war in 2011.  
 
 A review of the background conditions for the emergence of this alliance back in 
1980s is necessary to understand the current dynamics of bilateral relations. Historical 
and geopolitical factors shaping the changing the regional balances in late 1970s, the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict, and the issue of Lebanon had much to contribute to the 
emergence of the Syrian-Iranian axis. In 1970s, the Lebanese civil war was the arena of 
rivalry for regional and international players. The Christian Maronite were supported by 
both the USA and Israel.  The Syrian regime chose to support the Shia populations as well 
as the PLO, who had deployed themselves on the South of Lebanon, with an attempt to 
counterbalance the opposing domestic and external forces and to preserve its area of 
influence. The Lebanese Shias were already discovered by the Iranian-born and Najafi-
educated influential Shia cleric Musa al-Sadr in 1970s for political Shiism, who had 
travelled from Iraq to Lebanon to mobilize the socioeconomically and politically 
marginalized Shia communities. Within the framework of rising Shia activism, the Shia 
clerical networks were expanding to the Lebanese Shias and the leftist-Islamist entities 
opposing the Shah regime in Iran like Mujahedeen-Khalq were trained in the PLO camps. 
The Syrian regime was moving towards a greater regional isolation on two fronts. First, 
the Alawite identity of the minority regime in Syria was experiencing a legitimation crisis 
due to its identity.564 The Alawite identity crisis is also emphasized by Interviewee 10, 
where he argued that Assad’s secular Baath regime is the source of this crisis for the 
Alawites in Syria who as a community lack a religious or political order.565 This 
legitimation and identity crisis facilitated the rapprochement by Shia clerical figures 
towards the Alawites. In this context, Musa al-Sadr issued a fatwa in 1973 from Lebanon 
announcing all local Lebanese Shiites as Alawites, thereby giving a green light to the 
Syrian regime for deeper collaboration and alliance on the domestic situation in 
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Lebanon.566 The Shia-Alawite rapprochement was thus underway, with political 
ramifications on the relations between the Lebanese Shiites and the Assad regime. 
Second, Egypt was gradually shifting away from the anti-Israeli camp in the Middle East 
towards the pro-Western camp, which culminated in the signing of Camp David Accords 
between Egypt and Israel in 1979.567 The Syrian regime was concerned by the 
ambivalence of the Iraqi and Saudi position on Camp David and losing other Arab states 
to the pro-Western camp on the issue of Palestine. In short, the Syrian regime was moving 
towards greater isolation among Arabs, having a legitimacy and identity crisis, and was 
in search of allies by 1979.  
  
 The Iranian Revolution in the same year was a game changer in terms of regional 
balancer, and much so for the Syrian regime. Iran rose from its internal crisis as an Islamic 
Republic, with a strong revolutionary, Twelver Imamate, pan-Islamist ideology. The new 
regime had ties to the Palestinian resistance and Lebanese Shiites thanks to the pre-
revolutionary clerical and resistant group-level networks. The Islamic Revolution was 
framed as much an anti-imperialistic movement than as a Shia-religious movement, 
countering the US penetration in the region and opposing Israel. Given its ideology and 
network capabilities, Iran thus appeared as an emerging counter-force to US policies in 
the region and to Israel. This meant the arrival of a new anti-Western and anti-Zionist ally 
for Syria in the region, which could solve its legitimacy crisis and mitigate its felt 
isolationism.  
 
 Three events in early 1980s sealed the Iran-Syria axis. First, Syria sided with Iran 
during its war with Iraq in 1980. Both Syria and Iraq were ruled by Arab-nationalist Baath 
regimes, who were rivalling one another for the title of ideological and political leadership 
in the region. Each regime was stirring the domestic politics of the other. The Iraqi regime 
was supporting the Syrian Ikhwan movement by mobilizing the Sunnis from inside 
Lebanon.568 For the Syrian regime, Iraq’s war with the Islamic Republic was a great 
distraction on the part of Iraq. Moreover, the Syrian regime would not want to lose its 
new ally against Israel and the pro-Western Arab camp with the war. Therefore, the Syrian 
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regime supported the Iranian regime during the war, by the transfer of Soviet-provided 
war materials and political assistance.569 Second, the Syrian regime benefited from 
Iranian military assistance during the Israeli invasion of South Lebanon in 1982. The 
Syrian regime needed the Iranian support for the mobilization of Shia communities 
against Israel in South Lebanon. Iran, predominantly by the ideological and revolutionary 
fervor of the fledgling Islamic Republic, saw the Lebanese issue as a moral responsibility. 
Moreover, Iran was interested in further engagement with the Lebanese Shias, as it saw 
Lebanon, which had the second largest Shia community outside of Iran after Iraq, as a 
potential locus for the export its revolution and for building an Iranian base 
geographically close to Israel.570 For Iran, the engagement with the Shias would thrust 
Iran to the forefront in the pro-Palestinian and anti-Zionist politics in the Arab world and 
possibly export its revolution to Lebanese Shiites. For Syria, the Iranian mobilizational 
capacity among the Shias were necessary to balance against Israel and the Lebanese 
regime who was allying with Israel against the existence of PLO on its southern 
territories.571  
 
The 1982 invasion proved to be a defining moment both for the establishment of 
the Islamic Republic as an anti-systemic actor in the region, and both for Syrian-Iraqi 
axis, as the Iranian involvement lead to the creation of the Lebanese Hezbollah. Emerging 
as an anti-US, anti-Zionist, and Shia armed movement with an ideological allegiance to 
velayet-e faqih, Hezbollah would be the leading Iran proxy in the region, get transformed 
into a welfare organization and political party in Lebanon, and attain an independent 
army-like status against Israel. Third, when Syria experienced a powerful internal 
opposition by the mobilization of Sunni constituencies in the city of Hama in 1982, the 
Iranian regime sided with the Assad regime instead of Ikhwan. This Iranian move in 1982 
was counter-intuitive, as the revolutionary Islamist regime, whose political vision 
included the union of the Islamic Ummah regardless of sectarian differences, was 
expected to support the Ikhwan’s political Islamist movement against the secular Baathist 
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Assad. The 1982 Ikhwan uprisings in Hama was the last step towards the sealing of the 
official alliance between Syria and Iran.572     
 
What tied the knot between the secular Baathist Syrian regime and the 
revolutionary Islamist Iran was the geopolitical situation developing around the Arab-
Israeli conflict and Lebanon in early 1980s. Goodarzi argues that the ideological 
differences made the alliance endure, as neither state had a reason for claiming ‘the mantle 
of leadership’ in their respective political ideologies.573 On the other hand, Khalaji argues 
that the ‘minority’ identity experienced both by Syrian regime as Alawites and by Iran as 
a Shia Islamist revolutionary regime isolated in the region might have created an identity 
bonding between Syria and Iran.574 While geopolitics played an important role in sealing 
the Iranian-Syrian nexus, the alliance itself deepened the anti-US and anti-Zionist 
ideological stance exhibited by both countries. Especially the fact that both countries were 
dubbed as the ‘axis of evil’ by the USA in 2003 brought them even closer as an anti-US 
axis.575 The following Israeli war with Hezbollah in 2006 established Hezbollah as an 
anti-Zionist, powerful military force specialized in non-conventional and urban warfare 
in the region. Over time, the Iran-Syria-Hezbollah alliance, with the addition of 
Palestinian resistance forces, came to be dubbed as an axis counter-balancing the USA, 
Israel, and the Arab allies committed to preserving the status-quo in the region. In the 
Iranian foreign policy discourse, the axis of Syria-Hezbollah-Iran and Palestinian 
resistance groups were called ‘the Axis of Resistance.’ As Majidyar states, in its original 
meaning, ‘When the Iranians talk about this, they mostly mean the alliance of Iran with 
state and non-state actors that fight against the USA and Israel. If I use the Iranian term, 
the global arrogance, which is America, and Zionism which is the Israel.’576 In short, the 
Syrian regime, along with the Lebanese Hezbollah, was the member of an emerging block 
or axis of countries resisting the existing status-quo on the Palestinian-Israeli issue that 
shaped the pro-Western alliance dynamics among Arabs in the region. This alliance had 
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priority status in the minds of Iranian foreign policy elites due to Iran’s general sense of 
isolationism in the region.  
 
 The Arab Spring of 2011 and its spread to Syria with a snowball effect was a 
moment of dilemma for the Islamic Republic. On the one hand, Iran had received the 
Arab uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt very favorably. Partly illusioned by the popularity or 
Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist political parties, the Iranian regime expected the 
people in the Maghreb to overthrow the authoritarian, pro-Western, Arab regimes in favor 
of an Islamist regime, thereby finalizing the Islamic movement started with the Iranian 
Revolution in 1979.577 In the Iranian view, a similar popular movement was underway in 
Syria in 2011, where the civilian populations were chanting for reform, free elections, 
and justice.578 While part of the protestors were secular civilians, others were rising 
Islamists, especially the Syrian Ikhwan and Iran was sympathetic to their counterparts in 
Egypt as Iran expected them to Show an anti-US and anti-Israeli position in the region as 
well.579 In a way, the Syrian uprisings thus fitted the Iranian imagination of the Arab 
Spring. On the other hand, the Syrian case soon proved to be different from the 
movements in the Maghreb, with possible ramifications for Iran. First, as Malaek states, 
the foreign mercenaries and global jihadists movements, who could not survive in Kabul 
and Sudan and were looking for a new capital for basing their operations, arrived in 
Syria.580 Iran identified this group of global jihadists with the Salafist movements, who, 
according to Iran, were financed by Saudi Arabia.581 The engagement of external forces 
in Syria signaled to Iran that if there be any change, it would not be led by the local 
populations.582 Moreover, the volume of external forces quickly multiplied in Syria when 
the civil war turned into a proxy war among regional and international players. Secondly, 
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the Syrian uprisings was a big threat to the Syria-Iran-Hezbollah axis. As Dehghan states, 
when proxy forces occupied the Syrian territories, ‘the situation in Syria meant a passage 
to invade Iran as well.’583 Syria was the central player of the axis, as it was ‘the route to 
reach Lebanon, a safe place for Iran to arrange its meetings with Hezbollah, and transfer 
weapons.’584 The survival of the axis trumped the Iranian imagination of the Arab Spring.  
 
According to Interviewee 8, the Iranian leadership began to see the situation in 
Syria ‘as weakening the resistance front.’585 Given the presence of many players on the 
Syrian field, Iran thought that the Syrian proxy war was designed and orchestrated by 
external players including Saudi Arabia, as an attempt to ‘weaken the Iranian, Hezbollah, 
Syrian axis.’586 Over time, the Iranian regime perceived itself to be the ultimate target of 
this invasion. He argues that from the Iranian perspective, when the nuclear deal was 
signed, the lifting of sanctions was on the horizon, Iran was expected to engage in better 
relations with China and Russia, and become a regional power, suddenly the ISIL threat 
emerged.587 To conclude, the situation in Syria gradually grew to be threat to the Iran-
Syria-Hezbollah axis and the rising Iranian power in the region in the Iranian eyes, which 
took precedence over the early imagination of the Arab uprisings.  
 
 The Iranian regime’s official reaction to Syrian uprisings in the early days of the 
uprisings reflected the regime’s concerns about any foreign intervention into the Syrian 
affairs. Ramin Mehmanparast, the then foreign ministry’s spokesperson, said ‘What is 
happening in Syria is a mischievous act of Westerners, particularly Americans and 
Zionists. With the help of their media, they are trying to create an artificial protest 
somewhere or exaggerate a demand of a small group and present it, instead, as the demand 
and will of the majority.’588 In a press conference held in Istanbul at the time, then 
president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad also said ‘The government and the people of Syria 
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have reached a level of maturity to solve their own problem by themselves and there is 
no need for foreign intervention.’589 The Iranian regime’s official discourse focused on 
leaving the matter to the local Syrians and the Assad regime. The then Iranian foreign 
minister Ali Akbar Salehi was inviting Bashar Assad to address the Syrian people’s 
demands through reforms by saying ‘If the majority of people in Syria have legitimate 
demands, it is the duty of the Bashar al-Assad government to respond to those demands 
as it has done so (thus far) and has fulfilled its promises to improve the situation.’590 
Finally, the Supreme Leader Ayatollah also sharing the official line expressed by the 
foreign ministry, where he was claiming that the situation in Syria was orchestrated by 
the USA, Israel, and the Arabs and were serving the American and Israeli interests in the 
region.591 Ayatollah Khamenei also assured that Iran would be willing to support any 
movement that is popular, Islamist, anti-American, and anti-Zionist in nature.592  
 
 The Iranian Qods-Forces engaged in the Syrian conflict early on, but the Iranian 
leadership refrained from openly accepting the IRGC presence on the Syrian territory. On 
the other hand, news was abounding regarding the IRGC presence in Syria. In 2012, 48 
Iranian nationals who were pilgrims to Sayyeda Zainab Shrine near Damascus were taken 
hostage by opposition forces.593 According to official statements, the abducted Iranian 
nationals were retired Qods Force members.594 While the Iranian leadership still refrained 
from openly acknowledging the IRGC presence, news spread in 2013 regarding the IRGC 
personnel getting killed while fighting in Syria. A veteran commander of the IRGC called 
Mohammad Jamali was killed in Syria.595 It was claimed on several news sites that Jamali 
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had volunteered to fight for the defense of the Sayyeda Zainab Shrine against the terrorists 
near Damascus – one of the most prominent holy Shia sites across the Middle East.596 At 
the same time, the IRGC sources were becoming more open about their presence in Syria. 
Mohammad Ali Jafari, a general of IRGC said ‘In comparison with the scale of support 
the Arab countries have given to opposition groups in Syria and their military presence, 
we haven’t taken any action there,’ but that they provided ‘intellectual and advisory 
support and transferred experience.’597 A bold move came from Mehdi Taeb in 2013, the 
head of Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei's Ammar Base think-tank in a speech at a 
Basij meeting in Mashhad, where he stated;  
 
‘Syria is [Iran's] 35th province, and it is a strategic province for us. If the 
enemy attacks us and wants to take Syria or Khuzestan, our top priority will 
be to preserve Syria. By preserving Syria, we will be able to retake Khuzestan 
– but if we lose Syria, we will not be able to preserve Tehran. […] Syria has 
an army, but it cannot wage the war within Syria's cities. This is why Iran 
proposed establishing a Basij force, to conduct the fighting in the cities. [So] 
the 60,000-strong 'Syrian Basij' was established; it has taken over the fighting 
in the streets from the army."598 
 
The year 2014 ended the Iranian reticence regarding the IRGC activities on the 
field when the rising ISIL threat legitimized their presence there. The IRGC was now 
more vocal about its role in the fight against ISIL. The IRGC was framing its involvement 
both in Iraq and Syria as providing military aid, advice, and strategy in their fight against 
terrorism. A military aid to the Iranian Supreme Leader Major General Yahya Rahim 
Safavi said ‘We don’t conceal that we are present in Syria and Iraq as advisors and give 
advice to Mr. Bashar al-Assad and Mr. Haider al-Abadi.’ in this respect.599 Regarding the 
Iranian technical support to both countries, the Commander of the IRGC Aerospace Force 
Brigadier General Amir Ali Hajizadeh added that Tehran has provided Iraq, Syria, and 
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resistance groups the technological know-how in building missile capabilities.600 By the 
summer of 2015, the reports indicated that Iran had 700 IRGC - Qods Force and Ground 
Forces personnel only in Syria, further supported by 4000 to 5000 advisors and fighters 
sent by the Lebanese Hezbollah.601 Iran reportedly an additional 2300 to 2500 IRGC 
members to Syria in November 2015.602 
 
The Iranian military presence was not limited to the provision of military aid and 
advice though. In a study conducted by Alfoneh and Eisenstadt, the funeral services 
reports on Iranian IRGC and Lebanese Hezbollah showed that 342 IRGC personnel and 
878 Hezbollah fighters were killed in Syria between 2012 and 2016.603 ‘The defense of 
the holy shrines’ discourse has been repeatedly used by Iran to account for IRGC 
deployment in Syrian and Iraqi territories and those who are killed in the conflicts have 
been counted as Shia martyrs by Iran’s Martyrs’ Foundation and public funerals were held 
with the attendance of political and military figures. A rally was organized in the Iranian 
city of Mazandaran in May 2016 in support of the volunteers and IRGC forces fighting 
in Syria and Iraq under the banner ‘from Holy Defense to Shrine Defense.’604 The phrase 
refers to the Iranian volunteer-based mobilization to defend the new Islamic Republic 
against Iraq in 1980s and shows how the mobilization is extended for the defense of 
another holy entity – the holy Shia shrines- outside of Iranian territories.      
  
The involvement of a third actor in the Syrian conflict should also be mentioned 
in explaining Iran’s relations with Syria after 2011: the Lebanese Hezbollah – the third 
pillar of the Axis of Resistance. As discussed before, the Lebanese Hezbollah’s seeds 
were sown in 1970s with Musa al-Sadr’s move to Lebanon to mobilize the Lebanese 
Shiites. However, the official entity was the outcome of 1982 Israeli-Lebanese War and 
the revolutionary Iran’s efforts to mobilize the more radical elements within the Lebanese 
Shia movement according to its revolutionary Islamist ideology. Created under the 
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circumstances of war and invasion by Israel, Hezbollah announced an Open Letter in 
1985 and branded itself as a ‘resistance’ force fighting against Israel and US imperialism 
in the region.605 The ‘resistance’ discourse was the manifestation of the Karbala paradigm, 
but not against as much against the ruler as it was against the invader – Israel.606 The 
Iranian influence was reflected on the ideological and operational components of 
Hezbollah, where the entity defined itself as an internationalist an pan-Islamist entity 
committed to velayet-e faqih.607 The entity adopted Ayatollah Khomeini’s terminology of 
the ‘oppressor’ and the ‘oppressed,’ where the oppressed Shia community in Lebanon.608 
Defensive jihad, i.e. defense of the Islamic Ummah against the oppressor, provided the 
justification for the idea of ‘resistance’ through asymmetric warfare, martyrdom of the 
self, and unconventional capabilities against ‘a better-funded and better-equipped’ 
aggressor.609 
 
With the end of the civil war and the subsequent Taif Agreement in 1989, 
Hezbollah was gradually transformed into an organizational hybrid. On the one hand, the 
entity became a legitimate and over time powerful political party representing 
predominantly the Shia constituencies in Lebanon. On the other hand, the armed wing of 
Hezbollah did not get dissolved once coopted by Lebanese electoral politics. To the 
contrary, the armed wing of Hezbollah grew exponentially after the 2006 War with Israel. 
The entity gained near army-like status after 2006 with extensive Iranian provision of 
military equipment and missile capabilities.610 The Hezbollahi military capacity against 
Israel was seen by many as sidelining the regular Lebanese army in this respect. 
Hezbollah recognized its dual organizational role both as a legitimate Lebanese political 
party and as a military force in a new Hezbollah manifesto published in 2009. In this 
manifesto, Hezbollah defined Lebanon as ‘the homeland’ and reiterated its position on 
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the rightfulness of the Lebanese parliamentary system based on the free representation of 
all people and communities and on electoral politics.611 Accordingly, Hezbollah was 
rebranding itself as a central political actor in Lebanese politic with a tone-down on the 
original vision of a velayet-e faqih type of ‘Islamist regime’ in Lebanon.612 However, this 
did not mean a total refusal of its allegiance to the Islamic Republic and, as a matter of 
fact, Hezbollah repeated its allegiance to Ayatollah Khomeini and the Iranian regime’s 
official stance in the matters pertaining to the Islamic world.613 In this respect, 
Hezbollah’s dedication to the Palestinian cause, resistance against the Zionist regime and 
resistance against the American discourse on the fight against terrorism and the 
subsequent penetration in the region.614 In short, the Lebanese Hezbollah had adopted a 
nationalist position on the politics of Lebanon and an increasingly internationalist 
position woven around the US and Israeli deeds in the region. By 2009, Hezbollah had 
established itself as the official carrier of ‘resistance brand’ in the region along with the 
Iranian regime.  
 
Given the growing internationalist stance of Hezbollah on the military front, it 
was not surprising to see Hezbollah elements at the outbreak of the Syrian civil war. As 
early as 2011, Hezbollah entered Syria under the rhetoric of defending the Lebanese Shias 
living on the Syrian territory.615 However, in reality, Hezbollah was already providing 
training and fighting alongside the Assad forces in 2011 and 2012.616 On the other hand, 
the official acknowledgement of Hezbollah’s involvement in Lebanon came in 2013, 
when Nasrallah said ‘Syria is the backbone of the resistance, and the support of the 
resistance. The resistance can- not sit with its hands crossed while its backbone is made 
vulnerable and its support is being broken, or else we will be stupid.’617 Nasrallah’s 
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statement came at the time of a famous Hezbollah in the Syrian town of Qusayr. Resided 
by a population of mixed religious and sectarian denominations, the town of Qusayr was 
a logistical corridor for the transfer of opposition militia and weapons between Homs and 
Lebanon and the flow of Sunni volunteers sympathetic to the opposition forces was from 
the northeast of Bekaa Valley.618 Soon the Shias living in Syrian villages accused the 
opposition forces which they claimed to be Salafist and jihadists for forced 
displacement.619 With a 17- day coordinated assault between Hezbollah and the Assad 
regime, the town of Qusayr was taken from the opposition forces, establishing Hezbollah 
as a central strategic force tilting the balance in favor of the Assad regime.620    
 
Hezbollah’s involvement in Syria lies on two calculations. The first one is its 
commitment to ‘the axis of resistance’ both for ideological and geopolitical reasons. The 
second is the centrality of Syria as a corridor of military support flowing from Iran to 
Lebanon. Therefore, Hezbollah’s operations alongside the Assad regime in the following 
years and Nasrallah’s statements reiterated this enduring Hezbollahi commitment to Syria 
and the resistance axis. In 2015, Nasrallah said ‘We are fighting alongside our Syrian 
brothers, alongside the army and the people and the popular resistance in Damascus and 
Aleppo and Deir Ezzor and Qusayr and Hasakeh and Idlib. We are present today in many 
places and we will be present in all the places in Syria that this battle requires.’621 
However, Hezbollah’s growing military campaign in Syria created a central dilemma for 
its further political and ideological evolution. The Lebanese Hezbollah had fought against 
Israel from inside Lebanon, but it was now fighting against Muslims on the Syrian 
territory.622 Before 2013, the Hezbollahi discourse on involvement relied on the 
protection of fellow Shia populations on the Syrian territory as well as the defense of the 
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holy Sayyeda Zainab Shrine.623 However, with the rise of Salafist-jihadists elements as 
powerful opposition forces to the Assad regime and more so with ISIL, the intervention 
discourse shifted towards ‘takfirism,’ extremism and radicalism.624  
 
While the Iranian regime never acknowledged the term ‘Shiite Crescent’ 
introduced by the Jordanian king, ‘the axis of resistance’ became an official discourse. As 
Chapter 5 will discuss in more detail, the originally anti-US and anti-Israeli content of the 
‘axis of resistance’ has gradually been transformed with the Syrian civil war and the rise 
of ISIL in the recent years to contain anti-takfirism, anti-Salafism, and anti-jihadi 
radicalism in the region. Another point was the gradual overlap of the referents of the 
‘axis of resistance’ and the ‘Shiite Crescent,’ which predominantly resulted from the 
involvement of pro-Iranian Shia militia in Iraq in the Syrian conflict. An extensive 
network of trans-border armed mobility took the center stage in the northern axis, where 
the Iran sent-Basij volunteers, pro-Iranian Iraqi Shia militias, and Hezbollah forces 
moved along the axis and fought alongside the Assad regime against opposition forces in 
a highly-coordinated manner. ‘The axis of resistance’ gradually included the pro-Iranian 
Iraqi Shias as well and the coordinated military strategy among Iran-Lebanon-Syria and 
the pro-Iranian Iraqi Shias strengthened the alliance. The next sections will discuss the 
post-2011 trans-border Shia-mobilization and the institutionalization of security 
institutions in line with the ideological and organizational ‘resistance’ model in this 
respect.     
 
 Both the Iraqi and Syrian cases have shown in detail that the pre-existing Iranian 
ties to Shia networks in Iraq and Lebanon have played an important role in facilitating 
the Iranian penetration into Iraq and Syria. Iraqi Shia political actors like Badr Brigades, 
Dawa Party, as well as the Lebanese Hezbollah have continued to be Iran’s significant 
allies during this process. Nevertheless, the rise of the religious element in the Middle 
East has also brought complications for Iran and the most observable complication was 
the multivocality of Shia politics. The marjaiyya in Iraq became a rival to Qom hawza in 
Iran as well as to the political influence of the Islamic Republic over Iraqi Shias. Iraqi 
nationalism seemed to trump transnationalism for some Shia political actors within Iraq. 
                                                
623 Ibid., p. 216.  
 
624 Ibid. 
 202	
	
Moreover, the Iranian regime also felt challenged when the Syrian Sunni opposition 
started uprisings against Assad in Syria. Iran’s experienced dilemma was between 
supporting its decades-long authoritarian ally and a rising Sunni Islamist movement. 
Politically, being the state patron of all Shias in the region and uniting them under a 
Islamist political system or Ummah would be a remote possibility for Iran. Despite the 
complications on the political front, the rise of Sunni jihadism which threatened the 
human and political security of the Shias in the region saved the Islamic Republic from 
these dilemmas on the security front. With the rise of Sunni jihadism and especially of 
ISIL on Iraq and Syria, the Iranian regime and IRGC – Qods forces would be patron of 
Shia armed mobilization in the region, which is the topic of the following section.  
 
 
4.5.  Models of Shia Mobilization Across Iraq and Syria 
 
 
 
The year 2011 witnessed a rapid securitization of Shia communities and Shia holy 
sites in Iraq and Syria upon the rise of Sunni jihadism and ISIL across these territories. 
Given the multi-actor nature of the Shia revival including the Iranian regime, Ayatollah 
Sistani of Najaf, and Muqtada al-Sadr were quickly engaged in a process of Shia 
mobilization against rising Sunni jihadism and ISIL. The proxy war in Syria added the 
Syrian regime and the Lebanese Hezbollah on the list as well. The borders between what 
the Iranian regime called as ‘the axis of resistance’ and ‘the Shiite Crescent’ gradually got 
blurred. Despite the involvement of multiple actors in the field, we see that the Iranian 
regime spearheaded the mobilization process by engaging its own popular mobilization 
forces, coordinating among multiple Shia power centers over militia support, and laying 
the institutional infrastructure. The Iranian strategy can thus be divided into three: 1) the 
Shia mobilization on the Iranian territory, 2) Iranian support for armed mobilization 
among the Shias, and 3) the creation of paramilitary institutions.  
 
 
4.5.1. The Involvement of Iranian Basijis and Afghan Volunteers 
 
As discussed above, Iran’s IRGC – Qods Forces’ involvement in both Iraq and 
Syria was a well-known phenomenon early on. Qods Forces gradually increased their 
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visibility on the field when the rise of Sunni jihadism provided a unique opportunity for 
the Iranian security forces to legitimize their involvement. What is less-known is the 
involvement of Iranian Basijis in the Syrian conflict as well as the mobilization of Shias 
on the Iranian territory for fighting in Syria. The Basij forces, whose military duties were 
toned down within the regime in the aftermath of the Holy War and who continued to 
function as the domestic overseers of the Islamic Republic’s revolutionary values in Iran, 
suddenly regained their military relevance for the Islamic Republic. Moreover, the Iranian 
Basijis were now mobilizing for not for the defense of the Islamic Republic’s territorial 
borders and unlike the Holy War, they were mobilizing for the defense of a Shia shrine in 
Damascus: the Sayyeda Zainab. As Chapter 5 will discuss in more detail, the Iranian 
volunteers were being mobilized under the Basij organization in Iran under the discourse 
of ‘defending the holy Shia shrines’ across the border. In that sense, cross-border 
mobilization for the defense of Shia holy sites is a novelty for the Iranian regime. 
 
 The estimates of how many Iranians volunteered under Basij for the defense of 
Sayyeda Zainab varies, but the news abounds on the notable size of the volunteers. In this 
respect, and a retired IRGC reportedly said ‘The Revolutionary Guard now has [a] 
problem in managing hundreds of thousands of volunteers who want to be defenders of 
the oppressed and holy shrines.’ 625 Nevertheless, the Islamic Republic has acted quite 
careful about the cross-border mobilization of the Basiji volunteers. The Supreme Leader 
Ayatollah Khamenei has reportedly ordered the Basiji headquarters in Iran to be 
extremely careful about the selection of volunteers for cross-border operations.  Upon the 
order of the Supreme Leader to choose the best-trained and the most experienced 
volunteers, as the same IRGC general reported, ‘Quds commanders are trying to select 
the best trained of these people who understand the new tactical concepts for defending 
the oppressed who are coming under attack.’626 The same Karbala narratives which 
mobilized the Basijis during the Holy Defense War have mobilized the Basiji volunteers 
for cross-border military operations. In this respect, they are mobilizing defending Imam 
Hossein’s sister’s shrine in Syria, and like Imam Hossein, they are self-sacrificing 
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themselves for this mission. As such, we see a recurrence of the Karbala theme and Shia 
identity as a strong mobilization force for Iranian volunteers.  
 
 Besides Basiji mobilization, another Shia mobilization on the Iranian territory 
takes place among the Afghan-Iranian Shias. The militia called Liwa Fatimiyyoun is a 
case in point. Liwa Fatimiyyoun was established by the IRGC by the mobilization of 
illegal Afghans living in Iran.627 Majidyar argues that Liwa Fatimiyyoun is the ‘largest 
single militia unit fighting Iran’s war in Syria,’ and ‘even the numbers according to the 
accounts given by the Iranian officials are much larger than Hezbollah, let alone any 
single Iraqi Shia group.’628 Majidyar argues that ideology and identity is one factor 
driving the Afghan recruits. He argues that some top commanders of this militia have had 
strong clerical and military ties to the Islamic Republic since the Holy War. In his own 
words; 
 
   ‘Some of the very top commanders […] are from very well families in Iran, 
they are very well settled. They lived in Iran for so many decades. Their 
fathers are studying and teaching in some religious seminaries in Qom, the 
Holy city of Qom. So, they don’t have any other [reason] to just go and join 
other than ideological reasons. And those people that are close to Iran go back 
to Iran-Iraq War; some 2000 Afghans were killed at that time. […] And in the 
1990s those people fought against Taliban in Afghanistan. So, those people 
have had these links with the IRGC, with the religious establishment in Qom 
for almost 3 decades. So, they are the people who are mobilizing the 
Fatimiyyoun at the first place.’629     
 
All in all, Iran’s recruitment of Liwa Fatimiyyoun and the Basiji mobilization in 
Iran are a novelty in terms of Iranian popular mobilization. The reason is that this popular 
mobilization is carried out for trans-border operations and the accompanying religious 
discourse has a transnational aspect. It should be noted that the inside-Iran mobilization 
is intended for Syria and defense of the Sayyeda Zainab, whereas the mobilization in Iraq 
is predominantly carried out by the Iraqi local Shias. The following sections will discuss 
the Iranian influence over local Shia mobilization in Iraq and Syria.    
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4.5.2. Shia Militia Mobilization across Iraq and Syria  
 
The Shia mobilization in Iraq is highly factional as it encompasses several Shia 
actors with different power positions and visions about the political future of Iraq. In this 
system, Iran is one actor among others with a capacity to influence Iraqi politics. The 
Syrian case seems relatively more monotonous, as two Shia patrons of a small minority 
of Syrian Shias, Iran and the Lebanese Hezbollah, are ideologically and operationally 
aligned with each other as well as the incumbent Syrian regime. Still, one should look at 
the overall data on armed Shia groups across Iraq and Syria to get a more detailed insight 
on the nature of Shia mobilization today.  
 
Table 1 shows that a total of 125 Shia groups that have been active across Iraq and 
Syria between 2003 and 2015. As Figure 4 shows, 85 % of these groups originated in 
Iraq, while only 11 % originated in Syria. As Figure 5 indicates, 40 Iraqi-originated 
groups passed across the border following the outbreak of Syrian civil war, while only 5 
groups that originated in Syria became active in Iraq as well. This shows that most Shia 
mobilization occurred originally in Iraq. This is not surprising given the fact that both 
demographics and the sectarian political landscape are in favor of the Shiites in Iraq. What 
is striking though is that around 40 % of the Shia groups in Iraq did not remain limited to 
the Iraqi territories and they passed across the border to fight in Syria. Part of this cross-
border mobilization can be attributed to the Iranian attempt to mobilize Iraqi Shia groups 
to fight alongside the Assad regime in Syria when the civil war broke out in 2011. 
Nevertheless, the cross-border mobilization gained an impetus after the rise of ISIL threat 
in June 2014. Some Iraqi Shia groups in Syria went back to Iraq to defend the Shia 
dominated territories against ISIL in Iraq. However, additional Iraqi groups were also 
mobilized to fight against ISIL in Syria. Almost 50 % or 18 of the groups that originated 
in Iraq and fought also in Syria are a part of the Hashd al-Shaabi, i.e. the umbrella 
organization bringing Shia militias together upon a fatwa by the most revered Iraqi cleric 
Ayatollah Sistani and later integrated into the Iraqi military as a paramilitary unit. This 
shows that not only the Iraqi militia, but also the institutionalized paramilitary forces of 
the Iraqi state have fought in Syria, mostly against the ISIL there.     
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Table 1. Shia Militia in Iraq and Syria630 
 
 
Group Name Origin Area of Activity Political Affiliation Institutional Affiliation 
Abu al-Fadl al-Abbas Iraq Iraq, Syria n/a n/a 
Al-Abbas Fighting Division Iraq Iraq Sistanist Hashd al-Shaabi 
Al-Ghalibun Syria Syria Hezbollah (Syrian) n/a 
Ansar al-Haq Lebanon and Iraq Lebanon, Syria Pro-Iran n/a 
Ansar Allah al-Awfiyya Iraq Iraq, Syria Pro-Iran, Sadrist  Hashd al-Shaabi 
Asaib Ahl al-Haqq Iraq Iraq, Syria Pro-Iran Hashd al-Shaabi 
Badr Organization Iraq Iraq, Syria Pro-Iran Hashd al-Shaabi 
Fatiyan al-Aqaida Iraq Iraq Pro-Iran n/a 
Fawj al-Imam al-Fujja Syria Syria Hezbollah (Syrian) n/a 
Faylaq al-Karar Iraq Iraq Hizb al-Minana Party n/a 
Faylaq Waad al-Sadiq Iraq Iraq, Syria Pro-Iran, Hezbollah Hashd al-Shaabi 
Firqat al-Abbas al Qataliya  
al-Dafa an Quqadisat al-Iraq Iraq Iraq Sistanist n/a 
Fursan Brigade Iraq Iraq Islamic Dawa Party Hashd al-Shaabi 
Harakat al-Abdal  Iraq Iraq, Syria Pro-Iran  Hashd al-Shaabi 
Harakat al-Shaheed al-Awal Iraq Iraq n/a n/a 
Harakat al-Talia al-Islamiyah n/a Syria Pro-Iran n/a 
Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba Iraq Iraq, Syria Pro-Iran Hashd al-Shaabi 
Hezbollah Lebanon Syria  Pro-Iran n/a 
Hezbollah al-Ghalibun Iraq Iraq Hezbollah  n/a 
Hezbollah al-Sairun Iraq Iraq Sistanist Hashd al-Shaabi 
Hezbollah al-Tha'irun Iraq Iraq Hezbollah n/a 
Hezbollah the Islamic 
Revolution 
in Iraq 
Iraq Iraq Pro-Iran n/a 
Hezbollah the Mujahedeen in 
Iraq Iraq Iraq ISCI Hashd al-Shaabi 
Hizballah al-Abrar Iraq Iraq Pro-Iran Hashd al-Shaabi 
Jaafari Force /  
Liwa al-Sayyeda Ruqayya Syria Syria Pro-Iran NDF 
Jaysh al-Mu'ammal Iraq Iraq, Syria Sadrist n/a 
Jaysh al-Mukhtar Iraq Iraq Pro-Iran n/a 
Jaysh al-Wilayat al-Faqih Iraq Iraq Pro-Iran n/a 
Junud al-Mahdi Syria Syria Hezbollah (Syrian) n/a 
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Therefore, constantly updated data is necessary to map the linkages within Shia armed groups networks. 
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Kataib A'imat al-Baqi' Iraq Iraq, Syria Pro-Iran n/a 
Kataib Ahrar al-Iraq Iraq Iraq Pro-Iran n/a 
Kataib al-Ahad al-Sadiq al-Jadid Iraq Iraq Hezbollah n/a 
Kataib al-Aqila Zainab Iraq Iraq, Syria Pro-Iran n/a 
Kataib al-Difa' al-Muqaddas Iraq Iraq Pro-Iran n/a 
Kataib al-Fatah al-Mubin Iraq Iraq Pro-Iran n/a 
Kataib al-Imam Musa bin Ja'afar Iraq Iraq n/a n/a 
Kataib al-Jaysh al-Fatimi Iraq Iraq Hezbollah n/a 
Kataib al-Muqawama  
al-Islamiya fi al-Iraq Iraq Iraq, Syria Pro-Iran, Sistanist n/a 
Kataib al-Qiyam al-Husseini Iraq Iraq Pro-Iran Hashd al-Shaabi 
Kataib al-Sabirun Iraq Iraq, Syria Pro-Iran n/a 
Kataib al-Shaheed al-Awal:  
Quwat al-Buraq Iraq Iraq n/a Hashd al-Shaabi 
Kataib al-Shaheed Zayd al-
Tha'ir Iraq Iraq Hezbollah n/a 
Kataib Ansar al-Hijja (2) Iraq Iraq Pro-Iran, Sadrist Hashd al-Shaabi 
Kataib Ansar al-Madhhab Iraq Iraq, Syria Sadrist Qasim al-Ta'i, Sistanist  n/a 
Kataib Ansar al-Wilaya Iraq Iraq, Syria n/a n/a 
Kataib Jund Allah al-Ghalibun Iraq Iraq n/a n/a 
Kataib Rayat al-Huda Iraq Iraq Pro-Iran, Hezbollah n/a 
Kataib Thawrat al-Abbas Iraq Iraq Pro-Iran n/a 
Kataib Zaynab al-Kubra Iraq Iraq Pro-Iran n/a 
Kataib Ahrar al-Iraq Iraq Iraq Pro-Iran Hashd al-Shaabi 
Kataib al-Difa al-Muqaddes Iraq Iraq, Syria Pro-Iran Hashd al-Shaabi 
Kataib al-Ghadab Iraq Iraq Islamic Dawa Party Hashd al-Shaabi 
Kataib al-Shahid al-Aval Iraq Iraq n/a Hashd al-Shaabi 
Kataib al-Tayyar al-Risali Iraq Iraq, Syria Pro-Iran Hashd al-Shaabi 
Kataib al-Fateh al-Mubiin Iraq Iraq Pro-Iran Hashd al-Shaabi 
Kataib al-Imam Ali Iraq Iraq Pro-Iran Hashd al-Shaabi 
Kataib Ansar al-Aqeedah Iraq Iraq Sistanist Hashd al-Shaabi 
Kataib Ansar al-Hijja Iraq Iraq Pro-Iran, Islamic Dawa Party Hashd al-Shaabi 
Kataib Hezbollah  Iraq Iraq, Syria Pro-Iran Hashd al-Shaabi 
Kataib Imam al-Ghaib Iraq Iraq Pro-Iran Hashd al-Shaabi 
Kataib Imam Hossein Iraq Iraq Pro-Iran Hashd al-Shaabi 
Kataib Jund al-Imam Iraq Iraq Pro-Iran Hashd al-Shaabi 
Kataib Malik al-Ashtar  Iraq Iraq Pro-Iran, Sadrist n/a 
Kataib Rijal Allah al-Ghaliboun  Iraq Iraq Pro-Iran, Sistanist n/a 
Kataib Rua Allah Iraq Iraq Pro-Iran Hashd al-Shaabi 
Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada  Iraq Iraq, Syria Pro-Iran  Hashd al-Shaabi 
Kataib Tayyar al-Rasuli  Iraq Iraq Pro-Iran, Sadrist n/a 
Kataib Zahra Iraq Iraq, Syria Pro-Iran  n/a 
Khorasan Brigades Iraq Iraq, Syria Pro-Iran  Hashd al-Shaabi 
Liwa Abu Fadl al-Abbas  
(LAFA) Syria Syria, Iraq Pro-Iran, Sadrist n/a 
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Liwa Abu Fadl al-Abbas  
Suqour al-Imam al-Mahdi Iraq, Syria Iraq, Syria Pro-Iran, Sadrist n/a 
Liwa Abu Fadl al-Abbas  
Tashkil Iraq Iraq Iraq Pro-Iran, Sadrist  Hashd al-Shaabi 
Liwa Abu Sadr al-Abbas  
Khadam al-Sayyida Zaynab Iraq, Syria Iraq, Syria Pro-Iran, Sadrist n/a 
Liwa al-Hamad  Iraq Iraq, Syria Pro-Iran, ISCI n/a 
Liwa al-Imam al-Qaim Iraq Iraq Pro-Iran Hashd al-Shaabi 
Liwa al-Karia Iraq Iraq n/a Hashd al-Shaabi 
Liwa al-Muntazar Iraq Iraq Sistanist Hashd al-Shaabi 
Liwa al-Qaim Iraq Iraq n/a Hashd al-Shaabi 
Liwa al-Yum al-Mawud Iraq Iraq, Syria Sadrist n/a 
Liwa al-Baqir Syria Syria Pro-Iran NDF 
Liwa al-Imam al-Hassan al-
Mujtaba Iraq Iraq, Syria Pro-Iran Hashd al-Shaabi 
Liwa al-Imam al-Husayn (LIH) Iraq  Iraq, Syria Sadrist n/a 
Liwa al-Imam al-Mahdi Syria Syria Pro-Iran, Hezbollah (Syrian) n/a 
Liwa al-Muqawamat Lihamayt 
 al-Muqadisat fi Suriyya w al-
Iraq 
Iraq Iraq Pro-Iran, Sadrist n/a 
Liwa al-Muthandir Iraq Iraq Pro-Iran, ISCI n/a 
Liwa al-Sadiqiin Iraq Iraq, Syria Pro-Iran Hashd al-Shaabi 
Liwa al-Shabaab al-Rasali Iraq Iraq Sadrist Hashd al-Shaabi 
Liwa al-Shahada Iraq Iraq Sistanist n/a 
Liwa Ali al-Akbar Iraq Iraq 
Sistanist, Imam 
Hossein Shrine of 
Karbala 
Hashd al-Shaabi 
Liwa Ammar Ibn Yasir Iraq Iraq, Syria Pro-Iran, Sadrist Hashd al-Shaabi 
Liwa Ansar al-Marjaiyya Iraq Iraq Sistanist Hashd al-Shaabi 
Liwa Assad Allah al-Ghalib Syria, Iraq Syria, Iraq n/a n/a 
Liwa Assad Allah al-Ghalib 
(Iraq) Iraq Iraq, Syria Pro-Iran, Sadrist Hashd al-Shaabi 
Liwa Dhulfiqar Syria Syria, Iraq Pro-Iran, Sadrist n/a 
Liwa Fatemiyoun  Afghanistan  Iraq, Syria,  Afghanistan  Pro-Iran  n/a 
Liwa Fatyan Bani Hashim Iraq Iraq Sistanist Hashd al-Shaabi 
Liwa Kafil Zaynab  Iraq Iraq, Syria Pro-Iran n/a 
Liwa Yum al-Qaim Iraq Iraq Pro-Iran Hashd al-Shaabi 
Liwa Zainebiyoun Syria Syria n/a n/a 
Liwa Zhulfiqar Iraq Syria n/a Hashd al-Shaabi 
Manẓamat Ansar Allah Iraq Iraq, Syria 
Pro-Iran, Islamic 
Dawa Party - Tanzim 
al-Dakhil  
n/a 
Martyr Sadr Forces /  
Qowat al-Shaheed al-Sadr Iraq Iraq 
Islamic Dawa Party - 
Tanzim al-Dakhil Hashd al-Shaabi 
Muqawamat Islamiyya  
Liwa Yewmul Maud Iraq Iraq Pro-Iran Hashd al-Shaabi 
National Ideological Resistance  
in Syria Syria Syria Pro-Iran n/a 
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Qaeda Quwet abu Fadl al-Abbas Iraq Iraq Pro-Iran, Sadrist n/a 
Quwat al-Kadhimain al-Qitaliya Iraq Iraq Kadhimanian Holy Shrine n/a 
Quwat al-Ridha Syria Syria Hezbollah (Syrian) n/a 
Quwat Zaynab al-Kubra Iraq Iraq, Syria Pro-Iran n/a 
Quwet al-Shahid Muhammad  
Baqir al Sadr  Iraq Iraq, Syria Pro-Iran  Hashd al-Shaabi 
Rapid Intervention Regiment Syria Syria, Iraq Sadrist n/a 
Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) Iraq, Syria Iraq, Syria Pro-Iran, Sadrist n/a 
Saraya al-Jihad Iraq Iraq Sistanist Hashd al-Shaabi 
Saraya al-Zahra Iraq Iraq Sistanist Hashd al-Shaabi 
Saraya al-Aqideh /  
Saraya Ansar al-Aqidah Iraq Iraq, Syria Pro-Iran, ISCI Hashd al-Shaabi 
Saraya al-Ashura Iraq Iraq Sistanist, ISCI Hashd al-Shaabi 
Saraya al-Dafa  al-Shaabi  
(KH-SDS) Iraq Iraq Pro-Iran n/a 
Saraya al-Imam Iraq Iraq Pro-Iran n/a 
Saraya al-Jihad  Iraq Iraq Pro-Iran, ISCI Hashd al-Shaabi 
Saraya al-Khorasani Iraq Iraq, Syria Pro-Iran n/a 
Saraya al-Salam Iraq Iraq, Syria Sadrist Hashd al-Shaabi 
Saraya Aqa'idiyun Iraq Iraq, Syria n/a n/a 
Saraya Talia al-Khorasani  Syria Iraq, Syria Pro-Iran  n/a 
Sarayaa Aqadiiyun  Iraq Iraq Pro-Iran n/a 
Tashkil al-Hussein al-Tha'ir Iraq Iraq n/a Hashd al-Shaabi 
Tashkilat Asad Baghdad Iraq Iraq, Syria Pro-Iran n/a 
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Figure 4: Country Origin of Shia Groups 
 
 
 
Figure 5: The Area of Activity of Shia Groups 
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 As Table 1 shows, there are three core ideological blocks within the Shia 
armed mobilization. Some groups in Iraq pay allegiance to Ayatollah Khomeini of Iran 
and subscribe to velayet-e faqih as a political ideology. These groups look to the Islamic 
Republic as an example for the establishment of a similar political system in their areas 
of activity. Some of these groups are already defined as ‘Iran proxies’, as they receive 
military, political, and ideological training as well as technical support from the IRGC – 
Qods Forces. Famous Iranian proxies are Badr Brigades, Kataib Hezbollah, Asaib Ahl al-
Haq, Harakat al-Nujaba, and Khorasan Brigades, among others. Proxy groups often 
cooperate with one another during strategic operations, they help establish front 
organizations to be sent to Syria, and have an upper hand among all Shia groups in terms 
of men power.  
 
 A second group armed Shia militias pays allegiance to the Iraqi nationalist 
cleric Muqtada al-Sadr. This group of militias are predominantly Iraqi nationalist in 
outlook and they defend the idea of an independent Iraqi state free of foreign influences 
including that of Iran. Saraya al-Salam is the official militia of the Sadrist faction today. 
The ideological differences between Sadr and the Qods Forces as well as the political 
power struggle inside the post-Saddam Iraqi electoral and bureaucratic politics puts 
affiliated groups at odds with each other. However, that does not mean that Sadrist groups 
enter strategic cooperation from time to time with either the Qods Force or pro-Iranian 
militias. Qods Forces often try to appeal to Sadrist and other Iraqi nationalist factions 
inside Iraq. Militia formations such as Ansar Allah al-Awfiyya and Liwa Kafil Zaynab 
are pro-Iranian with attempt to appeal to Sadrists at the same time. Following the 
dissolution of Muqtada al-Sadr’s initial militia formation called the Mahdi Army, Sadrist 
splinters have come under the command of IRGC-Qods Force and became famous Iran 
proxies such as Kataib Hezbollah and Asaib Ahl al-Haq. The IRGC-Qods Force has also 
provided technical and strategic support to some Sadrist groups when the need for 
operational cooperation arose. Cooperation between two factions happened especially 
under the circumstances where both parties shared the same goals, such as the defense of 
the holy shrines. In this respect, the LAFA network of Shia groups fighting in Syria, i.e. 
groups who are affiliated with Liwa Abu Fadl al-Abbas and fight in support of the Assad 
Regime and for the defense of the Sayyeda Zainab Shrine near Damascus is composed of 
fighters that are both Sadrist and pro-Iranian.  
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 A third group of Shia militias are affiliated with Ayatollah Sistani of Iraq.  
Ayatollah Sistani of Najaf hawza is the most revered Shia cleric for the Shia world. He 
belongs to the theologically quietist Najaf hawza and had refrained from political 
engagement in Iraq. However, the sectarian conflict in Iraq, the rise of ISIL, and Sunni 
jihadist threats to Shia hawzas have pushed him towards a more political activism during 
the recent years. His most politically active moment was when he released a fatwa calling 
for all Iraqis to arm themselves against ISIL. In response to his fatwa, thousands of 
volunteers came together and formed the pro-Sistani militia under the Hashd al-
Shaabi.631 The pro-Sistani militias are Iraqi nationalists and they oppose to the increased 
Iranian influence over Iraq’s political system. Unlike pro-Iranian and Sadrist groups who 
are affiliated with Shia political parties and factions within Iraqi politics, these groups 
largely do not prefer political engagement and they plan to dissolve themselves once the 
ISIL threat is fully eliminated. Saraya al-Ashura, Saraya al-Jihad, Al-Abbas Fighting 
Division are well-known Sistanist militias to date.  
 
 
Figure 6: Political Composition of Armed Shia Mobilization 
 
 
 
                                                
631 Abdo, The New Sectarianism, p. 21. 
 213	
	
What does the composition of armed Shia mobilization say about power balances 
among various Shia factions? As far as the ideological composition of the groups is 
concerned, a striking result is that 61 % of Shia groups are pro-Iranian and they pay 
ideological allegiance to Iran’s Supreme Leader, while only 6 % are Sadrist and 9 % are 
Sistanist. This shows that there is a marked Iranian influence over Shia armed 
mobilization compared to Sadrist and Sistanist factions. As Figure 6 shows, 11 % of the 
groups are coded as both pro-Iran and Sadrists. A part of these groups is splinter groups 
that broke away from Muqtada al-Sadr’s forces and were later coopted by Iran. Another 
part of these groups is pro-Iranian with attempt to appeal to the Sadrist factions. Yet 
another group belongs to LAFA network of Shia militias, i.e. the Iraqi Shia militia 
network headed by Liwa Abu Fadl al-Abbas Brigades and went to Syria for the defense 
of the Sayyeda Zainab shrine near Damascus along with Assad’s forces. 4 % of militia 
are affiliated with the Dawa Party, whose Nouri al-Maliki changed the traditional position 
of the party on having an armed wing with an attempt to increase his political position at 
home against Muqtada al-Sadr and other factions in Iraq. Given the closer links between 
Iran and Maliki especially after the latter could preserve his position of premiership 
despite losing his party’s parliamentary monopoly to the Sunni block in 2010 elections, 
these militias can also be said to augment Iranian dominance within Shia armed 
mobilization in Iraq. Especially on the Syrian front, an influential pro-Iran ally whose 
official involvement to the Syrian conflict in 2013 augmented Iranian power is the 
Lebanese Hezbollah. As the Figure 3 shows, 9 % of the groups pay ideological allegiance 
to Lebanese Hezbollah. It should be noted that promoting oneself as a Hezbollah brand 
equals to having allegiance to Iran’s Supreme Leader. When the Lebanese Hezbollah, 
Hezbollah-branded Shia groups, and groups appealing to multiple factions are added, the 
extent of Iranian influence over armed Shia mobilization far exceeds the actual numbers 
the table exposes. Compared to Iranian and even Hezbollah’s influence on the field, the 
groups associated with Muqtada al-Sadr and Ayatollah Sistani does not enjoy the same 
extent of influence. 25 of the 40 Iraqi groups who went to Syria for fighting are pro-
Iranian, 5 are Sadrist, and 3 are both pro-Iranian and Sadrist. This also shows the Iranian 
influence over mobilizing Iraqi Shias for fighting in Syria.  
 
Raw statistics leave us with several conclusions on the nature of Shia mobilization 
across Iraq and Syria. First, although Shia armed mobilization across Iraq and Syria is 
characterized by factionalism, the overproportion of pro-Iranian militias show that Iran is 
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the most influential actor in mobilizing Shias through the activities of IRGC-Qods Force. 
Second, clerical authority does not automatically translate into political and military 
influence on its own. Without doubt, Ayatollah Sistani is still the most revered Shia cleric 
across the Middle East and he has more religious followers compared to Ayatollah 
Khamenei of Iran or any other cleric in the Middle East. His fatwa helped bring together 
the Shia groups for military defense against ISIL in 2014. However, it was the IRGC 
military mobilization strategy in the form of training, funds, and strategic advice and its 
own experience during the Revolution, The Holy Defense War, and export of the 
revolution period that made a difference. Third, the sectarian conflict situation across Iraq 
and Syria has strengthened Iran’s military influence over the Middle East. The Islamic 
Republic’s military power does not come from conventional capabilities, but from 
unconventional capabilities. Patronage for Shia militias in two conflict-ridden states put 
Iran in an advantageous position as a regional and international player. Fourth, besides 
Iran’s strength in unconventional military mobilization, the data informs us on Iran’s 
capacity to socialize these groups in line with its own political orientation and ideological 
vision. As discussed above, most Shia militias do not plan to dissolve themselves once 
the sectarian conflict and the ISIL threat is over. A more plausible scenario is that these 
groups will either be coopted by the security institutions of Iraq and Syria, or they will 
function as legitimate political parties maintaining their armed wings at the same time, 
thereby imitating the Hezbollah model. Finally, the pro-Iranian militias have a 
transnational ideological and operational outlook, which can be expected to strengthen 
the Axis of Resistance Alliance.  
 
 
4.5.3. The Creation of Paramilitary Organizations 
 
The support for Shia armed groups is one of Iran’s military activities in Iraq and 
Syria, while the institutionalization of these forces in the form of paramilitary groups and 
their further integration into the official security institutions is another. The Iraqi Hashd 
al-Shaabi, i.e. ‘Popular Mobilization Forces’ (PMF) of Iraq and ‘Jaysh al-
Shaabi/National Defense Forces’ (NDF) of Syria are two military institutions established 
as paramilitary forces functioning. The Iranian regime has provided direct technical, 
institutional, and military support for the formation of the PMF in Iraq. The NDF has a 
precursor, the Jaysh al-Shaabi, which were known as local committees made up 
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predominantly of Syrian Alawites and created by the Assad Regime decades before the 
civil war. After the eruption of the Syrian civil war, these committees were brought to 
fight for the Assad regime, in coordination with Iranian and Lebanese Hezbollah’s forces.  
 
 
 
4.5.3.1. The Hashd al-Shaabi / Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) 
 
 
When the Islamic State (ISIL) invaded the Iraqi city of Mosul in June 2014, the 
central Iraqi army, which was institutionally and militarily weakened due to the de-
Baathification process of the country, rapidly deserted the city without any committed 
confrontation. The city’s capture took the Iraqis by surprise and the Shia populations 
doubly so. ISIL was a direct threat to Shia populations, as the group adopted a strong anti-
Shia rhetoric and targeted the Shia populated areas of the Iraqi territories. When the ISIL 
threat approached the Shia shrine areas in cities such as Najaf and Karbala, the esteemed 
Iraqi Shia cleric Ayatollah Sistani of Najaf issued a fatwa on June 13, 2014 calling for 
arms to all Iraqis including both Sunnis and Shias.632 Ayatollah Sistani’s fatwa was an 
extraordinary move for a politically quietist cleric. Religiously, Ayatollah Sistani’s 
clerical credentials had gained him popularity as ‘a marja of emulation’ among the Shia 
of the whole region. Politically, he was consistently reluctant to interfere with the political 
discussions of his country and he subscribed to the traditionally politically quietist Shia 
theology of Najaf hawza. His basic political views on the future of Iraq was the 
establishment of a constitutional democracy and he was also opposing the importation of 
velayet-e faqih to rule the multi-ethnic and multi-religious Iraqi society.633 Only one week 
after the fatwa, on June 20, Sistani’s representative Sayyed Ahmad al-Safi issued another 
statement emphasizing that Sistani’s fatwa was intended for all Iraqis regardless of their 
sects and religions.634 The marja was apparently sensitive about the potential 
sectarianization of this proposed security formation. 60 to 90 thousand volunteers enlisted 
for arms immediately, a number surpassing far beyond what was expected.635 Despite al-
                                                
632 Abdo, The New Sectarianism, p. 21.  
 
633 Joost Hiltermann, ‘Iraq: The Clerics and the Militias,’ The Crisis Group, October 2015, 
https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/iraq/iraq-clerics-and-militias  
 
634 Abdo, The New Sectarianism, p. 21. 
 
635 Ibid. 
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Safi’s attempts, a great majority of the volunteers were Shia men though, answering the 
call by their esteemed Shia marja as a religious duty.  
 
Ayatollah Sistani’s call for arms was not intended to form a new institution 
separate from the state. He was rather calling for the men who could take up arms and 
support Iraq’s existing security forces, under a lawful and legitimate Iraqi state 
authority.636 This fatwa was soon encroached upon by then Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki. 
Maliki, as the representative of the Dawa Party was originally against any militia 
formation in a striking contrast to his other political rivals – Muqtada al-Sadr and ISCI. 
However, the growing power of Sadr’s influence within the Iraqi political system had 
pushed Maliki towards his own militiafication. As a matter of fact, Maliki was already in 
connection to Shia 7 militia formations with an attempt to counterbalance Sadr’s JAM 
when Sistani’s fatwa was issued, which were Badr, Ashaib Ahl al-Haq, Kataib Hezbollah, 
Harakat al-Nujaba, Kataib Imam Ali, Kataib Jund al-Imam.637 He had also become 
increasingly dependent on Iranian support; as when he lost against the Sunni al-Iraqia in 
2010 elections, he still maintained his position as the prime minister with Iran’s 
support.638 Sistani’s fatwa was an opportunity for Maliki in 2014 to boost his political 
power which was lying on a shaky ground due to his unpopular and unsuccessful sectarian 
policies as well as to maintain his relevance for the Iranians.639 Finally, a new institution 
called the Hashd al-Shaabi was formed with the initial participation of 42 militias and its 
number reached 130 thousand volunteers over time.640 Except for one Christian militia 
formation, the Hashd was predominantly of Shia volunteers. Both the formation of a new 
institution separate from the existing Iraqi security structures and the predominantly Shia 
composition of this institution was incompatible with Sistani’s original vision.  
 
The formation and the composition of the Hashd reflects the factionalization of 
Shia politics in Iraq. The core militia constituents of the Hashd can be divided into three 
                                                
636 See Ranad Mansour, ‘The Popular Mobilization Forces and Iraq’s Future,’ Carnegie Middle East Center, April 28, 
2017, http://carnegie-mec.org/2017/04/28/popular-mobilization-forces-and-iraq-s-future-pub-68810.   
 
637 Ibid.  
 
638 Ibid.  
 
639 Ece Göksedef, Journalist at TRT World and formerly at Aljazeera Turk. Skype interview with the author, 
conducted on June 13, 2017.   
 
640 Ibid.    
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groups determined by their political ideology, factional supporters, and vision of the 
Hashds' future: The Sistanists, Sadrists, pro-Iranian Hashds. The first group of Sistanists 
are made up of volunteers who took up arms as a religious duty in response to Ayatollah 
Sistani’s fatwa and this group is also known as ‘Hashd Sistani.’641 The motivation of these 
groups is the defense of the holy sites in Najaf, Karbala, Samarra. Some notable Sistanist 
militias are Saraya al-Ataba al Alawiya, Liwa Ali al-Akbar, Saraya al-Ataba, al-
Hussainiya, and Saraya al-Ataba al-Abbasiya.642 ISCI-affiliated groups, which 
approached the Sistanist view of Iraqi politics over time while distancing themselves 
further away from Iran after 2007, can also be grouped under the Hashd Sistani. 
Prominent pro-Sistani groups include Saraya al-Jihad, Saraya al-Aqida, and Saraya al-
Ashura.643 The Sistanist groups’ vision of the Hashd al-Shaabi is the dissolution of the 
entity after the ISIL is defeated on the Iraqi territories. The Sistanist militias are thus 
reluctant about future involvement in politics, which bears parallels to Sistani’s view.644 
The second group of militias are the Sadrists, the most prominent of them being Saraya 
al-Salam, the successor of JAM. The Sadrist Hashd are believed to have more than a 
hundred thousand volunteers, who are part of an extensive Sadrist social network 
structure and they have considerable fighting expertise.645 The real problem for Sadrist 
groups is the lack of funding and military equipment due to a lack of Iranian support for 
Sadrist groups, though. The last group is the pro-Iranian militia and is referred to as the 
‘Hashd Soleimani’, as they are extensively supported and supervised by IRGC Qods 
Force and the Iranian commander Qasem Soleimani.646 These groups are known as 
institutionally better established, militarily stronger, and more experienced compared to 
Sadrists and Sistanists thanks to a committed Qods Force support of military materials 
and training.647 6 of the most powerful Hashd groups are thus directly Iran-trained: the 
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Badr Brigades, Iran’s decades-long Iraqi Shiite ally since the war with Iraq; Kataib 
Hezbollah, established by Al Muhandis, an ex-member of Badr Brigades and a 
commander of the Hashd al-Shaabi; Ashaib Ahl al-Haq, established by dissenters from 
the Sadrist movement and now enjoying very close relations with Iran and Hezbollah; the 
Harakat al-Nujaba, established by Ashaib Ahl al-Haq as a front organization to send Iraqi 
fighters to Syria for fighting next to the Assad regime; and Kataib Sayyed al-Shuhada, 
established by IRGC and Hezbollah first in Syria, from where they moved to Iraq.648 The 
pro-Iranian proxies within the Hashd have ideological allegiance to Ayatollah Khomeini 
and Khamenei and subscribe to velayet-e faqih. The pro-Iranian groups thus have a more 
transnationalist vision in contrast to Sadrists and Sistanists, both of whom are Iraqi 
nationalists. Therefore, several of these pro-Iranian proxies within the Hashd fight in 
Syria to support the ‘axis of resistance’ or they form front groups for this purpose. 
Moreover, the Hashd Soleimani are closely affiliated with pro-Iran and/or pro-Maliki 
political parties and they have a considerable influence over the Iraqi electoral politics. 
In 2014, the Badr organization had gained 22 seats out of 328 within Maliki’s ‘State of 
Law’ coalition.649 In a similar vein, Ashaib Ahl al-Haq has also made an application to 
form its own political party.650 The relations between Sadrist and pro-Iranian militia 
within the Hashd are generally tense due to Maliki’s turn to Iranian proxies for political 
influence and emerging as a counterbalancing force against Muqtada al-Sadr at home.651   
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Figure 7. The Political Composition of the Hashd al-Shaabi 
 
 
 
The Iranian influence within the Hashd al-Shaabi is immense, as the most 
powerful militia groups fighting against ISIL on the field are those trained by IRGC-Qods 
Force. The Iranian influence over the Hashd is not limited to the institution’s composition 
though. As a matter of fact, the military leadership and the budgetary allocations inform 
a lot on the Iranian influence over Hashd as well. The Commander in-Chief of the Hashd 
al-Shaabi is Haider al-Abadi and the institution is governed by a Hashd Commission 
comprised of some of the important leaders of the Shia militia groups brought under the 
Hashd. In the Commission’s 2016 composition, 8 out of 10 Hashd Commission was 
comprised of commanders and secretary generals of pro-Iranian groups.652 Important pro-
Iranian personalities within the Commission include Hadi Qais al-Khazali, the Secretary 
General of the Asaib ahl-al-Haq; Akram Abbas al-Kaabi, Secretary General of the 
movement of Hezbollah al-Nujaba; and Hassan Munis al-Abodi of Kataib of  Iraqi 
Hezbollah among others.653 The chairman of the Hashd is the National Security Advisor 
Falih al-Fayyad, a former Dawa Party official who is responsible for the administrative 
affairs of the Hashd.654 The deputy Hashd Commander Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis and an 
                                                
652 The data on the members of the Hashd Commission can be found under ‘Popular Crowd Forces in Iraq (Al-Hashd 
al-Shaabi) … Origins and Future Survey,’ Rawabat Center, August 29, 2016, http://rawabetcenter.com/en/?p=1037.   
 
653 Ibid.  
 
654 Hassan Abbas, ‘The Myth and Reality of Ira’s al-Hashd al-Shaabi (Popular Mobilization Forces): A Way 
 220	
	
Assistant Commander Hadi al-Amiri, both of whom are famous pro-Iran figures, have a 
central influence over strategic decision-making. Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis operated 
alongside the IRGC-Qods Force and the Badr Brigades against the Saddam regime during 
Iran-Iraq War.655 He then formed the pro-Iranian Kataib Hezbollah Brigades. Hadi al-
Amiri, on the other hand, was a former Minister of Transport serving in years 2010-2014 
and a member of the parliament. He is better known for his leadership for the Badr 
Brigades and close ties to the IRGC-Qods Force. The chairman Falih al-Fayyad is referred 
to as the ‘ra’is’, i.e. ‘the president’ of the Hashd, while al-Muhandis and al-Ameri are the 
‘qa’id’, i.e. ‘the commander’, which highlights the operational predominance of pro-
Iranian personalities over the Hashds.656   
 
The Hashd al-Shaabi institution’s funding comes directly from the Iraqi state’s 
budget.657 The funding for pro-Sistani Hashds also comes from donations to the religious 
offices of the holy shrines, as well as from wealthy individuals who contribute to the 
Hashd income via donations to civil society institutions.658 The budgetary share for 
Hashd as determined by the current Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi was 1 million 
US Dollar in 2015.659 However, the funding is not allocated equally to all groups 
operating under the Hashd and the issue of budgetary allocation is a source of contention 
among different Hashd factions. Abadi hands in the Hashd funding to al-Muhandis as a 
lump amount, who then decides on the distribution of the money for all militia groups 
operating under the Hashd.660 Al-Muhandis thus controls the volunteer militia flow and 
funds flow to the factional Hashd militias, where the pro-Iranian groups get an upper 
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hand.661 The pro-Iranian Hashd militias receive more volunteers and military equipment, 
which increase their status as a more a powerful fighting force within the Hashd al-
Shaabi. News abound regarding the budgetary contention between pro-Iranian and pro-
Sistanist groups as well. Iraq’s Ministry of Defense had agreed to approve the salaries of 
13,000 recruits out of 14,500; however, al-Muhandis reviewed that amount and agreed to 
pay the salaries of only 4,800 fighters, thereby showing his unwillingness to fund some 
pro-Sistani volunteers.662   
 
The Hashd al-Shaabi has a strong support base within the Iraqi population. The 
formal Iraqi army is generally seen as a corrupt and inefficient institution by the Iraqis 
and an army made-up directly of Iraqi people was deemed to be a legitimate supplement 
to that. This was also reflected in the motto of the Hashd, which said ‘We are not only 
fighting against ISIL, but also against corruption.’663 The sectarian nature of the ISIL 
threat to the Iraqi Shiites and Ayatollah Sistani’s fatwa for the defense of the shrines has 
provided a sacred character to the Hashd al-Shaabi. The Shiite leaders have emphasized 
the homogeneity of the Shiite people in the fight against ISIL and the heroism, sacrifice, 
and martyrdom of the Hashd volunteers –linking them to Shia Karbala- narratives are 
emphasized.664 Moreover, social welfare organizations supporting the veterans and the 
families of Hashd martyrs have also been established.  
 
The Hashd were incorporated into the Iraqi Security Forces by Prime Minister 
Haidar al-Abadi on February 22, 2016. The document recognizing the official status of 
the Hashd as a security force is called the Office Order 91, according to which the Hashd 
‘will be an independent military formation and a part of the Iraqi armed forces, and linked 
to the general commander of the armed forces.’665 The Hashd al-Shaabi thus gained 
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official status as a permanent and separate security entity integrated into Iraq’s security 
forces. With the Office Order 91, the Hashd were thus given the status of paramilitary 
organization existing side by side and working in coordination with the Iraqi Army. The 
strong volunteer-based popular mobilization aspect of the Hashd as its name ‘popular 
mobilization forces’ as well as the religious Shia narratives employed for the mobilization 
recall the IRGC and Basij formations – the institutional extensions of the Iran-Iraq War 
that shaped the military structure and strategic culture of the Islamic Republic. The strong 
Iranian influence over the organizational structuring of the Hashd along with Iranian 
ideological and operational influence on individual Hashd groups strengthens the 
proposition that the Islamic Republic’s Qods Forces have tried to create an institution like 
the Iranian Basijis. As a matter of fact, Iranian sources close to IRGC and Basijis speak 
of the Hashd al-Shaabi as an institution modelled on the Iranian Basijis. In a message 
released by Chief of Staff of the Iranian Armed Forces Major General Mohammad 
Hossein Baqeri in 2016 for the 37th anniversary of the formation of the Iranian Basijis 
said that the Iranian Basijis can be an inspiration for the foundation of an Islamic World 
Basiji.666 The same news article published by Tasnim News Agency, an agency close to 
IRGC, continued saying that ‘Inspired by the Iranian Basiji, a similar organization has 
been established in Iraq, known as the Popular Mobilization Units or Hashd al-Shaabi.’667 
In a similar vein, a news site close to the Iranian Basijis quoted a spokesperson for the 
Hashd al-Shaabi saying that the Iraqi Hashd al-Shaabi are a continuation of the Iranian 
Basijis, where the Iraqi counterparts relied heavily on the Iranian Basiji experience.668 
The same news article continued quoting Nouri al-Maliki saying that the Iraqi 
government adopted the form and structure of the Iranian Basijis when establishing the 
Hashd al-Shaabi.669  
 
The Hashd al-Shaabi can also be compared to the Lebanese Hezbollah in terms 
of its current role within the security and electoral sectors of the Lebanese state. As 
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discussed before, the Lebanese Hezbollah is an Iranian proxy which acts like a 
paramilitary organization matching the power of the Lebanese army and complementing 
it with its experience in guerilla and urban warfare. Moreover, the proxy also functions 
as an Islamist Shia political party within the Lebanese electoral politics and is thus highly 
integrated into the Lebanese political system. Dehghan, an Iranian journalist interviewed 
by the author said that the Hashd al-Shaabi is Iran’s ‘another shadow organization’ in 
Iraq resembling the Hezbollah model.670 Discussions abound whether the Hashd will be 
another IRGC, Basiji, Hezbollah within the Iraqi society. The political battles between 
the pro-Sadr, pro-Sistani, pro-Maliki, and pro-Iran forces will determine the further 
evolution of this institution. It is currently clear that the Hashd as an institution is already 
integrated into Iraqi Shia politics and security system with its Shia-infused mobilization 
model, its militia’s affiliation with Shia political parties, and its integration into the 
military bureaucracy of the Iraqi state in 2016.  
 
 
 
4.5.3.2. Jaysh al-Shaabi / National Defense Units (NDF) 
 
 
A similar paramilitary force formation has been underway in Syria following the 
outbreak of the civil war in 2011. Several concepts have been used to refer to the Syrian 
version popular mobilization forces such as the Shaabiha, Jaysh al-Shaabi, and the 
National Defense Units (NDF). All three names are used almost interchangeably in the 
media outlets and correspond to a single phenomenon observed in Syria following the 
civil war: ‘A popular army’ made upon a district-level conglomeration of predominantly 
Alawite volunteers fighting for the Assad regime in coordination with the Syrian Army. 
Contrary to the attraction the Iraqi Hashd al-Shaabi attracted from the policy 
communities, the NDF remains relatively understudied. Such lack of attention can be 
attributed to the Syrian Army’s relative strength as the central pillar of Assad Regime’s 
security structure. Despite its relative strength, the Syrian security establishment has 
relied heavily on the use of pro-regime militia and paramilitary units fighting off a diverse 
set of anti-Assad forces. 
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The popular mobilization forces in Syria have a longer history compared to the 
Iraqi Hashd al-Shaabi. Assad family’s Baath Party formed several paramilitary units after 
coming to power in 1963 as a counterforce to domestic opposition.671 A more extensive 
militia and paramilitary group formation process was underway during the 1980s, where 
the Baath Party provided arms and training to regime supporters throughout the country 
against the Muslim Brotherhood uprisings.672 When the civil conflict erupted in Syria in 
2011, the Assad Regime had already had a thirty-years long experience in growing pro-
regime militia forces against domestic turmoil and did not hesitate to release their militia 
forces to the war field. These militia are called the Popular Committees, local volunteers 
who armed themselves at towns, villages, and district-levels in defense against anti-
regime elements.673 These popular committees are also called the Jaysh al-Shaabi, are 
usually of minority towns, villages, and districts, and made up of the Alawite, Druze, and 
Christians – the minority populations of Syria.674 The Shaabiha, on the other hand, refers 
to the criminal smuggling networks and mafia-like organizations emerging in 1970s and 
80s and operating with the Assad family.675 As the Assad family have relied on both 
formations since 2011 for the defense of their regime, both Shaabiha and Jaysh al-Shaabi 
are generally used interchangeably by media outlets. The concept of popular committees 
was thus already ingrained in the Syrian security logic under the Assad family before the 
eruption of the civil conflict in 2011 and it was not a consequence of the extreme 
militiafication of the Syrian war.   
 
When the Syrian Army was worn-out in the face of a myriad of opposition forces 
in 2013 and was expected to soon lose the game by both regional players and the 
international community, Syria’s two long-standing allies, Iran and the Lebanese 
Hezbollah stepped in to save the Assad regime. Both the Lebanese Hezbollah and Iran 
were providing training to pro-Assad units and were fighting alongside Assad since 2012, 
yet their military activities increased in 2013. Hezbollah and Iran’s decision to press for 
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more military support was rooted in the defense of the ‘axis of resistance’ alliance. In his 
May 2013 speech, Hezbollah’s leader Hassan Nasrallah called Syria ‘the backbone’ of 
the Axis of Resistance that cannot be left to Israel, to the West, and recently to the takfiri 
terrorist forces.676 Both Iranian IRGC-Qods Force units and the Lebanese Hezbollah 
supported the Assad regime by direct involvement in the conflict, funding and training 
the pro-Assad militia, sending Iraqi Shiite militia to fight in Syria, and by creating new 
militia in Shiite-dominated villages. Ayatollah Khamenei of Iran, Hassan Nasrallah of 
Hezbollah, Qasem Soleimani of IRGC-Qods Force, and Syrian officers met in Tehran in 
the spring of 2013 and decided on a closer cooperation and coordination among all the 
parties fighting for Assad.677 One consequence of this closer cooperation and coordination 
decision was grouping the pro-Assad militia and paramilitary forces under a more 
institutionalized mechanism. As a result,  a number of pro-Assad militias and the Jaysh 
al-Shaabi, or local committees committed to defend their towns and villages against anti-
regime forces, were restructured and merged under a more institutionalized structure 
called the National Defense Forces.678 The NDF was established by a former Iranian 
Basiji deputy commander, Hossein Hamedani.679 Like Jaysh al-Shaabi, a majority of 
NDF volunteers are Alawites despite the existence of Christian, Druze, and some Sunni 
groups.680 Hezbollah has provided significant support for the creation and expansion of 
NDF, especially training the NDF constituents in Latakia, Homs, Damascus and Aleppo 
in urban warfare and guerilla tactics.681  
 
Whether the NDF was originally modelled on Iranian Basij is matter of discussion. 
As discussed above, the idea of popular mobilization units date back to the rise of Baath 
Party in Syria and its attempts to protect the regime against domestic opponents. On the 
other hand, the collaboration by Iranian, Hezbollahi, and Iraqi Shia militia forces on the 
NDF project has a significant effect on the further evolution of the NDF. The Assad 
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Regime is a highly secularist regime and does not share the Lebanese Hezbollah, Iran, 
and Iraqi Shia militias’ Islamist political ideology. However, all parties are committed to 
the ideological contours of the ‘axis of resistance’ and operational necessities to keep the 
alliance intact. As such, the operational experience of the latter parties in popular 
mobilization model and the ‘axis of resistance’ discourse highlight the resemblance 
between Iranian Basijis, Hashd al-Shaabi, and NDF as paramilitary state formations. In 
this respect, Sullivan argues that NDF is intended to resemble the Iranian Basijis as a 
national paramilitary force.682 Moreover, the IRGC Qods Office in Damascus is the 
coordination office for the military planning, strategy, and operations which bring 
together all parties of the ‘axis of resistance.’683 Undoubtedly, the Iranian, Syrian, 
Hezbollahi and Iraqi Shia militias’ military collaboration on the Syrian territory has 
brought all ‘axis of resistance’ parties in the northern axis closer. The Iranian regime’s 
discourse about the NDF forces is in parallel to its discourse for Hashd al-Shaabi. 
Commander-in-Chief of the Islamic Republic of Iran's Revolutionary Guard, Hossein 
Dehghan talks of the IRGC duties and practices as being ‘beyond their dear homeland’ 
and a model for the Front of the Islamic Resistance.684 An article published on Payam-e 
Enghelab follows the same line of thinking;    
 
   ‘The presence of the Quds Force in Iraq and Syria and the support of the 
Resistance groups has led Iran to define its own security frontiers beyond the 
boundaries of security. The assistance provided by the Iranian Quds Corps in 
Syria and Iraq, which played an important role in defeating the region's 
terrorists, has led to the popularity of this school of thought beyond the 
borders of the region. Today, I think Iraq and Syria are the commanders of the 
Republic of as heroes of their own lands. This, the dialogue between popular 
forces such as Jaysh al-Sha'abi in Syria and Hashd al-Sha'bi in Iraq, which is 
based on the modeling of our forces and the Iranian army, is an indication of 
the influence of Iran's authority in neighboring countries.’685 
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4.6.  Conclusion 
 
 
 
An overview of Iran’s Middle East policy leaves us with several conclusions on 
the changing nature of security, politics, and order in the Middle East. First, describing 
Iran’s foreign policy as a pendulum that swings between ideology and pragmatism lies 
on faulty premises. Iran’s foreign policy in the Middle East since 2003 shows that both 
rational and identity-based factors play a role. While the transnational environment is 
characterized by increased Shia empowerment, the multivocality of Shia politics curbs 
Iranian leadership on the political front. However, the rise of Sunni jihadism has provided 
Iran with an opportunity to unite the Shias against a common enemy. This shows that the 
Iranian political ideology has less influence over the Shias today, compared to the 
influence of its peculiar popular mobilization model on the security front. Among a 
plethora of Shia clerical and political actors, the Iranian regime has an upper hand in Shia 
mobilization through the IRGC – Qods Forces. In this respect, Iranian institutions such 
as the IRGC and Basijis as well as the organizational model have become institutionalized 
and become a source of ‘power’ on its own for Iran. Iran’s unconventional power 
challenges our traditional understanding of ‘military power’ as rooted in states’ 
conventional capabilities. One should thus focus more on unconventional power 
dynamics to understand the changing security map of the region. Iran’s Middle East 
policy is a valuable test-case in this respect. 
 
Second, religion is a strong mobilizational force in the Middle East today. 
Nevertheless, religious and/or religious-ideological affiliation is not sufficient on its own 
to mobilize co-religionists living under a myriad of nation-states. Iran’s strong 
mobilizational capacity over the Shiites across the Middle East comes from its decades-
long experience in and commitment to its popular mobilization model accompanied by a 
careful framing and branding of the Islamic Republic’s revolutionary ideology, Karbala 
narratives, and resistance discourse. Iranian experience with religious politics and 
religious armed mobilization has been institutionalized over the past forty years of the 
revolutionary regime’s existence. Therefore, religion has become more institutionalized 
in Iran’s security culture and security policy.  
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Third, for the Islamic Republic’s foreign policy, the Axis of Resistance alliance 
relies as much on institution-building as militia support in war-struck domestic settings. 
The Iranian policy of the ‘export of the revolution’ during 1980s has long been understood 
to be exporting Iran’s velayet-e faqih-based political ideology to neighboring Muslim 
countries. Today, Iran carefully refrains from vocalizing velayet-e faqih and Shia clerical 
rule as an alternative political order for the Middle Eastern nations on the path to political 
transformation, although most of Iran-supported militia pay allegiance to velayet-e faqih 
in discourse. Nevertheless, Iran’s activities in the Axis of Resistance show that the 
exportation of Iranian political system seems to be replaced by another idea today: the 
exportation of Iran’s military system. The experience with Lebanese Hezbollah showed 
that a group can operate as a paramilitary organization independent of a state’s security 
system on the one hand, and be integrated into the electoral political system of the 
Lebanese state on the other and can still exert immense influence domestically and 
transnationally. The creation of paramilitary organizations such as Hashd al-Shaabi in 
Iraq and NDF in Syria can be considered as part of an Iranian state-building effort in 
conflict settings. The Iranian officials’ emphasis on ‘the Iranian Basiji model’ as emulated 
by these new institutions strengthens the proposition that the Islamic Republic is 
exporting its military model to the region through a myriad of activities, if not its political 
one. The conflict situation within these countries might have generated such an outcome. 
The perceived security threats emanating from ISIL and other opposition forces have 
precipitated the military alignment and coordination among Axis of Resistance actors, 
thereby leading to such institutional build-ups.     
 
 Related to the last point, the question remains as to what implications will these 
new institutions have for the future of Middle East. Are Hashd al-Shaabi and NDF 
provisional institutions created to address the civil conflict situations in Iraq and Syria 
and are they expected to get dissolved once the conflict is over? Or are they permanent 
institutions designed to be an integral part of both the Iraqi and Syrian military and 
political systems? The IRGC has evolved from a volunteer-based mobilization force at 
the outset of the Holy Defense War to a highly-institutionalized army in the end. Over 
decades, the IRGC has further evolved from a mere military to an economic, social, and 
finally political force inside the regime through its involvement in the post-war 
reconstruction of the country at all levels. A similar scenario may be a possibility for Iraqi 
and Syrian politics in the future. As a matter of fact, the overt militia and political party 
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linkages as is exemplified by Badr and Kataib Hezbollah in Iraq already signals such a 
possibility for Iraq. Another related question is whether these institutions will have a 
national or transnational political orientation. Further transnationalization of such 
institutions both in an ideological and operational sense can be expected to have 
ramifications for the future of the Axis of Resistance alliance. These issues remain as a 
question mark for now. The intra-state, inter-state, and state to non-state politics will 
determine the future of political order in the Middle East.   
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CHAPTER 5 
 
 
IRAN’S FOREIGN POLICY DISCOURSES ON THE MIDDLE EAST 
 
 
 
 
5.1.  Introduction 
 
 
 
The Islamic Republic is quite innovative in devising new discourses. The 
establishment of a revolutionary Islamic regime does not go unaccompanied with the 
creation of new political concepts matching the ideals and objectives of the revolution. 
As discussed before, the amalgamation of Marxist concepts with Islamic ones during the 
early years of the Revolution such as ‘mostezefan,’ ‘estekbar,’ and ‘holy defense war’ 
exemplifies Iranian ambition in discursively self-determining the Islamic Republic’s 
identity, existence, and experience. Two reasons can account for this discursive 
inventiveness: 1) the self-declared uniqueness of the Islamic Republic, 2) the Islamization 
of social sciences in Iran.  
 
 Iran branded the 1979 Islamic Revolution of Iran as a third option both to 
American liberal-modernity and to Soviet communism that had divided the Middle East 
region in both ideology- and alliance-based terms. The main ideological current that the 
Islamic Revolution was spearheading was one of Islamism, i.e. the establishment of a 
unified Islamic civilization across the Middle East, which was propagated as a new 
solution to the national and transnational problems of the Middle Eastern nations. The 
idea was that the Middle Eastern states could not address the experienced political and 
socio-economic problems of constant external intervention into internal affairs such as 
the exploitation of national resources, externally-arranged coup d’états, and political 
dependence on superpower patronage by adopting an external political ideology. These 
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political ideologies, be it Western liberalism and Western-modernity or Marxism, were 
seen as the root cause of the socio-political problems, backwardness, and dependence in 
the Middle East. The Islamic Republic believed that if the revolution was a total 
transformation of the political system and the establishment of a new unique regime and 
ideology rivals the two main ideological currents of the Cold War years, this had to be 
accompanied by a new terminology. This is emphasized by the Supreme Leader Ayatollah 
Khamenei in a speech where he discusses the regime type of the Islamic Republic;      
 
   ‘One of the things that is necessary in every popular movement is to create 
the necessary terminology and systems on the basis of the fundamental 
principles of the movement. When a new idea - such as the idea of Islamic 
rule or Islamic Awakening - is proposed, it introduces new concepts into 
society. Therefore, this movement needs its own terminology. If terms are 
borrowed from somewhere else, there will be confusion and it will be 
impossible to fully clarify the idea. We believe in democracy and we also 
believe in freedom, but we do not believe in liberal democracy. Although the 
literal meaning of "liberal democracy" is freedom coupled with democracy, 
the term is commonly associated with certain concepts which we hate. We do 
not want to use the term for the immaculate, wholesome, righteous and pure 
concept that we have in mind. Therefore, we need to select a new name for 
our favorite system: "Islamic democracy" or "Islamic Republic."686 
 
The Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei’s discussion on the invention of new 
political terminologies reflects the Iranian ambition of independence. According to this 
perception, if most of the regional problems are related to dependence to external 
superpowers and Iran leads the way towards independence via its revolutionary logic, 
then an equally independent and innovative political terminology had to be adopted. This 
logic is also reflected on the Islamic Republic’s social sciences research and education. 
Now that Islamism was presented as a third ideological option to American-led liberalism 
and Soviet-based Marxism, this ideology had to be institutionalized in the scientific and 
cultural arena through what the Islamic Republic called ‘the cultural revolution.’687 ‘The 
cultural revolution’ in Iran refers to a set of education and research policies in Iranian 
universities to Islamize both the teaching curriculum and the teaching cadres to create an 
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Islamic polity since 1980s.688 Besides the regime’s ambition to raise an Islamist 
generation of students and researchers, the cultural revolution also aimed at preempting 
the so-called ‘cultural invasion’ of the Western thinking, specifically the threat of 
Westernization and secularization in the Iranian society, which could threaten the survival 
of the Islamic regime.689 The Iranian emphasis on devising new terminologies and 
discourses thus serves two objectives. First, the Islamic Republic frames its position in 
the wake of national and transnational transformations from its own ideological lens and 
thus exerts soft power. The Islamic Republic constantly creates, re-creates, and/or 
retrieves existing discourses to match its political objectives at critical political junctures. 
Second, the whole process helps institutionalize the Islamic Regime at home through an 
Islamization of the social science thinking. 
  
Tracking the Islamic Republic’s discourses on the transformation of the Middle 
East since 2003 helps us further disentangle the Islamic Republic’s policy formulations 
towards the region. This chapter will thus be devoted to an analysis of Iran’s foreign 
policy discourses. A survey of the discourses by the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei, 
IRGC, Basij, as well as other foreign policy elites responding to regional transformations 
since 2003 are reduced to five core concepts: the Islamic Awakening, the popular 
mobilization, resistance (axis), takfiri terrorism, and the defense of the holy shrines. The 
content, referents, and the historical evolution of all concepts will be examined with 
examples taken from relevant sources. This chapter will thus serve to understand the 
discursive patterns the Islamic Republic uses in presenting its views on regional 
developments, devising its current mode of foreign policy activities and strategies, and 
finally promoting its views and strategies to both domestic and foreign audience. The 
Islamic Republic’s use of discursive tools and its emphasis on ideological framing in 
foreign policy will be the central components of this chapter. As will be seen, the Islamic 
Republic heavily relies on its traditional revolutionary Islamist framing. The old 
revolutionary Islamist discourses are often revoked, albeit with its content and referents 
adapted to the current historical context. The existing discourses that are transformed are 
further accompanied by new discourses with religious overtones. 
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5.2.  Islamic Awakening 
 
 
 
The Islamic Awakening (Bidar-e Eslami in Persian) is one of the most commonly 
used discourses by Iranian political elites. An Iranian diplomat in Istanbul used the term 
in a casual conversation on Arab Spring, where he specifically questioned why political 
analysts use the term ‘Arab Spring’ for the events of Egypt and Tunisia in 2011. He later 
added that the Iranian political elites use the term ‘Islamic Spring’ or ‘Islamic Awakening’ 
instead of ‘Arab Spring,’ as the toppling down of the Egyptian and Tunisian regimes by 
popular demonstrations and the subsequent empowerment of Islamist political countries 
in both countries signaled for the Islamic Republic an Islamic Awakening that would 
sweep the whole region.690 While the term is used to refer to the Arab Spring today, it has 
a long history of usage by the Islamic Republic and its content has been reworked and its 
referents transformed in accordance with the political atmosphere the term is aimed to 
address. 
 
The term Islamic Awakening originally refers to the rise of a new political 
ideology and political system in the Middle East as an alternative to Western liberalism 
and Soviet Marxism. This new ideology is one of Islamism, a socially and politically 
activist Islamism, expected to address the sociopolitical problems experienced in the 
region. In the Iranian discourse, the sociopolitical problems that plague the region are the 
direct result of Western colonialism. The drawing of arbitrary borders dividing the 
Muslim lands, the successive interventions into the political affairs of Middle Eastern 
nations by outside powers, the exploitation of natural resources, and the cultural and 
social problems indicted on the Muslim lands by the globalization of Western liberal and 
materialist cultural norms and practices, and finally the dependence of Middle Eastern 
regimes on outside powers and this very system are all considered to create and 
consolidate the cycle of exploitation and dependence experienced by Middle Eastern 
nations. The way to break this cycle is to turn inwards, to discover indigenous sources 
and forces, and to establish an indigenous system not exported from elsewhere. For the 
Islamic Republic, Islamism is this very indigenous force that would free the Iranian nation 
from Western colonialism and earn the nation its independence. The Islamic Revolution 
                                                
690 A casual conversation with an Iranian diplomat in Istanbul, June 2015, at the Consulate General of the Islamic 
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of 1979 is considered as the first instance of a popular movement that generated the 
ideology of politically activist Islam during the 20th century and a revolutionary Islamist 
government. According to the Islamic Republic, the 1979 Revolution is thus the first 
instance of Islamic Awakening of a nation-state against colonialism, which has the 
potential to inspire other nations in the region and lead a collective effort to create a more 
independent and self-standing Middle East by putting Islam at the center of its ideology 
and system. In short, the Islamic Awakening is an anti-colonial ideological and political 
movement that Iran leads as the first revolutionary and anti-colonialist nation in the 
modern Middle East. The Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei’s words on the Islamic 
Awakening in a pilgrimage message in 1991 is telling on the theme of colonialism: 
 
   The historical background of the Islamic Ummah is something that colonial 
powers have tried to distort and wipe off the memory of Muslims since the 
time they entered Asia and Africa. Domination over natural resources of 
Islamic countries and their manpower and taking the destiny of Muslim 
nations into their hands have been the goal of colonial powers since the late 
18th century. Destroying the pride of Muslims and separating them from their 
glorious past were the requirements to achieve this goal. In this way, Muslims 
could be encouraged to abandon their culture and ethical values and to accept 
western culture and colonial teachings. And this plot proved effective because 
the domination of corrupt and autocratic governments over Islamic countries 
had completely prepared the way for the hegemony of colonial powers. And 
the aggressive norms of western culture and the promotion of all the concepts 
that were deemed necessary for political and economic domination of 
colonial powers started flowing like a flood. As a result, within 200 years all 
Islamic countries became an easy target for western plunderers.’691 
 
He further says in a speech made in Ahwaz in 2003 that the element to overcome 
colonialism is awakening:  
 
   ‘Today the awakening and determination of nations is the only thing that 
can overcome the wild spirit of colonialism. If a nation is vigilant, it knows 
its rights, it knows its enemy, it knows what the goal of the enemy is and it 
can stand up against that enemy. Then the power of the arrogant powers and 
America and all military equipment become ineffective. In such a situation, 
the arrogant powers cannot do anything. This is the essential thing that the 
Islamic Revolution relied on since the beginning and the Islamic Republic 
built its firm foundations on it.’692  
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According to Ayatollah Khamenei, the West regards the Islamic Awakening, along 
with the Islamic Revolution and the activist Islamist political ideology, as a serious threat. 
The Islamic Awakening threatens the Western program to steer the Middle Eastern politics 
and economics according to their own material interests as well as the modern Western 
liberal ideology which legitimizes this very Western outreach. Ayatollah Khamenei 
emphasized this point in his speeches, where he says:  
 
   ‘[…] When the Islamic Revolution emerged in Iran and caused that great 
commotion in the world, a number of outstanding western personalities such 
as Kissinger, Huntington and Joseph Nye - who are outstanding political 
personalities in America and Europe - published a series of articles during the 
early years of the Revolution. These articles and writings warned the western 
political system and western governments that the Revolution which has been 
conducted in Iran does not only mean a transfer of power and a change of 
governments. It means the emergence of a new power in - as they say - the 
"Middle East" region. […]  This new power may not be on a par with western 
powers in terms of technology and science, but in terms of political influence 
in areas surrounding this country, it is either better than or as good as western 
powers and it will challenge them. These outstanding personalities warned 
western powers about this. This means that, in their opinion, the emergence 
of this power would put an end to or at least weaken western influence in this 
sensitive, wealthy and very strategic region which connects three continents 
to one another and which is the center of oil, wealth and important and 
necessary minerals. The West has made many efforts to achieve political, 
economic and - naturally - cultural domination over this region. At that time, 
these outstanding western personalities guessed that this would happen and 
of course, they guessed correctly. Today, after the passage of more than three 
decades, the nightmare which they have been suffering from is gradually 
coming true. That is to say, a great national and regional power has emerged 
which has not been defeated by different economic, security, political and 
psychological pressures. On the contrary, this power has managed to 
influence regional nations, to establish and promote communal Islamic 
culture and to help regional nations have a sense of identity.’693 
 
For Ayatollah Khamenei, the Islamic Awakening as manifested by the Iranian 
Revolution was a ‘power’ on its own, a power that would mobilize the Muslim peoples 
all around the region, give them a new sense of identity, and tools to fight the influence 
of Western outreach in the region. Islamism stands at the center of this new power in the 
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region. In another speech, Ayatollah Khamenei says that Islamism, and the political 
system this ideology foresees, is considered to be the real threat by the West: 
 
   ‘They interviewed an American politician. The interviewer asked him, 
“Who is America’s enemy?’ He replied, “America’s enemy is not terrorism, 
nor is it Muslims. America’s enemy is ‘Islamism.’’ This means that as long as 
Muslims move forward in an indifferent way and without any Islamic 
motivation, they do not show any feelings of enmity towards them, but when 
Islamism, commitment and loyalty to Islam and Islamic governance and the 
formation of the Islamic civilization step into the arena, then enmities begin. 
He was right. His enemy is Islamism. This is why you witness that they 
become very nervous and agitated whenever Islamic Awakening emerges in 
the world of Islam and they work to destroy and to eradicate it and in certain 
cases, they succeed.’694 
 
Ayatollah Khamenei argues that Islamism is the root cause of the international 
pressures on Iran since the Islamic Revolution. In his pilgrimage message in 2001, he said 
that the USA and other Western countries have realized that Muslim nations ‘form the 
core of this awakening and resistance to their plans for global domination’ and they use 
‘economic, political, propaganda, and military tools’ to ensure their influence over the 
region, especially over ‘the most vital oil and gas resources – which are essential for their 
industrial machinery and their material advantage over the rest of humanity.’695 Moreover, 
he also added in a ceremony after Imam Khomeini’s death in 1989 that these powers also 
seek to shake the foundations of Islamism and Islamic Awakening ‘by imposing wars on 
[them], broadcasting negative propaganda, imposing sanctions and leveling allegations 
against [them].’696 The West is thus considered to employ multiple methods ranging from 
physical war to psychological war to diminish the power of the Islamic Republic, as the 
leader of this awakening movement, and to hinder the further empowerment of this new 
ideological current in the region. The challenging encounter of the Islamic Republic with 
the West, through the imposed war of 1980-89 and the sanctions to its economy and 
military program is thus a response to this new power since the revolution.  
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 The Iranian policy option to fight the Western pressures to ensure its colonial 
outreach on the Middle East is the unification of the Muslims, or the establishment of the 
Islamic Ummah. The Islamic Awakening should not be limited to the Iranian borders; 
rather, the idea of it should be spread elsewhere. This formed the basis of the Islamic 
Republic’s policy of ‘the export of the revolution’ between 1979 and 1989. The 
establishment of the Islamic Ummah would necessitate the export of the Islamic 
Awakening idea and the revolution to other Muslim countries. As a result, the Islamic 
Republic saw the Islamist movements and groups as the carrier of this Islamic Ummah 
Project and provided support to them both in words and in deeds.   
 
Considering the 1979 Revolution to be the first instance of Islamic Awakening of 
a nation-state against colonialism that engendered a new power in the region, the Iranian 
leadership saw the political upheavals of 2011 in Egypt and Tunisia nothing more than 
the continuation of the anti-colonialist struggle started by Iran in 1979. Like the Iranian 
Revolution of 1979, the uprisings in Egypt and Tunisia are a response to ages-old 
domination of the Middle Eastern nations, culture, and political system by the forces of 
Western colonialism. As was the case with the Iranian Revolution, the real responsibility 
fell on the shoulders of the authoritarian Arab regimes who allied with the Western powers 
for their parochial regime security interests and facilitated the Western infiltration that put 
the Middle Eastern people at a disadvantage in socio-economic, political and cultural 
terms. In this respect, Ayatollah Khamenei refers to the predominant Western reading of 
the Arab uprisings of the Middle East that places the analyses only on economic terms as 
a misreading. While he does not underestimate the significance of economic factors in 
driving the Egyptian and Tunisian people to the streets, he says that ‘the main reason is 
the feeling of humiliation that has been created among the people of Tunisia and Egypt 
because of the performance of their rulers.’697 According to Ayatollah Khamenei, the root 
of the problem is the dependence of the Egyptian president Mobarek on the Western 
powers, ‘which prevented the economy of Egypt from developing.’698 Moreover, in 
Khamenei’s discourse, the Western analyses also underestimate the role of Islam as a 
driving force behind these uprisings. He specifically emphasizes Friday prayers and 
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mosques in Egypt as well as the religious slogans chanted during the events.699 In a similar 
vein, he also emphasized Ben Ali government’s modern-secularist and often anti-
religious policies concerning the use of hijab, the religious covering for women, in public 
areas and individual and congregational prayers in public spaces as a cause for the 
uprisings.700 The undisputed infiltration of Western modernism at cultural, economic, and 
sociological levels under authoritarian Arab leaders allied with Western powers is 
regarded to be the real reason for people’s chants for democracy, equality, justice on the 
Arab street.  
 
The solution to the problems driving the Arabs on the street is putting Islamism at 
the center of new political discussions, which would lead to transformations. Ayatollah 
Khamenei says that ‘regional developments should pay attention to preserving the pivotal 
role of Islam’ and ‘Islamic principles and Sharia should be the pivot of things.’701 This 
argument is based on the belief that Islam is answer to solutions for many human 
problems and is a progressive force ‘compatible with progress, change, and 
civilization.’702 In the Conference on Islamic Awakening organized by Iran in relation to 
the Arab uprisings in 2012 with the attendance of representatives from 80 countries, 
Ayatollah Khamenei clarified the specific practical components of Islamic Awakening, 
where he said ‘to speak of Islamic awakening is not to speak of a nebulous and indistinct 
concept that is amenable to various interpretations.’703 First of all, if the Arab uprisings 
are a revolutionary moment, the slogans and principles of the revolution should be set in 
a solid manner as in all revolutions.  As Islamism is the pivotal ideology that will steer 
the course of the Arab revolutions, then ‘the slogans and principles must be refined and 
brought in line with the foundations and undisputed principles of Islam.’704  
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Khamenei adds that the principles of Islam are already a source of inspiration for 
addressing the predominant problems of the Middle Eastern nations today, where he says 
‘Independence, freedom, justice, refusal to bow to despotism and colonialism, rejection 
of ethnic, racial, and religious discrimination, and the outright rejection of Zionism, 
which, today, comprise the pivots of the movements in Islamic countries, are all inspired 
by Islam and the Quran.’705 Secondly, Islamic Awakening is not an ideological movement 
without a political end. Rather, the Islamic Awakening is a movement that aims the 
establishment of an Islamic political system in the end. That system is institutionalized in 
velayet-e faqih in the case of Islamic Republic of Iran and it entertains the idea that the 
Islamic state is governed by an elected Shia cleric of a high theological rank. Velayet-e 
faqih thus requires the pre-existence of a well-established Islamic clerical system which 
would generate religio-political rulers. Iran could establish this system due to the 
existence of Shia clerical hawza of Qom as well as the majority of Shia population. 
However, the Iranian regime was convinced after the leveling down its ‘export of the 
revolution’ policy that the specific socio-political context in each country might not be 
suitable for a very specific political idea like velayet-e faqih.  
 
However, this also has not prevented the Islamic Regime’s desire to see similar 
Islamic regimes elsewhere, if not velayet-e faqih itself. Therefore, the Islamic Republic 
never dubbed velayet-faqih as an alternative political system to that of Arab 
authoritarianism during the Arab uprisings, and propagated for electoral Islam or ‘Islamic 
democracy’ in its stead. For one thing, at its very core, Iran self-identifies its government 
system as an ‘Islamic democracy’ as opposed to the Western ‘liberal democracy,’ which 
the Iranian regime associates with a liberal-modern understanding of societal functioning 
as well as on Western human rights values.706 Islamic democracy is thus already seen as 
compatible with the core of the Islamic Republic. For another, a very important demand 
by the people who participated in the Arab uprisings was ‘to have a decisive participation 
in the management of their countries.’707 According to Ayatollah Khamenei, ‘since they 
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believe in Islam, their desire is to have a system of Islamic democracy, i.e. the rulers being 
elected through the vote of the people and the dominant principles and values of the 
society being based on the Islamic knowledge and Sharia.’708 All in all, the Islamic 
Awakening referred to a popular revolutionary movement by the Arab nations against 
their authoritarian Arab leaders and the establishment of an electoral system based on the 
principles of political Islam at its very basic sense which will be shaped by the specific 
contextual variables of each nation.     
 
When it comes to the leadership of the region-wide Islamic Awakening movement, 
the Islamic Republic sees itself as the founder and current leader of the movement. 
Ayatollah Khamenei says; 
 
   ‘A wave of Islamic revival and awakening has swept through the Islamic 
world, and Muslim nations are expressing a strong desire to return to Islam 
and practice this lofty religion. This awakening has stemmed from the great 
Islamic revolution of the Iranian people under the leadership of our late 
magnanimous Imam. […] The enemies told us not to export our Islamic 
revolution! We said that revolution could not be exported, since it is not a 
commodity! However, our Islamic revolution, like the scent of spring flowers 
that is carried by the breeze, reached every corner of the Islamic world and 
brought about an Islamic revival in Muslim nations.’709 
 
Ayatollah Khamenei argues that the Iranian slogans shouted by the Iranian people 
on Iranian streets now resonate on the Arab Street throughout the region, which means 
that they are following the same goals as the Iranian nation and that they ‘have joined the 
Iranian nation as progressive forces, thanks to the determination of their people.’710 
However, Ayatollah Khamenei does not claim that they have led to the Arab uprisings. 
He rather sees the Iranian Revolution as a model to be emulated by the Arab nations today. 
As such, he argues that ‘it is also illogical to say that the awakening of the Iranian nation 
and the uproar it has caused over the past three decades has had no effect on the 
awakening of other nations.’711 In other words, Iran has the potential to inspire other 
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nations in the region and to lead a collective effort in creating a more independent and 
self-standing Middle East by putting Islam at the center of its ideology and system. With 
its 40 years of experience in Islamic revolutionary state building, Iran is regarded to be a 
model for other states.712 In Ayatollah Khamenei’s words, if the world of Islam is making 
‘a historical turn,’ ‘The Islamic Republic is the manager and director of this great event. 
Of course, the players are many. The doers, agents and activists in the world of Islam are 
many, but the manager is the Islamic Republic.’713 
 
All in all, in the Islamic Republic’s discourse, the Islamic Awakening refers to 
political Islam as a viable alternative to other political ideologies for solving the socio-
economic and political problems experienced by the peoples of the Arab nations living 
under authoritarian Arab regimes that are allied with the colonialist powers. The Islamic 
Awakening is building a governing system based on electoral Islamism, i.e. Islamic 
democracy. According to this discourse, the 1979 Revolution showed that Islamic 
Awakening is a power that will ultimately change the political order in the region. In this 
respect, the Islamic Republic is the very ‘mother of Islamic awakening and Islamic 
movement,’ which is regarded to have the resources to inform the Middle Eastern nations 
on ideological and institution-building fronts for accomplished Arab revolutions.714  
 
The discourse data shows that the frequency of the term ‘Islamic Awakening’ 
gradually decreases in Ayatollah Khamenei’s speeches in 2014. The coup d’état in Egypt 
and the civil war in Libya deflated the Iranian optimism regarding the Islamic movements 
in the region. The Iranian demoralization about the North African uprisings, the sectarian 
war in Syria, the rise of Wahhabi groups, and the emerging Sunni jihadism across Syrian 
and Iraqi territories shifted the Iranian attention to alternative discourses matching the 
reality on the field. The shift would also reflect Iran’s growing military activism in the 
Middle East, i.e. how it rationalized and legitimized this activism on the field.     
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5.3.  Popular Mobilization 
 
 
 
The idea of popular mobilization is delivered by Ayatollah Khamenei and IRGC 
officials with several concepts such as ‘people’s presence,’ ‘reliance on people,’ ‘popular 
support,’ ‘indigenous forces,’ and ‘Basij’ in the analyzed texts.  The term has both political 
and military connotations. Politically, if the Islamic Awakening is the aspiration for a new 
political order in the region, popular mobilization is the basic strategy for accomplished 
Arab revolutions. In this respect, popular mobilization refers to the very revolutionary 
characteristic of the uprisings and emphasizes the action aspect of the revolution which 
is performed by and for the people. The popular mobilization in this sense refers to the 
centrality of the masses of people in the revolutionary moment against the existing 
regime. In its military sense, popular mobilization means the volunteer-based armed 
mobilization strategy modelled on the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps 
(IRGC) and the Basij. 
 
Ayatollah Khamenei used the terms ‘people’s presence’ and ‘popular support’ to 
emphasize the centrality of people and masses in the revolutionary action hoped to be 
accomplished on the Arab streets. He maintained that ‘the most important element of the 
wave of Islamic Awakening is the presence of the people in the arena of action, battle and 
jihad.’715 Therefore, people who were there for Islamic Awakening ‘were present, not 
only with their heart, desire and faith, but also with their body and souls.’716 The idea is 
that the presence of population masses gives them their revolutionary character and 
action. He often invokes the traditional ‘oppressor’ and ‘oppressed’ categories of 
Khomeini’s revolutionary ideology in this respect. He perceives the existing regime elites 
and militaries as ‘oppressors,’ whereas ‘People and the elite that are of the people and 
others who are from the people are the true owners of these revolutions that should be 
trusted to protect them and draw the path to the future.’717 The public character of these 
movements is important, as the existing political leaders who are the bearers of corruption 
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and despotism giving rise to the outbreak of these popular movements are supported by 
foreign powers who aspire to have their own share in these movements.718  
 
Khamenei also refers to the revolutionary movements of 1950s and 1960s in North 
Africa and Asia, were the ‘the heavy load of the revolution was not on the shoulder of 
diverse segments of population and the youth from all parts of the country, but rather on 
the shoulder of coup d’état or small and limited armed groups.’719 Khamenei argues that 
when these elements interfere in the popular movement, ‘the revolution became its own 
enemy’ and the foreign powers managed to re-force themselves on these countries.720 
Accordingly, the people as well as their struggle for the revolutionary movement 
constitute the true element of the revolution, whereas the existing regimes and the 
militaries they are struggling against are allied with external forces as per the Iranian 
revolutionary logic. According to Khamenei, popular support is not only important for 
successful revolutions, but also for fighting against foreign intervention and imperialism 
as well. In the conference on Islamic Awakening organized by Iran in 2012, Khamenei 
assures the world of Islam that ‘strengthening popular support’ should be a priority for 
Islamic governments.721 The Islamic governments should gain the backing of the masses, 
as the real power comes from the people.722 Regarding this point, he adds; 
 
   ‘Islamic governments should not separate themselves from the people. The 
people have certain expectations and needs. The real power is in the hands of 
the people. Whenever the people hold demonstrations, whenever they become 
firmly united and whenever they unanimously support their leaders and 
government officials, then America and even powers that are greater than 
America cannot do anything to harm them. We should maintain the support 
of the people and you intellectuals, authors, poets and religious scholars can 
do this. The most significant people are religious scholars who have a heavy 
responsibility. They should clarify for people what they want and where they 
are going. They should enlighten them about the problems and the enemy. 
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They should help the people remain vigilant. In this way, no harm will be 
inflicted on the Islamic Ummah.’723 
 
Once the Iranian hopes for accomplished Islamic Revolutions faded, the civil 
conflicts in Syria, Iraq, and elsewhere escalated and Iran’s military involvement became 
more accentuated, policy elites used popular mobilization discourse within the framework 
of security and military policy. Related concepts invoked in this sense are ‘indigenous 
forces,’ ‘localization of security,’ ‘Basiji.’ The central theme around which the popular 
mobilization discourse is invoked in a military sense is two-fold. First, it refers to Iran’s 
own institutional model for security, the volunteer-based armed mobilization model and 
culture in the revolutionary period and its immediate aftermath, the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq 
War. Second, especially in the IRGC usage of the term, it refers to the Iranian experience 
in volunteer-based mobilization being promoted by the IRGC as a ‘model’ for similar 
institutional build-ups in other countries.   
 
In the Iranian experience, the revolutionary action was as much about institution-
building as popular presence. The revolutionary movement created its own mobilization 
strategy by ordinary people. As discussed before, the war with Iraq in the immediate 
aftermath of the revolution put the new regime and ideology at an existential risk and 
necessitated the establishment of new security and military institutions for the survival of 
the regime, which were IRGC and Basij. It should be noted that both institutions emerged 
and flourished under circumstances where the existing regular army and security forces 
were weakened during revolution and hence were insufficient to counter the security 
threats. A plausible strategy was to arm the ordinary people for a military end. The long-
term effect of this process was a peculiar Iranian security culture which rested on 
unconventional forces, ‘people’s war,’ popular mobilization, and human wave tactics.724 
The Iranian exceptionalism in military strength and influence in the region, despite the 
weakness of conventional capabilities compared to other regional players, comes from 
this security culture that rests on unconventional forces and popular mobilization.  
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Another point to emphasize is the religious aspect of this popular mobilization in 
the Iranian security culture. The power of religion manifests at the level of religious 
narratives, the narrative of Karbala event, the ‘oppression’ of the first Shias by the 
‘oppressor’ Umayyad dynasty in the 7th century AD, the martyrdom and sacrifice of Imam 
Hossein for faith and the defense of the community. Accordingly, the Karbala narrative 
of the Shia faith added the ingredient of motivation for the mobilization of the Shias.725 
This Karbala narrative of the Shia faith became a central component of Iranian popular 
mobilization during the Holy Defense War.726 In other words, the Islamic Republic 
citizens volunteered for the defense of the new Islamic regime in a similar way the great 
Shia martyr Imam Hossein fought during the battle of Karbala against the Umayyad 
dynasty during the 7th century AD. The Karbala narrative became a mobilizational force 
for the ordinary Shia people who had to defend the Islamic Republic against an external 
power. 
 
The IRGC staff’s speeches continue to consistently accentuate the revolutionary, 
popular, and religious aspects of this ideological army after forty years of existence today. 
A news article on Sepah News emphasized that the IRGC is a ‘revolutionary’ and ‘popular 
institution.’727 The same source emphasizes the religious aspect of this institution, where 
the IRGC is ‘the product of faith, spirituality, revolutionary action, and the 
institutionalization of the jihadi spirit.’728 A commander of the IRGC implied that the 
IRGC has surpassed that of an institution and has become a defense school, a defense 
mentality and a defense brand on this own, where he stated ‘During the sacred defense, 
the Revolutionary Guards managed to create the Islamic Revolutionary school of defense, 
a defense school that came from Ashura school, not military strategies taught in military 
schools of the world. And this school responded to various forms of wars such as irregular 
wars and urban wars.’729 Given the security situation in the Middle East today, the IRGC 
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portrays itself as ‘the security shield of the Iranian nation and the Islamic Ummah,’ ‘along 
with the Islamic resistance in Syria and Iraq.’730 An element of pride is detectable in the 
IRGC-related texts when talking about the successful institutionalization and influence 
of ‘this revolutionary and pious army.’731 The Sepah News article says that the IRGC ‘has 
undeniably made their global fame,’ over the course of forty years by being ‘selflessly 
present in the areas of high-risk situations and where there is a need for revolution.’732 
 
The second popular mobilization institution in the Iranian experience is the Iranian 
Basij. Ayatollah Khamenei places special emphasis on the Basij in his speeches as the 
epitome of popular mobilization model. As discussed before, the Basij has a very specific 
definition in Khamenei’s words, where it refers to ‘a group of people who show their 
presence in the middle of the arena and anywhere necessary with lofty divine goals and 
with an untiring spirit, who show their talents and bring all of their capacities to the arena, 
and who are not afraid of the dangers of this path.’733 Basij does not only operate within 
the military or security structure and this form of popular mobilization covers a wide area 
of activity, or a ‘wide scope of presence in military, scientific, and artistic arenas.’734 
Accordingly, a Basiji is a person who ‘is prepared […] for laying down his life and 
sacrificing things that are even dearer to his life.’735 The Basij was originally proposed by 
Imam Khomeini, who envisioned the establishment of ‘an army of 20 million people’ 
inside the regime, who would be constantly ‘prepared for armed defense’ against ‘global 
oppression, international hegemony of superpowers, imposed backwardness and 
arrogance.’736 The emphasis on preparedness for defense, being on the arena for action, 
and sacrifice signalize the Islamic concept of jihad as the basis of Basij development. In 
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this respect, jihad should be understood as defense of the faith and faith community and 
resistance against any aggressor thereto. On a theoretical level, Basij should thus be 
considered as a collective endeavor and institutionalized form of defensive jihad or 
resistance. In a 2005 speech, Ayatollah Khamenei emphasizes this point; 
 
   ‘Basij is the manifestation of national resistance and the presence of the 
people on the scene. Basij is the manifestation of our nation's awareness, the 
kind of awareness that is accompanied by vibrancy, spirituality and sincerity. 
There are certain individuals who are working for the enemies of our nation's 
dignity by undermining the value of jihad. You know that in certain countries 
in the region, the Americans are trying to purge textbooks of the ayahs that 
are related to jihad. They have insisted that this should be done and certain 
weak and pathetic governments have accepted their demands. They want to 
eliminate jihad from the Holy Quran and Islamic teachings. This is because 
jihad in the way of God ensures the dignity of Muslim nations and the Islamic 
Ummah and it is the most important base for resistance. They tried to promote 
the idea that martyrdom is simplistic and naive. This is while martyrdom is 
one of the most valuable outcomes of jihad. Jihad can completely reveal its 
significance only when it is accompanied by a commitment to martyrdom. 
Jihad and martyrdom are two important values of the Basij movement. Our 
honorable Basijis have made good progress so far. It is necessary to continue 
making progress. There is no doubt that this role model in our dear country 
will play a role in the world.’737 
 
Basij is an institutionalized popular resistance force in the Iranian experience, and 
hence is centrally related to the theme of resistance. It is the Iranian and Islamic version 
of popular resistance forces across the world, which mobilized under the circumstances 
of political issues, conflict, and revolutionary activities. According to Ayatollah 
Khamenei, what differentiated the Iranian Basiji formation from others was the longevity 
and consolidation of this force in the Iranian experience; 
 
   ‘The phenomenon of Basij is an innovative phenomenon. This does not 
mean that in other countries and places, popular resistance forces have not 
existed. We know that they have, but resistance forces in different countries 
in the world – in the west, in the east and the like – emerged during the time 
of political suppression and pressure, and revolutionary activities. After such 
revolutionary activities came to an end, either these resistance forces came to 
power themselves or others came to power with their assistance. After that, 
their resistance force and their popular organization stopped pursuing their 
activities. This has been the case in the world. Those who are familiar with 
popular resistance forces in Africa, Europe and Asia and in different countries 
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are aware of this. For example, during the time of the domination of the 
French over Algeria, popular resistance forces were formed and they fought 
for many years. They fought hard perhaps for eight, ten years and they 
endured many difficulties. However, after the formation of a revolutionary 
government, no trace of such forces remained. Some of them came to power 
and some of them formed a party, but nothing like a resistance force survived. 
Another example is France during the time when it was occupied by 
Germany. During that time, resistance forces existed – leftists, rightists and 
conservatives – and they fought very hard, but after liberation from German 
occupation and the formation of a government, no trace of such forces was 
seen and they were gone.’738  
 
Both the IRGC and the Basij emerged as the institutional pillars of an Iranian 
security culture based on popular mobilization. It is therefore no coincidence that, as 
discussed in the previous chapter, both institutions acquire a central place in the Islamic 
Republic’s foreign policy implementation in the Middle East. In the IRGC’s discourses 
of ‘indigenous defense’ and ‘localization of security,’ which means basing the security 
system on popular, local, and indigenous forces, has characterized the Iranian success in 
deterring the security threats posed by the developments in the region. In this respect, 
Major General Safavi of IRGC says ‘Despite the insecurity and instability of security 
beyond the borders of the Islamic Republic of Iran, […] the indigenous security features 
inside the country have prevented insecurity from entering the country.’739 In a similar 
vein, the representative of the Supreme Leader to IRGC stated that ‘reliance on 
indigenous defense’ as well as ‘resistance and jihadist organization’ has been the primary 
strategy of enhancing internal power in the face of the conflicts in the Middle East 
today.740 Besides enhancing the Iranian deterrence capacity against regional threats, 
popular mobilization as indicated by the concepts of ‘people’s presence,’ ‘reliance on 
people,’ ‘indigenous forces,’ and ‘Basiji’ has also served as discursive mechanisms for 
the mobilization of Shias in the region. The Iranian predominance in the mobilization of 
Shia armed groups and paramilitary organizations, despite the multivocality of Shia 
revival and political leadership in the Middle East, can be attributed to the forty years of 
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experience, accumulated resources, and organization capacity of the Islamic Republic in 
popular mobilization.  
 
As discussed before, the IRGC-related media outlets portray both the IRGC and 
the Basij as a model for mobilization in the region. A message released by Chief of Staff 
of the Iranian Armed Forces Major General Mohammad Hossein Baqeri in 2016 for the 
37th anniversary of the formation of the Iranian Basij said that the Iranian Basij can be an 
inspiration for the foundation of an Islamic World Basij.741 The same news article 
published by Tasnim News Agency, an agency close to IRGC, continued saying that 
‘Inspired by the Iranian Basij, a similar organization has been established in Iraq, known 
as the Popular Mobilization Units or Hashd al-Shaabi.’742 In a similar vein, a news site 
close to the Iranian Basij quoted a spokesperson for the Hashd al-Shaabi saying that the 
Iraqi Hashd al-Shaabi are a continuation of the Iranian Basijis, where the Iraqi 
counterparts relied heavily on the Iranian Basij experience.743 The same news article 
continued quoting Nouri al-Maliki saying that the Iraqi government adopted the form and 
structure of the Iranian Basij when establishing the Hashd al-Shaabi.744 In a foreign 
policy analysis published in the Payam-e Enghelab, the official policy journal of IRGC, 
the self-acclamation by Iranian security forces as a model is evident:    
  
   ‘This, the dialogue between popular forces such as Jaysh al-Sha'abi in Syria 
and Hashd al-Shaabi in Iraq, which is based on the modeling of the IRGC 
and the Iranian Basiji, is an indication of the influence of Iran's sovereignty 
in the neighboring countries. Without doubt, what has made IRGC popular in 
the neighborhood is not only the military power and the deterrence capacity, 
but also the influence of divine values and the jihadist thinking. The young 
people who have formed the Islamic resistance in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and 
Bahrain these days are the same youth who have modelled on the ideals of 
Islamic resistance, martyr Sayyed Abbas Mousavi, or the Lebanese Party. 
Today it is thanks to both the military power and this jihadist thinking 
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dominant in the IRGC that the strategic depth of the Islamic Republic is 
beyond its territorial boundaries.’745  
 
In conclusion, popular mobilization, both as a discourse and as a strategy, is the 
basis of Iran’s security culture. Iran’s state-to-sub-state relations in the Middle East region 
rests on popular mobilization. Iran relies on the idea of ‘people’s presence,’ ‘Basij,’ and 
‘indigenous forces’ as a strategy for revolutionary action, as a legitimation tool for armed 
mobilization, and as a self-acclaimed organizational model of a security institution for its 
Middle Eastern audience today. Religious narratives of Karbala, martyrdom, and jihadi 
thinking accompany popular mobilization. The discourse attains further relevance when 
combined with the discourse of ‘resistance’ and Iran’s alliance-network associated with 
it, which will be discussed in the next section.     
 
 
 
5.4.  Resistance 
 
 
 
Resistance is the most frequently used discourse by the Iranian political and 
military elites. In the modern Islamic intellectual thought, the concept refers to the Islamic 
nations’ resistance against Western imperialism and colonialism over the Muslim lands.746 
Walberg traces the emergence of Islamic resistance to Abd al-Wahhab’s Salafism in this 
respect, where the return to the essence of Islam by ‘the strict emulation of the prophetic 
way of life and thought’ was a reaction to Western colonization and the penetration of 
their economic, social, and political models into the Muslim territories in the 18th 
century.747 In the 19th century, al-Wahhab’s idea of countering colonization developed 
into political activism, where Jamal al-Din al-Afghani of Iran advocated the idea of pan-
Islamism as a political ideology against British colonialism. He sought to unite Muslims 
around the idea of political Islam by organizing secret meetings, publishing leaflets, and 
participating in the assassination of the Iranian king at the time.748 In the 20th century, the 
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Muslim Brotherhood movement of Egypt, intellectually and organizationally led by 
Hasan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb, marked the hallmark of Islamic resistance in the Middle 
East.749 When political pressures forced Muslim Brotherhood cadres out of Egypt, the 
organization and ideology spread across the Middle East, encouraging similar 
organizational set-ups and alternative Islamist political movements in the region. The 
Islamic resistance was thus an intellectual and political movement against Western 
colonialism and imperialism in the Muslim world with a history of almost three centuries, 
spearheaded by both Sunni and Shia scholars alike.  
 
In the Iranian Islamic intellectual and political thought, the concept of ‘resistance’ 
(moqawamat in Persian) was widely embraced after the 1979 Islamic Revolution and the 
anti-imperialist and political Islamist content of the original movement was maintained. 
Today, ‘resistance’ is a multi-layered concept in the Iranian political discourse, blending 
a strong anti-imperialist ideology, revolutionary Islamism, and Shia narratives. Moreover, 
the content of the concept has gradually transformed in line with systemic changes. Today, 
if the Islamic Awakening is an aspiration for a new political order in the region and 
popular mobilization is the central strategy thereof, the idea of resistance adds the element 
of legitimacy. The discourse has several referents in the Islamic Republic’s Middle East 
policy. First, resistance refers to the Islamic Revolution of 1979, whose ideological 
background incorporates the idea of resistance to the authoritarian regime at home and 
foreign intervention abroad. Second, the revolutionary institutions in Iran use the concept 
in combination with Iran’s popular mobilization forces and security units, where it 
strongly overlaps with the discourse of popular mobilization. Third, the term refers to the 
anti-US and anti-Israel alliance network in the Middle East called ‘the axis of resistance’ 
(mehvar-e moqawamat in Persian) or ‘resistance front’ (cephe-ye mogawamat in Persian). 
Finally, the content of the ‘axis of resistance’ is reworked to encompass the Iran-led 
alliance network that further extends to the Shia elements across the region. In this last 
definition, ‘the axis of resistance’ approximates ‘the Shiite Crescent’ in a geographical 
sense. 
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The Islamic Republic’s mode of existence is one of resistance. With its 
revolutionary ideology and practice, the Islamic Republic has long claimed the mantle of 
anti-imperialist and Islamic resistance in the Middle East. The 1979 Revolution is 
ingrained in Islamic Republic’s self-identification as a moment of resistance first against 
the Shah regime, whose liberal-modernist reforms presumably disrupted the socio-
economic and political structure in Iran and augmented socio-political grievances at 
home. In addition to that, foreign interference in Iran’s key economic and governmental 
sectors by Western powers as well as the infiltration of western political and economic 
systems in Iran was another justification for resisting externally. The blend of ‘internal’ 
and ‘external’ reasons for resistance is invoked frequently in Ayatollah Khamenei’s 
speeches; 
 
   ‘Before the victory of the Islamic Revolution, Iran was part of US empire 
in this region. The former regime was quite loyal to the United States and 
implemented all the policies that were dictated to it by Washington. The 
national wealth of the Iranian people was at US disposal, and the three 
government branches were controlled by the United States. […] Despite all 
US support for the former regime, the Islamic movement culminated in 
victory, thanks to the strong resistance of the Iranian nation and the wise 
leadership of Imam Khomeini.’750  
 
It is clear in Khamenei’s speech that the USA is the main referent of resistance 
against imperialism. Nevertheless, one should approach the Iranian regime’s anti-US 
discourses from a more systemic perspective, where international system and the 
distribution of socio-economic and political power maintained by the USA is more central 
to the  anti-imperialism discourse of the Iranian leadership than the USA per se. 
Khomeini’s traditional conceptualization of ‘oppression’ and ‘global arrogance’ refers to 
this very US hegemony. The resistance of the Muslim countries and Iran is against the 
hegemony, i.e. ‘the global arrogance,’ or estekbar in the Iranian political discourse. The 
Islamic resistance in the Muslim lands is thus portrayed as the most powerful strategy to 
end this ‘global arrogance.’ This line of thinking is compatible with the original use of 
the term by former Islamist resistance movements. Ayatollah Khamenei’s remarks in the 
occasion of pilgrimage in 2001 makes this point clear; 
  
                                                
750 Ali Khamenei, ‘Leader’s Speech on Student’s Day,’ The Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei Website, November 
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   ‘The US and other arrogant Western powers have finally concluded that 
Muslim countries and nations, especially those of the Middle East, form the 
core of this awakening and resistance to their plans for global domination. If 
they fail to control or suppress this Islamic Awakening in the next few years 
through economic, political, propaganda and military tools, all their plans for 
an absolute global hegemony and control of the most vital oil and gas 
resources […] will be ruined. If that happens, big western and Zionist 
capitalists, who are the ones that control all the arrogant governments, will 
fall from the peak of their imposed power.’751  
 
Nevertheless, what differentiates the Iranian resistance from others is the 
culmination of this movement into a successful revolution, overthrowing a US-dependent 
regime and establishing a new Islamist political system. Ayatollah Khamenei thus 
portrays the Iranian Revolution as an inspirational moment and the exemplary model of 
an emancipatory Islamist political movement for other countries. His remarks in the 
occasion of National Day of Fighting Global Arrogance in 1990 is a case in point; 
 
   ‘Hope is awakening nations of the world. Undoubtedly, the victory of the 
Islamic Revolution in Iran, the establishment of a government, which was 
independent of the West and the East and promoting the policy of resistance 
against the arrogant powers, have been the most important source of hope for 
nations of the world during the past ten years. These realities gave hope to the 
people of the world, especially Muslims. These realities awakened the people 
of the world.’752  
  
If the Islamic revolution was the first pillar of resistance, the Holy Defense War 
was the second to test the strength and durability of the Iranian resistance movement. 
Related to this point, Interviewee 1, a researcher at a research center on Islamism in Iran, 
argues ‘The resistance culture, which is one of Khamenei’s discourses today, has roots in 
the Holy Defense War and the US policy of imperialism.’753 Ayatollah Khamenei 
reiterates this point often in his speeches, where he says that the war was a defensive war 
and a moment of resistance.754 The Iranian regime’s understanding of resistance during 
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the Holy War was systemic as well. As discussed before, the Islamic Republic viewed the 
eight-year-long war not only as a defense against the Iraqi regime, but  also against the 
international community and their regional allies who sought to uproot the new Islamic 
regime and its ideology. In the Iranian mind, the Islamic Republic proved the strength of 
its resistance against a plethora of players that seek to maintain the existing regional and 
international system. Regarding this point, Interviewee 1 also states; 
 
   ‘Regarding the Holy Defense War, Khomeini once said “Our enemy is not 
Iraq. All of the Western countries were supporting Iraq.’ Saddam was in 
opposition to the USA and USSR, but these countries along with the UK, 
Germany, and France all supported Iraq. The war was thus not a regional war, 
it was a philosophical and political war between the discourse of political 
Islam that appeared suddenly in the region and the West. It was an ideological 
warfare and the enemy was not the West, but the West led by the USA. 
Khamenei dissociates modernity from imperialism of the West as a political 
regime in his discourse. The enemy was not modernity itself, but the political 
systems of the West. Therefore, the “resistance’ was against American 
imperialism, and the war was defending Islam. The war was not intended for 
economic or political benefits. The war was holy, because it was protecting 
Islamic values. This “holy war’ and “resistance’ logic is the official discourse 
in Iran today.’755 
 
Because of both the revolutionary experience and the Holy War experience, the 
Islamic Republic identified itself as the institutional and governmental epitome of 
resistance. Related to this point, Ayatollah Khamenei refers to the Islamic Republic ‘as a 
government of resistance.’756 He specifically differentiates between ‘a government of 
resistance’ and a ‘personality’ of resistance or resistance ‘orientation,’ where the former 
‘has politics, an economy, international action, and an extensive influence zone inside 
and outside the country.’757 The governmental character of the Iranian resistance 
movement gives the Iranian state an element of extensiveness in its operations and power. 
Khamenei emphasizes this power element by stating that ‘Jihad and resistance in a nation 
is one of the sources of national power’ and that resistance means ‘adopting a position of 
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power’ against imperialist and colonialist powers.758 The implication here is that all 
resistance movements should end up in a governmental and institutional formulation, i.e. 
they should establish a resistant Islamic government in their countries of operation. 
According to the same logic, the Islamic Republic is the first example of an Islamic 
resistance movement turning into a government of resistance, which can inspire and 
support other Islamic resistance movements for the same aim. This marks the linkage 
between ‘the export of the revolution’ and ‘resistance’ logics in this respect.   
 
How does religion play out in the resistance discourse? It should be noted that the 
resistance against perceived imperialism and colonialism is one of Islamic resistance in 
the Iranian foreign policy discourse. Islam is always a basic element of resistance in 
Khamenei’s speeches for a number of reasons. First, political Islam, and thus Islamic 
Awakening, is considered and portrayed as a ‘power’ against the existing US-maintained 
system in the region. This makes Islam an opposition force to and a target of opposition 
for ‘global arrogance’ in the Iranian discourse. This is highlighted in a 1989 Khamenei 
speech, where he says; 
 
   ‘The opposition of the arrogant powers to Islam is not limited to what they 
did to Iran, the people of Iran, and the Islamic Republic, rather opposition to 
Islam was seriously pursued on a larger scale through political and 
propaganda campaigns as well as through cultural methods. The pressure that 
has been mounted on Muslim activists, freedom fighters, religious scholars 
and intellectuals in Islamic countries by the regimes which are dependent on 
America, the pressure that has been mounted on Muslim minorities in non-
Islamic countries, the clear cases of a political battle against Islam, producing 
articles, books and insulting films against Islam and distributing them in 
Islamic and non-Islamic environments – these are clear cases of the cultural 
battle against Islam.’759  
    
Second, Islam’s relevance to the fight against ‘global arrogance’ comes in its 
capacity to form a collective identity. Uniting the Muslim nations as a front against 
‘arrogance,’ bringing together the Islamic Ummah under the experienced leadership of 
the Islamic Republic is put forward as a force to fight against Western-inflicted crises in 
the region. Ayatollah Khamenei states;     
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   ‘Economic powers are capable of creating crises. It is economic powers 
who create crises, wage wars and establish violent and brutal regimes […]. It 
is necessary to challenge them. What is it that can challenge them? A vibrant 
collective international identity that relies on religious faith. It is this 
collective identity that would prevent humanity from feeling tired. Except for 
vibrant religious faith, everything else would cause exhaustion in the long 
run. A collective international identity can challenge those powers, reduce 
their influence and ultimately eliminate them. By Allah's favor, this goal will 
be achieved under the just rule of the Imam of the Age. […] Today this 
collective international identity is in the process of formation and the Islamic 
Republic is the core.’760  
 
Third, borrowing again from the discourse of ‘Islamic Awakening,’ the leadership 
believed that successful resistance depends on the level of institutionalization of these 
movements. Khamenei again invokes ‘the government of resistance’ in this respect, 
where he argues that only a governmental system built on Islamic resistance can fight 
against oppression. In his address to the members of the Assembly of Experts in 2016, he 
says; 
 
   ‘Only the kind of Islam that enjoys a government, a military force, media, 
politics, economy and many tools and instruments can annihilate kufr and 
oppression or restrict and prevent it from transgressing. Only the kind of 
Islam that has managed to build a system and establish a government can 
resist. Otherwise, if individuals – although they might be outstanding 
Muslims – and Islamic movements, like the ones that exist in the world, do 
not move towards the goal of establishing a government, they will not cause 
any danger to arrogance.’761 
 
Finally, religious narratives merge with the discourse of popular mobilization and 
form the mobilizational aspect of ‘resistance’ discourse. In this respect, Iran’s popular 
mobilization model and security institutions are called resistance forces and the term 
refers to the basic institutional tool for resistance. A survey of Ayatollah Khamenei’s 
speeches show that Khamenei uses the term predominantly when addressing the IRGC, 
Basij, and Imam Hossein University students, which is tasked with training IRGC staff 
for the Islamic Republic. In this respect, Ayatollah Khamenei defines Basij as ‘the 
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manifestation of national resistance.’762 In a similar vein, a statement by IRGC on Sepah 
News stated that ‘IRGC has not only proved influential in regional and global affairs as 
a defensive military force, but has also revealed itself as a model and thinking of the 
resistance’ for other nations who are looking to their independence.763 Religious 
narratives again serve as strong mobilization and institution-building forces. Khamenei’s 
speeches bear strong religious connotations when he talks about resistance forces. He 
highlights the Shia narratives of Karbala, i.e. Imam Hossein’s defense and martyrdom 
during Karbala Battle, as one of resistance.764 The ideas of jihad, sacrifice, and 
martyrdom emerge as the basic tenets of resistance in this respect.765 The popular 
mobilization model, achieved by the participation of ordinary people and the mobilization 
of authentic and indigenous forces, serve as the Islamic Republic’s resistance forces. The 
religious and Shia elements are invoked to create a legitimizing discursive narrative for 
resistance.      
 
How does the idea of ‘resistance’ play out in actual foreign policy making on a 
more practical level? After the 1979 Revolution, the idea of ‘resistance’ played out in the 
Holy Defense War and ‘export of the revolution’ during the first decade of the revolution. 
Today, the anti-imperialist conceptualization of resistance manifests politically and 
diplomatically in Iran’s relations with the wider international community. Iran’s nuclear 
program, an issue which predominantly intrigues the international community’s relations 
with the Islamic Republic, is the epitome of Iranian diplomatic resistance against the West 
today. In this respect, Iran’s years-long insistence on the nuclear program until the signing 
of the JCPOA can be considered as a policy of resistance against the international nuclear 
status-quo sealed by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime, which is considered to be 
highly contentious and discriminatory by the Iranian leadership.766 Iran considers its 
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nuclear program as a proof of scientific development and technological modernization, 
accomplished through technological independence from other nations and a self-standing 
attitude. In the Iranian logic, the international community’s response to Iran’s resistance 
was the strict imposition of economic sanctions on Iran. The Supreme Leader reacted to 
the economic sanctions by what he termed as ‘the economy of resistance’ in return. ‘The 
economy of resistance’ is about optimal management of the economy under strict 
international pressures. In his speeches, Ayatollah Khamenei described the characteristics 
of resistance economy as ‘putting the people in charge of economy,’ ‘minimizing the 
nation’s dependence on oil,’ ‘managing consumption,’ ‘using domestically produced 
products,’ ‘developing plans - such as the targeted subsidy plan,’ and ‘strengthening 
national production.’767 In other words, the resistance economy is an economic model 
based on self-sufficiency in the face of international sanctions on the Iranian economy.768 
In short, the Iranian insistence on the nuclear program and the resistance economy are the 
manifestations of diplomatic and political resistance against the West.  
  
Nevertheless, the idea of resistance manifests more on the military front as an 
alliance strategy. Since the 1979 Revolution, the Islamic Republic has used the term, both 
with its anti-imperialist and Islamist connotations, to refer to political and armed groups 
sharing an anti-imperialist, anti-US, and Islamist political vision. In this 
conceptualization, the Lebanese Hezbollah and Palestinian Resistance groups were the 
first to become the referents of Islamic resistance. The term resistance is very widely used 
in Iran’s political discourse in referring to Lebanese Hezbollah and Palestinian resistance. 
Since the revolution, the Islamic Republic has adopted a very clear position on the Israel-
Palestine issue, where the regime openly declared its ideological and moral opposition to 
‘Zionism’ and openly supported the build-up and further empowerment of Lebanese 
Hezbollah against Israel. Upon recommendation by Ebrahim Yazdi, the first prime 
minister of the Islamic Republic, Ayatollah Khomeini announced the last Friday of 
Ramadan as the International Qods Day in 1979.769 In an international conference 
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organized in 2006 for the Holy Qods, Ayatollah Khamenei used the resistance discourse 
for both Lebanon and Palestine; 
 
   ‘Religious faith, to which the Palestinian nation strongly adheres, gradually 
created some bright spots on the dark and gloomy horizon, thanks to the firm 
determination of patient and persevering mujahedin, and gave rise to hopes 
and motivation. At this time, the sun of 'Islamic Revolution' suddenly rose in 
the east, and the hoisted flag of this divine revolution was embellished with 
the words 'Allah', 'the Islamic Sharia' and 'Palestine.' […] The jihadi groups 
devoted to Islam emerged in Palestine and Lebanon and constituted a 
generation of dedicated and determined combatants. Jihad and martyrdom 
were revitalized and the genuine power, namely the power of a nation that 
was intent on resistance and self-sacrifice, attained its due status in the 
equations of Palestine and the region.’770 
 
In Ayatollah Khamenei’s speeches, the Palestinian Hamas and Islamic Jihad, the 
Lebanese Hezbollah and any other group that is fighting against Zionism are defined as 
resistance groups.771 He is also quite vocal about Iranian support and political assistance 
to various Islamic resistance groups that are in harmony with Iran’s anti-Zionism and 
resistance discourses. In a speech delivered in a conference on Palestinian intifada in 
2017, Khamenei pays tribute to several groups such as Saraya al-Quds from Islamic Jihad, 
Kataeb al-Izz ad-Din al-Qassam from Hamas, Kataeb al-Shuhada al-Aqsa from Fath as 
playing important roles for the Islamic resistance.772 He also reiterates Iranian support for 
any group involved in the resistance movement;  
 
   ‘Our position on the Resistance is a fundamental position, one which has 
nothing to do with any particular group. We are with every group that is 
steadfast on this path and every group that abandons this path has drifted away 
from us. The depth of our relationship with groups involved in the Islamic 
Resistance is only dependent on the level of their commitment to the principle 
of the Resistance.’773 
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The Palestinian resistance and Hezbollahi resistance are considered to be part of the 
same international movement headed by the Iranian Resistance. Like the Islamic 
Awakening and popular mobilization, ‘the Iranian model’ mindset is also apparent in the 
resistance discourse. In this respect, Ayatollah Khamenei says that the Islamic Republic 
and its revolutionary moment is ‘a model and lesson for other nations’ including Palestine 
and Lebanon, as ‘The Palestinians said to us, "We learned from you." The people of 
Lebanon too repeatedly said to us that they learned from us.’774 A self-acclaimed model 
of resistance for the Lebanese and Palestinian resistance movements, the Iranian 
leadership reiterates its position on ‘providing [the Palestinian and Lebanese resistance] 
with whatever assistance they need until they achieve their final victory.’775  
 
Iran’s relations with resistance groups fighting against Israel culminated in an 
alliance system over time, where especially the IRGC and affiliated sources began to use 
the term ‘resistance’ in combination with the terms ‘axis’ and/or ‘front’ and called this 
alliance system ‘the axis of resistance’ and/or ‘resistance front.’776 Former professor of 
international relations Abbas Khalaji defines the ‘resistance front’ ‘both [as] a religious 
and strategic issue.’777 He continues;  
 
   ‘Religiously, this front has the responsibility of providing support to Shia 
groups. We look at this issue from a revolutionary perspective. Before the 
revolution, Feth, Jihad, Hamas, Hezbollah were being supported. 
Strategically, the USA, Zionism, and Israel are the biggest enemies. Iran and 
the resistance front had to open up a strategic front to fight against the USA 
and Zionism.778 
 
Hossein Malaek, a former Iranian diplomat and foreign policy expert, 
reemphasizes that ‘the resistance axis’ originally relates to the resolution of the 
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Palestinian issue.779 According to Malaek, the USA was aware of this axis as early as 
1990s, when it proposed the two-state solution.780 He argued that the two-state solution 
was an acknowledgement that an anti-US and anti-Israeli ‘axis of resistance’ existed in 
the region, which was expected to fall with the acceptance of the solution.781 Malaek also 
emphasizes the highly ideological nature of the axis, as the axis had an Islamist 
orientation and encompassed the Islamic movements from Hamas to Iranian Shias.782  
 
The anti-US and anti-Israeli ‘axis of resistance’ gained an increasingly strategic 
character when with the consolidation of Iran-Syria alliance during the Iran-Iraq War and 
Lebanon’s War with Israel. Over the years, Syria has proved to be a dependable ally for 
Iran serving as a route to Lebanese Hezbollah and supporting the Lebanese Hezbollah 
against Israel, despite its secular and Baathist political ideology. Syria has thus become a 
central component of ‘the axis of resistance’ alliance, whose relevance proved to be even 
more critical after 2011. Interviewee Mostafa Dehghan emphasizes the strategic role of 
Syria in ‘the axis of resistance’ alliance in this respect. He argues ‘Iran has dependence 
on Syria and the Assad regime in the sense that Syria is the route to reach Lebanon, a safe 
place for Iran to arrange its meetings with Hezbollah, and transfer weapons. Therefore, 
Iran has the policy of “resistance axis,’ which includes Lebanon, Palestine, Syria, and 
Iran.’783 In a similar vein, Interviewee 8 also emphasizes the strategic centrality of Syria 
for ‘the axis of resistance’ where he says that the Syrian uprisings and the Syrian civil 
war were considered by Iran ‘as weakening the resistance front,’ where both are 
considered to be arranged by foreign powers to weaken the Iran-Hezbollah-Syria 
alliance.784  
 
The IRGC and affiliated sources used the term ‘axis of resistance’ frequently to 
refer to the Iran-led alliance network of Iran, Hezbollah, Syria, and Palestinian resistance 
groups after 2011 in the region. Like Interviewee 8, these sources also emphasized the 
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centrality of Syria in preserving the alliance. The discourse also boded well with Iran’s 
military engagement in the Syrian conflict and unfailing support for the Assad regime. 
The Supreme Leader’s advisor to IRGC said ‘the strategy of the Islamic Republic of Iran 
in Syria focuses on the axis of resistance and the preservation of Syria as the core of the 
resistance.’785 ‘The axis of resistance’ became a legitimizing discourse for the Iranian 
regime’s strategic calculations in the region after 2011, without underemphasizing the 
religious and ideological dimensions of the axis though. An IRGC commander stated that 
‘Iran is a serious actor in the region, the hope and shelter of the Islamic world, and the 
main sponsor of the countries of the axis of resistance.’786   
    
 Iran’s ‘axis of resistance’ discourse is quite dynamic, rather than static, where both 
its ideological and strategic content and referents expand as allowed by political 
circumstances. Accordingly, IRGC commanders and affiliated sources have included Iraq 
and Yemen into the Iran-Hezbollah-Syria-Palestine alliance during the past couple of 
years. The content of the concept expanded in parallel to increased IRGC assistance to 
the Syrian regime, the Iraqi Shias, and Yemeni Houthis. A Sepah News article, quoting 
an IRGC commander called Jamal al-Din Abromand, uses the ‘axis of resistance’ term 
with its content expanded;    
 
   ‘The events that we see today in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen indicate 
that global arrogance is seeking to eradicate the issue of Islam in the region 
or change it to non-revolutionary Islam. […] Today, Syria is the front line of 
the resistance front, and we feel it all the way. […] Iranian nation will not 
forget Syria's assistance to Iran during the imposed war of global arrogance 
and Saddam and by God's grace, the standing and resistance of the nation, the 
army and the government of Syria will eventually […] overcome its terrorists 
and enemies. We believe that the task of the war is determined on the ground, 
[and] we will use all our capabilities to help win the resistance front, and like 
the holy defense period, there should be commanders in the middle of the 
field.’787  
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  The Revolutionary Guard Corps call ‘the axis of resistance’ as an alliance system 
in the region. The ever-changing regional balances are quickly reflected into the content 
of the discourse. In this respect, a 2017 analysis that appeared in Payam-e Enghelab 
portrayed the resistance axis as an alliance of Iraq, Syria, Iran, and Lebanese Hezbollah 
as opposed to Turkey and Saudi Arabia, who are claimed to coordinate with the USA and 
Israel in the region.788 According to IRGC’s analysis, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and the USA 
block is trying to increase its political leverage in Syria and Palestine by supporting the 
Salafist-Takfiri ideology and curbing the Islamic Awakening in the region.789 IRGC’s 
identification of allies and enemies strongly reflects the realpolitik, i.e. power balances 
and alliances in the region, which highlights the strategic character of ‘the axis of 
resistance’ at the practical level.  
  
 On an ideological level, the IRGC maintains the dominant anti-imperialist aspect 
of ‘the axis of resistance’ discourse. Another Sepah News article quotes a university 
professor, who says that ‘the Western-led forces, led by the United States and the Zionist 
regime’ aim to generate geopolitical crises in the Middle East.790 The university professor 
is also quoted saying  the goal of ‘the US-led and Zionist-led Western powers’ in creating 
this geopolitical crisis in the region is to destabilize the resistance-oriented states, cause 
the possible breakdown of Iraq, Syria, Libya, Yemen, and to prevent the freedom of 
Palestine.791 The anti-American and anti-Zionist stance of the resistance axis is clear in 
IRGC’s analyses, where they frame Iran’s strategic stance in an anti-American and anti-
Zionist discourse. Iran’s traditional ideological commitment to anti-imperialism, anti-
Americanism, ‘oppression,’ and ‘global arrogance’ is thus consistently maintained in the 
axis of resistance discourse.  
 
 Nevertheless, anti-imperialism was not the only ideological element that 
contributed to the expansion and consolidation of ‘the axis of resistance’ alliance. The 
sectarian nature of the conflict in Syria, the rise of ISIL threat, and the threat of sectarian 
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terrorism against Shia populations have generated two new official discourses that 
supplemented the axis of resistance: ‘takfiri terrorism’ and ‘the defense of the holy 
shrines.’ Iran’s ‘resistance,’ which emerged as an anti-imperialist and revolutionary 
Islamist discourse during the revolution and the Holy War and referred to the anti-Israeli 
and pro-Palestinian axis of Iran, Hezbollah, Syria, and Palestinian groups, retained an 
obvious Shia component when the Iraqi Shias and Yemeni Houthis were added. On a 
discursive level, the Islamic Republic systematically abstained from calling this alliance 
a Shia alliance. However, at the practical level, the Iranian strategy of mobilizing the Shia 
elements in these countries and legitimizing the prolonged Iranian presence on Iraq and 
Syria required devising Shia-religious discourses. The next sections will discuss how the 
discourses of ‘takfiri terrorism’ and ‘defense of the holy shrines’ supplement Iran’s ‘axis 
of resistance’ policy on the field.   
 
 
 
5.5.  Takfiri Terrorism 
 
 
 
By 2014, the Iranian regime had realized that Iran’s hopes for Islamic Awakening 
were greatly hampered by the coup in Egypt and the transformation of civilian uprisings 
into large scale sectarian warfare. The sectarianization of civil conflicts and the rise of 
ISIL necessitated Ayatollah Khamenei’s discourse to shift away from the issue of a new 
political order in the Middle East to security. One new discourse that he predominantly 
used was ‘takfirism.’ He used the term consistently in combination with the term 
‘terrorism,’ where the primary security threat to the Islamic communities in the region 
was dubbed to be ‘takfiri terrorism’ (terorism-e takfiri in Persian). 
 
 Traditionally, the Arabic word ‘takfir’ means ‘pronouncing an action or an 
individual un-Islamic.’792 According to Islamic jurisprudence, the authority to declare any 
Muslim or their action as un-Islamic lies with the ulama. In the modern era though, takfir 
is increasingly adopted by especially Salafist/Wahhabi jihadist groups such as al-Qaeda 
and ISIL, who declare certain Muslim groups that refrain from paying allegiance to their 
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rule and ideology as apostates.793 In lieu of ulama’s jurisprudence to declare apostasy 
against a person, the Salafi groups acclaim the right to exercise takfirism and administer 
capital punishment themselves.794 Accordingly, the Shiite political leadership including 
Hezbollah and the Iranian regime use the term takfiri in referring to Sunni jihadists and 
extremists especially in Syria today. The main narrative behind this discourse is that the 
Sunni extremists are dividing the Islamic Ummah by their deeds and the Shiites are 
against in-group fighting.795 The Iranian regime and Hezbollah employ the term in 
referring to the activities of the USA, Saudi Arabia, Israel, and the extremist groups they 
associate with aforementioned countries, who presumably conspire against the Iranian 
regime, Hezbollah, and Assad in Syria.796 
 
In Ayatollah Khamenei’s speeches, ISIL is referred to as a takfiri terrorist group 
created by the intelligence agencies of the USA, UK, and Israel with an attempt to divide 
the Islamic community.797 According to him, takfirism was a policy to pit fellow Muslims 
against each other in countries such as Iraq, Syria, and Libya and to change the course of 
the ‘anti-American, anti-tyranny’ Islamic Awakening movement, which ‘managed to 
make the movement of Islamic Awakening deviate from its path.’798 He adds; 
 
   ‘[The Islamic Awakening] was a movement that had been launched by the 
masses of the people in different countries of North Africa. These countries 
were against arrogance and America. The takfiri orientation changed the 
direction of this anti-arrogance, anti-American and anti-tyranny movement. 
It turned it into a war between Muslims and into fratricide. The front line of 
fighting in the region was the borders of occupied Palestine, but the takfiri 
orientation came and changed this front line to the streets of Baghdad, the 
Jameh Mosque of Syria and Damascus, the streets of Pakistan and different 
cities of Syria. These places became the front line of fighting. Take a look at 
the condition of today's Libya, Syria, Iraq, Pakistan and see against whom the 
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forces and swords of Muslims are being used. These forces should have been 
used against the Zionist regime. The takfiri orientation changed the direction 
of this fighting to our homes, our cities and our Islamic countries. They cause 
explosions inside the Jameh Mosque of Damascus. They kill people by 
causing explosions in Baghdad while they are holding their ordinary rallies. 
In Pakistan, they fire a volley of bullets on hundreds of people. As you can 
witness today, they are creating such disastrous conditions in Libya. All of 
these are among the unforgettable and historical crimes of the takfiri 
orientation.’799  
 
Khamenei specifically emphasizes the ‘terrorism’ part of this discourse, where he 
says ‘Today, the enemies of Islam have invested in waging domestic wars within nations 
so that they can pit people against one another with tribal and denominational excuses. 
[…] They falsely refer to the events in Iraq as the war between Shia and Sunni, but this 
war is the war of terrorism against the opponents of terrorism.’800 Ali Akbar Velayati, the 
advisor to Ayatollah Khamenei in foreign affairs, uses the term in referring to ‘the 
extremist groups and organized terrorist groups such as ISIL in Syria and Iraq’ which are 
used by foreign actors ‘in a bid to pursue divisive plots and contain or derail the Islamic 
Awakening movement.’801 He thus defines such groups primarily ‘as a rival force against 
the Islamic Awakening movement.’802 Khamenei and Velayati’s use of the term suggests 
that the Iranian leadership resorted to takfirism discourse to rationalize the failure of 
Islamic Awakening in the region. Accordingly, the Islamic Awakening failed because of 
intra-Muslim conflict, which is, according to Iranian leadership, caused by Sunni 
extremism created and supported by the West. In other words, the Islamic Awakening 
could be achieved by ‘Islamic unity’ between the Sunnis and the Shiites according to this 
line of thinking, if it were not for foreign meddling.  
 
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps employs the term in a similar way the 
Supreme Leadership does. However, in the IRGC usage, references to terrorism as a 
strategic device to beat the ‘axis of resistance’ is more emphasized. Hossein Dehghan, the 
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Commander in Chief of the IRGC, suggests that ‘the Zionist regime,’ the USA, and ‘the 
terrorist groups such as ISIL and Jabhat al-Nusra’ are ‘seeking to change the geopolitics 
of the region.’803 He refers to the US actions in Iraq and Syria as aiming to ‘restore the 
terrorists’ to weaken the anti-terrorist front of resistance.’804 In a similar fashion, the 
IRGC depicts ‘the axis of resistance’ as resisting against terrorism in the region. Besides 
American presence in the region and the Zionist regime, ‘takfiri terrorism’ emerges as the 
third threat the ‘axis of resistance’ is resisting against. In this respect, a senior 
spokesperson of the IRGC said ‘It has been five years since the eruption of ISIL terrorism 
and the presence of a powerful US military in Iraq. What we are seeing is the victory and 
success of the resistance front, or the front against the Americans and the terrorists.’805 
The IRGC portrays itself as a central actor in the fight against terrorism in Syria and Iraq 
in this context. Related to this point, Lieutenant General Ali Abdullah Ayoub of IRGC 
said that the IRGC assistance to Syrian people and regime helped them resist against 
takfiri terrorists.806 He added ‘the unparalleled courage that [the Revolutionary Guards 
and Qasem Soleimani] have shown are huge triumphs against the Syrian terrorists and 
[…] we hope that in the course of this process, we will see the continuation of the 
successes and the final victory of the resistance front.’807 The IRGC’s emphasis on the 
issue of terrorism is in line with its understanding of national threats in the present era. 
As discussed before, the IRGC’s understanding of national threats and national security 
is about trans-border security, where the elimination of security threats on the Syrian and 
Iraqi territories such as the ISIL and other takfiri groups will contribute to Iran’s security. 
This also enhances the IRGC’s self-acclaimed ‘role’ in fighting against takfirism across 
the region. In this respect, an IRGC member stated that the Islamic Republic and the 
IRGC are not only responsible for the protection of its borders, but also for fighting 
                                                
803 See General Dehghan’s statement, Former Defence Minister, ‘Har eghdame tajavozkarane be Suriye mojebe 
tashdide bohran ve touseye jang dar mantage khahad shod,’ Sepah News, May 2, 2017, 
http://www.sepahnews.com/index.php/sepahnews/item/3622.  
 
804 Ibid.  
 
805 The statement of the IRGC, ‘Nahadine shodane Esteghlal ve azadi eslami dar keshvar ve darham shekastane 
khatkeshi soltegar ve soltepazir dar jahan az dastavardhaye jomhuriye-eslami ast,’ Sepah News, March 30, 2017, 
http://www.sepahnews.com/index.php/etelaieah/item/3463.  
 
806 See General Aberomand’s statement, ‘Estekbar jahani dar sadade rishe kan kardane Eslam dar mantaghe ast/ 
Suriye piruze miyane mogabele ba godrathaye estekbari ast, az hich komaki be jebheye-mogavemat darig nakhahim 
kard,’ http://www.sepahnews.com/index.php/sepahnews/item/3624.  
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against terrorism in the region.808 This shows IRGC’s new self-acclaimed ‘role’ in 
fighting against takfiri terrorism in ‘the axis of resistance’ countries. 
    
A comparison of the Islamic Republic’s takfiri terrorism discourse with actual 
practice on the field shows that the discourse has had a key legitimizing role for the 
growing IRGC involvement in the Middle East. The Islamic Republic was relatively 
silent about IRGC involvement in the Syrian conflict until 2014. However, the capture of 
Mosul by ISIL in 2014 and their increasing presence on the Syrian front opened a room 
and created a legitimate cause for involvement on the part of the Iranian regime. The 
focus on ‘terrorism’ also reinforced the legitimacy the Islamic Republic was seeking. 
Relying on takfirism discourse, the Islamic Republic told the international audience that 
it is fighting against takfiri terrorism that is targeting the Shia communities and places in 
Iraq and Syria. While the sectarian war both in Syria and Iraq was between Sunni and 
Shia elements and the Iranian regime seemed to concentrate on the mobilization of the 
Shia elements in this war, the takfirism discourse would also help Iran to bypass any 
charges on perpetuating a Sunni-Shia conflict in these countries. As a matter of fact, by 
relying extensively on ‘takfiri terrorism,’ Iran was perpetually saying that it was not 
fighting against the Sunni populations in favor of the Shias, but against those ‘takfiri 
terrorists,’ who were, according to the Iranian regime, Western-constructs to divide the 
Islamic Ummah and to reduce the power of Muslim countries in the region. In that respect, 
the Iranian regime never framed the Syrian issue as a Sunni-Shia issue, but as a terrorism 
issue, where it portrayed its involvement as a commitment to solve terrorism and fight 
against takfirism that generated in-fighting within the Islamic community. 
 
In addition to its legitimizing role, the discourse of takfiri terrorism helped Iran to 
unify the Shias around a pressing security issue. The Iranian regime could mobilize the 
politically and ideologically diverse Shias in Syria and Iraq around the threat of takfiri 
terrorism. As a matter of fact, the increase in the number of Shia armed groups in Iraq 
and Syria as well as the establishment of paramilitary groups such as Hashd al-Shaabi 
temporally corresponds with the rise of ISIL. In this respect, an IRGC member stated that 
the unity and solidarity of Islamic forces against terrorist groups within the axis can be 
                                                
808 See General Pakpour’s statement, the Commander of the IRGC Ground Forces, ‘Biron randane teroristha az 
marzhaye Iran tanha hadafe ma nist/ be sorage aghabehaye an ha mi ravim,’ Sepah News, July 20, 2017, 
http://www.sepahnews.com/index.php/component/k2/item/3989.  
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employed as a model to achieve unity among all the Islamic Ummah.809 Without doubt, 
the rise against ISIL and the fight against takfirism discourse had the greatest impact on 
tightening ‘the axis of resistance’ alliance. Iran, the Lebanese Hezbollah, the Syrian 
regime, and the Iraqi Shia elements so closely coordinated with one another militarily in 
the fight against takfiri terrorism that the alliance became more consolidated and 
institutionalized. The IRGC assumed the role of lead coordinator in this alliance as well 
as a self-acclaimed leadership in fighting against terrorism. Related to this point, a 
Payam-e Enghelab analysis compared the Iranian fight against terrorism and the US 
discourse of fighting against terrorism in the Middle East, saying ‘The success of the 
Qods Force in combating terrorism in recent years in Iraq and Syria, and the 
reinforcement of popular forces in Syria, Iraq and Yemen, has helped decrease the 
presence of US troops in the region more than any other.’810  
 
The ‘axis of resistance’ has evolved from being primarily an anti-Israeli and anti-
US alliance of Iran, Lebanese Hezbollah, and Palestinian resistance to a more 
encompassing one, increasingly integrating the Iraqi Shia militias and putting Syria at the 
center of the alliance. Besides the alliance’s traditional stance on American involvement 
in the region and the Palestinian issue, takfirism and terrorism became other issues the 
alliance seemed to resist against. Given the sectarian nature of the security situation and 
the actors involved, ‘the axis of resistance’ acquired a more Shiite outlook in its actions 
over time. Takfiri terrorism discourse was intended to offset this outlook in Iran’ foreign 
policy. Nevertheless, this did not mean a total refusal of the discourse of anti-
Americanism and anti-imperialism of ‘the axis of resistance’ alliance. To the contrary, 
Ayatollah Khamenei always stressed that takfiri terrorism is an extension of US policies 
in the region. In a speech addressed to ambassadors of Islamic countries, he stated that 
ISIL is an American-created formation.811 Pointing out to the technical and monetary 
sources such groups receive, he stated that ‘The hand of arrogance has played the largest 
                                                
809 See General Hashem Giyasi’s statement, the Commander of IRGC in Fars Province, ‘Tarvije farhange Qurani dar 
sazmanha ve nahadha sababe ertegaye sathe akhlagi ve manavi karmandan mi shavad,’ Sepah News, June 18, 2017, 
http://www.sepahnews.com/index.php/ostanha/fars/item/3801.  
 
810 ‘Dar Sayeye Egtedar Solh, (in the shadow of Peace Auhority),’ p. 28, 
http://www.sepahnews.com/images/payam94/payam.pdf.  
 
811 Ali Khamenei, ‘Leader’s Speech to Officials and Ambassadors of Islamic Countries on Mab’ath,’ The Supreme 
Leader Ayatollah Khamenei Website, May 16, 2015, http://english.khamenei.ir/news/2069/Leader-s-Speech-to-
Officials-and-Ambassadors-of-Islamic-Countries.  
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part in creating terrorism and in strengthening, helping, and supporting terrorists in the 
region.’812 He perpetually puts the responsibility on Western and Israeli intelligence units 
for cultivating terrorism in the region.813 In another speech delivered at Ahlul-Bayt World 
Assembly, the Supreme Leader claimed that not only ISIL, but also al-Nusra Front and 
other takfiri groups were created by the USA, because ‘When taghuti governments were 
overthrown in Tunisia and Egypt with Islamic slogans, all of a sudden the Americans and 
the Zionists decided to use this formula for destroying resistant governments and 
countries. Therefore, they turned to Syria.814 Interviewee 8 also emphasized the Iranian 
resistance to US allies in the region, most notably the Saudi Arabia, as the target of 
resistance, where he said ‘Hezbollah, Assad, Iran considered the revolutionary movement 
in Syria as weakening the resistance front, [which is] against Israel. Iran thinks that some 
other countries like Saudi Arabia support this movement in Syria. So, this movement is 
not original and is supported by foreign countries to weaken the Iranian, Hezbollah, 
Syrian [axis].’815  
 
In short, ‘the axis of resistance’ both maintains its anti-Americanist stance and 
increasingly embraces a Shia empowerment aspect in the last couple of years. Majidyar 
emphasizes the dual nature of this alliance by saying, 
 
   ‘When Iranians talk about the axis of resistance, it mostly means just this 
alliance of Iran with [regional] state and non-state actors that fight the USA 
and Israel. If I use the Iranian term, [it is] ‘the global arrogance,’ which is 
America, and Zionism, which is Israel. So they don’t talk about Saudi Arabia 
divide, they don’t talk about Sunni-Shia divide, they never made this 
discussion sectarian or a Shiite war against the Sunnis. All the justification is 
that this is a war, this is a resistance against USA and its allies. And even in 
Syria or Iraq where there is the war against the ISIL or some proxy wars 
against Saudi proxies, or even Turkish proxies, they define these proxies not 
just as Saudi Arabia’s. They describe them as an extension of the US and [its] 
allies. That’s why ISIL is described by the Iranian leaders as a group which 
furthers the US interests in the region. They accuse the USA of supporting 
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813 Ali Khamenei, ‘Ayatollah Khamenei: American, Zionist and English Intelligence Services Created Terrorism in 
the Islamic World,’ The Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei Website, July 7, 2016, 
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The Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei Website, August 17, 2015, http://english.khamenei.ir/news/2109/Leader-s-
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these groups. So, that is the axis of resistance that they are talking about. And 
another factor they don’t talk much about is the Shiite empowerment. As the 
Shiites in the Arab countries […] are executed. For example in Iraq, which is 
a Shiite majority country and had been under a very brutal Saddam regime. 
So now this is the time, they say, that the Shiite nations or communities have 
to be linked together. They must be allied with each other […] for their own 
empowerment.’816  
 
 
 
5.6.  Defense of the Holy Shrines 
 
 
 
 In May 2016, the people of Iran’s Mazandaran province gathered in a rally with 
posters ‘From Sacred Defense to Shrine Defense.’817 The rally was organized to 
commemorate the Iranian ‘martyrs’ who travelled to Syria to defend the Shia shrines near 
Damascus. The rally was attended by IRGC members, the relevant Basij units, and local 
people who carried the posters of Iranian martyrs who lost their lives there. The banner 
‘From Sacred Defense to Shrine Defense’ is quite telling in understanding the 
transformation of the discourses over the defense of the Islamic Republic. The Sacred 
Defense, or the Holy Defense of 1980-88, was fought by popular mobilization along 
Iran’s borders. The ordinary people had thus mobilized for the defense of the Iranian state. 
On the other hand, ‘the shrine defense’ (defa az herem in Persian) narrative pointed to the 
defense of a different geography – a geography that transcended Iranian borders. The 
domestic popular mobilization was aimed for a situation that was beyond the immediate 
defense of the Iranian state: It was for the Shia shrines outside of Iran, most notably in 
Iraq and Syria.  
  
As discussed, the early IRGC engagement in the Syrian conflict between the years 
2011-2013 was portrayed both to the domestic and international audience as intended for 
‘the defense of the Shia shrines’ in Syria. The further Basij involvement and the 
mobilization of Iranian armed forces such as Liwa Fatimiyyoun also rested on the same 
discourse of defending the Shia shrines. In a meeting with the families of the ‘7th Tir 
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817 Hamed Amirnejad, ‘From Sacred Defense to Shrine Defense Gathering,’ Mehr News, May 25, 2016, 
https://en.mehrnews.com/photo/116834/From-Sacred-Defense-to-Shrine-Defense-gathering.  
 
 272	
	
martyrs’818 in 2016, Ayatollah Khamenei also addressed the families of whom he called 
‘the defenders of the Ahlul Bayt Shrines’ – the shrines of the prophet’s family and those 
of Shia Imams in Iraq, Syria, and Iran.819 In this meeting, he referred to the defenders of 
the Shia shrines;  
 
   ‘Today, we are involved with the issue of the martyrs who defended the 
Ahlul Bayt (a.s.) shrines. This is one of the astonishing stories of history. 
During the time of war, we used to encourage youth to go and fight in the 
arena of war and they would answer our call. Whenever Imam (r.a.) delivered 
a speech in this regard, a large group of youth would go and join the front 
lines. But we do not encourage them today. Nonetheless, notice that the 
determination of these youth from Iran, Afghanistan and other countries is so 
strong and their faith is so pure that they […] go to a foreign country and 
foreign soil to fight and be martyred in the way of God.’820    
 
Ayatollah Khamenei refers again to takfiri terrorism as the main reason for the 
defense of the holy shrines. However, in Khamenei’s discourse, the defense of the shrines 
in Syria and Iraq are held equivalent to defending the Iranian state and its borders. As a 
matter of fact, he identifies the threats of terrorism on the Syrian and Iraqi territories as a 
direct threat to the Iranian state and hence equates the defense of the shrines to ‘the 
defense of one’s own city,’ where he states;  
 
   ‘They created these terrorists in order to defeat the Islamic Republic. Iraq 
was an introductory step. Shaam [Syria and Levant] was also an introductory 
step. They were introductory steps towards exerting their influence on our 
country. However, our power in the country caused them to be defeated there 
as well. This was their goal. A person who goes from Iran to Iraq and to Syria 
in order to stand up against these takfiri orientations in the name of defending 
the Ahlul Bayt’s (a.s.) shrines is, in fact, defending his own city. Of course, 
they do so for the sake of God, but this is the truth of the matter. This is an 
act of defending Iran and the Islamic community.’821 
                                                
818 The 7th Tir bombing was organized by Mojahedeen Khalq in 1981 before the Iran Islamic Republic Party 
headquarters killing 72 people, a majority of them government officials. Those killed included key revolutionaries 
and ideologues of the Islamic Republic including Ayatollah Mohammad Beheshti. The bombing was ingrained into 
the Islamic Republic’s history as one of martyrdom for the new regime, where the people were acknowledged as the 
greatests martyrs of the Islamic Republic. See ‘In Remembrance of Tir 7th Martyrs,’ Mehr News, June 28, 2014, 
https://en.mehrnews.com/news/103198/In-remembrance-of-Tir-7th-martyrs.  
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In a similar vein, the IRGC sources use the ‘defense of the holy shrines’ in 
combination with the discourse of takfiri terrorism. In this respect, a statement issued by 
IRGC described the IRGC role as ‘supporting Islamic Resistance, especially in the area 
of counteracting Takfiri terrorism in Iraq and Syria’ in alignment with the people, 
governments, and armies of these countries.822 The same statement recognizes the IRGC 
presence in Iraq and Syria for the purposes of the defense of Shia shrines and even 
commemorates those who became martyrs during the defense.823 Martyrdom is a crucial 
component of this discourse. The IRGC-affiliated media gave wide coverage to ‘martyrs’ 
who fought in Syria. According to a news article published on Sepah News, Qasem 
Soleimani is quoted praising an IRGC member who was killed during a fight alongside 
the Iraqi Badr Forces.824 One prominent ‘martyr’ was Mohsen Hojaji, an IRGC member 
who was captured and beheaded by ISIL while fighting in Syria. Hojaji’s ‘martyrdom,’ 
his execution by ISIL, and the repatriation of his body via the help of Lebanese Hezbollah 
received wide public and political attention.825 In that respect, ‘the defense of the holy 
shrines’ discourse served primarily two purposes. First, it legitimated the Iranian IRGC 
and Basij volunteers’ engagement across the Iranian borders for a transcendental purpose 
of defending the Shia shrines against takfiri terrorism to the domestic audience. Second, 
the discourse helped Iran define the borders of security and threats, where the ideological 
and identity-related borders of Shiism were highlighted. By putting the defense of Shia 
shrines at the center of its discourse, the Iranian regime also determined and legitimized 
its scope of military operations across Iran’s border. 
  
It should be noted that the Iranian regime does not have a monopoly over ‘the 
defense of the holy shrines.’ As a matter of fact, the discourse is used by all ‘axis of 
                                                
822 The Statement of the Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran, ‘Sepah Pasdaran Separe Defaei Iran ve 
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824 See General Qasem Soleimani’s statement, the Commander of Quds Forces, ‘Ma dar Iraq sarbaz bi edeaye nellat 
Iraq hastim / Hashdo-al-shabi shajareye tayebeye ve abo-mahdi shahid zende ast,’ Sepah News, July 10, 2017, 
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resistance’ forces. When the Lebanese Hezbollah started to organize the Syrian Shia 
fighters into armed groups such as Quwat al-Ridha, Al-Ghaliboun, and Liwa al-Imam al-
Baqir, their motto was ‘Labayk ya Zaynab!’ (At your service, O Zainab!), which refers to 
the shrine of Imam Ali’s daughter near Damascus and thus the protection of this shrine 
by the Shia fighters.826 In Iraq, the Iraqi Shia mobilization had gained an impetus in 2014 
upon Ayatollah Sistani’s fatwa calling all Iraqis for armed mobilization for the defense of 
the holy shrines. In a similar vein, the Iraqi Shia groups who are fighting in Syria today 
moved across the border to defend the holy shrine of Sayyeda Zainab.827 Along with the 
fight against ‘takfiri terrorism’ discourse, the ‘defense of the holy shrines’ helped unite 
the politically and ideologically diversified Shias of the region against a common security 
issue. The mobilization and coordination impacts of this discourse helped tighten the 
relations within ‘the axis of resistance’ and thus contributed to the consolidation of this 
alliance. In short, the defense of the holy shrines and takfiri terrorism discourses 
reinforced one another in support of the resistance discourse and policy in the Middle 
East.   
 
 
 
5.7.  Islamism or Realpolitik? 
 
 
 
Ayatollah Khamenei and IRGC’s discourses of Islamic Awakening, popular 
mobilization, resistance, takfiri terrorism, and defense of the holy shrines are clearly 
Islamist discourses. Among all discourses, the Islamic Awakening, popular mobilization, 
and resistance are extensions of the Islamic Republic’s revolutionary Islamist ideology, 
which have been transformed at varying levels to fit the historical contexts within which 
they operate. On the other hand, takfiri terrorism and defense of the holy shrines 
discourses are relatively new constructs. Corresponding to the sectarian nature of the 
conflicts, mobilization patterns, and alliances, both discourses have Shia overtones. At 
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defend-shia-shrines-they-show-less-zeal-8983559.html.   
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this point, one question is why the central foreign policy discourses the Islamic Republic 
adopts towards the Middle East are inherently religious. Do the discourses imply that the 
Islamic Republic following an Islamist agenda? Or are they covers for other foreign 
policy objectives? As implied in the discussion of each discourse above, Ayatollah 
Khamenei and IRGC statements on the Middle East do not go without the accompaniment 
of traditional realpolitik concepts. The data shows the centrality five traditional IR 
concepts used in referring to Iran’s policy in the Middle East: rationality, national security, 
model, strategic depth, and power. All concepts carefully blend with the five Islamist 
discourses discussed above.   
 
 One issue Ayatollah Khamenei tackles in his speeches is the issue of idealism and 
rationality. In a speech, Khamenei defines ‘idealism’ as a basic component of the Islamic 
Republic.828 He argues that the Islamic Republic is not to be understood merely as a 
political structure. Employing a holistic perspective, he says that the Islamic Republic 
should be understood both as a political structure and ‘a set of goals and ideals.’829 As 
such, the security of the Islamic Republic not only lies with securing the political 
structure, but also ‘preserving all the values that the Islamic Republic feels committed to, 
such as justice, progress, spirituality, knowledge, morality, democracy, the observance of 
the law and idealism.’830 The identity of the system, its ideational background, and 
principles are sources of power for the Islamic Republic according to Khamenei, whose 
protection is required for the holistic security of the Islamic Republic.  
 
 When it comes to ‘rationality,’ Khamenei’s first approach to the concept is 
methodological. He sees using one’s reason, i.e. ‘reasoning,’ as a method to evaluate the 
best course of policy action by a careful evaluation of historical experience.831 The 
keyword accompanying Khamenei’s understanding of rationality is ‘experience.’ 
Pertaining to Iran’s relations with the West, Ayatollah Khamenei points out to nature of 
bilateral experiences with the West, including the overthrow of the nationalist Mosaddeq 
                                                
828 Ali Khamenei, ‘Ayatollah Khamenei: Advocating Tendency Towards the West is not Reasonable and Contrary to 
Lessons of Our History,’ The Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei Website, July 2, 2016, 
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government, the missile support to the Saddam regime during the ‘imposed war,’ 
extensive propaganda against the Islamic Republic, among others.832  ‘We should use 
these events as experience,’ he says, ‘Reason dictates that we respond to them with 
wisdom and with acumen.’833  
 
Content-wise, Ayatollah Khamenei does not see idealism and rationality as two 
polar opposites. To the contrary, commitment to one’s identity, founding values, and 
principles are deemed to be true rationality. In this respect, Ayatollah Khamenei argues 
that ‘True rationality lies in revolutionary outlook’ for the Islamic Republic.834 That 
means that a commitment to the central components of this revolutionary outlook should 
be understood as true rationality. In this respect, ‘Rationality means reliance on people. 
Rationality means reliance on domestic forces,’ he says.835 In line with this, relying on 
and promoting ‘popular mobilization,’ despite the ideological and religious content of the 
discourse, becomes true rationality. His take on the related concept of ‘national interest’ 
is no less similar, where he does not see ‘national interest’ and the ‘revolutionary identity 
of the people of Iran’ as two polar opposites.836 Addressing at governmental officials in 
2017, he clearly underscores this point;  
 
   ‘National interests are national interests only when they do not disagree 
with the national and revolutionary identity of the people of Iran. Interests 
become national only when they are not in conflict with national identity. 
Otherwise, when we consider something as a national interest which causes 
national identity to be trampled upon, we have certainly made a mistake. […] 
One of the greatest achievements of the Islamic Revolution was that it defined 
an identity for the people and that it insisted on it. It derived national interests 
from that identity. The Revolution portrayed, confirmed and pursued national 
interests on the basis of that identity.’837   
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In the same speech, ‘Our Muslim nature, historical depth, and our revolutionary 
quality are three main elements that constitute the identity of the people. We should not 
keep these three elements out of sight,’ he says.838 The Islamic identity and revolutionary 
ideology constitute the national security of the Islamic Republic among others.   
  
Besides rationality and national interests, the Islamist revolutionary ideology that 
fashions the state identity of the Islamic Republic also determines the very Iranian 
‘power.’ In Khamenei's understanding, idealism is power. In this respect, the revolution 
itself, ‘the revolutionary spirit,’ and revolutionary ideology becomes the source of power 
and influence in diplomacy which should be strictly preserved;  
 
   ‘Elimination of ideology" is one of the ideas that they have put forward 
recently. It existed for a few years and later on, it was cancelled for a few 
years, but now they have begun it again. They say, "We should eliminate 
ideology from diplomacy and domestic policy." But this is the exact opposite 
of the truth. This means that we should not involve the principles of the 
Revolution and Islam in domestic and foreign policy. How should we not 
involve them? These policies should be formulated on the basis of these 
principles. The same is true of other areas. Well, what does a revolution do? 
What a revolution does in the beginning is to lay out ideals. It lays out ideals. 
Of course, lofty ideals are not changeable. Tools and instruments are 
changeable. Daily developments are changeable, but those principles that 
form the main ideals are not changeable. Well, these two premises contradict 
each other because this power and influence originate from the Revolution. If 
it were not for the Revolution, the revolutionary spirit and revolutionary 
actions, this influence would not exist. When they say, "Now that you are 
influential and powerful, you should abandon the Revolution so that we can 
live together"- this means that we should abandon the Revolution. And when 
we do so, we will become weak and they will be able to swallow us.’839 
 
In addition to revolutionary ideology, another strong element of power in 
Ayatollah Khamenei’s speeches is revolutionary institutions, i.e. Iran’s ideological 
security forces and security culture based on popular mobilization. He specifically 
highlights the IRGC and Basij as strong components of Iranian power; 
 
   ‘The elements which make the country powerful – the Armed Forces, the 
Islamic Revolution Guards Corps, Basij and pious and hezbollahi individuals 
                                                
838 Ibid.  
 
839 Khamenei, ‘IRGC Blocks the Enemy’s Infiltration,’ http://english.khamenei.ir/news/2155/IRGC-blocks-the-
enemy-s-infiltration.  
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– should be preserved. I will tell you that the people who risk their lives, who 
stand up against the enemy in different areas, and who endure hardships are 
pious, revolutionary and hezbollahi elements. It is these individuals who 
stand firm. Therefore, they should be preserved.’840 
 
In the same speech, he openly states the centrality of these ‘power elements’ in 
regional issues as well; 
  
   ‘The officials of the country should help these elements in different areas – 
in universities, and in industrial, scientific and public service areas. If the 
enemy dislikes the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps, well, this is clear! Do 
you want America to like your Quds Force? Do you expect the US to like 
such and such a Sardar who is active in this area? Well, it is clear that he does 
not like him! It is clear that he sets terms in different areas. Well, he wants us 
to be deprived of elements of power. This is like saying that your wrestling 
team can participate in international competitions provided that two, three 
star wrestlers of yours are not included in the team. What does this mean? It 
means that you should participate for losing. They say, "We let you enter 
international competitions. You can come in order to lose." This is what it 
means. When they say that the condition for such and such a thing to happen 
is that the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps should not be involved and that 
Basij should not interfere on such and such an issue –for example on regional 
issues – this is what it means.’841 
 
 Not only the security institutions, but also the Iranian security culture that relies 
on the Islamic and Shia concepts and narratives of jihad, sacrifice, martyrdom, and 
resistance are the real sources of ‘power’ in Khamenei’s foreign policy discourse. 
Addressing to Imam Khomeini University students in a 2017 speech, he underscores the 
centrality of these Islamic concepts and narratives in augmenting Iran’s power;  
 
   ‘Self-sacrificing military personalities are a source of power as well. As 
well as military organizations, a self-sacrificing individual, a Sayyad Shirazi, 
a Shahid Shushtari and a self-sacrificing individual who is a military 
personality and who is altruistic and honest is the target of their rage and 
grudge. These personalities were not martyred in the war, rather they were 
assassinated. In other words, they were identified, chased and assassinated 
because they showed themselves as an obstacle on the way of the enemy's 
transgressions and because they were a source of power for the country. So, 
they show enmity towards such personalities as well. The spirit of jihad and 
resistance in a nation is one of the sources of national power as well. That is 
                                                
840 Khamenei, ‘Everything in Conflict with Our Islam, Our Revolution, Our Rich Historical Background is not Part of 
National Interests,’ http://english.khamenei.ir/news/4925/Everything-in-Conflict-with-Our-Islam-Our-Revolution-
Our-Rich.  
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why they are opposed to the spirit of jihad and resistance. In the colonialist 
discourse, they accuse the spirit of resistance and jihad of violence. They 
accuse it of violence and extremism. Unfortunately, we sometimes learn these 
phrases from them and repeat them inside the country. This is because the 
spirit of jihad and martyrdom is a source of power for every country.’842 
  
 Khamenei’s discussion of rationality, national security, and power suggest that the 
religious foreign policy discourses employed towards the Middle East region are not 
separate from these traditional IR concepts. To the contrary, these religious discourses are 
in line with and part and parcel of the Islamic Republic’s understanding of rationality, 
national security, and power today. If commitment to the revolutionary ideology and 
identity is a source of power for Iran, so is supporting the Islamic Awakening movement 
in the region. If reliance on people and domestic forces has proved to be true rationality 
in the Iranian experience, so is promoting the idea and organizational model of popular 
mobilization among Shias against Salafist/Wahhabi jihadism in the region. A clear 
overlap is traceable between ideological and rational factors in Iran’s foreign policy in 
the Middle East today. The keyword again is ‘experience.’ Iran’s revolutionary experience 
of 1979, its experience in popular mobilization during the Holy Defense, and its 
consolidated security culture are observed to be true rationality in the Islamic Republic’s 
foreign policy. In a historical context where the region is swept by civil-sectarian conflict, 
the domestic political order has decayed, state institutions have almost failed, and 
regional power balances have shifted, and the Shias have gradually achieved political 
empowerment, all the Islamic discourses the Islamic Republic is adopting towards the 
Middle East, all of which are about the Iranian ‘experience’ in some way or another, are 
a source of power and influence in the region. This is well-proved with two additional 
foreign policy concepts encountered in the statements of Iran’s political and security 
establishment extensively: Iranian experience as ‘a model’ or ‘inspiration’ for the Middle 
Eastern nations and Iran’s ‘strategic depth’ in the region.  
 
 As discussed in relation to Islamic Awakening, popular mobilization, and 
resistance discourses, the concept of ‘Iranian model’ is widely used and emphasized by 
the Iranian leadership and IRGC members. The Islamic Awakening is portrayed by the 
Supreme Leader as an alternative political model to be emulated by those rallying on the 
                                                
842 Khamenei, ‘The Enemy Wants to Take Away Iran’s Deterrent Power, Ayatollah Khamenei,’ 
http://english.khamenei.ir/news/4807/The-enemy-wants-to-take-away-Iran-s-deterrent-power-Ayatollah.  
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Arab street, while the IRGC generals took pride in the Iranian Basijis for being an 
organizational model for Hashd al-Shaabi in Iraq. In an interview with Sepah News on 
the achievements of the Islamic Revolution of 1979 so far, the Supreme Leader’s 
representative in IRGC, Hojjatoleslam Ali Saeedi, directs the attention to the Iranian 
governance model, resistance model, and Basiji culture model.843 He argues that the 
Islamic Revolution introduced an intellectual system of Islam to the world of Islam, which 
is ‘a governance model based on religious democracy against Western liberal 
democracy.’844 He proposed the Iranian resistance as a second model in the region, which, 
according to Saeedi, has ‘revolutionized the resistance in Lebanon, Palestine, Iraq and 
Syria’ and changed the regional power equations in favor of Iran and these countries.845 
Saeedi portrays ‘the Basiji revolution’ of Iran as the third model, where the Islamic 
Revolution could ‘instill and institutionalize the Basij culture in Lebanon, Iraq, and Syria’ 
and ‘exported [the Basiji culture] to the region.’846 Finally, the ‘Iranian model’ is well-
connected to Iran’s self-portrayed ‘strategic depth’ in the region. According the Iranian 
leadership, the revolutionary ideology, the revolutionary spirit and actions, i.e. ‘to remain 
revolutionaries,’ is the source of ‘Iranian influence, power, and strategic depth that [they] 
have in the region and among regional nations.’847 On a more practical level, the Islamic 
Republic measures its strategic depth in the region by the so-called ‘back-up’ groups in 
some countries.848 As such, the pro-Iranian Shia armed groups in Iraq and Syria, the 
organizational model of Hashd al-Shaabi, and the Basiji culture are considered to be the 
manifestations of Iran’s ‘strategic depth’ in the region. Religious ideology, Shia identity 
and Shia narratives constitute the infrastructure of Iran’s strategic depth in the Middle 
East.  
 
 
                                                
843 Hojjat-al-Eslam Saeidi, ‘Enghelabe Eslami Talieye Ehyaye Tamadone Eslami,’ 
http://www.sepahnews.com/index.php/goftogo/159.  
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5.8.  Conclusion  
 
 
 
This discourse analysis shows that the Islamic Regime’s discourses go hand in 
hand with Iran’s evolution of the Middle East policy. Accordingly, the Iranian shift of 
focus from the political sector to the security sector is reflected on the choice of the 
discourses as well. The ‘Islamic Awakening’ is a case in point, which was extensively 
used by the Supreme Leader after 2011, but was gradually dropped after 2013, when the 
hopes for the formation of Islamic governments in the Arab Spring dimmed. Then the 
discourses shifted towards the security area, with ‘popular mobilization,’ ‘resistance,’ and 
‘takfiri terrorism,’ and ‘defense of the holy shrines’ at the center. 
 
 It should be noted that all discourses discussed above are Islamist. The ‘Islamic 
Awakening,’ ‘popular mobilization,’ and ‘resistance’ refer to the Islamic Revolution, the 
Islamist revolutionary ideology, and the Iranian model of mobilization. Moreover, these 
discourses inherently reflect the same revolutionary logic: ‘the export of the revolution.’ 
The Iranian leadership inherently refers to the transformations in the region with the 
discourses of ‘Islamic Awakening,’ ‘popular mobilization,’ and ‘resistance’ as a 
revolutionary Islamist moment. Nevertheless, the Iranian leadership does this without 
dubbing the phrase ‘export of the revolution’ in any way. Moreover, with the changing 
circumstances, the military aspects of these terms are featured more and the political 
aspect is featured less. The content of the terms is reworked to fit Iran’s evolving foreign 
policy logic. Finally, the addition of two discourses, ‘takfiri terrorism’ and ‘the defense 
of the holy shrines,’ highlight the Shia element in the regime’s Middle East policy 
discourse. This is also in line with the growing Iranian engagement with Shia mobilization 
in the region. All in all, Iran’s ‘Axis of Resistance’ policy diverges from the ‘export of the 
revolution’ policy with its increased focus on the security and military sector and on the 
Shia communities as opposed to the whole Ummah.  
 
 What does the discourse analysis tell us about the role of religion in Iran’s foreign 
policy under the ‘Axis of Resistance’? Ayatollah Khamenei’s speeches also show that he 
does not use the Islamist discourses as distinct from the more ‘realpolitik’ discourses. His 
understanding of ‘rationality’ is not separate from the revolutionary Islamist ideology of 
the regime. He thinks that Islamic Republic’s ideology is true ‘rationality’ and the true 
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source of ‘power.’ In a similar vein, he thinks that Iran’s revolutionary institutions are a 
source of ‘power’ and that Iran’s relations with the Shiites via IRGC-led Shia mobilization 
activities reflect Iran’s ‘strategic depth’ in the region. As such, the Iranian regime neatly 
amalgamates the ideological elements with rational factors. As the previous chapters 
showed, the Iranian regime’s engagement with the Shiites in the region is an 
institutionalized foreign policy. The name of the policy changes, and so does its extent 
and nature. Nevertheless, the institutionalized role of religion as a mobilization tool, the 
use of Shia Karbala narratives, and Iran’s reliance on its peculiar security institutions and 
culture remain the same. These religious elements become a source of power for the 
Islamic Republic, to be employed under right conditions.   
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CHAPTER 6 
 
 
CONCLUSION: EXPORT OF THE REVOLUTION’ VS.  
‘AXIS OF RESISTANCE’ 
 
 
 
 
6.1.  Overview of the Research Motivation, Questions, and Hypotheses 
 
 
 
When this research started in 2014, the Islamic Republic appeared to be following 
a very pragmatist path towards moderation and integration with the international 
community. The former nuclear negotiator and pragmatist politician Hassan Rouhani had 
won a landslide victory over his hardliner predecessor Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in 2013 
presidential elections. The Iranians seemingly had brought the moderate and pragmatist 
leader Rouhani for a specific mission: Rouhani would use his diplomatic experience as 
the nuclear chief negotiator of the Islamic Republic for the resolution of the prolonged 
nuclear crisis with the Western community and get the international sanctions lifted, 
where the long-interrupted oil sales would be resumed and the Iranians would finally 
leave behind the economic depression, unemployment, and inflation they were 
experiencing for a long time. As a matter of fact, Rouhani accomplished his mission and 
signed the historic JCPOA with the P5+1. As a result, the sanctions were gradually eased, 
President Rouhani negotiated for prospective investment opportunities with foreign banks 
and companies, and oil sales were resumed as expected. After Ahmadinejad’s strong push 
for Iran’s nuclear rights in the international arena, the international community interpreted 
the Iranian move to temporarily forsake its nuclear right under Rouhani’s government as 
a sign of distancing away from revolutionary ideals, gradual regime moderation, and of 
demands for integration with the international system. JCPOA and associated 
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expectations for moderation in Iran’s internal and external policy remained as the focus 
of foreign policy analysts and Iran experts.  
Without doubt, there is an element of truth in this analysis. President Rouhani has 
followed a foreign policy that is a reconciliatory foreign policy in interacting with the 
international powers at the international level. Nevertheless, a reverse foreign policy 
pattern accompanied Rouhani’s reconciliatory foreign policy in the matters pertaining to 
the Middle East region and it was not moderate at all. The 2003 US invasion in Iraq had 
precipitated a series of political transformations in the region, which achieved a 
momentum in 2011 with the Arab uprisings and the civil wars across the Middle East. 
The Iranian regime responded to the shifts in the regional power balances and the 
sectarianization of conflicts with quite an assertive foreign policy strategy. By 2014, the 
Islamic Revolutionary Guards Qods Forces – which was originally tasked with the export 
of the revolution during 1980s -  mobilized an extensive network of pro-Iranian Shia 
militias in Iraq, sent Iranian Basij volunteers to fight in Syria, cooperated with Lebanese 
Hezbollah in mobilizing a small of number of Shia villages to fight against domestic 
opponents in Syria, and moved the pro-Iranian Iraqi proxies to Syria to fight alongside 
the Assad regime. Iran’s Middle East policy relied heavily on the political and military 
mobilization of Shias across the region. Iranian political and military elites invoked a 
heavily ideological discourse with strong references to the Islamic Revolution and Shia 
symbolism accompanying its strong military activism in the region.  
 
The sectarianization of the civil conflict in Syria generated a brief moment in the 
region where regional powers seemed to ally along sectarian lines on the conflict. 
Nevertheless, by 2015, the Sunni powers were marked by intra-sectarian divisions due to 
their differences in political ideology, thus were far from acting like a unified block on 
the domestic political reconfiguration of Syria. While far from being a politically united 
front, the Shias of the region exhibited a considerable unity, where the Lebanese 
Hezbollah, pro-Iranian Shia militias in Iraq, the IRGC - Qods Forces, and the Assad 
regime have achieved a strong military coordination and mobilization capacity. The IRGC 
referred to the now predominantly Shia alignment ranging from the Lebanese Hezbollah 
and the Assad regime in Syria on the West to the Shia-dominated government in Iraq and 
Iran on the East and in some accounts down to the Houthis in Yemen as ‘Axis of 
Resistance.’ The ‘Axis of Resistance’ originally reflected the Islamic Republic’s 
ideological attitude on the Israeli-Palestinian issue in the 1990s, but the content and the 
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referents of the concept has tremendously grown in the recent years to cover the ongoing 
Shia empowerment across the region. Religion seemed to have a substantial centrality in 
the Middle East policy. A common sectarian identity seemed to characterize the parties to 
the alliance, Shia narratives of Karbala accompanied the mobilization strategy, and the 
Shia security formations accompanied the process. Although Iran was following a 
reconciliatory foreign policy on the Western front, no moderation was in horizon on the 
Eastern front. When this research started in 2014, Iran’s Middle East strategy thus 
resembled ‘the export of the revolution’ policy of the first revolutionary decade. 
 
The above-described dilemma motivated the research questions this thesis tried to 
answer: Why does Iran pursue a foreign policy with distinct religious and ideological 
contours in the post-2003 Middle East, despite the observed pragmatism and rationalism 
in relations with the West during the same period? What role does religion play in Iran’s 
‘Axis of Resistance’ policy? Given the centrality of ‘religion’ both in the transnational 
politics of the Middle East region as well as in Iran’s foreign policy, this research relied 
on an emerging literature in International Relations Theory which aimed to merge the 
study of ‘religion’ into established IR paradigms. Three hypotheses were put forward in 
this respect, each representing the realist, liberalist and constructivist IR traditions:  
 
Hypothesis I:  Iran is caught up in a regional power game since 2003, where the 
regime instrumentalizes religion to become the regional leader. 
 
Hypothesis II: Iran’s religious foreign policy in the Middle East reflects the 
ongoing factional balances tipping towards regime hardliners in domestic politics.  
 
Hypothesis III: Iran’s Islamist revolutionary ideology leads to an ideological and 
religious policy in the Middle East. 
 
In line with these hypothesis, this research has generated two sets of conclusions. 
The explanatory power of each hypothesis over the Iranian case will be discussed in 
relation to these two sets of conclusions: 1) the role of religion in Iran’s foreign policy 
since 1979 and 2) Iran’s ‘Axis of Resistance’ policy today.  
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6.2.  The Role of Religion in Iran’s Foreign Policy since 1979 
 
 
 
One main conclusion that this research has generated relates to the concept of 
‘religion,’ which crudely refers to a transcendental faith system, as used in politics and 
international relations. When used in international politics, the concept of ‘religion’ 
transcends its meaning as a specific faith system and a doctrine that is manifested by a 
holy book, written codes, narratives, and traditions. That does not mean that the doctrine 
is irrelevant to politics, it does play a role. However, when talking about religion and 
politics, one means the practical implications of religious doctrine on non-religious 
spheres of life including the politics, economics and society through human interpretation 
of religious faith and doctrine. The concept of religion as used in this sense is closer to 
the concept of ‘public theology’ as discussed in Chapter 2 of this thesis. The historical, 
temporal, and spatial dimensions within which the religious faith and doctrine influence 
the ideology, institutions, actors, and political interactions matter. Such a 
conceptualization takes the religious faith out from its static nature and gives it increased 
dynamism. Such conceptualization of religion also opens a richer space for us to discuss 
and understand the various political manifestations of religion. This explains the multiple 
forms of ‘political Islam’ as mentioned and implied elsewhere in this research. Politically 
activist Shiism is only one type of political Islam among a plethora of Islamist political 
movements across the region. Wahhabism is another form of political Islam shaped in the 
Saudi context, while electoral Islamism in Tunisia and Turkey is yet another. The Iranian 
style political Shiism institutionalized as velayet-e faqih is also different from Sistani’s 
understanding of politically quietist Shiism. Even when one examines the variety of 
Islamist jihadist groups in Syria, Libya, and Iraq, one will see that they all entertain 
different ideas about the proper religio-political order as well as the tools and mechanisms 
for establishing this order. This variety is the result of different interpretations as well as 
political, social and legal necessities informing such interpretations at a specific time and 
place.   
 
 This thesis has employed such an understanding in examining the role of religion 
in the Islamic Republic’s foreign policy. Chapter 3 paid scholarly attention to the question 
of how religious faith manifested itself in the ideological, institutional, and political 
configuration of a regime at a specific time. As for the Islamic Republic, a scholarly work 
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on Iranian politics should devote sufficient time in understanding the contours of 
politically activist Shiism, i.e. how long-accumulated intellectual and religious inputs 
formed the basic tenets of the activist, revolutionary, Shia ideology of the Islamic 
Republic, its institutions, actors, and power centers. The Islamic Republic of Iran was the 
culmination of a politically activist Shia movement across the region in a Shia theocracy 
in a nation-state. There was a vast intellectual history behind the religio-political 
movement leading to the Islamic Revolution in Iran, spearheaded by Shia clerics in 
traditional Shia hawzas of Iraq and Iran, lay intellectuals, Shia political actors, and 
activists. This political and intellectual background not only shaped Iran’s mode of 
existence after the revolution, but also its mode of interaction with the greater political 
movement it came from. Religion thus stood out as a multifaceted concept in Iran’s 
foreign policy towards the Middle East, impacting the various facets of foreign policy 
making. An analysis of Iran’s foreign policy helps us deconstruct this multifaceted 
concept and understand in what ways religion plays a role in Iran’s foreign policy. 
 
Religion as Ideology. The first facet of religion as a multifaceted concept relates 
to the ‘ideology’ aspect of religion. Research showed that the intellectual background of 
the Islamic Revolution has generated a multilayered political identity merging multiple 
intellectual and political traditions. In this respect, the revolutionary ideology of Iran 
since 1979 can be defined as a careful and innovative blend of anti-imperialism, anti-
liberal and/or Islamic modernism, revolutionary Marxism, and politically activist Shiism. 
This thesis employed the commonly used ‘Revolutionary Islamism’ in referring to this 
creative blend. This research has shown that religious ideology has played into the general 
foreign policy stance of the Islamic Republic on the questions of the international system, 
international organizations, and leadership. The ideology has also defined the Islamic 
Republic’s relevant foreign policy terminology on the enemy (kufr, bughat), the defense 
logic (jihad) and mobilization strategy (shuhada). 
 
Religion as Identity. The Islamic Republic’s ideology of ‘Revolutionary 
Islamism,’ accompanied by Shiism, became a state identity after 1979. As the analysis 
showed, revolutionary Islamism and velayet-e faqih have become a brand mark for Iran. 
This identity helped the Iranian regime to rationalize its anti-systemic and revisionist 
mode of existence during the first decade and perpetuated its self-acknowledgement as a 
‘inspirational model’ both for the Shias, who have historically been political minorities 
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in most countries across the Middle East, and for similar Sunni political movements. 
During the first decade, the Islamic Republic emerged as an inspirational model of 
‘revolution’ for the Islamic Ummah, where the regime portrayed itself as an exemplary 
model and patron of ‘Shia empowerment’ across the region. Both the Shia theocracy and 
revolutionary Islamism constituted the identity of the regime and also had strong 
ramifications on foreign policy.  
 
Religion as Shaping the Regional Ontology. As discussed in the introduction and 
the theoretical chapter of this thesis, one predominant assumption shared by all 
international relations paradigms is that the international system is based on Westphalian 
principles. In the Westphalian system, autonomous, territorially distinct, and sovereign 
states are the primary actors of the international system. The IR discipline has 
traditionally evolved as a field investigating the political, military, and economic 
interaction among these autonomous and territorially distinct political units, where 
religion was restricted to the domestic realm. Previous research has convincingly shown 
that the international and regional orders are far from such an idealized and neat 
description. The Middle East region had always been characterized by super power 
penetration following World War I, where the mandate system and artificial borders have 
traditionally complicated the question of allegiances across religious, sectarian, ethnic, 
and national lines. The transformation of the regional order since 2003 and that of 
domestic political order since 2011 only aggravated this characterization. Today, the 
Middle East region is identified by weak state institutions, where religious and sectarian 
allegiances often transcend national borders. The authority of Shia clerics and hawzas in 
Iraq, Iran, Lebanon, and Gulf countries is not restricted to national borders. Despite 
political and ideological differences, the Iranian regime is predominantly seen as a 
political patron by Shia political movements across the region. Shia clerics, the Iranian 
regime, Shia political parties, armed groups, and security institutions interact in network-
type relationships that transcend national borders across the region. The Iranian regime 
designs its foreign policy within such a regional ontology, characterized by the increased 
role of religious actors.     
 
Religion as Institution. The Islamic Republic is an Islamic state-building project. 
The religious identity, ideology, and the early internal and external experiences of the 
Islamic Republic have been gradually institutionalized over the past 40 years, thereby 
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informing the political, security, economic institutions of the Islamic Republic. In the 
foreign policy realm, religion has played the greatest role in the Islamization of security 
institutions. The experiences of the Holy Defense War and ‘export of the revolution’ have 
transformed the small revolutionary militia into a peculiar ideological army called the 
IRGC. The post-revolutionary period witnessed the evolution of the IRGC along with its 
paramilitary wing Basij as a significant economic, social, and political force over the 
Iranian regime. The IRGC-Qods Forces’ involvement in post-2003 Iraqi politics as well 
as the Syrian and Yemeni conflicts along with the Basij reflects the growing power of 
these ideological security institutions in Iran’s foreign policy.  
 
Religion as Capability and Power. It should be noted that both the IRGC and Basij 
are unconventional forces, pursuing unconventional political and military strategies in 
implementing Iran’s external policies. Both constitute the Islamic Republic’s 
unconventional capabilities. During the first decade of the revolution, a primary role of 
the IRGC was the mobilization of ideologically like-minded Shiites in relevant countries. 
Shia narratives of Karbala, martyrdom, and sacrifice played a crucial role in boosting the 
mobilization process. The same mobilization strategy is underway since 2003. The 
research has shown that the IRGC and the Basij have mobilized the Shias in Iraq and 
Syria and contributed to the establishment of security institutions organizationally 
modelled on the Iranian security forces. The Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei’s 
speeches, the IRGC commanders’ own accounts and the foreign policy experts’ accounts 
interviewed for this research all converge on the idea that the IRGC and Basij model is a 
significant source of power for Iran. Both constitute the hard power capabilities of Iran , 
albeit in an unconventional manner. Nevertheless, both the primary and secondary data 
sources show that the Iranian foreign policy makers see this capability as an inalienable 
and integral asset for Iran’s foreign policy. 
 
Religion as Shaping the Foreign Policy Interests and Objectives. Finally, the 
research has shown that revolutionary Islamist ideology and the Shia identity have 
determined Iran’s self-ascribed transnational duties, interests, and objectives. Iran’s 
central self-ascribed transnational role is being the patron of the Islamic Ummah and of 
Islamic independence movements in the region. The Islamic Republic’s transnational 
interests and objectives thus include protecting the Muslim community against the 
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regional policies of the ‘global arrogance,’ being an ‘inspirational model’ for other 
Islamist movements, and providing support for these movements.  
 
In short, religion matters in Iran’s foreign policy and it does so in multiple ways. 
Nevertheless, it should be noted early on that not all facets of religion matter in the same 
manner in Iran’s foreign policy across time. What is noteworthy is that most research 
analyzing Iran’s foreign policy behavior on the ideology - rationality pendulum inherently 
focus on only one area religion impacts: the foreign policy interests and objectives. If Iran 
is observed to move away from revolutionary Islamic and ideological 
principles/interests/objectives for the sake of economic and power-related 
interests/objectives, the regime’s foreign policy behavior is coded as ‘rational.’ On the 
other hand, if the regime is following the principles and transnational interests associated 
with its revolutionary Islamist identity and ideology, the foreign policy is coded as 
‘ideological.’ What this research shows us that a mere reliance on the nature of 
interests/objectives is insufficient to understand the nature of Iran’s foreign policy. We 
should instead examine the relative relevance of each facet of religion discussed above.  
 
A quick look at all six facets of religion discussed above reveals that the role of 
religion as ideology and state identity are constants. Forty years after the revolution, both 
the ideology and the identity are still the raison d’etre of the Iranian regime. The 
revolutionary Islamist ideology, with its anti-imperialistic and revolutionary components, 
the Shia identity, and velayet-e faqih have remained to be relevant across time. Despite 
relative changes in the foreign policy behavior, the key foreign policy discourses and 
terminology associated with the state ideology and identity are still there as well. As a 
matter of fact, even after the historic nuclear deal was negotiated and signed and a relative 
rapprochement with the USA was achieved, the Supreme Leader and Iranian diplomats 
continued using the terms ‘global arrogance’ and ‘the Great Satan’ in referring to the 
USA. Chapter 5 on foreign policy discourses has shown that the Islamic Revolution is 
still a brand mark for Iran, where the Iranian regime still self-ascribes the role of being 
the patron, inspirational leader, and supporter of similar movements in the region. The 
‘Islamic Awakening’ and ‘resistance’ that dominated the leadership’s discourses after 
2011 are a direct reflection of this very identity and ideology. In that respect, there is an 
observable continuity in the role of religion as an identity and ideology in Iranian politics, 
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with implications on Iran’s self-ascribed roles, duties, and discourses in the foreign policy 
realm.  
 
While the identity and ideology have remained as constants, the role of religion 
as shaping the regional ontology, as institution, capability and power has not only 
remained there, but also increased tremendously over time. Ontologically, the 
transnational religious networks have never been as consolidated during the last forty 
years as today. The Iranian leadership sees the Lebanese Hezbollah as the only Iranian 
achievement in exporting the revolution. The Iranian regime could fully use the civil war 
and state weakness in Lebanon to its advantage and create a politically strong and friendly 
Shia player inside Lebanon that started to behave like an ideological army performing 
transnational military operations on its own against ideologically defined enemies such 
as Israel and ‘takfiri terrorists’ today. There is an inverse relationship between the strength 
of horizontally-organized transnational religious networks and state strength in the 
Middle East. Since the decline of the Ottoman rule in the Middle East, when nation-state 
institutions are strong, the dormant religious networks are weak. When there is a near 
state failure accompanied by foreign intervention and/or civil conflict, the dormant 
religious networks are the first to mobilize and dominate the political scene. Foreign 
intervention, civil war, the shifts in the domestic political order have led to a rapid erosion 
of state institutions and capacity in Iraq and Syria. As a result, a plethora of Sunni Islamist 
political movements, Shia clerical centers, and transnational Shia armed groups emerged 
as potential political authorities serving the political, social welfare, and security needs 
of the populations, thereby making up for the state failure in their home countries. 
Transnational religious allegiances and patron-client relationships marks the functioning 
of these networks, where some groups pay allegiance to another Islamist umbrella 
organization operating across nation-state borders, sub-state actors ally with a state patron 
other than their own, and complications abound concerning the populations’ dual 
allegiance to ethnic, religious, and sectarian authority and the nation-state authority at the 
same time. Iran’s foreign policy since 2003 corresponds to such an ontology in the region. 
The Iranian regime has capitalized on this very regional ontology, characterized by 
increased relevance of sectarian and religious identities and of Shia clerical centers. As 
Majidyar argued when interviewed, one factor that has helped Iran to mobilize the Shias 
in Lebanon in 1980s, then in Iraq after 2003, and finally in Syria after 2011 was the 
erosion of state capacity in these countries, which ‘provided the ground for Iran to come 
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and gain a foothold there.’849 In other words, the new regional ontology and systemic 
changes shaped the Iranian assertiveness in the region. This point was emphasized by 
interviewees referred to in Chapter 4, who share the proposition that the Iranian regime’s 
military activism in the region was a reaction to regional transformations.  
 
Without doubt, the external changes were not the only reason for Iranian military 
assertiveness and domestic factors were equally important. However, these domestic 
factors do not relate as much to leadership changes and domestic factional politics as to 
the increased institutionalization of Iran’s security establishment. A reality commonly-
recognized by foreign policy experts interviewed for this research is the rise of IRGC as 
an important player in Iranian politics. This peculiar Islamic army and its paramilitary 
wing Basij have become more experienced, institutionalized, and powerful since their 
initial formation as volunteer-based popular mobilization forces in 1980s. The Karbala 
narratives, discourses of shuhada, martyrdom, sacrifice associated with the IRGC’s 
mobilization strategy were already the central ingredients of the ‘Ashura culture.’ 
However, the shuhada discourse has become increasingly institutionalized by the efforts 
of Martyrs Foundation, IRGC-related media and propaganda outlets, and Basij 
themselves. Both during the mobilization of the Shiites and the reconstruction of Iraqi 
and Syrian security establishments, the IRGC and Basij were promoted as an Iranian 
security brand mark by the leadership and the IRGC.  
 
In the recent years, there is an internal concern over the increasing economic and 
political empowerment of the IRGC at home. Nevertheless, the internal politics seem to 
agree on the military empowerment of the IRGC in external operations. The Iranian 
political scene has seen three leadership changes since 2003 when Iraq was invaded: the 
reformist president Khatami, the hardliner president Ahmadinejad, and the moderate 
pragmatist president Rouhani. Despite the internal leadership change, the IRGC’s 
involvement in Iraqi and Syrian political and military affairs remained as constant. The 
Supreme Leader and the presidents have seen the IRGC as a source of power in the region 
serving the Islamic Republic’s regional interests and have supported their external 
presence despite factional concerns over the increasing economic and political power of 
the IRGC at home. This point rules out the liberalist hypothesis put forward for this 
                                                
849 Interview with Majidyar.  
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research, which argued that Iran’s religious foreign policy in the Middle East reflects the 
ongoing factional balances tipping towards regime hardliners in domestic politics. First, 
as discussed in Chapter 4, Iran’s foreign policy in the Middle East is decided by the 
Supreme Leader and implemented predominantly by the IRGC. Second, the military 
activism has remained as constant despite the presidential leadership changes and 
factional politics. Therefore, we can conclude that factional politics is not a reason for 
increased relevance of religion in Iran’s Middle East policy today.  
 
If the liberalist hypothesis is ruled out, what are the explanatory power of both 
realist and constructivist accounts in understanding the increased relevance of religion in 
Iran’s Middle East policy today? The central conclusion to be derived from this thesis is 
that certain facets of religion have become institutionalized in Iran’s foreign policy. The 
institutionalization of religion in Iran’s foreign policy has been in concordance with the 
Islamic state building since 1979. As the analysis above showed, religion has either 
remained as a constant or increasingly influential in foreign policy as ideology, identity, 
institution, capability, and power. These four domestic facets of religion have been 
increasingly institutionalized in foreign policy. Besides, religion as ontology has become 
remarkably relevant as an external factor determining Iran’s foreign policy. On the other 
hand, this research does not conclude that religious interests and objectives are constant. 
To the contrary, foreign policy interests and objectives change, are redefined, and are 
reformulated in accordance with the methodological realism of the Iranian regime, which 
carefully analyzes the historical context internally and externally, calculates the national 
interests, and determines the objectives. Merely focusing on a state’s foreign policy 
interests and objectives in terms of the role and influence of religion leaves out other 
important facets of religion discussed above. As such, it theoretically leaves us in an 
unbreakable loop running between the ideological and realist poles.   
 
In line with this, recognizing the religious aspect of Iran’s foreign policy and 
putting more effort on understanding how religion plays a role in determining the basic 
behavioral and discursive components of Iran’s Middle East policy might be scholarly 
more illuminating than questioning the real motivations behind it. There is a wide range 
of disagreement about ‘the real motivations’ of Islamic movements or sectarian divisions 
not only among outside observers paying allegiance to the ‘political’ and ‘religious’ 
dichotomy of modern secular thinking, but also among other Islamists who claim 
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monopoly over their own interpretations of divine truth. An alternative way to study this 
topic is to concentrate less on ‘real motivations’ and more on the reasons why actors frame 
their political action with religious undertones. For example, why do armed groups 
operating in Syria and Iraq, which might be a manifestation of long accumulated political 
and economic grievances, mobilize around a specific religious/sectarian ideology or 
identity, rather than any other secular ideology? Even though such groups might have 
additional motivations in mind such as gaining political and economic power, which is 
the case for many groups across the globe regardless of any political ideology they are 
entertaining, everything from their discourses to actions are religious. As long as political 
actors in the Middle East, be it state or non-state, predominantly frame their actions in a 
religious discourse today, this only proves that religion as an ideology, identity, and 
institution has a dominant role in shaping Middle Eastern politics today. We should thus 
put our efforts more into understanding the ‘whys’ and ‘hows’ of this religious trend rather 
than questioning the ‘real motivations’ behind the trend itself.  
 
Shifting our focus away from ‘real motivations’ also helps us overcome the 
ideology – rationality dichotomy and develop a more nuanced understanding of the 
religious phenomenon in Iran’s foreign policy today. A second central conclusion of this 
research is that analyzing Iran’s Middle East policy either as rational or ideological lies 
on false dichotomy. Rather, it is a neat amalgamation of rationality and ideology, and thus 
transcends the realist and constructivist hypotheses. Iran’s ‘Axis of Resistance’ policy is 
a highly relevant case to understand this and other dualities concerning religion in Iran’s 
foreign policy.      
 
 
 
6.3.  ‘The Axis of Resistance’ 
 
 
 
 As mentioned elsewhere in this research, Iran’s ‘axis of resistance’ policy 
resembles the ‘export of the revolution’ policy of the first decade on many levels. The 
Chapter 3 of this thesis has shown that the export of the revolution was a very ideological 
policy. The policy had roots in the transnational Shia political empowerment project of 
the 19th and 20th centuries, within which the Islamic Revolution and the subsequent 
revolutionary Islamist regime in Iran outgrew. One central objective of the Islamic 
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Republic after the revolution was to help similar Islamist independence movements 
culminate in a revolutionary moment and in Islamist political systems elsewhere in the 
region. Therefore, support for Islamist movements by political, diplomatic, oftentimes 
military, and Islamist propaganda means constituted the backbone of this policy.  
 
 The Islamic Republic experienced a certain level of disappointment and 
disillusionment with the export of the revolution policy during the first decade. As a 
matter of fact, no movement has culminated in a full-fledged revolution in the Middle 
East that replaced the existing un-Islamic governments with a self-reliant, independent, 
Islamic political system. Iran has remained to be the only revolutionary Islamist regime 
that has undergone a thorough Islamic state-building process in the region. Nevertheless, 
the project was not a complete failure either. The Iranian efforts to export the revolution 
has delivered Islamist political formations across the region that paid allegiance to the 
Iranian regime and adopted velayet-e faqih, if not Islamist governments. The Iranian 
regime could create the Hezbollah in Lebanon, SCIRI in Iraq, and instilled a sense of Shia 
empowerment in Gulf countries. Among these examples, the Lebanese Hezbollah can be 
described as the hallmark of this project. Although Lebanese Hezbollah has failed to 
replace the existing consociational political system with velayet-e faqih and was finally 
transformed from an anti-systemic, internationalist movement into a nationalist, Shia 
political party competing in Lebanese electoral democracy, it grew into an international 
military actor fighting against commonly defined ‘enemies’ with the Islamic Republic 
and proved to be a reliable ally to the Iranian regime. The evolution of the Hezbollah 
model was far from what the Iranian regime aspired to achieve with the export of the 
revolution policy. Nevertheless, the Qods Force’s efforts in the region had succeeded in 
creating influential and friendly allies like the Lebanese Hezbollah, SCIRI and Badr 
Brigades for the regionally isolated Iranian regime. In that sense, the export of the 
revolution was not an unrealized, but a half-realized dream and a half-completed process. 
The Iranian leadership gradually dropped the term ‘export of the revolution’ from their 
political vocabulary during 1990s and Ayatollah Khamenei very rarely used the term. 
However, in those rare moments when he used the term, he said that the Iranian has 
‘already exported the revolution,’ meaning that the Iranian regime has exported the 
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revolutionary spirit and the inspiration of political mobilization for Muslims in Palestine, 
Afghanistan, and North Africa.850         
 
As discussed in Chapter 4, some foreign policy experts interviewed for this 
research emphasized that the events of 2011 opened a window of opportunity for the 
realization of this unfinished dream for the Iranian regime. Both Iran’s foreign policy 
activities in Iraq and Syria described in Chapter 4 and the accompanying foreign policy 
discourses mapped out in Chapter 5 prove this point. Both IRGC - Qods Forces’ activities 
and the accompanying discourses were highly religious in outlook. The IRGC provided 
political support to Shia political parties in Iraq, arbitrated among different Shia factions 
for electoral success, mobilized Shia groups for armed resistance, and engaged in an 
institution-building process in the security sector in Iraq and Syria. By this way, Iran’s 
policy towards the Middle East after 2011 resembled the export of the revolution policy 
that was left unfinished after the first decade. In this respect, Interviewee 10 defined the 
‘axis of resistance’ as a term used in place of ‘the export of the revolution’ today.851 By 
looking at the religious and ideological elements, one might argue that the ‘axis of 
resistance’ has inherently religious and ideological overtones. Nevertheless, both policies 
also diverge on many fronts as well. A comparison of the ‘export of the revolution’ and 
‘axis of resistance’ can illuminate how religion plays out in each policy and thus map out 
the intricate relationship between rationality and ideology in Iran’s foreign policy today.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
850 See Khamenei, ‘Leader’s Address to Government Officials,’ http://english.khamenei.ir/news/1446/Leader-s-
Address-to-Government-Officials.  
 
851 Interview with Interviwee 10.  
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Table 2. ‘Export of the Revolution’ vs. ‘Axis of Resistance’ 
 
  
‘EXPORT OF THE 
REVOLUTION’ 
 
 
‘AXIS OF RESISTANCE’ 
 
Nature of the Iranian 
Regime 
 
• New revolutionary regime • Consolidated revolutionary regime  
 
Target Audience 
 
 
• The Islamic Ummah 
 
Against; 
 
• ‘Global arrogance,’ 
American imperialism in 
the region  
• Zionism, Israel 
 
• Ideological allies  
(Palestinian resistance and 
Lebanese Hezbollah)  
• Traditional strategic ally  
(Assad regime in Syria)  
• Shia political and armed 
movements Iraq, Syria, Yemen 
  
Against;  
 
• ‘Takfiri terrorism,’ Sunni 
jihadism 
• American presence in the region 
 
Foreign Policy Interests 
 
• Priority given to 
transnational, ideological, 
Islamic revolutionary 
interests 
• Nation-state’s interests 
serve transnational 
interests 
 
• Complementarity between nation-
state’s interests and transnational 
interests 
 
 
Foreign Policy 
Objectives 
 
 
• Politically-defined 
• Islamic state formation 
• Creating a moral order 
based on Islam and 
Islamism 
 
• Militarily and politically-defined 
• ‘Friendly regimes’ 
• Alliance-building  
 
Foreign Policy Strategy 
 
• Islamic Republic and 
velayet-e faqih as a model 
for state building 
• Exportation of the political 
model  
 
• Iran’s security system as a model 
with future political ramifications 
• Exportation of the security model 
- IRGC model 
- Basij model 
- Hezbollah model 
 
 
Role of Religion 
 
• Religion as a state 
‘identity’ and ‘ideology’ 
• Religion as a ‘power’ 
 
- Shia symbolism, Karbala 
paradigm, martyrdom for armed 
mobilization 
- IRGC and Basij unconventional 
capabilities 
- Iran’s security and strategic 
culture  
 
The Nature of Foreign 
Policy 
 
• Ideological  • Ideological and rational 
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First, the nature of the Iranian regime during the periods when each policy was 
pursued can tell us a lot about the evolution of each policy. The ‘export of the revolution’ 
should be treated predominantly as an ideological policy pursued by a new, 
inexperienced, and unconsolidated revolutionary regime. The high Islamic, moral, and 
communal principles beneath this policy reflect the revolutionary passion, fervor, and 
idealism of that period. During the early years of the regime, the policy was pursued with 
least attention to the historical and political context within which the revolutionary regime 
functioned, the capabilities at hand, and to the associated risks. Iran was following this 
policy under war circumstances, the Islamic regime was not consolidated yet, Islamic 
state-building was in process, and the regime security was already at risk. Despite such 
adverse circumstances, the idealism of the revolutionary thinking pushed the Islamic 
Republic towards such a costly policy abroad. On the other hand, by year 2011, the 
Islamic Republic was a consolidated revolutionary regime. A consolidated revolutionary 
regime should be understood as coterminous to being more experienced and more 
institutionalized. The experience of the 8-years-long war, Islamic state building, and of 
survival in a regional and international system to which it is resisting has rendered the 
Islamic Republic a very rational player in international politics. However, rationality 
should not be understood as coterminous to a move-away from ideology. The ideology 
and the identity of the revolutionary Islamic regime has remained constant. But, the 
Islamic Republic has learnt through experience to rationally evaluate the external political 
context within which it operates, to realistically evaluate its strengths, weaknesses, 
capabilities, and devise the optimal policy alternative. In other words, the consolidated 
revolutionary regime is committed to the state identity and ideology, but knows when to 
push for ideological principles and objectives and when to shy away. As one expert 
interviewed for this thesis emphasized, the Iranian regime compromises with the 
international community in the areas where it feels less powerful, but exhibits an 
ideologically assertive attitude where it feels more empowered.  
 
 This methodological rationality has been reflected on the course of the ‘axis of 
resistance’ policy after 2011. The Iranian regime carefully evaluated the regional context, 
the associated risks and opportunities during this period and determined the optimal 
solutions for each aspect of the policy. The target audience of the ‘export of the revolution’ 
policy was the Islamic Ummah. The Iranian aspiration was to unite all Muslims, both 
Sunni and Shia, against US imperialism in the region and Zionism. The Iranian regime 
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has succeeded in finding Sunni allies especially among Palestinian resistance groups. 
Nonetheless, the Iran-Saudi rivalry, some Sunni Arab regimes’ alliance with the USA, 
and the lack of reception to Islamic revolution in these regimes led Iran to reevaluate its 
position on the Sunnis. The Arab uprisings in 2011 and the rise of Islamic political parties 
in Egypt and Tunisia was a short moment of promise for Iran, where the Iranian regime 
looked hopeful about the political transformations and prospects for cooperation with 
these Sunni countries. However, the sectarian war in Syria and the rise of Sunni jihadism 
soon proved that the Sunni-Shia context after 2011 did not look any promising at all. 
Therefore, the new target audience for the ‘axis of resistance’ were the Shiites of the 
region. Iran has sought to incorporate the Shia empowerment into the already existing 
resistance movement led by Lebanese Hezbollah, the Syrian regime, and the Palestinian 
resistance against Israeli and US policies in the region. The Iranian regime both stepped 
up the Shia mobilization and legitimized its opposition to fellow Muslims in Syria and 
Iraq by the discourses of ‘takfiri terrorism’ and ‘defense of the holy shrines.’ The regime 
also added an element of anti-imperialism to the Shia mobilization by claiming that Sunni 
jihadism was supposedly supported by Western countries that wanted to divide the 
Islamic Ummah. By this way, a complementarity between the ideological pillars of the 
axis of resistance and that of Shia awakening was hoped to be achieved to a certain extent.  
 
 When it comes to the foreign policy interests and objectives pursued under the 
‘export of the revolution,’ priority was given to transnational, ideological and Islamic 
interests over the nation-state’s interests. Between 1985 and 1989, the revolutionary 
regime’s survival was given priority over the interests of the Ummah. However, the 
revolutionary regime framed the shift in priorities away from the Ummah to Iran as 
nation-state as a necessity ultimately serving the interests of the Ummah. According to 
the new foreign policy discourse, the survival of Iranian nation-state as the ‘center’ and 
the ‘leader’ of the Islamic Ummah was necessary for the long-term interests of the 
Ummah itself. The objectives of the ‘export of the revolution’ were politically defined. 
We can summarize the ultimate objective of the export as reversing the nation-state 
system, establishing a united Islamic moral and political order, and building an Islamic 
State in the region. On the other hand, the ‘axis of resistance’ policy does not look to be 
aspiring to reverse the nation-state system in the region. To the contrary, the Iranian 
leadership consistently emphasized the territorial integrity of both Iraq and Syria on 
multiple occasions. The project can be more accurately described as one of alliance-
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building in the region. The interviewees have highlighted the term ‘friendly regime’ for 
the Iraqi case. Politically, a ‘friendly regime’ refers to a Shia-dominated government in 
Iraq that is friendly to Iran’s national interests in the region. In terms of the intended 
political system, the data of Shia armed groups in Chapter 4 has shown that most pro-
Iranian groups operative across Iraq and Syria seems to pay ideological allegiance to 
Khomeini’s ideology. Nevertheless, exporting velayet-e faqih does not seem to have a 
priority over having a ‘friendly’ Shia-dominated political system in Iraq today. A similar 
case is observable in the Syrian case as well. The Iranian regime seems to be committed 
to securing the friendly Assad regime in place.  
 
 One complication concerning the ‘friendly regime’ ideal was the multivocality of 
Shia revival across the region. As repeatedly pointed out by the interviewees, no 
monotonous Shia revival exists in the region. Shia clerical authorities in Iraq, Shia 
political parties, the Lebanese Hezbollah, and the Iranian regime have diverging 
ideological positions and political aspirations regarding the role of clerical authority in 
politics, the political objectives of Shia empowerment, and the future of Iraq and Syria. 
The Iranian regime acknowledged the intra-Shia political divergences early on and 
refrained from dubbing a single political model for the movements. However, even 
though the Iranian regime did not propose a single political model to be emulated by all, 
the Shiites’ political confusions around sectarian identity on the one hand and national 
identity on the other stood as another obstacle before the Iranian policies over the Shiites 
in the region. At that very moment, a security shock changed the course of events to the 
advantage of Iran: the rise of Sunni jihadist groups and especially of ISIL in Iraq and 
Syria. Politics had divided the Shias, but suddenly security reunited them. The data on 
armed Shia mobilization presented in Chapter 4 has shown that Shia mobilization has 
remarkably gained an impetus after ISIL rose and threatened the Shia communities in 
2014. After 2014, we observe a closer military coordination and cooperation among Iran, 
the Lebanese Hezbollah, the Assad regime, and pro-Iranian Shia groups in Iraq. The 
Lebanese Hezbollah mobilized the Syrian Shiites, the pro-Iranian Shias in Iraq crossed 
the border to fight alongside the Assad regime in Syria, and the IRGC – Qods Forces 
provided the organizational and military support to the formation and development of 
Hashd al- Shaabi and Jaysh al-Shaabi. As a result, the ‘axis of resistance’ appeared more 
to be a military alliance among relevant parties than a political project by 2017.  
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 The military overtones of the ‘axis of resistance’ policy is observable in the 
strategies employed by the Iranian regime as well. As discussed extendedly in Chapter 3 
of this thesis, the Islamic revolutionary ideology and identity of the regime has assigned 
certain transnational roles to the Islamic Republic. A central self-ascribed role of Iran is 
being an inspirational model for similar Islamist political movements. During the first 
decade of the revolution, the Islamic Republic portrayed itself as a political model to be 
emulated by others. Exporting velayet-e faqih as a political model, at least to the Shia 
movements if not the Palestinian resistance groups, stood at the center of this policy. The 
analysis of Ayatollah Khamenei’s discourses on the transformations of the Middle East 
after 2003 has shown that the ‘model’ discourse is still used by both Ayatollah Khamenei 
and IRGC, albeit in multiple ways. The Iranian leadership first adopted the ‘Islamic 
Awakening’ discourse to refer to the Arab uprisings in 2011. The Islamic Awakening was 
a political project, referred to Iran’s own experience to make a revolution and establish 
an Islamist government, and hence reflected the Iranian expectations that the Arab 
uprisings would follow the same political course. Therefore, the Islamic Republic 
presented itself as a government of Islamic Awakening and as a ‘model’ of Islamic 
Awakening with its forty years of experience in Islamic state-building. However, the 
Iranian regime had already given up the hope on Islamic Awakening by 2014, both due 
to the failure of Arab uprisings across the Middle East as well its final decision to support 
the authoritarian Assad regime as opposed to those very Islamic movements challenging 
the Assad regime in Syria. The discourse of ‘resistance’ replaced ‘Islamic Awakening’ in 
the later periods. Although ‘resistance’ has political connotations and refers to the Iranian 
resistance against imperialism during the revolution and although Iran portrayed itself as 
‘a government’ of resistance,’ the term has also strong military connotations which have 
been gradually highlighted after 2014.  
 
 When the ‘axis of resistance’ alliance acquired more military overtones, there was 
a gradual transition in the Islamic Republic’s discourses from the Islamic Republic as ‘a 
political model’ to the Islamic Republic’s security institutions as ‘a security model.’ The 
IRGC statements repeatedly pointed out to the IRGC and Basij as a ‘military school,’ ‘a 
security thinking,’ and ‘a security model’ shaping the Shia armed mobilization, Hashd al-
Shaabi, and Jaysh al-Shaabi in the region. Several experts interviewed for this research 
have brought up this point as well, especially within the context of discussions regarding 
the future evolution of Shia mobilization in the region. Accordingly, three models are put 
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forward: the IRGC model, the Basij model, and the Hezbollah model. Differentiating 
these models from one another is not easy task. On a very general level though, the Basij 
model proposes that the Shia armed groups and formations like Hashd al-Shaabi might 
remain as paramilitary forces institutionally integrated into the Iraqi security apparatus 
after the ISIL threat is eliminated. The IRGC model means the evolution of the forces 
from a paramilitary force institutionally integrated into the Iraqi security apparatus to a 
social and economic actor responsible for the reconstruction of the Iraqi state following 
the end of civil war. The Hezbollahi model, on the other hand, has the most political 
connotation. This model is proposed in responding to the fact that most powerful Shia 
armed groups within Hashd al-Shaabi are either political parties in Iraqi electoral system 
or are on the way to establish their own political parties, thus resembling the Lebanese 
Hezbollah’s evolution since 1980s. The ‘export of the revolution’ aimed to establish an 
Islamic Ummah by the strategy of exporting the Iranian political model. On the other 
hand, if the Iranian regime is extending any model to the region today, it seems to be a 
security model for the moment. Nonetheless, as the discussions on the future of Shia 
mobilization suggest, this security will have important political ramifications for the 
future, impacting the evolution of the political systems in Iraq and Syria.  
 
 What about the role of religion under both policies? As discussed above, the 
‘export of the revolution’ was a very ideological foreign policy pursued by a new 
revolutionary regime. The self-assigned role and duty to support Islamist revolutionary 
movements elsewhere was an extension of the new regime’s ideology. As such, religion 
played a role as an identity and ideology for this policy. On the other hand, religion has 
become increasingly institutionalized over decades. Iran’s relations with the Lebanese 
Hezbollah, SCIRI, and several other groups in the Middle East over decades has rendered 
the regime a more experienced player on the field. Iran’s transnational networks with the 
allied Shiites have become increasingly consolidated. The IRGC and Basij have become 
increasingly institutionalized and empowered as ideological security formations. Overall, 
Iran’s unconventional forces and military strategies have become the central pillar of 
Iran’s security and strategic culture. Shia symbolism of martyrdom and sacrifice, which 
are rooted in the Ashura culture and Karbala narratives of the Shia faith, strongly 
facilitated volunteer-based popular mobilization against Islamically and ideologically 
defined opponents. The Shia symbolism has been institutionalized in the body of Basij 
and IRGC and has further institutionalized both security formations in a cyclical way. 
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Today, Ayatollah Khamenei’s speeches, IRGC statements, and policy experts interviewed 
for this research show that these ideological security formations are a source of power for 
the Islamic Republic. Ayatollah Khamenei refers to IRGC within the context of Iran’s 
‘power’ and ‘strategic depth’ in the region. He refers to revolutionary Islamist ideology 
and Islamism as a source of ‘power’ in the region as well.  
 
 By 2011 when the socio-political upheavals swept the region, the revolutionary 
ideology and the revolutionary regime’s institutions had become quite institutionalized. 
This experienced and consolidated Iranian regime did not set out with a foreign policy 
that looked very ideological, religious, and Shia-oriented without any careful 
understanding of the regional context, a review of Iran’s capabilities, and a calculation of 
associated risks and opportunities. This research has shown that religion has become an 
institutionalized foreign policy element over the past forty years. Religion has become a 
source of ‘power,’ which the Iranian regime seems to put into action when the 
circumstances are right. The objectives of the ‘axis of resistance’ policy might be both 
ideological and strategic. This leaves us with an overview of to what extent the realist and 
constructivist hypotheses explain the phenomenon at hand. 
 
It should be noted early on that both realism and constructivism have explanatory 
power over the role of religion in Iran’s ‘axis of resistance’ policy today. Nevertheless, 
neither the main findings of this research fits none of the hypotheses derived from each 
scholarship. Moreover, the main findings also challenge the basic assumptions of both 
realism and constructivism. The most important finding of this research is that religion 
has become an institutionalized source of ‘power’ for Iran over the years. The ‘power’ 
element seems to approximate the realist thinking at first sight. However, this finding 
seems to be at odds with the traditional realist thinking that puts hard power capabilities 
and conventional capabilities at the center of scholarly analysis. The realist and rationalist 
IR scholarship has traditionally measured a state’s power predominantly by looking at its 
conventional military capabilities, number of military personnel, and military technology. 
Estimates on the balance of power among nations are predominantly performed by the 
data collected in line with this traditional conceptualization of power. On the other hand, 
the power balances in the Middle East since 2003 point out to the unravelling of a 
different story for the Middle East: Power seems to be determined not by conventional 
military capabilities regional powers have at their disposal, but by their capacity to 
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mobilize religious and sectarian identities for political and military ends. Not the states 
with extensive conventional military capacities, but the ones with a distinctive capacity 
to mobilize populations along religious and sectarian lines seems to enjoy an upper hand 
in regional politics today. This is because of the shaky ground upon which the Middle 
Eastern nation-states are built on. The sectarian nature of nation-building process in the 
Middle East, state failure, and the undecided tone of prospective political orders in the 
region have featured religious and sectarian identities as important elements of regional 
politics. The type of Islamist political ideology each nation aspires to promote and 
sectarian identities characterize the formation of political alliances in the region. As such, 
religion and sectarian identities, and not conventional military capabilities, shape the 
balance of power. As for Iran, both primary and secondary sources prove that the Iranian 
strategy of mobilizing the Shiites by forging state-to-sub-state level relations has shifted 
the regional balance of power in favor of Iran in the recent years. If Iran aspires to become 
a regional leader in the Middle East, as most analysts point out, the strategy that pays off 
is not pushing forward the Iranian Artesh on the field or even strengthening Iran’s nuclear 
capacity. The religious strategy, the reliance on religious identity, institutions, 
mobilization pays off for greater influence in the region. In that sense, the Iranian use of 
religion is based on very realistic and rationalist grounds.  
 
Besides realism’s traditional understanding of ‘power,’ the Iranian strategy of 
state-to-sub-state strategy fails to match the realist assumption that states are the primary 
actors of international politics. Politics is not among nations in the Middle East today, but 
among national, sub-national, and trans-national entities. Trying to understand 
transnational power politics, to gauge alliance patterns, and to ruminate over prospective 
political orders in the post-2003 Middle East with a single focus on nation-states leaves 
out the reality of the transnational political setting in the region. Finally, the realist 
hypothesis says that religion is used by Iran as a functional tool, which implies that 
religion is employed by the regime as an instrument for a greater material gain in regional 
politics. However, religion is not a functional tool in Iran’s foreign policy; it is an element 
of institutionalized foreign policy. As the historical analysis, interviews, and policy elites’ 
discourses have shown, religion is an integral part of Iran’s theocratic system, self-
identification, grand ideological vision, institutional structure, and finally security 
culture. As such, religion is not a tool, but an institution of the consolidated Islamist 
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revolutionary regime in Iran. The Islamic Republic sees institutionalized religion as a 
distinctive asset and source of power to rely on in devising its Middle East strategy. 
 
Constructivism has more room to explain the role of religion in Iran’s ‘axis of 
resistance’ policy without challenging the basic assumptions of this scholarship. First, 
constructivism better captures the reality of the regional interaction context within which 
regional players operate. Accordingly, transnational Shia networks of national, sub-
national, and trans-national actors whose political allegiances and activities surpass that 
national borders define the interaction context in the region today. The relevance of 
multiple forms of actors in the system is quite telling about the presumed reality of 
Westphalian order in the Middle East. To the contrary, this research has shown that weak 
state structures, transnational sectarian allegiances, and the centrality of non-state actors 
in the Middle East challenge the Westphalian assumption inherent in all IR paradigms. 
The ‘axis of resistance’ is a military alliance among various forms of Shia political actors 
today, but this alliance has the capacity and potential to turn into a transnational security 
and/or political order in the future if the existing circumstances are maintained. The dual 
nature of Lebanese Hezbollah both as an ideological and unconventional army with 
extended military operations on extra-Lebanese territories and as a religious-nationalist 
political party functioning in the Lebanese electoral system is quite predictive over the 
possible transformation of Iraqi and Syrian Shia militias and formations like Hashd al-
Shaabi in the coming years. As new forms of political players with such dual – national 
and transnational - natures emerge, so does a new transnational political and security 
order in the Middle East.  
 
Finally, the main findings of this research are partially compatible with the 
constructivist hypothesis that Iran’s Islamist revolutionary ideology leads to an 
ideological and religious foreign policy in the Middle East. The elite interviews as well 
as discourse analysis prove that the revolutionary ideology and transnational religious 
interests are important to the main contractors of Iran’s Middle East policy – the Supreme 
Leader and the IRGC. Nevertheless, the same interviews and discourse analysis have also 
proved that ideology is not a binary opposite to rationality in the minds of Iran’s political 
elites. Revolutionary religious ideology is rationality, power, and strategic depth in the 
Iranian political elites’ mind, which rules out any monopoly of constructivist hypothesis 
in explaining Iran’s ‘axis of resistance’ policy today. In conclusion, neither the 
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constructivist hypothesis that puts religious ideology at the center, nor the realist 
hypothesis that merely sees religion as a tool is sufficient to explain the institutionalized 
role of religion in Iran’s foreign policy. Whether the central policy objective is 
ideologically or rationally defined, religion is there as an institutionalized foreign policy 
element and a source of power for Iran. 
 
 
 
6.4.  Acknowledgement of Limitations and Further Research 
 
 
 
One of the best descriptions that fit the Islamic Republic’s capital city of Tehran 
is probably ‘the city of martyrs.’ The buildings are decorated with paintings of Holy War 
martyrs. The streets are named after key revolutionaries who were killed in Haft-e Tir 
bombings. It is not uncommon to see a conference hall named after Shahid Chamran in 
one of the biggest universities of Tehran. Revolution, war, and martyrdom are ordinary 
themes of the city easily capturing an ordinary visitor’s attention in an ordinary public 
space in Tehran. However, the war tanks, weapons, and soldiers’ photographs that 
decorated the most crowded Park Laleh of Tehran in September 2016 were not ordinary. 
They were there for a particular occasion. Iranians were preparing for a week-long 
national event that commemorated the 28th anniversary of the end of Holy Defense War. 
Public ceremonies were organized for a week, where participants read war poems, 
soldiers narrated war stories and actors held theatre plays illustrating and extolling the 
heroism, sacrifice and victory of Iranian soldiers that volunteered on the frontlines. After 
one of those plays was over on a September night in Park Laleh, the organizer of the event 
took up the microphone, commemorated the heroes of the Holy Defense War who 
sacrificed themselves for resistance, and finally changed the topic to the heroism of 
another person that volunteered for another purpose, at another place, and another time. 
He was referring to a volunteer who had set out for Syria to defend the sacred Shia shrine 
of Sayyeda Zainab, got wounded during the conflict, and came back to Iran. Reportedly, 
he was ready to go back to Syria once fully recovered. The speaker closed the event with 
a long speech on Shia volunteers leaving their homes and families all around the world 
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to defend the holy Shia shrines in Syria. The audience shared the speaker’s sympathy and 
accompanied with prayers for those volunteers.852  
 
Approximately one and a half year after these commemorations, on December 28 
of 2017, Iranians took to the streets chanting anti-governmental and anti-regime slogans. 
Besides slogans addressing the economic problems in the country, some people were also 
protesting the Iranian policy in the region. In contrast to the audience’s prayers for the 
Iranian volunteers defending the Shia sites outside the country the previous year, some 
people were now chanting ‘No to Gaza, no to Lebanon, I sacrifice my life only for Iran!’ 
and ‘Forget about Syria, think about us!’ The timing of the protests was not ordinary, as 
the protests came during the yearly budgetary discussions in Iran. In the new budget, 
Hassan Rouhani government was intending to cut state subsidies introduced by 
Ahmadinejad government as part of his populist economic policies and to increase taxes 
on basic commodities and services, all of which would have a direct impact on the living 
conditions in Iran. Nevertheless, what pushed the protestors to the streets was not only 
the budget cuts, but also what the budget cuts were intended for. Unlike his predecessors, 
president Rouhani had decided to openly announce the proposed budgetary allocations to 
each state institution under the principles of transparency and accountability. For the first 
time, Iranians were learning about the budget allocated for Shia hawza activities, Shia 
clerics, religious state institutions, and religio-ideological foundations.  
 
As a matter of fact, billions of Iranian Tomans were being spent on the activities 
of Shia religious education complexes, welfare services for Shia clerics, the regime’s 
propaganda apparatus, Shia research centers, and the regime’s Shia-oriented educational 
and cultural activities in foreign countries. The allocated budget for Al-Mustafa 
University, which was tasked with training foreigners inside and outside the country in 
Iran’s revolutionary ideology and with promoting Shiism was far beyond the budget 
allocated for Iran’s leading research universities. Besides state institutions, the budget 
proposal revealed the high volumes of monetary allocations to the bonyads, i.e. the 
foundations. The budgetary allocations to some religious, educational, and cultural 
bonyads owned by the leading clerics of Qom hawza such as Grand Ayatollah Makarem 
Shirazi and Hassan Khomeini and committed to promoting Shiism, Iranian culture, and 
                                                
852 This anecdote is based on the author’s field observations in 2016, in Tehran, Iran. 
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language at home and abroad surpassed that of several state institutions. Added to that 
was the tremendous budgetary increase for the IRGC and the Artesh.853    
 
 The budgetary revelations of December 2017 showed that the Islamic Republic is 
not cutting back on ideology. To the contrary, the regime is making significant 
investments to Shia hawza activities, the Shia clerical institutions, and the regime’s 
ideological, cultural, and religious promotion activities. As a matter of fact, the Shia 
clergy in Iran has become a social class, the Shia hawzas have increased their socio-
economic power, and religious institutions and bonyads have become more influential 
over time. Moreover, their power and influence is not limited to the domestic realm, but 
it surpasses the borders through networking with other hawzas and their activities in other 
countries. We should therefore read the institutionalization of religion in Iran’s foreign 
policy as part of a greater institutionalization of religion process and the rise of clerical 
class in Iran since the Revolution. This study focused on how religion impacted the 
Iranian strategy in Iraq and Syria on the political and military realm. However, the 
political and military activities of the IRGC have long been accompanied by the ‘soft 
power’ activities of the Islamic Republic in both countries as well. The hawza connections 
between Qom, Najaf, and Karbala, the welfare support of very influential bonyads 
operating in Shia-populated regions such as Imam Khomeini Relief Foundation, and the 
establishment of Islamic Azad University branches in Iraq and Syria are only a few 
elements constituting the ‘soft power’ capacity of the Islamic Regime in Iraq and Syria. 
Future research focusing on how religion plays a role in soft power projection of Iran 
over ‘axis of resistance’ countries will further illuminate the nature of Iranian foreign 
policy activities in the Middle East. 
 
 A second limitation of this study is that it examines the ‘axis of resistance’ 
phenomenon from a single perspective. This study is originally intended as a study on 
Iran’s foreign policy in the Middle East and therefore, it presents an understanding of the 
‘axis of resistance’ from an Iranian foreign policy perspective. It should be acknowledged 
that the ‘axis of resistance’ is a multifaceted and extensive phenomenon with multiple 
players. As such, this is a study on Iranian foreign policy that may sometimes say too 
much without intending to do so on behalf of other players. This study is only based on 
                                                
853 See Ezgi Uzun, ‘İran’ın Öfkesi Neden Hizipler Üstüydü,’ Gazete Duvar, January 26, 2018, 
https://www.gazeteduvar.com.tr/forum/2018/01/26/iran-protestolarinda-tabanin-ofkesini-anlamak/. 
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field trips conducted in Iran. Ideally, a field research in Iraq and Syria would greatly 
complement the study. However, the security complications in both countries and the 
nature of the phenomenon studied being related to non-state actors eliminated the 
prospects for field research in both countries for this research early on. Most data on Shia 
mobilization in Iraq and Syria has been derived from English and Persian sources. An 
alternative, probably more credible and detailed, data source would be Arabic sources, 
which was also eliminated from the very beginning of this research due to language 
barriers. Future research should thus study the axis of resistance from Iraqi, Syrian, 
Hezbollahi, and even Yemeni perspectives to fully understand the phenomenon that 
impacts the today and tomorrow of the region.    
 
Another methodological limitation concerns the interviews. Given the 
geographical and thematic division of labor in foreign policy between the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs on the one hand the IRGC and the Supreme Leader on another, ‘axis of 
resistance’ falls within the domain of the Supreme Leader and the IRGC. However, the 
experts interviewed for this study are predominantly representing the more pragmatist 
and rational Foreign Ministry school. The IRGC and the clerical establishment are 
inaccessible to most foreign policy researchers, which prevented any meeting with them 
for the purposes of this study. Nevertheless, this limitation has been sought to be 
compensated by a thorough analysis of these actors’ discourses on foreign policy. Finally, 
the greatest limitation of the study is that the ‘axis of resistance’ is a very recent 
phenomenon and still in progress. Although it traces the current phenomenon back to 
2003, the study predominantly focuses on a 6-year period between 2011 and 2017. Due 
to its topicality, the ‘axis of resistance’ is extremely susceptible to be disturbed by another 
systemic shock, which does not look improbable given the history of the region. This 
makes it difficult to make sound predictions over the evolution of this phenomenon and 
draw policy implications in the short-term.  
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Interviewee 1, interview 1. Researcher speciliazed on Islamic political thought and the 
intellectual history of the Islamic Revolution at the Center for Islamic Research, 
in Tehran, Iran. Interview with the author, conducted on August 22, 2015 at Shahid 
Behesthi University, Tehran, Iran.  
 
Interviewee 1, interview 2. Researcher speciliazed on Islamic political thought and the 
intellectual history of the Islamic Revolution at the Center for Islamic Research, 
in Tehran, Iran. Interview with the author, conducted on August 14, 2016 at Park 
Sayee, Tehran, Iran. 
  
Interviewee 2, interview 1. Iranian researcher on foreign policy, Turkish-Iranian relations, 
and regional affairs at Center for Strategic Research, Tehran, Iran. Interview 
conducted in September 2015 at Park Mellat, Tehran, Iran.  
 
Interviewee 2, interview 2.  Researcher on foreign policy, Turkish-Iranian relations, and 
regional affairs at Center for Strategic Research, Tehran, Iran. Interview 2 with 
the author, conducted on July 22, 2016, at Park Laleh, Tehran, Iran. 
 
Interviewee 3. Senior foreign policy expert specialized on Iran’s relations with the West 
and nuclear diplomacy at Center for Middle East Strategic Studies. Interview with 
the author, conducted on September 1, 2015 at Center for Middle East Strategic 
Studies, Tehran, IranIran.  
 
Interviewee 4, interview 1. Expert on Iranian foreign policy specialized on relations with 
the Middle East at Center for Strategic Research and professor of international 
relations at Shahid Beheshti University, Tehran, Iran. Interview with the author, 
conducted on August 14, 2016 at Center for Strategic Research, Tehran, Iran.  
 
Interviewee 4, interview 2. Expert on Iranian foreign policy specialized on relations with 
the Middle East at Center for Strategic Research and professor of international 
relations at Shahid Beheshti University, Tehran, Iran. Interview with the author, 
conducted on September 13, 2016 at Regional Studies Institute, Shahid Beheshti 
University, Tehran, Iran.    
 
Interviewee 5. Expert on Iraqi politics at Center for Strategic Research. Interview with 
the author, conducted on September 10, 2016 at Farhangsara Niavaran, Tehran, 
Iran. 
 
Interviewee 6. Professor of international relations at Shahid Beheshti University, Tehran, 
Iran. Interview conducted on September 13, 2016 at Regional Studies Institute, 
Shahid Beheshti University, Tehran, Iran.    
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Iran. Interview with the author, conducted on September 13, 2016 at Regional 
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Interviewee 8. Professor of international relations at Tarbiat Modarres University and 
expert on international relations and political economy at Center for Strategic 
Research. Interview conducted on September 16, 2016 at Tarbiat Modarres 
University in Tehran, Iran.  
 
Interviewee 9. Turkish diplomat in Erbil, Iraq. Skype interview with the author conducted 
on May 21, 2017. 
 
Interviewee 10. Turkish professor of international relations specialized on Iranian security 
establishment. Meeting with the author on April 6, 2018 in Ankara. 
 
Dehghan, Mostafa. Journalist at ANA News Agency of Iran. Interview with the author, 
conducted on September 5, 2015 at ANA News Agency, Tehran, Iran. 
 
Göksedef, Ece. Journalist at TRT World and formerly at Aljazeera Turk. Skype interview 
with the author conducted on June 13, 2017.   
 
Khalaji, Abbas. Former professor of international relations and Iranian foreign policy at 
Imam Hossein University. Interview with the author conducted on August 4, 2016 
at Tehran International Exhibition, Tehran, Iran. 
 
Majidyar, Ahmad. Expert on Iranian domestic and foreign policy at Middle East Institute, 
Washington DC, USA. Interview with the author conducted on November 20, 
2017 at Middle East Institute, Washington DC, USA.   
 
Malaek, Hossein. Former ambassador of the Islamic Republic of Iran to China, a senior 
foreign policy and international relations expert and head of the foreign policy 
unit at Center for Strategic Research in Tehran, Iran. Interview with the author 
conducted on August 14, 2016 at Center for Strategic Research, Tehran, Iran.    
 
Saghafi-Ameri, Nasser. Former senior Iranian diplomat and former foreign policy expert 
specialized on Iran’s relations with the West, nuclear proliferation, and 
international security at Center for Strategic Research. Interview with the author 
conducted on August 22, 2015 at Center for Strategic Research, Tehran, Iran. 
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APPENDIX B 
 
 
LIST OF INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
 
 
• How does Iranian foreign policy decision-making mechanism function?  
 
• What institutions and actors are responsible for Iran’s foreign policy in the Middle East? 
 
• What are the similarities and differences between the foreign policy orientation of the 
Office of the Supreme Leader and that of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Iran? 
 
• How can you describe the Islamic Republic’s state identity? What are its key 
components?  
 
• How can you describe the Islamic Republic’s state ideology? What are its key 
components? 
 
• How does the Islamic Republic’s ideology factor into Iran’s foreign policy? 
 
• What role does Shiism and/or Shia identity play in Iran’s foreign policy orientation? 
 
• How does the Shia culture play a role in the evolution of Iran’s security/military 
approaches?  
 
• Academic literature on Iran’s foreign policy predominantly suggest that there is a 
constant shift between ideology and pragmatism in Iran’s foreign policy. What are the 
possible sources of that presumed shift? 
 
• How did the Islamic Republic receive Arab Uprisings in 2011?  
 
• How can you describe Iran’s foreign policy strategy on Iraq and Syria today? 
 
• Why does the Islamic Republic of Iran engage extensively on a political and military level 
in Iraq since 2003 and Syria since 2011? Do ideological or material concerns play out 
in Iran’s decision to engage? 
 
• Why does the Iranian regime pursue an ideological and religious foreign policy in Iraq 
and Syria today?  
 
• What historical experiences inform the Islamic Republic’s political elites’ foreign policy 
decisions on Iraq after 2003 and Syria after 2011? 
 
• How can you describe Iran’s threat perceptions, national security interests, and foreign 
policy priorities in the post-2003 Middle East?  
 
• What are the associated risks and opportunities for the Iranian regime in the Middle East 
given the transformations of the region since 2003?  
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• How can you describe Iranian influence over Iraq since 2003? What are possible areas 
of influence?  
 
• What are the opportunities and limitations of the influence of a common Shia identity 
concerning the Iranian influence over Iraq? 
 
• What kinds of support does the Iranian regime provide to Shia political parties and militia 
formations in Iraq? 
 
• What are some of the prominent pro-Iranian Shia political actors in Iraq? 
 
• How can you describe the Islamic Republic’s reaction to the claims over a rising ‘Shiite 
Crescent’ as dubbed by other players in the region? 
 
• In there a ‘Shiite Crescent’ in the region? 
 
• How are the relations between Najaf and Karbala hawzas in Iraq and Qom hawza in Iran 
in the post-2003 period? 
 
• How can you describe the Shia clerical relations between Iran’s Qom hawza and Iraq’s 
Najaf? 
 
• How does the theological divide between Najaf and Qom hawzas on the political role of 
clerics and velayet-e faqih reflect on the Shia empowerment across the region? 
 
• What can you say about the role of Iranian security institutions like IRGC and Basij in 
Iraq and Syria? 
 
• Both IRGC and Basij media sources claim that formations like Hashd al-Shaabi and 
Jaysh al-Shaabi are modelled upon Iranian Basij. What does it mean for these formations 
to be modelled upon Iranian Basij? What can we say about the organizational and 
ideological aspects of such a ‘model’? 
 
• What does the term ‘resistance’ mean in the Islamic Republic’s political discourse? What 
does the ‘culture of resistance’ refer to? 
 
• What does ‘axis of resistance’ mean? How can we describe the content and referents of 
this concept? 
 
• My survey of IRGC and Basij media sources show that both the content and referents of 
the ‘axis of resistance’ concept has changed through decades. How have the post-2003 
regional transformations reflected on ‘the axis of resistance’ concept? 
 
• What motivates Iranian-Afghan militia formations such as Liwa Fatimiyyoun and Iranian 
Basiji to go fight in Syria? Material or ideological concerns? 
 
• How does the recruitment to Liwa Fatimiyyuon and Iranian Basij occur in Iran? Who 
runs the recruitment process?  
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• Compared to other regional players, the Islamic Republic seems to have an immense 
mobilization capacity over populations in the region. What are the sources of Iran’s 
mobilization capacity?  
 
• What do you think about the future evolution of security formations like Hashd al-Shaabi 
and Jaysh al-Shaabi in Iraq and Syria? 
 
• What are the possible implications of Shia mobilization in Iraq and Syria as well new 
organizational formations such as Hashd al-Shaabi and Jaysh al-Shaabi on the future of 
the Middle East region? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
